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ABSTRACT 
 
 My dissertation is a study of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia. In the last forty to 
fifty years, there has been a reconsideration of the place of the indigenous peoples in the 
traditional narrative of Bolivian historiography. Previously, the place of indigenous 
peoples in the political imaginary of the colonial Andes and Republican Bolivia had 
been relegated to a mythical space which served the teleological and ideological 
discourses of its political elites, and excluded the voice of the indigenous from its 
narrative production. Emergent indigeneity is the recovery of this voice, where 
indigenous claims have been given an unprecedented visibility in the public sphere, in a 
process which has entailed a re-reading of the place of the indigenous in the country. By 
analyzing the work of a number of writers involved in this process of emergent 
indigeneity in Bolivia, this study proposes to approach critically the way this has taken 
place, from the late 1960s up until the present.  
The term emergent indigeneity has been used in the field of Indigenous Studies to 
refer to the recent visibility of claims to indigeneity in the global public sphere. In the 
findings of my dissertation, I show that the current political process in Bolivia can only 
be understood from a framework which accounts for the global nature of this 
phenomenon. Three observations in particular contribute to providing a precise 
conceptual framework for the term emergent indigeneity that can help us to understand 
the current process better. Firstly, my findings show the specific way that ethnicity is 
constructed in this process. I show emergent indigeneity to be a specific type of 
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production, and therefore also argue that its political effects cannot be reduced to 
questions of ethnicity. Secondly, the study provides us with a critical approach to history 
through which it becomes possible to better understand the characteristics of Western 
political modernity. Finally, I argue that emergent indigeneity must be considered a part 
of the dynamics of world modernity and the way in which it is changing the current 
conditions of political life.  
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CHAPTER I                                                                                              
INTRODUCTION: EMERGENT INDIGENEITY AND THE NEW STAGE OF 
HISTORY 
 
On December 18 2005, presidential candidate Evo Morales won the General 
Elections in Bolivia with an enormous 54% of the votes, the largest majority vote in 
recent Bolivian history. His party, the MAS or Movement Towards Socialism 
(Movimiento al Socialismo), which had grown out of grassroots movements in 
opposition to the neoliberal policies of the previous governments and boasted strong 
indigenous representation, was voted to parliament, also with a majority vote. Evo 
Morales was the first indigenous president of a country where, according to the 2002 
census, 64% of the population identified as indigenous.1 His election was hailed by the 
supporters of the MAS as a victory for popular sectors in Bolivia, but above all for its 
indigenous peoples. It appeared during those years as the promise of indigenous 
emancipation, finally, after so many years of anti-colonial struggle. Morales, in his 
                                                
1 There has been recent controversy over those statistics in light of the fact that, according to the 2013 
census, this number is actually only 41%. This matters little for my study, where 41% would still represent 
a very large proportion of the population, but it nevertheless begs the question as to why I am not using the 
most up-to-date data. As the reader can probably imagine, however, it is not that 20% of the indigenous 
population disappeared or de-indigenized themselves during this time. It is much more a matter of the way 
in which the census has been carried out. The debates over how the questions have been asked and how to 
interpret the meaning of this change in responses have been very interesting. One can refer to Xavier 
Albó’s column in La razón, where he himself provides an explanation (see Albó 2013, “Preguntas étnico-
lingüístas” and “¿Cuántos indígenas hay en el país?”). However, for the sake of my study, which would 
rather avoid the question of who ‘is’ and ‘isn’t’ really indigenous, it is simply important that a large 
proportion of the population identify in one way or another with an originary people or nation. That Evo 
Morales was the first indigenous person to ever be elected as a president is therefore illustrative in some 
way of the importance of ethnic divisions in the political sphere in Bolivia.  
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inaugural presidential speech on January 22, 2006, expressed this sentiment in the 
following way:  
We are here to say enough with resistance. From 500 years of resistance 
to 500 years of holding power, indigenous, workers, all sectors, to bring 
an end to that injustice, to bring an end to that inequality, to bring an end 
above all to the discrimination, the oppression, to which we have been 
submitted as Aymaras, Quechuas, Guaranies. (“Los discursos de Evo”, 
Página 12)2  
 
 The anti-colonial struggles of the indigenous peoples have finally come to an 
end. This at least appeared to be the message that Evo Morales gave to his own election. 
The election of Morales arrived to the scene of Bolivian politics as the fulfillment of a 
certain promise — or at least as the possibility that a certain promise would be fulfilled. 
An elusive promise of indigenous emancipation. Evo Morales called it a cultural-
democratic revolution (ibid..). Yet he is often also seen employing the Aymara term 
pachakuti in public discourses, which refers to the turning upside-down of space and 
time. The final victory of the indigenous peoples after 500 years of colonialism would be 
the turning of history onto its head. Evo Morales and his followers appear to suggest that 
the Bolivian people have front row tickets to a new stage of history.  
 However, not all would be so taken in by the discourse of the new, and first, 
indigenous president. They have staged a false revolution. This would be the claim of a 
number of people on the left who had originally seen in the election of Evo Morales the 
possibility of continuing a series of transformations that had taken place between 2000 - 
                                                
2 “Estamos acá para decir basta a la resistencia. De la resistencia de 500 años a la toma del poder para 500 
años, indígenas, obreros, todos los sectores para acabar con esa injusticia, para acabar con esa desigualdad, 
para acabar sobre todo con la discriminación, opresión donde hemos sido sometidos como aymaras, 
quechuas, guaraníes.” 
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2005 in the country, but who quickly came to see in the government the same old elite 
practices that had supposedly defined the state institution for hundreds of years. 
Intellectuals that had been involved in the general excitement of the first five years of the 
twenty-first century, many of whom will be studied here, as well as a number of social 
movements, would begin to mark their distance from the MAS government and demand 
that the real spirit of the so-called proceso de cambio (Process of Change) be respected.  
 We are presented here with two interpretations of history. Evo Morales’s election 
could be either the inauguration of a pachakuti, a turning upside-down of history and the 
victory, finally, of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia after 500 years of conflict, or it is 
merely a continuity with that same colonialism it would proclaim to have defeated, the 
same colonial form under a difference guise, the staging of a false revolution. What was 
immediately at stake was a certain promise of indigenous emancipation, of a spirit of the 
revolutionary moment, and of the specters of history that had suddenly irrupted, in the 
last decades of Bolivian history, onto the political scene. The question quickly became, 
then: Can they live up to the promise of the revolutionary spirit? Will they respect the 
ghosts of our ancestors, who have been waiting for the messianic return to the 
indigenous promised land?  
 In fact, neither one nor the other of these two historical interpretations is strictly 
true. If we are witnessing today a new stage of history, and if the current political 
transformations that are taking place in Bolivia have an important connection to this new 
stage of history, it is not simply that we have moved up the ladder in the progression of 
historical stages. Neither turning upside-down, nor continuity. If the stage of history is 
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new, it is because the old stage upon which history played itself out is now obsolete. It is 
an entirely different history which is today being staged.  
 What is important about both of these two interpretations that have been made of 
the current Bolivian moment is that they both reveal a certain understanding of Bolivian 
history and its specific legacy of colonialism that would have been unthinkable only 
forty years prior to Morales’s election. This historical understanding is based on a 
particular re-reading of the place of indigeneity in the national historical canon. What I 
am calling a new stage of history, therefore, which is neither a turning upside-down nor 
a simple continuity of history, does not begin with the election of Evo Morales to 
government. It does not even begin with the social mobilizations that took place between 
2000 - 2005 which brought him to power although, arguably, these developments 
represent a certain threshold of no return. Yet neither should we be tempted to imagine 
that, conversely, this ‘beginning’ should find its genesis in the pre-Columbian 
civilizations from which the indigenous peoples themselves supposedly descend, as if 
those civilizations had sown the seed so many thousands of years ago for an inevitable 
and necessary historical process that has, finally, come to fruition. What made it possible 
for Evo Morales, in 2005, to proclaim the end of a 500-year colonial struggle, and for 
others to decry its continuity, was precisely this particular re-reading of the place of 
indigeneity in national public life. A re-reading that had only been taking place, in 
Bolivia, since the late 1960s.  
 The re-reading of the place of indigeneity in Bolivian history takes place on a 
new stage of history. What is clear is that the current political transformations that are 
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taking place today in Bolivia and the centrality of its indigenous peoples to this process 
cannot be considered separately from transformations of a global nature which have 
produced similar political processes in other countries. Indeed, the second half of the 
twentieth century has borne witness to the increased visibility in the public sphere of 
political claims made in the name of indigeneity on a global scale among numerous 
postcolonial nations. In the field of Indigenous Studies, the term “emergent indigeneity” 
has been employed to describe this contemporary phenomenon. It has been used as an 
explicative and analytical tool, as a description of a reality and as a concept, across 
numerous cases of study and for the Andes in particular.3 My dissertation attempts to 
offer a study of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia.  
 In this introduction, therefore, I will provide the general bearings for a 
consideration of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia, from the perspective that we are 
witnessing an entirely new phenomenon which is conditioned by and operates within 
this new stage of history. This is also to say, subsequently, that an analysis of its features 
may be able to help us better appreciate the specificity of our current moment, of the 
particularity of Bolivian emergent indigeneity itself in comparison to other post-national 
processes, as well as to understand what it means today to say that history, or at least a 
certain history, that is, Western modernity as history, is living its own metamorphosis.  
 My exposition of the argument will proceed in the following manner. First of all, 
I will provide a brief history of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia. This will require 
                                                
3 Refer to José Bengoa (1990), the special edition on emergent indigeneity published in Cultural 
Anthropology (2010) and the 2013 publication The Politics of Indigeneity:Emerging Indigeneity (ed. 
Michelle Harris et al. 2013).  
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recounting the place that the indigenous have held in narrative accounts of colonial and 
post-colonial imaginaries of the Andes, and of Bolivia in particular, with a view to 
understanding how emergent indigeneity in Bolivia can be claimed to mark the first time 
that readings of national history are carried out from the perspective of indigeneity 
(which is not, in strict terms, an ethnic identity or subject). I will also show that its 
emergence is the product of a general disarticulation of the National Revolutionary state 
project of 1952, a disarticulation which can not be disassociated, in my view, from a 
more general transformation of Western political modernity. Secondly, I will provide a 
specific conceptual framework for understanding the term emergent indigeneity, which 
has been used in scholarship in a general way to refer to the politicization of the 
indigenous question in numerous postcolonial nations but has been given no precise 
definition. The definition I propose will not only offer a precise analytical tool, but will 
also support my study with a general methodological approach. This methodological 
approach will be discussed in the subsequent section of the introduction, where I will 
provide a brief overview of the chapters. Finally, I shall present the broad intellectual 
stakes of my study and provide a note on the translations that appear throughout my 
dissertation.  
 
I.1 Readings of the Indigenous: Indigenous Readings? 
 In general terms, it is possible to say that the place of the indigenous peoples in 
the historical narrative of the Latin American colonial and postcolonial imaginaries has 
involved readings of the indigenous, but these were never indigenous readings. The 
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indigenous were excluded from this production of historical meaning and became, 
instead, a symbol or metaphor which was subsumed under a teleological view of history, 
which regarded the indigenous always as somehow primitive or primordial. In the many 
juridical and theological debates that took place during the 16th century in Spain 
regarding the rights of the Spanish in the New World, and the justified treatment of the 
Indians that were now subjects of the crown, the culture of indigenous peoples was 
always considered as anachronistic or inferior in the teleological schema of the 
development of civilization according to so-called ‘natural law,’ of which Spain was, of 
course, the highest example. Ultimately, indigenous civilizations became understood as 
‘primitive’ forms of ‘superior’ civilizational models such as Spain, and this became the 
lens through which the ‘early anthropological’ work of Dominican, Franciscan and 
Jesuit friars took place.4 This naturally led to a justification of the need to ‘convert’ the 
Indians of the New World, both in a religious and political sense, as well as a need to 
‘care for’ or ‘watch over’ them, as sheep of the flock and as subjects to the crown, to 
order and administer life in the colony according to this teleological framework.  
 Bolivian independence did not greatly change this state of affairs. In fact, in 
many aspects the life of indigenous peoples was threatened to a greater extent in the new 
Republic. Firstly, the indigenous were refused full citizenship on the basis of their 
perceived lack of education, and therefore lack of the responsibility appropriate to the 
right to vote. Voting was therefore limited to those who owned land and were literate in 
Spanish. Meanwhile, if the new creole elites at times constructed a sense of their 
                                                
4 Refer to Anthony Pagden’s The Fall of Natural Man, 1982.  
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collective selfhood as a fusion between a glorious Spanish and indigenous past, this did 
not mean that the current indigenous populations were regarded as anything other than 
undesirable, backwards elements of a nation which came to have a strong liberal and 
modernizing agenda. Many of the indigenous were dispossessed of their communal 
lands throughout the years of the so-called oligarchic government (1825 - 1952) and 
their place in history continued to be subsumed to a teleological developmentalist vision 
in which indigenous ways of life were perceived to be symptoms of Bolivia’s lack of 
ability to have ‘caught up’ with the rest of the modern world. This period has therefore 
been characterized in recent literature as a Bolivian apartheid, in which the indigenous 
peoples of Bolivia held a second-class citizenship.  
 The National Revolution of 1952 took place as the result of massive social 
upheaval and resulted in a new national-popular nation-state project. In its immediate 
aftermath, a social revolution took place throughout the country, which included an 
agrarian reform that redistributed land among the indigenous-peasant sectors, and the 
expansion of universal suffrage to all its citizens. The Bolivian National Revolutionary 
process that founded this project, like other similar processes that took place during the 
early-to mid-twentieth century in Latin America, emerged following the production of a 
unified national-revolutionary subject. This unified citizenship was able to provide a 
certain level of social cohesion for the new governmental project following the National 
Revolution of 1952. This national-revolutionary subject was constructed as a mestizo or 
mixed-blood subject, and found common ground for national unification through the 
question of the nationalization of natural resources. This new subject was thus envisaged 
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as a subject of the people. It was considered that the so-called Rosca or oligarchic class 
that had owned and extracted the natural resources of the country (particularly tin) prior 
to the National Revolution represented an anti-national force, a kind of internal 
imperialism.  
 If indeed this new, revolutionary discourse managed to provide a certain level of 
recognition to indigenous-peasant groups in Bolivia, however, it was nevertheless at a 
certain cost. The indigenous peoples’ own ways of life and of managing local economies 
and societies became subsumed by a national synthesis of the people as a modern, 
mestizo nation. The 1952 government’s emphasis on development and progress as a 
unified national project effectively undermined the ability of indigenous people to find 
forms of self-determination from within the government apparatus that were compatible 
with their own forms of social, political and economic organization. The words ‘Indian’ 
and ‘indigenous’ were replaced in the official government vocabulary by that of 
‘peasant,’ and a number of union organizations were established to integrate indigenous-
peasant sectors to the state’s logic. Once again, the place of the indigenous effectively 
became relegated to a mythical space of originary national unity, always framed within a 
specifically Western history of political modernity. Meanwhile, indigenous forms of 
expression continued to have no voice in mainstream national culture.  
 New readings of the place of the indigenous in the context of this Western and 
specifically Latin American tradition, therefore, emerge in the 1960s in the folds of a 
failed and disarticulated national-popular state project. If the national-popular mestizo 
subject, as the center of gravity which held together the political articulation of National 
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Revolutionary ideology, appeared to hold some weight during the early years of the 
1952 government, its eventual fallout produced a general vacuity of meaning at the heart 
of the political and social fabric of nationhood, without any alternative articulations of 
the national community on the horizon. At the same time, the modernizing agenda of 
that government produced an unprecedented level of education among popular sectors, 
and people of indigenous-peasant backgrounds began to migrate to the cities and became 
integrated into the cultural and political life of the urban milieu, of the so-called literate 
elite. Faced with such a situation, there began to occur a re-questioning and re-reading of 
the place of the indigenous in national life, in a series of discussions which in some way 
colonized these deterritorialized spaces of national disarticulation left by the political 
vacuum of a failed national-popular project. In reterritorializing those spaces, a 
reconfiguration of the geometry of that political space took place, questioning in an 
unprecedented way both a colonial and Republican tradition of politics.  
 It must be stressed that these new narratives that would be produced concerning 
the place of the indigenous in the Bolivian historical canon, and which found themselves 
in contention with the national-popular tradition in that country, would do so from 
within the technologies of culture that had previously belonged to the ideological 
apparatuses of the national-popular state. The promoters of this new understanding of the 
place of the indigenous therefore colonized the technologies of cultural production 
which had traditionally belonged to national-popular ideology, and consequently 
transformed them from within. As a contemporary phenomenon, these discourses 
concerning the place of the indigenous people are therefore both cultural and political in 
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nature. What’s more, despite their claims to indigeneity and the clear links that its new 
actors had to traditional communal life in the countryside, this reconsideration of the 
place of the indigenous from within the Bolivian historical canon was nevertheless a 
thoroughly modern, or even post-modern, phenomenon.  
 Indeed, one of the central arguments of this study is that this reconsideration of 
the historical place of the indigenous peoples in Bolivia cannot be analyzed separately 
from the more global trends in which it is inserted. Emergent indigeneity in Bolivia  is 
partly a result of the general disarticulation of national-popular narratives that is seen not 
only in Bolivia, but throughout the Latin American continent, and is intensified from the 
1980s onwards by the onslaught of neoliberalism. In this sense, the process of re-reading 
the place of the indigenous in national life that took place from the 1960s is one which 
already operates on “the other side of the popular,” to adopt the expression that Gareth 
Williams has used to analyze post-national formations in contemporary Latin America 
(Williams 2002, 4). Williams himself identifies how such post-national formations in 
contemporary Latin America work within the ruins of a national-popular history. The 
author argues that, although these articulations remain the only ones with cultural-
symbolic power in contemporary society, they are nevertheless narratives that are 
already produced, in the post-national scenario, as radically unsatisfactory and void of 
real suturing power. They are cynical articulations, ones that continue to be produced as 
reflections and explanations of the national character but are already regarded as lies, as 
illusions, as a project that never came to fruition and without a real claim to truth. 
Williams describes the nihilism of the post-national articulation in the following manner:  
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In this sense, I examine [in The Other Side of the Popular] the emergence 
in recent years of the neoliberal order as the coming into being of a 
historical, epistemological, cultural, and political limit at which the social 
imperatives and conceptual systems of the past reveal themselves as still 
here and, indeed, still as imperatives. But they do so precisely by 
uncovering themselves as inheritances and imperatives that are no longer 
viable as such — that is, as they used to be. In the current order of global 
accumulation it is becoming increasingly obvious that words such as 
“nation,” “the people,” “development,” or “national culture” can no 
longer have the same conceptual value that they had before the advent of 
global capitalism, before the integration of Latin American economies 
into transnational configurations, before the demise of “actually existing 
socialism,” and before the emergence of the new world order. Indeed, I 
would hazard to say that this is the case precisely because the underlying 
philosophical, political, cultural and economic presuppositions that 
defined their meaning and that brought them into the field of social 
reproduction after the emergence of the Latin American nation-states in 
the nineteenth century have, for all intents and purposes, succumbed to 
the nihilisms that grounded them for decades (2002, 8 - 9). 
 
The difference in the Bolivian case when compared to other cases in Latin 
America, however (with the exception of other countries with a high indigenous 
population such as Ecuador) is that, in that country, there had existed in a more or less 
continuous way for hundreds of years a strong indigenous presence which maintained 
some level of ability to organize itself in disarticulated but nevertheless distantly 
connected social units, and which had produced a certain narrative of itself separately 
from that provided by the national-popular articulation. In the face of this now-cynical 
national-popular discourse in the fallout of the revolutionary state of 1952, from the late 
1960s onwards, such indigenous discourses found new spaces for developing an 
alternative narrative, one that cannot be called in any easy way national, but one that, 
rather than simply reproducing the national-popular myths with a cynical and nihilistic 
perspective, offered to put something else in its place. It did so by institutionalizing new 
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narratives from within the technologies of communication and ideology that formerly 
belonged to the nation-state, but that now appeared as spaces void of real political 
meaning in the collapse of a national-popular civic discourse. Emergent indigeneity 
therefore appears as one of many post-national formations, but one that questions much 
more radically the foundations of the political myths upon which the national-popular 
subject of the people was based. 
Emergent indigeneity therefore initially appears as a certain response to the 
limits of a paradigm already in decline, and as a certain promise to carry out its 
supersession. If emergent indigeneity appropriated or colonized the technologies of 
ideological production that had belonged to the national-popular state, it is clear that 
those technologies could not metabolize this new discourse without first undergoing 
some kind of metamorphosis. It thus becomes necessary to develop a framework for 
understanding emergent indigeneity that is capable of accounting for the specificity of 
both the decline of a former paradigm and the emergence of a new paradigm, while at 
the same time not losing sight of what is specific to the indigenous element of its claims, 
of its simultaneous production and unworking of ethnicity. Let us now embark upon this 
task.  
 
I.2 Emergent Indigeneity 
 José Bengoa’s publication La emergencia indígena en América Latina 
(Indigenous Emergence in Latin America, 2000), to my knowledge, is the first scholarly 
contribution to make use of the term ‘emergent indigeneity.’ It makes reference to a very 
 14 
concrete contemporary reality in which self-identified indigenous subjects are seen as 
making political demands from a state that has historically exploited their communities 
and, therefore, undermined the autonomy of these groups to live out their lives according 
to their traditions and customs. This increased indigenous participation and visibility at 
the level of the nation-state is felt in all areas of political and public life, whether in 
direct political participation, social movements, academic scholarship, labor 
organizations and/or cultural practices. The acquisition of rights in the name of 
indigeneity demands unforeseen legal recognition for these communities from the 
national and international arena alike. Bengoa calls it “a kind of reverse Conquest” (11).5  
 No precise definition of the term ‘emergent indigeneity’ is available. However, 
three characteristics provide a common framework for most contemporary scholarship 
on the subject. First of all, scholarship agrees that there is a contentious relationship 
between the discourse utilized by emerging indigenous groups and the “reality” of that 
discourse, by which I mean that these claims are regarded as more ideological or based 
on a certain way of understanding the world than they are strictly historical or accurate 
to describing current ethnic relations in the country. In so far as this is the case, 
scholarship on emergent indigeneity would appear to reject a reification of indigeneity in 
ethnic or racial terms, instead understanding its discourse as a kind of political 
positioning, in which the position that is adopted takes place in relation to hegemonic 
nation-state politics and to the Western political tradition more widely.  
                                                
5 “una suerte de Conquista al revés” 
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 Secondly, insofar as it is a political positioning with an antagonistic relation to 
traditional national politics, indigenous emergence in the Andean region provides a lens 
through which it becomes possible to critically re-read modern Bolivian historiography 
and the political tradition of modernity in the West (at least in so far as the latter has 
been the guiding principle for the projects of Republican government in the Andes). 
Mark Goodale (2006) qualifies this characteristic as the “cosmopolitical” character of 
emergent indigeneity, which concerns ways of “reclaiming the meanings and 
possibilities of Bolivia’s modernity” (634), projecting categories of belonging beyond 
the local (and, indeed, beyond the national) with a view to forging new ways of acting 
politically in the world. Marisol de la Cadena (2010), whose study has been particularly 
important for this research, argues that emergent indigeneity cannot be considered 
separately from the rupture with modern politics that it represents. This author develops 
upon Chantal Mouffe’s political philosophy (see Mouffe 2005), which argues that 
politics, in a strict sense, must be understood as that field which manages the political 
antagonism at work in society at all times, thereby making such antagonism livable and 
avoiding a situation of perpetual warfare. However, de la Cadena makes the observation 
that if this is the case, then, logically, politics is also the field that decides upon which 
concerns are strictly “political” and which can never be recognized as “political” as such 
(she calls this logic of separation “hegemonic biopower”). Indigenous claims that are 
made on the basis of paying homage to earth-beings are thereby never registered as 
properly political, but reduced to questions of cultural heritage and religious belief. De la 
Cadena, however, is interested in the strictly political dimension of such claims, and it is 
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the increased visibility of this dimension – and the necessary reconsideration of 
“politics” that it entails – that she calls emergent indigeneity. She calls this grey area of 
disputes in which indigenous claims are reduced to questions of culture and religious 
belief the “shadows of politics” (359). Emergent indigeneity, therefore, brings into 
question the assumptions which have historically grounded politics as both theory and 
practice.  
 Scholarship on emergent indigeneity is in agreement that this epochal change 
must be considered as a specifically contemporary phenomenon, thereby rejecting the 
notion that indigeneity would be a manifestation of some form of archaism that has 
survived in a more or less continuous way since pre-Columbian times. In other words, if 
it is true that the end of the national-popular paradigm in Latin America, and the 
subsequent accelerated integration of the continent into the dynamics of global capital, 
were hailed by the cheerleaders of liberalism as the long-awaited arrival of modernity, 
then – ironically – it is also precisely these changes which have made emergent 
indigeneity possible. In other words, globalization has given rise to a set of conditions 
which have fostered a kind of “indigenous consciousness” in which a politicized 
indigeneity regards itself as antagonistic to the politics of the state, supported by pan-
indigenist networks, discourses of human rights, transnational scholarly work and global 
institutions. What is crucial here is that, while the “emergence of the indigenous” in 
Latin America bears an important relationship to the nation-state (as we saw in the 
previous paragraph), the nation-state does not provide an adequate framework for 
understanding this emergence. Indeed, emergent indigeneity in this sense forms part of 
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the broader undermining of nation-state sovereignty resulting from the accelerated 
intensification of inter-global relations.  
 I propose to study this recent phenomenon of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia in 
the three dimensions identified here: firstly, as a critical approach to the production of 
ethnicity in contemporary society; secondly, as a critical intervention which exhausts the 
traditional categories of political modernity in the West; and, finally, as a specifically 
global phenomenon, understanding globalization not as a mere extension or 
intensification of Western modernization, but as a new development, qualitatively 
different from Western modernity, that is, as a ‘new stage of history.’ In fact, my aim is 
to show that these three dimensions are not separate, but intimately related to the new 
conditions of postmodernity or world-modernity which today are affecting the way we 
live our everyday lives, as much as on the capitalist center as on its periphery. Rather 
than use the term in a vague and ambiguous way to refer to these general developments 
as seen in other scholarly uses, however, I wish to provide a precise conceptual 
framework for the term which can allow us to appreciate both its ramifications for the 
tradition of Western political modernity and its operation of new political paradigms. A 
number of clarifications regarding my use of the term become necessary at this stage of 
the argumentation. 
 First of all, it should be emphasized that the term “indigeneity” does not refer 
here to a particular subject or group of subjects, continuous throughout time, which can 
be traced to a pre-Columbian heritage, whether it be in terms of blood, physiognomy, 
place of birth, culture, language, or any other distinguishing features. Indigeneity is not 
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an anthropomorphic manifestation, not a category or categorization of human beings into 
different ‘types’ of humanity. It is rather a certain place of enunciation, and a presencing 
(that is never present as such) of that place of enunciation as an act of enunciation, and 
as a condition of possibility for inscribing particular traits onto bodies which are 
thereafter considered to be (or consider themselves to be) indigenous. This place of 
enunciation is that of a ‘forgotten history’ of pre-Columbian civilization or civilizations 
that had been excluded from modern political life by apparatuses of colonialism and 
domination. This is also the ‘forgotten history’ of those forms of social organization that 
currently still exist in Bolivia, and have existed in a more or less continuous way for 
centuries, that are excluded de facto in their legitimate decision-making capacities from 
the ordering and administering of national life, a capacity which is today embodied in 
the state.   
 It should also be made clear that, by adopting the term “emergent,” it is not at all 
the intention of this study to foster the idea that indigenous communities have spent the 
last few hundred years lying dormant like volcanoes that were thought inactive, as if in 
some form of non- or pre-political animality, suddenly and unexpectedly rising to life 
once again in recent years. Nor would it be to support the notion that we are “finally” 
witnessing the integration of indigeneity into a long-awaited modernity on the Latin 
American continent. The term “emergent,” a qualifier which in this case is decisive, 
would rather indicate the increasing visibility of this indigeneity within the national and 
global public spheres and the way in which this visibility forces us to reconsider 
Bolivian politics and history – indeed, even what we understand by “the political” and 
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“the historical” as such. “Emergent” can be understood, in this sense, in strictly aesthetic 
terms. The politics of emergent indigeneity would be the way that such an emergence, 
such a making visible of indigeneity as the remnants of a colonial past that is still 
unresolved, challenge categories of political modernity, and question the nation-state’s 
distribution of political spaces and subjects, proposing alternative articulations in its 
place.  
 To use the terms of French philosopher Jacques Rancière, emergent indigeneity 
is a fiction. For Rancière, a fiction is more than an imaginary tale, it is rather “a set of 
relations between sense and sense” (“In What Time Do We Live,” 2013), in other words, 
between how the world is perceived and the meaning that is made of that perception. It 
is, as I argue in Chapter III of the dissertation, a making sense of the world. If this is the 
case, then emergent indigeneity is a fiction that makes sense of the world from a 
particular historical perspective (which is also, I must emphasize, a narrative 
construction itself): that of the indigenous peoples of the region, whose ways of life have 
been marginalized by a colonial, capitalist and modern tradition of politics. By giving 
such political currency to this fiction, however, the older fictions of political modernity 
upon which the colonial and Republican traditions in Latin America, and specifically 
Bolivia, were built, can no longer remain unchanged. This new fiction, which is a new 
making sense of the world, a process which is nevertheless internal to the ideological 
technologies of the nation and the state, necessarily transforms the “sense of the world” 
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previous to it.6 It questions the classical division of spaces and times according to the 
logic of a nation-state interpellation of the people. This disagreement7 over the way that 
times and spaces are divided in the political field, which results in a new way of 
perceiving, giving meaning to and subsequently acting within that field, is what Jacques 
Rancière calls the redistribution of the sensible.8 Insofar as this is the case, emergent 
indigeneity is a redistribution of the sensible at the heart of the Bolivian political 
tradition of modernity. 
 If emergent indigeneity is a redistribution of the sensible, however, it must 
nevertheless be considered as a redistribution of the sensible of a particular quality. If 
this is the case, it is because the redistribution of the sensible in which emergent 
indigeneity partakes is part of a general paradigmatic shift to a new stage of history, 
which is also the twilight of Western (political) modernity. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the ‘special way’ that emergent indigenity is a redistribution of the 
sensible, it is useful to compare and contrast it with a concept coined by the French 
Marxist philosopher Étienne Balibar, what the latter has called fictive ethnicity. This 
gesture is important because, if fictive ethnicity is for Balibar a certain history of the 
production of ethnicity, it is strictly a history which belongs to the formation of the 
nation-state and of the national-popular. Therefore, if we are to presume to locate a 
                                                
6 As well as drawing on Rancière, I here draw upon Jean-Luc Nancy and his The Sense of the World 
(1997) in order to understand how meaning is produced and a world is constructed and modified.  
7 The term disagreement here is used in the sense of mésentente in the work of Jacques Rancière, which is 
the dispute over the distribution of the common that is, for the author, the condition of democracy itself. 
Refer to Disagreement (1999).  
8 A redistribution of the sensible is a new way of cutting up, dividing and sharing the ‘common,’ which is 
always what is at stake in any political articulation. For a more detailed discussion, refer to Rancière 2004.  
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certain specificity of emergent indigeneity, which emerges in those deserted spaces 
which had formerly belonged to a now disarticulated national-popular project, then it 
will be useful to explore exactly how this contemporary phenomenon can be 
distinguished from the production of a national-popular people as fictive ethnicity.  
 A fictive ethnicity is, according to Balibar (“The Nation Form,” 1991), “the 
community instituted by the nation-state” (96). It is the production of the people of the 
nation as ethnicity, or as a division in the human species, where the state becomes the 
institution that would produce and institutionalize, through unified ideas of language and 
race, the “national character,” a “naturalization of belonging” and the “sublimation of 
the ideal nation,” making possible the “expression of a pre-existing unity to be seen in 
the state” (ibid.). What is at stake, for Balibar, in the essay where he proposes this 
concept, is to understand how the nation-state became the institution of political 
modernity. He conceives of the history of nations as “always already presented to us in 
the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject,” a 
“retrospective illusion” which also expresses, at the same time, “constraining 
institutional realities” (86). Part of his argument resides in the idea that what history has 
later reconstructed as the pre-history of the nation are in fact diverse and complex 
processes in which the nation-state was never an inevitable outcome. Nevertheless, 
Balibar affirms, “[the] fact remains that all these events, on condition they are repeated 
or integrated into new political structures, have effectively played a role in the genesis of 
national formations” (88). Moreover, agreeing with the generally accepted thesis that the 
formation of nation-states was made possible by the unification of society in capitalist 
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relations, he nevertheless challenges the idea that: “It is quite impossible to ‘deduce’ the 
nation form from capitalist relations of production. Monetary circulation and the 
exploitation of wage labour do not logically entail a single determinate form of the state” 
(89). Drawing from Wallerstein’s and Braudel’s studies of the world-system of 
capitalism, Balibar concludes that “national units form out of the overall structure of the 
world economy, as a function of the role they play in that structure in a given period. 
More exactly, they form against one another as competing instruments in the service of 
the core’s domination of the periphery” (89). 
More than a result of capitalist relations, therefore, the formation of nation-states 
for Balibar would rather be the mode by which a certain class became able to capture the 
ebbs and flows of a savage capitalism, control and discipline it, in a mode that would 
eventually be institutionalized in the state. The question therefore becomes how these 
class interests, embodied in the state, managed to unify the labor force dispersed 
throughout the territory that belonged to its administration. The answer resides in its 
institutionalized ideological formation. The community of a given territory of shared 
(class) interests would find ideological unification as a national people — a fictive 
ethnicity. The nation becomes the form of political modernity because it is able to 
provide a social cohesion within a given territory which will provide the conditions for 
an effective administration of capitalist accumulation. Balibar elucidates: 
It is globally necessary that control of the capital circulating in the whole 
accumulation space should be exercised from the core; but there has 
always been struggle over the form in which this concentration has been 
effected. The privileged status of the nation form derives from the fact 
that, locally, that form made it possible (at least for an entire historical 
period) for struggles between heterogeneous classes to be controlled and 
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for not only a ‘capitalist class’ but the bourgeoisies proper to emerge 
from these — state bourgeoisies both capable of political, economic and 
cultural hegemony and produced by that hegemony. (90) 
 
In Balibar’s analysis, what became necessary was a center of gravity, a Capital, 
which would become able to organize and administer capital from the center of its 
operations, and to the benefit of a particular capitalist class.9 The “simultaneous genesis 
of nationalism and cosmopolitanism” is explained by Balibar in the specific history of 
this production of nationhood in the body of the state, as a “process without subject” 
(90). The problem for Balibar, however, is to understand how this process, that 
nevertheless did not resolve, but actually radicalized, the inequalities between the center 
and periphery of capitalist relations, did not produce its own collapse. The necessary 
extinction of class conflict required by bourgeois ideology in order to reproduce itself 
created the fundamental problem, therefore, of how “how to produce the people” (93) as 
a subject of national unity, and how, moreover, such a unity could be produced in such a 
way so that, in spite of the many changes the nation-state has lived in the modern 
context, these changes would nevertheless not challenge the general shape and structure 
of that nation-state which was its center of articulation. Balibar identifies the ideological 
form of the nation-state as a production of the people: 
[Must] become an a priori condition of communication between 
individuals (the ‘citizens’) and between social groups — not by 
suppressing all differences, but by relativizing them and subordinating 
them to itself in such a way that it is the symbolic difference between 
                                                
9 This play on the difference between Capital and capital (expressed in the original French as a difference 
of gender and genre [genre], le capital and la capital, is explored by Jacques Derrida in the European case. 
Refer to Derrida 1991.  
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‘ourselves’ and ‘foreigners’ which wins out and which is lived as 
irreducible. (94) 
 
For Balibar, fictive ethnicity is specific to the nation-state form as a particular 
form of ideological unification projected by the state and its institutions as nation-state, 
that is, as the production of a people. In this production of the people, fictive ethnicity 
becomes the publicly recognized mode of identifying those that belong to the same 
political sphere (us versus foreigners). If, following Carl Schmitt, the political field is 
divided into those who are friends and those who are enemies,10 then this distinction 
must nevertheless be given a priori in the cultural sphere so that each and every one of 
those who belong to the same political unit can recognize one another as such, and this 
must become, moreover, the primary mode of understanding common values and ends. 
When this is achieved, it does not matter that there is conflict within society, as long as 
that conflict is lived as a conflict of interests and not of values and ends. 
To better understand how we might be able to distinguish a fictive ethnicity from 
emergent indigenenity, it is helpful here to refer to a particular passage of Balibar’s 
essay. In reference to the ‘nationalization’ of society as a process which must be 
understood within the context of capitalism as a world-system, and in particular as a 
result of a certain history of colonialism, Balibar asks the following provocative 
question: 
For whom today is it too late? In other words, which are the social 
formations which, in spite of the global constraint of the world-economy 
and of the system of state to which it has given rise, can no longer 
completely effect their transformation into nations, except in a purely 
                                                
10 Refer to Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political (1995). 
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juridical sense and at the cost of interminable conflicts that produce no 
decisive result? (91, emphasis in the original) 
 
Balibar provides us with two incompatible responses to his question. On the one 
hand, he affirms, it might be possible to reply that those post-colonial nation-states 
which have been given formal equality by the international institutions of post-World 
War II have now missed their opportunity to become nation-states from the perspective 
of history, given that this process must be understood as a reflection of the centers and 
peripheries of the capitalist world-system. On the other hand, he suggests, we might be 
tempted to say that the new production of nations is now only possible in the periphery 
of that system. “So far as the old ‘core’ is concerned,” he writes, “it has, to varying 
degrees, entered the phase of the decomposition of national structures which were 
connected with the old forms of its dominations, even if the outcome of such a 
decomposition is both distant and uncertain” (91). However, he adds a supplementary 
comment to this second possibility, writing: “if one accepts this hypothesis … the 
nations of the future will not be like those of the past” (ibid.).  
It is clear that Balibar’s statements regarding the possibility of whether it is too 
late for the periphery, and what that question might mean, does not only apply to 
formally recognized nation-states of the capitalist periphery, but also to those state-less 
nations which are emerging throughout the globe and are increasingly demanding some 
level of autonomy from the centers of statehood that have presumed to represent them, 
whether from the capitalist center (for example, the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, but 
it is possible to include here, in a reverse sense, right-wing populisms in Europe) as well 
as its periphery (emergent indigeneity, in Bolivia as elsewhere). Balibar, however, does 
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not go further in qualifying how this new kind of nation might be different from those of 
the past. What does Balibar mean when he speaks, on the one hand, of the impossibility 
of new national articulations (it is too late) in the capitalist periphery, and, on the other 
hand, of the capitalist periphery as the only possible site of new nationalist articulations 
(the nations of the future)? The nations of the future will not be like those of the past, he 
writes. I suggest that what is at stake is no less than the paradigmatic change within 
political modernity that has been discussed above. With the phrase the nations of the 
future, Balibar is perhaps referring to something that would be fundamentally other to 
political modernity, something that is, perhaps, yet to come. What is clear is that, if 
fictive ethnicity is the ideological cornerstone of the nation-state model, and if this 
model is that which could find a lasting and enduring historical form as the form of 
political modernity, then Balibar appears to suggest that this model is today in decline.  
The exhaustion of the categories of political modernity as a framework for 
understanding the contemporary global moment is already well documented. According 
to Carlo Galli (2010), for example, the Schmittian distinction between ‘friends’ and 
‘enemies’ that is the distinction of political modernity par excellence no longer retains its 
former strength of political interpellation. We are living in a moment of Global War, he 
suggests, where the Two of the friend-enemy distinction turns into the One, and where 
anybody is a potential enemy in any given instance (the author offers the terrorist as an 
exemplary figure of this new political moment). Giacomo Marramao (2011), meanwhile, 
describes the process of globalization as a collapse of what he calls the ‘leviathan’ model 
of politics, understanding the nation-state model that developed out of the Westphalia 
 27 
treaty of 1648 as being based on the model of Hobbes’s Leviathan. For Marramao, the 
leviathan model is a specific product of the development of European nation-statehood. 
This is a model that, it should be emphasized in passing, cannot be disconnected from a 
certain history of colonialism (Balibar is, therefore, speaking about the same thing here 
when he elaborates the concept of fictive ethnicity). The leviathan model thus gives us a 
specific political understanding of the modern process of secularization as “the 
separation of religion and politics sanctioned, at the halfway point of the seventeenth 
century (with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648), by the end of the confessional civil wars 
and by the affirmation of the ‘intraworldly’ sovereignty of the state” (13, emphasis in the 
original). The leviathan was therefore a political model that became able to neutralize 
conflicts within society in a corporative logic as conflicts of interest, whereas the 
national community was constructed according to common values (we should be 
reminded that this construction, for Balibar, takes place as the privileging of fictive 
ethnicity as national identity). Marramao thus asks himself, quoting from Niklas 
Luhman, “whether the modern way to describe conflicts as conflicts of interests and 
conflicts of values is still adequate in view of a global condition that suggests the 
emergence of fundamentalist identifications, that is ‘against-identities’ and not ‘career-
identities’” (qtd in Marramao 2010, 19). 
It is here that we find an entry point for understanding the ‘special way’ that 
emergent indigeneity, as fiction, operates a redistribution of the sensible. If emergent 
indigeneity questions the distribution of spaces and times in the political field, it does so 
neither as a question of interests among formerly equal citizens subsumed to the 
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overarching identity of the nation-state, nor as a question of values and ends shared by a 
common people and administered by the nation-state. While this is useful to identifying 
what emergent indigeneity is not, it nevertheless does not provide a strong sense of what 
it is.  
It may be useful to turn to Giacomo Marramao’s analysis of the specificity of the 
current global moment, and of what happens to the political once its mediation through 
the nation-state is in decline. Marramao notes how, under the current contours of 
globalization, we bear witness to a spatio-temporal compression that produces “a general 
process of cultural differentiation that accelerates the development of conflicting 
interpretations of world history, thereby provoking the proliferation of the demand for 
identity based upon the search for fundamentals (in the dual sense of totalising 
foundation and of anti-totalising fundamentalism)” (27, emphasis in the original). The 
inner plasticity of world as world-history-in-thought which Marramao describes in terms 
of mondialisation, a totalization of the West but also the possibility of its transformation 
– a feature of the contemporary moment which has already been given ample 
commentary by other authors11 – results in an internal differentiation and fracturing of 
the global into the local. Marramao gives the name ‘glocal’ to that new space of co-
belonging that is characteristic of the relationship between the global and the local, as 
the “interpenetration of the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of 
universalism” (29, emphasis in the original). The connection between glocal networks is 
                                                
11 The classical texts on the end of metaphysics as the possibility of a new beginning are provided, of 
course, by Martin Heidegger (see Heidegger 1973). But one might also, here, refer to the work of such 
philosophers as Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Catherine Malabou, among others.  
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a short-circuit, writes Marramao, by which he means that the connections between the 
local and the global, as now the confluence of a single space, are no longer mediated by 
the nation-state and its distribution of common political spaces and times.  
As Giacomo Marramao shows, therefore, the current global age in its 
interconnectedness now implodes former borders or confines between outside and 
inside, where we now witness the proliferation of incompatible identitarian productions 
of value in the public cultural sphere. This production of plural values, based on a logic 
of identity, presents “a new constellation of relationships between interests and values, 
one marked by a radical mutation in the form of conflict. This can be observed in the 
passage from the modern dominance of the conflict of interests to the current dominance 
of the conflict of values” (41). Such a change in the nature of political conflict today 
does not erase ‘conflicts of interest’ in society, but rather, these conflicts of interests 
“now find themselves inextricably caught within the dynamic of conflicts of identity” 
(43). This change in the nature of conflict poses a particular limit for the leviathan logic 
of the nation state and its administration of life (hegemonic biopolitics, in the words of 
Marisol de la Cadena). Marramao writes that: “The isometric logic of the democratic 
leviathan is able to govern the conflict of interests but not that of identities” (44). Indeed, 
“conflicts of identity,” he writes, “overflow all attempts to confine them within a logic of 
redistributive quotas” (ibid.). Drawing an analogy to the pre-Westphalia Religious Wars 
that saw the birth of the European juridical system, Marramao speaks of a new “political 
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function of religion” (46, emphasis in the original), as a kind of polytheism.12 The point 
is that the question about the ‘common good’ that is played out in the global public 
sphere in Marramao’s analysis is a radically asymmetrical one which refuses in advance 
the possibility of a consensus or of the reduction and appropriation of these conflicts to a 
single rational articulation. All of this is carried out in global technologies of 
communication, whereby the key question of conflict of values is the question of how to 
represent the post-national identities that proliferate and compete over who has the most 
valid reading of world history.  
 Emergent indigeneity in Bolivia therefore appears as part of a new global state 
of affairs where the distribution of the common and how it gives way to the “sense of the 
world” no longer needs to pass through the nation-state. It is a production of ethnicities 
(and, as we shall see, the consequent questioning of all ethnicity), which partakes in the 
production of values as what Giacomo Marramao calls nostalgia for the present. It 
represents a new kind of conflict which overflows the logics of nation-state politics and 
therefore radically redefines the political terrain. Emergent indigeneity is, ultimately, 
                                                
12 On this point, Marramao’s perspective can be put into dialogue with the writings of the Brazilian 
ethnographer Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, particularly in his essay “On the Inconstancy of the Indian 
Soul” (2011), where he argues that the Jesuit priests had actually given a more accurate perception of the 
Tupinambá-Guarani tribes of the Amazon when they had described them as having inconstant souls. For 
Viveiros de Castro, this perceived inconstancy is actually the absolute refusal within their culture to 
subjection, the refusal of the category of “true believer” which meant that they could adopt and leave the 
spiritual advice of the kaiba spiritual leaders and of the Jesuits as they pleased. This may appear to be a 
strange assessment of tribes that belonged essentially to warring cultures that practiced cannibalism. Yet 
as Viveiros de Castro attempts to show, only the doctrine of “true belief” leads to subjection, where one is 
subjected to the rule of the principle of that true belief. Meanwhile, in Tupinambá-Guarani religion there is 
no such normativity, no separation between true believers and heretics. There is only a perpetual becoming 
as supersession of the human condition by means of war and carnal consumption.  
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both an apparatus and machine of war.13 As a war apparatus, emergent indigeneity 
gathers together clans and tribes and makes them into nations, it orders and disciplines 
their bodies in new ways and forms new expressions of nationhood, beyond the nation-
state, based on other logics, and is therefore also capable of appropriating and expressing 
other logics of social organization. It is indeed a new production of ethnicity, but one 
that never becomes a national-state ethnicity, even if it sometimes aspires to become so, 
as we will see in a number of the authors under study. As a war machine, however, 
emergent indigeneity breaks with all forms of nationhood, resists the order of command 
and is constantly creating nomadic spaces of political disarticulation. I argue, therefore, 
that emergent indigeneity refers to, in an ambiguous and apparently contradictory sense, 
and as a kind of double movement, both the production of new ethnicities not 
constrained to the traditional apparatuses of the nation-state and, at the same time, the 
unworking of all ethnic identification (and, therefore, of all articulations of community 
which are based on ideas of ethnicity). It is both an apparatus and a machine of war: in 
making war in the name of ethnicity, it also makes war on the very possibility of 
distinctions made on the basis of ethnicity. These two movements cannot be separated: 
at the same time that ethnicity is deconstructed by emergent indigeneity, it reconstructs 
                                                
13 I draw here on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between apparatus and machine. An apparatus, for the 
authors, is defined by a ‘state’ logic, whereby it accumulates, gathers, orders, systematizes and controls 
that which is accumulated or appropriated by it. A professional army, administered and disciplined by the 
state, is an example of an apparatus of war. Machines, however, work according to a different logic 
entirely, where their various assemblages can be constantly changed, and it can freely connect and 
disconnect with other machines in a fluid process which resists systematization and discipline. Tribal 
warfare is an example, for the authors, of a war machine in operation.  See Deleuze and Guatrari 1987.  
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itself and finds a new terrain of political articulation. I call these two edges of the same 
sword of war ethnogenesis and savage nomadism.  
 
I.2.1 Ethnogenesis 
Ethnogenesis commonly refers to a field of study which already has a long 
history. It is the study of the “formation of ethnic groups” (Faust 2006, 7), “the 
processes, transformations, causes and politics of social identity making” (Weik 2014, 
292) or “the process by which distinct ethnic cultures are continually created over time, 
especially cultures that have experienced colonization” (Vieira Powers 1995, 183). It has 
a long and often dark history in the twentieth century. Earlier examples of the study of 
ethnogenesis in archaeology, for instance, included studies of the development and birth 
of nations and can be associated with a search for primal origins in Nazi and Soviet 
academic work (Weik 2014, 293, 296). Nevertheless, recent research in cultural 
anthropology and archaeology tends to highlight the fluid dynamic of ethnic identity 
formation, emphasizing not the construction of something continuous throughout time, 
but the changing dynamics of ethnicity. For example, while Jonathan D. Hill writes that, 
“[cultural] anthropologists have generally used the term ethnogenesis to describe the 
historical emergence of a people who define themselves in relation to a sociocultural and 
linguistic heritage” (1996, 1), he notes that, in his edited collection of essays, “a number 
of anthropologists are concerned to demonstrate that ethnogenesis can also serve as an 
analytical tool for developing critical historical approaches to culture as an ongoing 
process of conflict and struggle over a people’s existence and their positioning within 
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and against a general history of domination” (ibid.). He adds that: “ethnogenesis is not 
merely a label for the historical approaches to culturally distinct peoples but a concept 
encompassing peoples’ simultaneous cultural and political struggles to create enduring 
identities in general contexts of radical change and discontinuity” (ibid.).  
However we are to understand ethnogenesis, what is clear is that it is based on 
the study of ethnicity as an effect which can be traced back to an originary cause, a 
genesis. In my study, it comes to represent that element of emergent indigeneity that 
attempts to codify its own genesis — a genetic code — as a self-serving narrative 
providing common origins for a certain sense of community. It explains the formation of 
collective senses of self, beyond the production of a fictive ethnicity, by which a number 
of indigenous peoples came to identify one another as having common values and aims, 
and even to identify themselves as indigenous as such. My dissertation will show that, in 
the case of Bolivia, these senses of origins are not perhaps quite as one would expect. 
While the notion of a pre-Columbian civilization, infinitely superior in ethical terms to 
modern Western civilization, would be an important cornerstone of this genesis, an 
original violence located with the arrival of the Spanish conquest would provide writers 
from the 1960s onwards with a much stronger source of original ethnic unity. What it 
means to be indigenous in Bolivia will be measured constantly against this original 
violence which somehow precedes the originary peoples themselves.  
What this means is that emergent indigeneity, in its tendency to ethnogenesis, 
may offer an alternative projection of history, a re-reading of national Bolivian history, 
but it is one that ultimately remains grounded in an onto-theological structure of history, 
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even one with a tendency towards the construction of new fictive ethnicities. For all the 
differences that one can identify in the work of Fausto Reinaga, Luciano Tapia, Felipe 
Quispe and Álvaro García Linera, to name only a few of the figures that will be 
important to this study of emergent indigeneity, what remains true is that the indigenous 
are regarded by these authors as containing, in their genesis, a possible model for a new 
nation and perhaps even nation-state, a new fictive ethnicity. Nevertheless, it remains 
true that emergent indigeneity, when it produces ethnicity, is not the same as fictive 
ethnicity, produced as it is by the state ideological apparatuses in the name of a 
unification of a single people. This is the case, first of all, because it is the emergence of 
a particular historical place of enunciation, of those that still suffer from (neo-)colonial 
structures of domination which are a product of the capitalist world-system and cannot 
merely be subsumed by a broad-class alliance represented by the state. Secondly, its 
mode of producing common values, what we might call the ‘ethicity’ of its ethnicity, is 
no longer attached to the (re)production of the nation-state alone, but takes part in a 
global network of the production of indigeneity, in which Bolivian indigeneity plays but 
a part. 
Finally, if it is impossible to reduce emergent indigeneity to a fictive ethnicity, it 
is also because emergent indigeneity is not only an ethnogenesis, or the production of 
new ethnicities and of the subsequent new narratives that are necessary to explain the 
origins of the new ethnic commonality. It is also because emergent indigeneity contains 
an explosive, irruptive force that brings into question the construction of ethnicity tout 
court. This other element of emergent indigeneity I will call savage nomadism. 
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I.2.2 Savage Nomadism 
If ethnogenesis is the production of new identities in the global public sphere, the 
crystallization of ethnic identities around a single common history, the construction of a 
people as a race with its own particular genesis, and as a political subject with its 
consequent division of spaces into friends/enemies and included/excluded (no longer 
determined by the space of nation-states), then emergent indigeneity as I propose it here 
also effects an inverse but complementary function. Emergent indigeneity is not defined 
only by accumulation but by dispersion. That is, it is not only a static center of gravity 
which accumulates and appropriates new subjects but it also has a certain fluidity, it is a 
volatile force of disruption. There is something in emergent indigeneity that cannot be 
reduced to an ethnicity, or even the production of ethnicity. It is a war machine that is 
constantly forming secret pacts, clans and tribes to make war on ethnic formations. It 
produces lines of flight and spaces of deterritorialized nomadism where it is impossible 
to make out the contours of class and ethnic lines, places of new potential processes of 
subjectivations, and even of subjectless processes.  
In framing this more volatile, destructive, and deconstructive form of emergent 
indigeneity in terms of a savage nomadism, I am influenced by the writings of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their “Treatise on Nomadology” (1987). In seeking 
alternative forms of thinking about the Heideggerian question of the grounding of Being 
in ancient Greek thought (a question which remains assumed and in the background of 
the “Treatise,” but which elsewhere comes to the fore in their essay on “Geophilosophy” 
[1994]), they turn to the margins of the Greek polis. Reflecting on the notion that in all 
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Indo-European mythology, the figure of the sovereign adopts the double personae of 
magus king and jurist priest, of mythos and logos, the city margins nevertheless adopted 
the character of nomos. If nomos is the ancient Greek term for law and customs, it is 
nevertheless not the scripture of the city law, insist Deleuze and Guattari, which is 
associated with logos as word, speech or reason. Its origin lies, rather, with the pastures 
outside of the city gates (also called nomos in ancient Greek), those who wandered, 
roamed or roved to find new pastures for their flock (nomás in ancient Greek). It is the 
etymological root of the word nomad in English (among other European languages). It is 
the field of nomadic habits and customs that somehow form part of the city state without 
ever becoming taken in by the appropriative, calculative and ordering logos and mythos 
of the polis. Deleuze and Guattari characterize this nomadology as a war machine.  
In my dissertation, I show that emergent indigeneity also reveals a tendency 
towards a savage nomadism, where there is something below or beneath the production 
of new ethnicities that operates on the level of affectivity and corporal habits. When 
subjects begin to ‘discover’ their new ethnic identities through the construction or 
‘recuperation’ of their ‘forgotten’ histories, such ethnicity is an effect and affect of 
subjectivations and identifications that this new history produces. However, these effects 
and affects that inscribe themselves onto bodies, both individual and collective, and 
mould and change old habits, are not ascribable to subject positions except by way of an 
ethnogenesis. Through the ideological suturing that takes place in this reflection-effect in 
the writing of Fausto Reinaga, Luciano Tapia, and others, there exists beneath the 
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surface of this imaginary identification an affective impulse which opens to new spaces 
of political articulation.  
Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari show in their “Treatise on Nomadology,” the 
nomad can only reterritorialize herself (she is always a becoming-woman) in 
deterritorialized spaces. An important argument in my study is that emergent 
indigeneity, where it breaks open or ruptures traditional understandings of class and 
ethnicity in traditional Bolivian narratives, reveals such constructions to be unsuitable to 
the constantly changing and dynamic reality which lies at its base and which is 
crystallized or ordered according to a particular logic of the social. In the work of Fausto 
Reinaga that I study in Chapter II of this dissertation, for example, it is presumed by 
Reinaga that Bolivia’s racial division is able to explain better how exploitation and 
domination have taken place in that country. As my analysis shows, however, Reinaga 
himself never quite escapes a Marxist-style analysis based on the notion of class, and 
what his writings would rather show is the interstices of a class-ethnic boundary that is 
undecidable, as part of the same production of the social and its divisions. Where 
emergent indigeneity enters the scene as a savage nomadism, it finds the possibility of 
new forms of mobility in formerly territorialized spaces that have been abandoned or 
deserted. 
This savage nomadism that lies at the heart of emergent indigeneity is marginal 
and minoritarian in character. As I will demonstrate in my study, political uses of 
emergent indigeneity, from Fausto Reinaga to Álvaro García Linera, will continue to 
privilege the moment of ethnogenesis, of the formation of a unified people, of its 
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crystallization and consolidation as a political, social or economic unit, that can then 
subsequently be captured and reoriented, institutionalized and disciplined. Their readings 
will be a certain coding of ethnic genesis. However, what interests me in my study of 
emergent indigeneity is a certain overflow or excess that takes place at the margins of 
this process of the new production of ethnicities in which emergent indigeneity is 
revealed to itself, in its own conditions of (im)possibility, in its very own internal 
différance. The deconstructive effects and affects of savage nomadism, by breaking apart 
the fictions of Bolivian fictive ethnicity, reveal all ethnic identification to be the constant 
re-emergence of social fictions, based on lasting structurations of those fictions, which is 
constructed by something that nevertheless takes place outside of, within the folds of or 
below the threshold of such emergence. This possibility can produce, I argue, alternative 
readings which do not attempt to codify, order, discipline and control these effects and 
affects. It would rather try to read current indigenous emancipatory struggles in Bolivia 
as the irruption of an alterity that cannot be reduced to calculative or representative 
logics, and therefore is not even in a strict sense ethnic, or even indigenous. If 
indigenous emancipation is today in Bolivia an elusive promise, I argue that this promise 
should also be a work of mourning in the memory of a specter, a specter which belongs 
to a certain history of Western modernity and colonialism, but is also absolutely other, 
and never recognizable in advance.   
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I.3 Bolivian Readings 
 I approach the question of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia through a study of 
‘Bolivian readings.’ This ambiguous phrase can refer to three overlapping senses, all of 
which apply here. First and foremost, my study is based on readings of Bolivian authors 
who have been, in one way or another, important to the process that I am calling here 
emergent indigeneity. For these authors, therefore, writing was both a response and 
responsibility in the face of an important historical conjuncture, an act of struggle and of 
resistance. Secondly, the texts that I study are themselves readings. They are 
interpretations of a certain situation or problem which each of these authors had to 
confront in one way or another, a question that I will refrain from calling the “Indian 
question,” but which nevertheless had a strong relationship to emergent indigneity as a 
production of ethnicity. What is at stake in the writings of these Bolivian authors (or my 
reading of them) is a certain reading of history, and of the place of the indigenous in that 
history.  
 Third and finally, these interpretations of the texts under study are re-readings of 
Bolivia as nation, as a metaphor for one or for many peoples, that is, as a fictive 
ethnicity. It is both a re-metaphorization and a de-metaphorization of this fictive 
ethnicity, perhaps even of all ethnic identity, and a metamorphosis which moves beyond 
fictive ethnicity as a production of the nation. It is a metamorphosis of that history, of 
the reading of that history, which is also to say, of the bodies on which that reading has 
been inscribed, individual but also collective bodies. What I will show in my dissertation 
is that the question of the place of indigeneity in the public sphere, that which makes it 
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visible, makes it emerge in the mainstream cultural and political sphere for the first time 
in history, and already post-history, is a re-reading of that place from within a certain 
tradition of the West and of Bolivia as a part of that history, even from the re-reading of 
the West as history.  
 My study will begin with an analysis of the most significant work written by the 
father of Indianism, Fausto Reinaga and his La Revolución India (The Indian Revolution, 
1969). Its author in many ways inaugurated a certain hegemonic understanding of the 
place of the indigenous in the writing of future indigenous activists in Bolivia (as well as 
elsewhere). Chapter II will analyze how contemporary scholarship on Reinaga’s seminal 
work, by virtue of having largely ignored the more general intellectual trajectory of its 
author, has misunderstood how this work is a specific development of and within 
National Revolutionary ideology in Bolivia, in which Reinaga himself had been formed. 
While it is true, therefore, as other scholars have claimed, that Reinaga’s writings are 
based on an almost totalitarian structuration of history divided between two 
irreconcilable racial lines, these analyses have been insufficient for explaining the 
historical effectivity and affectivity of his proposals among future generations of 
Indianist scholarship, who would quickly adopt the author as an intellectual figurehead. I 
propose therefore to give a more nuanced reading of his work along those lines.  
 Following an analysis of some of the most important tenets of the Indianist and 
katarista ideology through the work of Fausto Reinaga, Chapter III will embark on a 
more general historical outline of emergent indigeneity throughout the years 1970 - 
2000, beginning with a more in-depth theoretical framework for the understanding of 
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emergent indigeneity in the Bolivian context. I will show how a broad alliance of 
political indigenous activism, emerging academic trends, and the rise of global networks 
which transformed the social, economic and political conditions of the country, 
intensified the collapse of the 1952 Revolutionary government and the gains made by 
these new articulations of indigeneity in the public sphere, which remained, until at least 
the 1980s, heavily grounded in the heritage of Fausto Reinaga’s intellectual legacy. In 
particular, I focus on the Indianist-katarista figures of Felipe Quispe and Luciano Tapia 
to show how emergent indigeneity breaks apart, on the one hand, the distinctions 
between class and ethnicity that had been important to traditional narratives of Bolivia 
and, on the other hand, finds its condition of possibility in a reflection-effect of writing 
that simultaneously makes its meaning radically unstable and ungrounded, hospitable to 
strangers that remain beyond the ‘we’ of ethnic identity construction.  
 Finally, I end the dissertation with a number of reflections on contemporary 
Bolivia, and of the place that indigeneity has taken in scholarly writings on the social 
movements from 2000 - 2005 and the new plurinational state formation. This is a topic 
of contention among recent scholarship and has been the focus, in many ways, of recent 
studies on Bolivia, even, we might say, of a revived interest in the country. Chapter IV 
will therefore approach this complex topic through an analysis of the intellectual work of 
current Vice President and state ideologue Álvaro García Linera and of the many 
scholars who have interpreted this author’s work. My argument will reside in the notion 
that current interpretations of emergent indigeneity, while still resisting the logic of 
fictive ethnicity, can today only be understood within the debates over the meaning of 
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the current state transformation in Bolivia. A proper understanding of these debates, 
therefore, can help us to interpret the transformations that both the state and its fictive 
ethnicity, as well as emergent indigeneity in both of its tendencies (ethnogenesis and 
savage nomadism), have undergone in this new phase of Bolivian political history.  
 
I.4 Towards A New Reading 
 A new reading of emergent indigeneity, indeed, a new reading as emergent 
indigeneity, has already begun. It is caught in an oscillation between the tendency to 
ethnogenesis and the tendency to savage nomadism. My new reading of emergent 
indigeneity would be insufficient if it were to propose itself merely as a better analytic, a 
better mode of interrogating the contemporary possibilities of indigenous political 
participation today. Given the enormous complexity and weight of the problem that has 
been identified here, my new reading should be one that can claim a more accurate 
understanding of the contemporary moment, but also one that suggests what a 
democratic practice of this reading might involve.  
 I will call this practice of reading I engage with in my study an infrapolitical 
reading.14 It has a relationship to the political, a critical relationship, and to everything 
                                                
14 I shall resist here a systematic attempt to define the infrapolitical, a concept, which may not be a concept 
at all, that in many ways is still being developed and defined. I refer the reader to the blog post “Ni 
siquiera un manifiesto” (“Not even a manifesto,” Moreiras 2015) for an introduction. The project of 
‘infrapolitical deconstruction’ which has been taken up by a number of figures in the field of Latin 
American Studies offers contemporary reflections on the political from a deconstructive legacy, 
identifying in the Heideggerian ontico-ontological difference the possibility of a critique of our current age 
as subsumed by the principle of general equivalence, or the age of techne in the sense that it was given by 
Heidegger in his essay “Question Concerning Technology” (2004).  
It should also be noted that I am putting into dialogue here the notion of the infrapolitical with a number of 
contemporary writings on the possibility of a democratic practice of reading that here informs my work. I 
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that has gone by the name of political philosophy or political science as that name by 
which social organization and antagonism becomes appropriated, ordered and 
systematized by theory. It is also related to the political insofar as it is a practice which 
supports a radically democratic politics. It is infrapolitical, however, to the extent that, as 
a reading practice, it interests itself in that which subcedes15 politics as a system of the 
organization and administration of life, and which in turn radically destabilizes it and 
metamorphoses it. It brings into question the onto-theological structuration of history by 
which form, and especially the human form, becomes a metaphor for history’s genesis, 
direction and end, where these forms become interchangeable on a plane of general 
equivalence, that is, they are reproducible, disposable and exposable. Every ethnogenesis 
                                                                                                                                           
do not follow any single one of these propositions in any systematic way, but rather take them as a 
constellation and intuit a certain connection between them. Such a reading has been proposed by 
subalternist Gayatri Spivak, where her notion of the subaltern as the “absolute limit of the place where 
history is narrativized into logic” (1998, 16) becomes also “a theory of reading in the strongest possible 
general sense” (4: see also Williams 2002, 10). A great deal of work has been carried out on providing a 
new understanding of reading by French philosopher Catherine Malabou, in particular in her L’avenir de 
Hegel (1996) and Le change Heidegger (2004), where an important node of this reading, compatible 
therefore with the aims of an infrapolitical practice, is found in Heidegger’s ontico-ontological difference 
and the notion of the end of an epochal history. It is also closely connected to the notion of Derrida’s 
democracy to come (see Derrida 2005), which introduces a series of contemporary work in the field of 
Latin American Studies which would propose a similar project. Erin Graff Zivin’s Figurative Inquisitions 
(2014), for example, proposes readings of marranismo which locates the marrano at the site of a secret 
which is not proper to it, a secret that is “neither locked in a crypt nor confessable” (51), resisting an 
inquisitional logic which would be the basis of her proposed ethics of reading. She writes: ““[I want to 
propose] an ethics of reading as witnessing that, in departure from the logic of proof, abandons 
Inquisitional logic in favor of something more expansive, but also more dangerous [this would be one that 
is open to ‘multiple possibilities of interpretation’]” (74). Abraham Acosta’s Thresholds of Illiteracy 
(2014) also suggests a similar project from an alternative standpoint, where the author proposes to carry 
out “a critical examination of the politics of reading resistance in contemporary Latin America” (2), which 
by revealing “the ultimately contingent and arbitrary nature of the political order” (3) and would advance 
“the possibility of a truly democratic reading practice” (ibid).  
15 The expression is taken from Moreiras’s “Ni siquiera un manifiesto” (“Not even a manifesto,” 2015). 
Infrapolitics, he writes, is something that subcedes, “that is to say, an excess which precedes, an 
experiential field which is neither circumscribable nor exhaustible by any political determination [es decir, 
exceso que precede, campo experiencial no circunscribible ni agotable por determinación política alguna] 
(Morerias 2015).  
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takes the body as its metaphor, whether it is as emergent indigeneity or as a fictive 
ethnicity. An infrapolitical reading thus looks to a radical de-metaphorization of such 
forms. It supports a practice beyond identity politics, even and above all if identity is the 
condition of political struggle today. To put it in other terms, if the politics of identity is 
the ground upon which we build our new home, this home should nevertheless be a 
place where there remains some level of openness, of hospitality, to its stranger, to its 
absolute other.  
  
I.5 A Note on Translations 
 All translations, unless otherwise stated in the dissertation, are my own. Many of 
the terms are extremely culturally specific and, where necessary, I have tried to provide 
the clearest indication of how these terms have been used, both historically as well as by 
the authors in particular, in the Bolivian context. Spellings of words which have a 
derivation from indigenous languages, especially of Aymara and Quechua, have been 
problematic. The question of the spelling of these words represents a special case, given 
that a formal and generally accepted phonetic (Latin) alphabet for both languages was 
only agreed on by linguists beginning in the 1960s, and their spellings before that time 
varied enormously between authors. Where there is no reason to change the spelling, 
such as in discussions of general history or in authors that make no particular use of that 
spelling, I have decided to keep the original English spelling where there is one (for 
example, Aymara, Quechua and Inca), or the Spanish where that is not the case. 
However, given the political significance of using the phonetic systems now specific to 
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Quechua and Aymara, in authors who have made use of these spellings, for example in 
the chapter on Fausto Reinaga, I have adopted this phonetic system to emphasize its use 
in the author and for consistency in spelling throughout the passages where I reference 
them (for example, aimara, qheswa and Inka).  
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CHAPTER II                                                                                                          
FAUSTO REINAGA, FATHER OF INDIANISM 
 
…he who made prose into an arm of war, he who knew how to delimit in 
a vigorous way the political meanings of cultural and historical Indian 
identity was without doubt Fausto Reinaga, who can be considered the 
founding father of contemporary Indianism-katarismo.  
Álvaro García Linera  
(La Prensa 118 [2001], quoted in Mallki No.6 [2004])16 
 
I am neither a writer nor a mixed-blood literato. I am Indian. An Indian 
who thinks; who makes ideas; who creates ideas. 
My ambition is to forge an Indian ideology; an ideology of my race.  
I was alone; now I will be millions. Dead or alive, lucid vital conscience 
or destroyed, I will be millions. And I will tear to pieces the despicable 
wall of “organized silence” with which the Bolivian cholaje has enclosed 
me… And the day will arrive in which this Sodom-Gomorric society 
howls in pain and cries tears of blood as a result of my word…  
 
Fausto Reinaga, La revolución India (45)17 
 
 This prophetic opening to Fausto Reinga’s opus magnum, entitled La Revolución 
India (The Indian Revolution), first published in La Paz in 1969, presents much of what 
is at stake in this important moment of the author’s work. Rejecting the revolutionary 
                                                
16 “…el que hizo de la prosa una arma de guerra, el que supo delimitar de manera vigorosa los significados 
políticos de la identidad cultural e histórica india fue sin duda Fausto Reinaga, que puede ser considerado 
como el padre fundador del indianismo – katarismo contemporáneo” 
17“No soy escritor ni literato mestizo. Yo soy indio. Un indio que piensa; que hace ideas; que crea ideas.  
Mi ambición es forjar una ideología india; una ideología de mi raza.  
Era solo; ahora seré millones. Vivo o muerto, lúcida conciencia vital o hecho polvo, seré 
millones. Y haré pedazos a la infame muralla de “silencio organizado” con que me ha puesto 
cerco la Bolivia del cholaje… Y llegará el día en que esta Sodoma-gomórrica sociedad, aulle de 
dolor y llore sangre por causa de mi palabra…” 
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legacy of 1952 in Bolivia which had done away with the term indio in favor of the more 
neutral campesino or indígena, Reinaga rejects the cultural accommodation of the 
indigenous to the mestizo ideology of the ’52 Revolution. Neither mestizo writer nor 
literato, I am Indian, he claims. His objective is none other than to tear down the walls, 
just as the indigenous leader Tupac Katari had laid siege to the city of La Paz centuries 
before him, of the organized silence of Bolivian cholaje – that is, either white or mixed-
blood, but in any case somehow Europeanized, Bolivia.18 This is the Bolivian nation 
that, according to Reinaga’s narrative, in the name of emancipating the indigenous had 
merely re-subordinated them under a new rationale of governmentality aimed at 
modernizing the countryside under the buzzword of development.  
 What Fausto Reinaga appears to tell us in the epigraph above is that there is a 
spirit of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia that is like the embers of a fire that has not 
been extinguished, and that can still be rekindled. That spirit is conjured in the epigraph 
provided above in the figure of Tupac Katari, he who is claimed to have prophesied 
before being drawn and quartered at the hands of the Spanish creoles for leading an 
indigenous rebellion against La Paz in 1780-81, that he would “return as millions.” 
Reinaga now repeats the prophecy: standing alone, he will one day be millions. His word 
– mi palabra – the phrase with which this epigraph ends but also the title of the chapter 
itself, will conjure the spirit of the Indian that the organized silence of the Bolivian 
                                                
18 Cholaje is a term similar to mestizaje (see below for an explanation of mestizaje), and is particular to the 
Bolivian tradition. A cholo or a chola is a person who is considered of indigenous descent but lives within 
mainstream white-mestizo culture, though normally only partially acculturated. It is a word that has been 
traditionally considered pejorative, though it is part of popular usage and there are an important number of 
people who identify with the term in contemporary Bolivia.  
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cholaje has suppressed but has been unable to exorcise entirely from the national body 
politic.  
 With what power does Fausto Reinaga claim to be able to conjure such spirits 
from an ancient past? Through the forging of an ideology, he claims. This ideology he 
will call indianismo, or Indianism. Fausto Reinaga was not the only intellectual who 
identified as Indianist in 1970. In fact, the term had been coined some time before in the 
nineteenth century, but in this case it belonged to a literary tradition of a very different 
character. However, Reinaga was certainly the most important proponent of Indianism in 
its modern usage in Bolivia (and, arguably, the whole of Latin America), and most 
definitely had a decisive hand in shaping its ideological presuppositions. What is at stake 
in Reinaga’s Indianism is no less than unveiling the repressive legacy of the 1952 
Bolivian Revolutionary government and projecting the possibility of true indigenous 
emancipation against the mestizo lettered elite that would have reproduced Indian 
subordination throughout the middle of the twentieth century.  
 La Revolución India forms part of a trilogy of books published within a couple of 
years of one another that mark the Indianist phase of this author’s work. The second is 
the “Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia” (Manifesto of the Bolivian Indian Party), 
which was written separately but published as the sixth chapter in La Revolución India. 
In 1971, Reinaga also published Tesis India (Indian Thesis), written as a political 
program for activist organizations with a strong indigenous presence. Reinaga remained 
throughout his life a marginalized and censored author. He was also always considered 
to be a radical activist who went from having strong Marxist leanings in the 1930s, to 
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later rejecting Marxism in favor of a theoretical position more strongly rooted in the 
notion of race in the 1960s, finally to changing his perspective again in the late 1970s. 
La Revolución India and his other two Indianist texts of those years were to have a 
resonance which no other of his texts had ever had or would ever achieve. As Marcía 
Stephenson confirms: “It was only in 1969, with the publication of Reinaga’s book La 
Revolución India, when the school teachers, the first generation of Aymara University 
students and young people found a text that would articulate and affirm an outspoken 
indigenous identity” (Stephenson, Mallki No.10).19  
 The importance of Reinaga’s intellectual legacy, and of La Revolución India in 
particular, cannot be understated. In his historical account of the indigenous activist 
movement of katarismo in the 1970s, current Vice President Álvaro García Linera 
writes: “In this first stage of the formative period [of katarismo], the work of Fausto 
Reinaga stands out, who can be considered to be the most relevant and influential 
Indianist intellectual in this entire historical period” (“Indianismo y marxismo,” 486).20 
His influence on the emerging political trends of Indianism and katarismo are well 
documented, even if they have not been given sufficient recognition within those 
intellectual currents themselves, a result of the fact that Reinaga’s teachings were often 
passed on to his disciples orally rather than through the circulation of texts and 
commentaries. Indeed, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui recently (2013) made the following 
                                                
19 “Fue únicamente en 1969, con la publicación del libro de Reinaga La Revolución India, cuando los 
maestros de escuela, la primera generación de estudiantes universitarios aymaras y los jóvenes encontraron 
un texto que articulara y afirmara una identidad indígena contestaria.”  
20 “En esta primera etapa del período formativo se destacará la obra de Fausto Reinaga, que puede ser 
considerado como el intelectual del indianismo más relevante y influyente de todo este período histórico” 
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comment about her fundamentally important book Oprimidos pero no Vencidos 
[Oppressed but not defeated], published in 1984, which was based on her activism 
working with the kataristas:  
The influence of [Reinaga’s] ideas on the emerging katarista-Indianist 
movements was inevitable, but at the same time elusive. I myself had not 
realized how many of the ideas from my book “Oprimidos pero no 
Vencidos”…, that I attributed to the kataristas – such as that of the “two 
Bolivias,” “political pongueaje,” the exaltation of a pre-Hispanic ethical 
order based on the trilogy “ama suwa, ama llulla, ama qhilla”, etc. — 
were inspired in reality by Reinaga’s thought. His proposals circulated by 
word of mouth among the Indianists of the 70s, but also among the 
kataristas of Genaro (sic) Flores, from whom I learnt for the first time the 
notion of “internal colonialism” at the beginning of the 80s. (“Prólogo,” 
19)21 
 
 It is well known that the reading groups that Reinaga held in his own home were 
enormously important for the intellectual development of a whole generation of Aymara 
students who had recently migrated from the countryside and were registering in the 
local universities. This would culminate in the group Movimiento Universitario Julián 
Apaza (Julián Apaza University Movement, MUJA), which was also to have an 
important impact on the development of katarista ideology.22 Current Bolivian President 
and indigenous leader Evo Morales, when asked to name the politician he most admired, 
is claimed to have responded: “More than any politician … I admired a writer, Fausto 
                                                
21 “La influencia de sus ideas sobre los emergentes movimientos kataristas-indianistas fue inevitable, pero 
a la vez esquiva. Yo misma no me había percatado de cuántas de las ideas de mi libro ‘Oprimidos pero no 
Vencidos’…, que atribuía a los kataristas – como la de las ‘dos Bolivias’, el ‘pongueaje político,’ la 
exaltación de un orden ético prehispánico basado en la trilogía ‘ama suwa, ama llulla, ama qhilla,’ etc. —
se habían inspirado en realidad en el pensamiento de Reinaga. Sus propuestas circulaban de boca en boca 
entre los indianistas de los años setenta, pero también entre los kataristas de Genaro Flores, de quienes 
aprendí por primera vez la noción de ‘colonialismo interno’ a principios de los ochenta.”  
22 For more details on the influence of Reinaga on the emerging discourses surrounding indigenous 
political activism and the question of what it means to be indigenous, refer to chapter 1 of Verushka 
Alvizuri (2009).  
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Reinaga and his works like La Revolución India… He allowed me to understand who we 
are as Quechuas and Aymaras” (quoted in Lucero 2008, 13). La Paz is home to the 
Fundación Fausto Reinaga, which disseminates regular publications and holds 
conferences on the thought of the author, claiming to work in the horizon of the 
pensamiento amaútico, a development of Reinaga’s thought in the later stages of his 
life.23 His writings were important for those who participated in the social mobilization 
of 2000 - 2005, a revolutionary moment of Bolivian history which to some extent 
culminated in the election of President Evo Morales. Esteban Ticona writes: “In the 
indigenous and peasant uprisings in Bolivia after 2000 … it is not an exaggeration to say 
that [Reinaga’s] ideas have been present in urban and rural indigenous activists” 
(2005).24  He was also an important influence on a number of other indigenous activists 
and political parties, as is confirmed by Marcía Stephenson: 
[Reinaga’s] thought leads to numerous movements derived from his [i.e. 
Reinaga’s] own Bolivian Indian Party, including the Tupak Katari Indian 
Movement (MITKA), the Julián Apaza University Movement (MUJA), 
the Tupak Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK) and Felipe Quispe’s 
Offensive of Red Ayllus. (Stephenson, Mallki No. 10)25  
 
                                                
23 An “Amauta” was a wise-man or teacher who was dedicated to raising the formal education of the sons 
of the Inka nobility. The term is used in Bolivian contemporary popular culture to refer to wise-men who 
hold claim to certain indigenous forms of knowledge. A loose equivalent in Western culture would be a 
tarot card reader, for example, who, by claiming to have access to knowledges of a pagan origin, is able to 
offer services alternative to those based on a Western scientific rationality. Reinaga gives the term his own 
emphasis. For him, pensamiento amaútico is a universal philosophy, based on a specifically Indian-Inkan 
history of ideas, which he nevertheless prescribes as a kind of ethical way of life for the whole of 
humanity.  
24 “En los levantamientos indígenas y campesinos en la Bolivia post 2000 … no es exagerado decir que 
sus ideas han estado presentes en actores indígenas urbanos y rurales” 
25 “Su pensamiento condujo hacia numerosos movimientos derivados de su propio Partido Indio de 
Bolivia, incluyendo el Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA), el Movimiento Universitario Julián 
Apaza (MUJA), el Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari (MRTK) y la Ofensiva de los Ayllus Rojos 
de Felipe Quispe.”  
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 It should perhaps appear as particularly striking to us from the outset that such a 
motley array of groups, who currently find themselves in ideological contention in 
Bolivia, should share this identification with the father of Indianism. This simple fact is 
testament to the plasticity of Reinaga’s discourse, one which has produced a diverse 
number of readings from different bodies of scholarship. However, at the same time, it is 
also true that there is a general dearth of scholarship on the work of this Bolivian 
intellectual. “About the ‘intellectual trajectory’ of Reinaga there are no in-depth studies,” 
writes Esteban Ticona (2005). It is only recently that a full-length book on the study of 
his work has been published by Gustavo Cruz, based on the author’s doctoral thesis, a 
meticulous study to which my own analysis is in great debt (Cruz 2013). As has already 
been mentioned, this lack is partly explained by the fact that Reinaga’s teachings were 
often not passed down through his writings directly, but rather through discussions that 
took place among indigenous intellectuals in the 1970s and 80s. It is also true that 
Reinaga’s work, while rhetorically sharp and very detailed, is often frustratingly 
imprecise and ambiguous, making it a difficult object of analysis. His autobiographical 
details, for example, which he generously distributes throughout his work, are oftentimes 
contradictory. This is made even more frustrating by the fact that there is no possibility 
of confirming the historical veracity of many of his anecdotes. 
  There does exist, nevertheless, a limited body of scholarship that has attempted 
to deal with the legacy of this intellectual’s thought. We can break the majority of that 
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scholarship down into three broad trends.26 The first of these trends does not focus on a 
detailed analysis of the author’s work, but is rather interested in reading Reinaga insofar 
as his work represents a kind of anti-colonial or de-colonial gesture. That is to say, these 
scholars are interested in a certain gesture found in Reinaga's work which seeks to 
criticize and break down colonial structures of domination. Esteban Ticona, for example, 
understands the critique of colonialism to be the most important aspect of Reinaga’s 
Indianist work, writing, “[the] critique of colonial categories was his starting point” 
(2006).27 Meanwhile, a group of scholars working in Latin America and the United 
States that propose a theoretical understanding of colonialism called the decolonial 
option, in which the history of modernity is inextricably tied to that of colonialism, 
praise Fausto Reinaga as part of a legacy which sought to understand the specifically 
colonial history of oppression on the continent. For Walter Mignolo (“On Subalterns and 
Other Agencies,” 2005), for example, Reinaga’s racial category of “Indian” is a means 
to “de-universalize categories of thought, to diversify theoretical concepts and to 
relocate them in the horizon of modern/colonial histories” (382). While for Catherine 
Walsh (“The Politics of Naming,” 2012), Reinaga would be part of the legacy of de-
colonial thinking that would also include writers as diverse as Aníbal Quijano, Enrique 
Dussel, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and various other figures 
                                                
26 While I criticize the three trends listed here for their partial readings of Reinaga’s work, I should admit 
that there are a number of critical studies on his work which are very complete and have been useful for 
my own analysis and that cannot be placed into any of these three. Such studies are José Antonio Lucero’s 
study of the relationship between Reinaga and Franz Fanon (“Fanon in the Andes,” 2008), Fabiola 
Escárzaga’s comparative study of Fausto Reinaga and Felipe Quispe’s writing (“Comunidad indígena y 
revolución en Bolivia,” 2013) and, more importantly, the only full-length study currently published on 
Reinaga’s work by Gustavo Cruz (Los Senderos de Fausto Reinaga, 2013). 
27 “La crítica a las categorías coloniales fue su punto de partida” 
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who are nevertheless very internally diverse in character (115). This first type of 
literature, while not necessarily an entirely false reading of Reinaga, is nevertheless a 
somewhat uncritical mass of literature. This is so to the extent that the authors of this 
trend do not try to give a careful historical account of what Reinaga understands by the 
colonial structures of domination in Bolivia, but instead simply appraise it, adopting 
Reinaga as a thinker of decolonization without necessarily explaining what this turn of 
phrase might mean. In this sense, these studies do not take into account the particularly 
complex historical understanding of the Bolivian “colonial condition” that Reinaga 
himself elaborates very carefully. They fail to engage critically with the specificity of his 
work in the context in which Reinaga was writing. 
 A second trend of scholarship on Reinaga is deeply critical of this author, 
rejecting Reinaga’s writings for their supposed racist presuppositions. As Stephenson 
affirms, various writers in the 1960s and 70s “discredited Reinaga, qualifying him as 
racist due to his sentiments, passionately expressed, against whites” (Mallki No. 10, 
2005).28 The authors of this second body of literature tend to caricature Reinaga as a 
racist writer, without however first accounting for the complexity of his work and his 
treatment of what he called the “Indian.” Tom Brass (2012), for example, simply 
dismisses Reinaga as part of “a continuation of peasant essentialist ideology” (312). 
While Brass’s diagnosis of a post-modern, neo-populist ideology that emerges in the 
second half of the twentieth century and recycles a romanticized image of the peasantry 
                                                
28 “…desacreditaron a Reinaga, calificándolo de racista debido a sus sentimientos, expresados 
apasionadamente, contra los blancos” 
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is very powerful, many aspects of Reinaga’s work are left unaccounted for in his study.  
Once again, it is not that there is no truth to some of these claims against Reinaga’s 
thought, one which adopted a highly racial character in the 1960s and 70s. However, the 
problem with this scholarship lies in the fact that these criticisms are often directed 
against a figure of Reinaga, or a certain gesture which, although found in his work, 
cannot be properly explained without first of all performing a close reading of his 
writings which accounts for the specificity of his context.  
 The third and final trend of secondary literature on Reinaga’s writings is 
probably the most dynamic and interesting of this type of scholarship, and therefore also 
the most difficult to account for. These authors adopt Reinaga’s work because they are in 
some way working within a tradition of indigenous activism that is also Reinaga’s own. I 
refer here to indigenous activists within Bolivia that have taken an interest in Reinaga’s 
writings, often returning to him after being politically formed in activist groups such as 
katarismo, in an effort to go back to the “source” of their ideological leanings. In this 
group we can include writers such as Felipe Quispe (e.g. El indio en escena) and 
Luciano Tapia (e.g. Ukhamawa jakawisaxa). This particular trend will be studied in 
more detail in the second chapter of this dissertation. For now, however, it is worth 
drawing attention to the fact that these readings of Fausto Reinaga cannot be considered 
sufficiently critical, insofar as Reinaga’s writings represent for these authors a strategic 
box of tools from which they can adopt what is useful from their own ideological 
perspective. And thus while these authors adopt interesting positions towards Reinaga 
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and are very dynamic in their interpretations, one cannot say that they are necessarily 
concerned with making a close, critical analysis of his work.  
 It is not my interest here to discuss in detail the ideological bases upon which 
these readings are built, to which I have alluded here, albeit briefly. Rather, what is 
interesting about these “misreadings” or uncritical readings of Reinaga’s work is that 
they are symptomatic of the conditions in which his work was produced. Fausto 
Reinaga, father of Indianism, should not be understood here to represent the paternal 
labor of an ideology forged ex nihilo, but rather an especially important and intense node 
of expression among a number of discourses that were circulating at a particular 
historical juncture. Whether one only takes interest in Reinaga’s pensamiento amaútico 
from the final years of his life, or adopts his fierce critique of the Latin American 
national-popular tradition without taking on board his dualistic vision of Bolivian 
society, this form of writing within Reinaga’s legacy is much more than a mere “partial” 
or “false” reading. Instead, it should be understood as a form of operating within an 
alternative hermeneutics of Bolivian modernity, a re-reading of that history which is also 
its re-writing: not from the perspective of a mestizo elite, but from some other 
perspective. For the moment, I shall hesitate to call this perspective unproblematically an 
“Indian” one, as do Fausto Reinaga and many of his readers. 
 Reinaga’s work, then, operates as the re-reading of a history which the author 
himself also inhabits. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that this history 
inhabits the author, insofar as he is a product of this history. If this is the case, then the 
writings of Fausto Reinaga and his most celebrated work, La Revolución India, can only 
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be properly understood in all their particular historicity. It becomes essential to 
understand how Reinaga dreams up alternative understandings of history through the 
reinterpretation of a tradition that is also his own. He is thereby able to transform the 
world which he inhabits, while always himself working from within that same world. It 
is from this departure point that Reinaga continuously seeks to forge an ideology as a 
new technique of writing – writing as an Indian.  
 Indeed, Reinaga’s most well-read and widely-distributed work is not only a new 
reading of Bolivian history but also a new philosophy of history. His central claim lies in 
the notion that the entire development of Bolivian history, beginning with the Spanish 
Conquest of the Inka Empire in 1533, can be read as a dialectical struggle between two 
vital forces, civilizationary models, races or Nations (always spelled, in this context, 
with a capital N). Reinaga refers to this theory as the theory of two Bolivias. Adapted 
from the writings of Guillermo Carnero Hoke who wrote about the co-existence of two 
Perus,29 the main difference in Reinaga’s account is that these two Nations form part of a 
centuries-long racial struggle. This struggle is presented as both the secret sub-current 
and the driving force of Bolivian history. It is a struggle which explains and reveals the 
“truth” of Bolivian historical development, and yet, curiously, it is never entirely visible. 
That is to say, this struggle, which has seemingly been waged for centuries in Bolivia, 
has never been written or even recognized as such. It has never risen to the surface of the 
annals of history, is never accounted for by the nations’ historical narrative. Reinaga 
claims to be the first, then, to unveil this secret history of Bolivia, to recuperate a history 
                                                
29 Refer to Escárzaga (2012), 194.  
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that is both lost and current. The secret struggle of the Indian race is, in some way, the 
history of those without history. Thus, according to Reinaga, Bolivia’s official history, 
its written and recorded history, would be nothing more than the masking of this struggle 
between two races. “In Bolivia there are two Bolivias,” he writes, “[a] mestizo, 
Europeanized Bolivia and another Bolivia, kolla-autochthonous. A cholo Bolivia and an 
Indian Bolivia” (174).30 The cholo-mestizo race is the inheritor of Spanish colonialism 
and politically and culturally dominant. The Indian race, on the other hand, represents 
the real life-blood of the American earth, whose secret history of struggle and resistance 
had been suppressed by the official historiography of cholo culture. For Reinaga, the 
Indian Nation is the authentic and autochthonous race and Nation of Bolivia which must 
seek its liberation by coming out on top of the weaker sub-race of the Bolivian cholaje. 
Reinaga calls this future struggle for liberation the Indian Revolution. 
 Reinaga’s very particular understanding of the cholo-mestizo Nation radically 
challenged the underlying assumptions of the National Revolutionary discourse that 
predominated at that time, which had always imagined the modern nation-state building 
project in terms of racial cohesion, or mestizaje (we shall analyze this in greater detail 
below). Reinaga, however, understands the cholo-mestizo Nation that inherited state 
power in 1825 following the Wars of Independence as a kind of parasitic, bastard-racial 
hybrid, which feeds off the autochthonous life-blood of the Indian. The Indian, in turn, 
receives no benefits for his servitude: “Bolivia exists because of the Indian, but not for 
                                                
30 “En Bolivia hay dos Bolivias. Una Bolivia mestiza europeizada y otra Bolivia kolla-autóctona. Una 
Bolivia chola y otra Bolivia india” 
 59 
the Indian” (ibid.),31 he writes. Therefore, the Indian Revolution, as the long-awaited 
emancipation of the Indian Nation after years of their secret underground struggle, is a 
question of correcting this historical injustice. Reinaga affirms that: “If Bolivia exists 
because of the Indian, Bolivia should exist for the Indian” (ibid., Reinaga’s emphasis).32 
Reinaga’s Indian Revolution is thus a revolution to be carried out in the name of justice, 
the righting of a historical wrong. His perception of this historical wrong is nevertheless 
based on a very particular reading of history, a new reading of Bolivian history which 
had been somehow “invisible” or “covered up” by official historiography up until that 
time.33  
 In order for this Revolution to take place, however, it was first of all necessary 
for the Indian Nation to become aware of this unwritten history. This is the primary 
ideological function of Indianism, of which Reinaga is among the first and principle 
proponents, certainly within Bolivia, but also probably within Latin America as a whole. 
Indianism is explicitly opposed in Reinaga’s writings to the ideology of indigenismo, 
which was always associated for him with the state and its official politics of mestizaje. 
How is the Indian, according to Reinaga, to become aware of the “true” history of 
Bolivia, of his discrimination at the hands of the Bolivian cholaje, to which he has been 
                                                
31 “Bolivia, sólo existe por el indio; pero no para el indio” 
32 “Si Bolivia existe por el indio, Bolivia debe ser para el indio” 
33 It is difficult to assess to what extent Reinaga believed this masking of “true” Bolivian history, this 
forgotten or ignored history of the Indian Nation, to be an intentional strategy on behalf of the cholo elites 
in order to maintain power. It seems likely, given Reinaga’s own methodology, that he regarded it as a 
systemic problem, a super-structural question which had been determined by long years of colonialism, 
including the emergence of the market economy and a Western-style political regime. Nevertheless, what 
is clear is that there is no forgiveness for the Bolivian cholaje who have been accomplices of that system 
and have knowingly sought the maintenance of a system which grants them certain privileges while 
continuing to oppress indigenous populations. This particular issue will be discussed in more detail 
towards the end of this chapter. 
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subject for the last 500 years? Precisely by being aware of himself as Indian. Fausto 
Reinaga thus always rejected terms such as “indigenous” or “peasant,” which had been 
incorporated as part of the official vocabulary of the revolutionary government in 1952 
in an attempt to create a broad base of support by speaking in the language of a cross-
class alliance. The Indianism’s objective for Reinaga was to bring about a cultural 
revolution, producing a culture which was not based on European norms, and rejecting 
the culture industry of his time, which was the exclusive property of a middle-class 
cholo elite.  Instead, Indianism sought to produce a culture that was proper to the 
autochthonous roots of Bolivia or the kollasuyu, the old Inka name for the territory 
which covers more or less the Andean geography of modern-day Bolivia. He states that 
the Indian has to have “‘his’ literature, his and his own; not ‘indigenous’ nor 
‘indigenista’, but an Indian literature, Indianist” (137, Reinaga’s emphasis).34  
 In sum, Reinaga’s re-writing of Bolivian history presumes to be an unveiling, 
revealing to Bolivia what it really is, and what it always has been: the eternal struggle 
between two races, the Indian and the cholo. This is the cornerstone of his Indianist 
writings, and will be influential for those indigenous currents that adopt his work from 
the late 1970s onwards. Reinaga’s historical dialectic between the Indian and the cholo 
revolves around two insights. Firstly, Reinaga provided a critique of the legacy 
inaugurated by the 1952 National Revolution, and thereby attacked what we can 
provisionally and schematically call both a certain tradition of indigenismo and a certain 
tradition of Marxism that had belonged to the 1952 state, grounded on the production of 
                                                
34 “‘su’ literatura; suya y propia; no ‘indígena’ ni ‘indigenista,’ sino una literatura india, indianista.” 
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what Étienne Balibar has called a fictive ethnicity (“The Nation Form,” 1991). The 
significance of Reinaga’s critique of the government of his time should not be 
underestimated. The legacy of the National Revolution was culturally and politically 
hegemonic among both the left and the right during the 1950s and 60s, conditioning 
what it was possible to say and even to think. Reinaga was among the first to denounce 
the way in which the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) government attempted 
to subordinate all internal difference to the project of establishing a unified developed 
nation during those years, a nation that was always understood as being racially mestizo. 
In order to better understand this aspect of Reinaga’s work, it is necessary to frame the 
author’s critique of National Revolutionary discourse within a more general 
understanding of this discourse’s underlying assumptions. 
 Secondly, Reinaga proposed in La Revolución India that there was an authentic 
mode of being Indian that was not merely virtual, not merely a horizon for indigenous 
activism that had yet to be attained, but an actually existing and identifiable alternative 
Nation, operating like an undercurrent to the more visible “other” Bolivia of the Bolivian 
cholaje. By dividing Bolivian history into two, that of the Indian and that of the cholo-
mestizo, Reinaga became able, rhetorically at least, to project a possible road to 
indigenous emancipation which would be capable of eradicating the second kind of 
Bolivia altogether. Indeed, for Reinaga, there would be no other kind of emancipation 
available to Bolivia. Let us look at both of these elements of Reinaga’s thought in more 
detail.  
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II.1 The Critique of a Mestizo-cholo Bolivia 
 Fausto Reinaga has many names for the Bolivian “other” that had been 
responsible for, at least in his account, historically subordinating the Indian: the cholo, 
the mestizo, the cholo-mestizo, the white, the Creole, Europeanized, Europeanizing, 
European, Western, or various other derogatory indigenous terms such as k’ara, k’ala, 
mussu or misti. His critique of this “racial” category cannot be considered separately 
from his critique of the Revolutionary legacy of 1952, the political-literary tradition 
known as indigenismo, and its official politics of mestizaje, which had been hegemonic 
in the Andean region throughout most of the twentieth century. What is at stake, then, in 
La Revolución India, is none other than the absolute deconstruction of the national 
popular legacy inaugurated in Bolivia following the 1952 revolution. 
 It therefore becomes necessary, in order to analyze Reinaga’s critical apparatus, 
to understand of what this National Revolutionary discourse consisted. It was a discourse 
that was largely consolidated by the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the 
political party which took up the seat of government following the events of April 1952 
in Bolivia. Following the Revolution, the MNR had quickly adopted a broad-based, 
cross-class, populist rhetoric based on the ideology of Revolutionary Nationalism, a 
popular discourse which had been growing in national influence since at least the 
disastrous losses of the Chaco War (1932 - 35). They had also adopted a discourse of 
modernization and developmentalism, which was used largely to favor the bourgeois 
elites that filled the upper echelons of their ranks. The MNR and military caudillos or 
strong leaders that governed throughout the Nationalist Revolutionary period of Bolivian 
 63 
history, roughly 1952 - 1985, were, nevertheless, operating from within an already 
strongly consolidated cultural heritage which to a large extent defined the parameters of 
their political ideology, a fact that Reinaga understood all too well. This cultural heritage 
was based on the literary and intellectual trends of indigenismo and mestizaje.  
 Indigenismo emerged during the early years of the twentieth century in a number 
of Latin American countries, and was extremely important in the Andean region 
specifically. It was an important ideological discourse which came hand in hand with the 
birth of a modern culture industry in Latin America. Indigenismo emerged alongside the 
first signs of mass culture, and to that extent was always subject to populist tendencies. 
Its proponents were not part of the old lettered elite, which had been largely composed 
of politicians, lawyers and doctors, but were often part of an emerging petit-bourgeois 
class, and thus indigenismo cannot be considered in separation from a certain history of 
modernization on the continent. These new indigenista writers were normally journalists 
and diplomats, professions that were growing in importance with the spread of the 
printing press and international diplomacy. And thus, as was perhaps to be expected, 
indigenismo was also part of a complex network of power relations in which these new 
men of letters attempted to consolidate a privileged place within the new order of things.  
 What was indigenismo? As a cultural phenomenon, indigenismo is not easy to 
define, given that it developed over a large geographical area, was represented by a 
diverse number of very different authors, and was engaged in complex power struggles 
that made it an always contentious ground. Nevertheless, what all indigenista writers had 
in common was that they participated in a revaluation of indigenous cultures in the 
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countries in which they were writing. This often included the idealization of a common 
indigenous past, supported by investment in anthropological endeavors. Indigenismo 
adopted a different character according to the particular conditions of the country in 
which it emerged. In Peru, for example, it adopted a vaguely Marxist character, and 
immediately became associated with left-wing parties such as the APRA movement. In 
Bolivia, it never adopted such Marxist tones. However, what remains true is that this 
appreciation of indigenous culture always took the glory of an indigenous ancient past as 
its model, not contemporary indigenous populations. In fact, when contemporary 
indigenous peoples were regarded as an important political and social issue by 
indigenista writers at all, which was certainly not always the case, the question was 
always how to integrate the indigenous into a popular, modern nation-state. For this 
reason, unsurprisingly, the ideological foothold of mestizaje became an important 
complement of indigenista thought. 
 Mestizaje literally means “mixing”, and mestizo or mestiza (mixed race) was a 
term that had been used since colonial times in the New World to refer to those children 
of Indian and Spanish or Creole origin. It was never only a question of blood, but also of 
intercultural exchange. However, if in colonial times it had been considered a pejorative 
term, in a culture where ethnic purity was highly esteemed, in indigenista ideology it 
became a desirable condition, often considered a marker of national unity, implying 
some level of assimilation to a nationalist ideal. In the words of Javier Sanjinés (2002): 
“mestizaje is the paradigm letrado elites sometimes employ to describe and interpret the 
mechanisms that govern society at the sociopolitical and cultural levels. In this sense, 
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mestizaje attempts to impose a hegemonic order upon a totality, whose internal 
coherence is built vertically by the structures of power” (39). Both indigenismo and 
mestizaje were, therefore, accomplices in a power struggle which sought to consolidate 
hegemonic power in the hands of a middle-class mestizo elite in the name of 
constructing a modern national body politic. “In Bolivia,” continues Sanjinés, “the 
paradigm of mestizaje is no more than a cultural discourse whose purpose is to justify 
the hegemony of a mestizo-criollo liberal upper class that assumed power at the 
beginning of the twentieth century” (ibid.). In sum, in the name of consolidating a 
modern mestizo nation, indigenismo adopted an idealized image of a glorious indigenous 
past which, in place of reclaiming indigenous autonomy, actually served to subordinate 
further the indigenous populations of the countries concerned, where the indigenous 
were expected to assimilate to the mestizo norm. 
 The 1952 Revolutionary government incorporated these elements of indigenismo 
and mestizaje as part of the official political ideology of the time: Revolutionary 
Nationalism. This was a discourse that initially emerged in the aftermath of the Chaco 
War (1932 - 35). This three-year-long war against Paraguay in the impossible conditions 
of the Chaco climate was a large-scale disaster, in which Bolivia lost a huge proportion 
of its territory to Paraguay and thousands of lives. The lower levels of society, 
particularly indigenous peoples, were conscripted to fight a war for a nation whose 
existence had been somewhat elusive to their more or less self-sufficient communities 
until that time. Subsequent to the crisis that the war entailed for the ideology of the 
liberal oligarchy in Bolivia, as well as to the changing economic and social conditions 
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that saw an emerging middle class competing for its power, the time was ripe for the 
alternative ideology of Revolutionary Nationalism to take hold. The MNR, founded in 
1941, became the principle proponents of this ideology and were strategic enough to 
gain a large base of support, something which other parties had been less successful in 
achieving.35  
 Probably the most theoretically sound critical analysis of the National 
Revolutionary discourse to date continues to be Luis Antezana’s 1983 analysis, “Sistema 
y proceso ideológicos en Bolivia” (Ideological System and Process in Bolivia). What is 
notable about this analysis is that Antezana’s study does not seek to explain this 
ideological and historical phenomenon only within economic or classist determinations. 
Rather Antezana regards this discourse as a systematic order which accompanies and 
even precedes the actual processes of political action themselves. He argues that 
Revolutionary Nationalism is a “complex discursive intersection,”36 which lies on an 
oscillating and flexible axis, “to the extent to which its extremes (‘nationalism’ on the 
one hand, ‘revolutionary’ on the other) touch and become mixed up with the ideological 
spheres of the Bolivian ‘right’ and the ‘left’” (248).37 
                                                
35 There are two particularly good histories of the formation of this ideology to which one can refer for 
more information. Chapter 2 of Fernando Mayorga’s El discurso del nacionalismo revolucionario (1985), 
for example, examines in great detail the economic and social conditions that brought about the collapse of 
the liberal oligarchy and the consolidation of Revolutionary Nationalism, and in particular how the MNR 
were able to channel the discontent of the time in their favor. Also refer to René Zavaleta Mercado’s La 
formación de la conciencia nacional (1990), originally published in 1967.  
36 “una compleja intersección discursiva”  
37 “…en la medida que sus extremos (‘nacionalismo,’ por un lado, y ‘revolucionario,’ por el otro) tocan y 
se entremezclan con los ámbitos ideológicos de la ‘derecha’ y la ‘izquierda’ bolivianas.” 
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 Essentially, Antezana is interested in reading the discourse of Revolutionary 
Nationalism in terms of what it means for power: “…the ideological sphere precedes, in 
some way, the exercise of power,” he writes (249).38 Following Foucault’s analyses of 
power, therefore, Antezana argues that Revolutionary Nationalism must be understood 
as “a kind of ideological epistemé: a discursive field in which a series of social and 
political ‘objects’ appear, are organized and defined: the field where discourses acquire 
sense” (ibid.).39 What he essentially argues here is that this political ideology is more 
than mere ideology. It appears as a discursive field which is the condition of possibility 
of the political itself, at least in that particular time and place, a malleable discourse 
which is appropriated by left and right wings alike. As the condition itself which in some 
way precedes power, it is only logical to conclude that Revolutionary Nationalism was 
not a static discourse, but a field of struggle in which different groups competed for a 
hegemonic hold on power. Nevertheless, it should not be taken for granted that the 
struggle for hegemony within the Revolutionary Nationalism took place on an even 
playing field. As Antezana remarks: “Revolutionary Nationalism appears as a discourse 
of every social class although, strictly speaking, it instrumentalizes (sic) above all the 
interests of the dominant classes” (249).40 In reference to the National Revolutionary use 
of a word such as pueblo, for example, he makes the observation that, “pueblo under 
Revolutionary Nationalism appears to us as an object constituted in such a way that, to 
                                                
38 “el ámbito ideológico NR precede, en cierta forma, al ejercicio del poder.” 
39 “una suerte de epistemé ideológica: un campo discursivo donde aparecen, se organizan y definen una 
serie de ‘objetos’ sociales y políticos: el campo donde los discursos adquieren sentido.” 
40 “el NR aparece como un discurso de todas las clases sociales aunque, en rigor, instrumentaliza 
notablemente los intereses de las clases dominantes.” 
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use an image, what tends to elevate it, simply buries it” (267).41 In other words, the very 
discourse which made the “people” a political subject is the same discourse that 
maintains them in a position of subalternity. In short:  “Said in another way, 
Revolutionary Nationalism is the ideology of power in Bolivia” (250).42 
 Following the analyses of power laid out by Michel Foucault in his 1975-6 
lecture course Society Must be Defended, we can say that the conditions of power 
relations are not explained either in economic/contractual exchange, or as the 
continuation of war by other means. These are always already ideological constructs for 
explaining the function of power. Instead, an explanation of power should be sought in 
the techniques immanent to power itself, that is, the historical conditions that make a 
particular person or group able to exert power over another particular person or group at 
a particular time.43 In the Bolivian case, the conditions which made possible the 
emergence of a modern nation-state are also the conditions that defined the limitations of 
the collective national-popular imaginary, or how it was possible to conceive of the 
nation. Although Antezana does not take his analysis in this direction, it would not be a 
                                                
41 “Brevemente, el pueblo bajo el NR nos parece un objeto de tal manera constituido que, por usar una 
imagen, lo que tiende a elevarlo simplemente lo hunde.” 
42 “Dicho de otra manera, el NR es la ideología del poder en Bolivia.” 
43 Foucault makes the following methodological precaution regarding the analysis of power during his 
second lecture, delivered on January 14, 1976: “…we should make an ascending analysis of power, or in 
other words begin with its infinitesimal mechanisms, which have their own history, their own trajectory, 
their own techniques and tactics, and then look at how these mechanisms of power, which have their 
solidity and, in a sense, their own technology, have been and are invested, colonized, used, inflected, 
transformed, displaced, extended, and so on by increasingly general mechanisms and forms of overall 
domination. Overall domination is not something that is pluralized and then has repercussions down 
below. I think we have to analyze the way in which the phenomena, techniques, and procedures of power 
come into play at the lowest levels; we have to show, obviously, how these procedures are displaced, 
extended, and modified and, above all, how they are invested or annexed by global phenomena, and how 
more general powers or economic benefits can slip into the play of these technologies of power, which are 
at once relatively autonomous and infinitesimal” (30–31).  
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stretch, I think, to speak of the emergence during those years of a new national political 
grammar or political unconscious, in explicit reference to Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
in particular the political readings that have been made of this discourse on the left.44 
The emergence of National Revolutionary discourse, which successfully managed to 
displace the hegemony of the traditional elites and became the condition of possibility 
for entry into the political debate in the national arena, represented the suturing of new 
political subjectivities and a new national imaginary which was impressively successful 
in interpellating its actors. This success is indicated, in part, by that fact that the former 
trade-union Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers’ Central, COB), which had 
always been the stronghold of Marxist dissidence throughout these years, worked always 
within the framework of the revolutionary state apparatus and never tried to challenge 
the latter’s claim to represent the “people,” a fact that has been astutely analyzed by 
Álvaro García Linera.45 
 This process of transformation in the conditions of political power that came with 
the eventual institutionalization of Nationalist Revolutionary discourse in 1952 should 
not be separated from political philosopher Ernesto Laclau’s well-known statement 
regarding the task par excellence of any radical politics: the construction of a people.46 
In some sense, the 1952 government found itself precisely at the helm of this project that 
                                                
44 For a detailed though partial account of the Lacanian left, refer to Yannis Stavrakakis (2007) and Jorge 
Alemán (2009). I am thinking more specifically here, however, of the thought of Italian philosopher 
Davide Tarizzo who, in a recent talk in College Station, Texas (2012), proposed to adopt Jacques Lacan’s 
writings on the logic of the fantasy (what Lacan calls “grammar”) in order to structurally explain a 
national collective unconscious.  
45 Refer, for example, to his Reproletarizazión (1999). 
46 Refer to Ernesto Laclau’s essay “Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of a Radical Politics” 
(2006). 
 70 
was the construction of a people; a National Revolutionary body of the people, of what 
Étienne Balibar calls a fictive ethnicity (“The Nation Form,” 1991). This political 
subject of “the people” adopted special characteristics in the Bolivian case. As Luis 
Tapia has indicated (Producción del conocimiento local, 2002), the ideologues of the 
MNR presented this subject of “the people” as the embodiment of a nation confronted by 
a kind of anti-nation or anti-people. This anti-national force was composed of the 
economic oligarchies which exploited the riches of the country for the interest of 
international capital, represented by the Rosca, the popular name for the Tin Oligarchy. 
This official and officialist discourse, centered on the conflict between nation and anti-
nation, is most clearly elaborated by MNR ideologue Carlos Montenegro in his 
Nacionalismo y Coloniaje (1943). What is important about this particular mode of 
constructing a new political subject in the name of the people is that the National 
Revolution was always already a question of political sovereignty for the MNR and its 
ideologues. The Bolivian national problem was that it had never been a nation or, rather, 
that it was a nation with no state, robbed by the Tin Barons and left in poverty, with no 
capacity for political decision-making. The national body was thus understood as part of 
a historical ontology which can be best described as an ontology of war, of a secret war 
between nation and anti-nation which (according to this discourse) was at the root of the 
entire development of Bolivia since its inception. The connection here to Carl Schmitt’s 
definition of the political as a field of struggle between friends and enemies should be 
made apparent.47 What is at stake is no other than the installation of a new political 
                                                
47 For Carl Schmitt, the sovereign decision between friend and enemy, the basis of the modern nation-
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theology, of a new figure of sovereignty embodied by the imaginary spirit of the 
people.48 
 What one effectively sees taking place throughout these years, then, is the use of 
one technique of power which had formerly belonged to the traditional political parties – 
that of state sovereignty – to institutionalize a state of affairs whose principal technique 
of power instead resided in the economy of the culture industry and the syndical 
organizations of the working class and peasant-indigenous groups. The principal 
discursive apparatus of such a transformation took place by making a new reading of 
history in which the “real” Bolivian nation, which represented a kind of alternative 
underground current of resistance in the history of Bolivia, found itself in a deadlock 
with the members of the anti-nation who sought to undermine its “natural” sovereignty. 
This all-inclusive discourse managed to agglutinate a number of disperse and 
antagonistic classes and groups within Bolivia which were in no way properly 
“represented” by this discourse. As Christopher Mitchell has noted, commenting on the 
early development of MNR ideology following the failure of the Villarroel project: 
“Here an important choice was made: differences between social classes would be 
played down in favor of a multiclass alliance stressing common national goals” (6). 
 It is important to note, and as will be analyzed in greater detail in what follows, 
that Reinaga had once been a vociferous advocate of the National Revolution, although 
                                                                                                                                           
state’s ability to fight just wars, is for this thinker a properly political distinction. Refer to his The Concept 
of the Political (1976).  
48 I am not the first to make such an observation. Luis Tapia makes the same connection to Carl Schmitt’s 
philosophy and the National Revolutionary writings of René Zavaleta Mercado (Producción del 
conocimiento local, 2002, 60).  
 72 
always in terms that privileged what we might call an Indian or indigenous perspective. 
He was therefore completely immersed in the language of Revolutionary Nationalism, 
and understood its relationship to Bolivian indigenismo and Marxism very well. 
However, beginning in the 1960s, Reinaga began to understand the legacy of the 
National Revolution, and its indigenismo in particular, as not working in the interests of 
the Indian population, but rather seeking to assimilate it to its ideal, always based on 
notions of development and national unity. He thereby developed a critical apparatus in 
which the Bolivian cholaje is not only a racial category, but also refers to a specific 
political and cultural tradition belonging to those that were in power during the moment 
in which Reinaga was writing. He accuses indigenismo in Bolivia of wanting “the 
integration of the INDIAN into the revolutionary movement of the leftist cholaje” (135, 
Reinaga’s emphasis).49 “It wanted to assimilate [the Indian]”, he writes (ibid.).50 In a 
certain sense – although Fausto Reinaga does not go so far as to state this explicitly – 
indigenismo is for this author the ideological cornerstone par excellence of the cholo-
mestizo elite, at least at the particular historical juncture in which he was writing. And 
this is the case insofar as it represents the adoption of indigenous traditions and customs 
in order to assimilate what was, for Reinaga, the life-blood of the Nation into a pseudo-
modernizing discourse which serves the Bolivian state, a mimesis of European norms. 
Yet it is a mimesis which is always partial, never true nor true to itself. The Bolivian 
                                                
49 “la integración del INDIO en el movimiento revolucionario del cholaje de izquierda” 
50 “Quería asimilarlo” 
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nation as the cholo nation is only ever a false nation, masking its true roots: those of the 
Indian Nation.  
 In fact, Bolivian cholaje is always considered in Reinaga’s Indianist writings as a 
sub-race, whereas the Indian Nation, although it has historically not been permitted to 
embody the Bolivian nation because it has not been able to occupy power, actually 
represents a true historical Nation, with its own proper rites and traditions: “The Indians 
are a Nation, a people, a race and a culture, a culture rooted in the cosmos since time 
immemorial; while the cholaje-mestizo is a larva, abstract, alleged Nation. A sub-race 
and an imported superstructure which floats above the Indian Nation, like clouds over 
the sky” (63).51 Essentially, for Reinaga, the cholo-mestizo is a half-breed bastard race, 
with no real father, no roots of its own. Rejecting its true Indian roots, which it is 
somehow never able to escape, the cholo desperately tries to imitate the European ideal, 
producing a superstructure or cultural domain in which the most prestigious forms of 
expression imitate the literary and artistic tastes of the West. Yet, not properly being 
from the West, the cholo is also unable to achieve the same heights.  
 An important element of Reinaga’s thought is the idea that Indianism finds itself 
in opposition not only to the tradition of indigenismo in Bolivia, but also to that of 
Marxism, and particularly of that Bolivian Marxism that formed part of the National 
Revolutionary tradition. The critique of Marxism as an imported, Western, Europeanized 
and, therefore, also cholo ideology, would form a central part of Reinaga’s critical 
                                                
51 “Los indios son una Nación, un pueblo, una raza y una cultura, cultura milenariamente enraizada en el 
cosmos; en tanto que el cholaje-mestizo es una Nación larva, abstracta, ficta. Una sub-raza y una 
superestructura importada que flotan sobre la Nación india, como las nubes en el cielo.” 
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apparatus. This fact would also explain the author’s preference for a racial understanding 
of historical and political differences, rejecting interpretations based on the notion of 
class struggle, which were at that time in Bolivia hegemonic among the left. He writes: 
“In Bolivia there is no such territorial or rural bourgeoisie; the Indian is not a salaried 
worker, he does not live off of a salary. The Indian is not a social class… The Indian is a 
race, a people, an oppressed Nation” (54).52 This refusal to understand what it meant to 
be indigenous on the basis of class struggle appears time and time again throughout La 
Revolución India. He criticizes Marxism, both Bolivian Marxism as well as that of 
Marx, for ignoring the problem of race, and for therefore being unable to properly deal 
with the Indian. The Indian question cannot be grasped in terms of class differences 
alone. In his own words: “…given that ‘Marxists’ of Indo-America, forget or ignore, in 
this point even Marx himself; and they sustain that race is a romantic and absurd 
concept, because race, according to them, does not exist” (113, Reinaga’s emphasis).53 
In La Revolución India, he is directly critical of some of Bolivia’s leading Marxist 
thinkers of the time, including those who were not so dogmatically allied with the MNR 
during those years. After quoting Marxist sociologist René Zavaleta Mercado, for 
example, Reinaga writes: “Communism has a total ignorance of the Indian. Bolivian 
Communism ignores the Indian. For Bolivian Communism, the Indian is a ‘class;’ a 
                                                
52 “En Bolivia no existe la tal burguesía territorial o rural; el indio no es un asalariado; no vive del salario. 
El indio no es una clase social… El indio es una raza, un pueblo, una Nación.” 
53 “ya que los ‘marxistas’ de Indoamérica, olvidan o ignoran, en este punto, al mismo Karl Marx; y 
sostienen que la raza es un concepto romántico y absurdo, porque raza según ellos no existe.” 
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‘peasant class’ and nothing more” (164).54 By framing Bolivian history in terms of race 
rather than in terms of class, he attempts to reject a Bolivian tradition of Marxism which 
he regards as insufficient. By so doing, Reinaga develops the notion of the Indian Nation 
through which, he claims, it becomes possible to overcome the cholo-mestizo legacy of 
the ’52 Revolution.  
 
II.2 The Indian in Bolivia and the Indian Revolution 
 So far, we have established that Reinaga fiercely criticized the Bolivian political 
tradition of his time, and especially the official discourse of the National Revolution 
associated with the ideologues of the MNR, for seeking to assimilate the Indian presence 
to its language of modernity and development. Culturally, this discourse attempted to do 
so through a project which became known as indigenismo, and politically, through re-
naming, or even re-assigning, the indigenous masses into syndical organizations and 
calling them peasants. This is why, for Reinaga, the language of class struggle did not 
work for the Indian cause. Moreover, this language was an official way for the cholo 
elites in government to cover up the real struggle between Nations, which was the true 
driving force of Bolivian history. For Reinaga, then, it was necessary to speak in terms 
of race, and not of class. This is all very well. However, what does Reinaga mean when 
he speaks of race? What is, exactly, the Indian race, and how is it distinguished from the 
cholo-mestizo one?  
                                                
54 “El comunismo tiene una ignorancia total del indio. El comunismo boliviano ignora al indio. Para el 
comunismo boliviano el indio es una ‘clase;’ ‘clase campesina’ y nada mas.” 
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 Reinaga’s elaboration of the highly racialized theory of two Bolivias is deeply 
historical in nature. He asserts that the Indian race is a millenarian race, which is the 
direct inheritor of the utopian, socialist Inka society that was conquered by the Spanish 
Conquistadors when they arrived in the New World (Reinaga is working here from 
within a classical interpretation of pre-Columbian Andean societies which largely 
emerged in the 1920s with Peruvian indigenismo).55 What is important about this is that, 
for Reinaga, the Indian is the direct inheritor of an independent and self-sufficient 
historical legacy which was contaminated but never destroyed by the arrival of the 
Spanish in the New World. This is what Reinaga means when he says that the Indian 
race is also a people and a Nation (always written with a capital N); the Spanish colony, 
divided between two Republics and later the Bolivian nation itself, never managed to 
assimilate the Indian Nation.56 Consequently, this Indian Nation was somehow able to 
hold on to its traditional culture, language, political and social organization, and 
particular modes of organizing and managing the economy. According to Reinaga, the 
modern-day nation of Bolivia is in fact a mix between two historical civilizations. On the 
one hand, Western civilization, which represents war and private property and, on the 
other hand, the “Inkanato” (sic), which represents the opposite; peace and 
                                                
55 Refer to the works of Luis E. Valcárcel, particularly Del Ayllu al Imperio (1925) and Tempestad en los 
Andes (1927). The idea of the Inka Empire as a kind of socialist society was a widely accepted 
presupposition in the 1920s, as is reflected by international scholarship, particularly by the publication of 
the well-known L’Empire socialiste des Inka by Louis Baudin (1928). This assumption would only begin 
to be displaced in the 1950s with John Murra’s writings on the notion of Andean vertical archipelagos, 
beginning with his thesis The Economic Organization of the Inca State in 1956.  
56 Note here that the use of the word nation refers not only to nation-state. The nation is rather a particular 
kind of community, which is manifested as united in the cultural sphere. It is defined not by political 
institutions but rather by shared heritage, particularly of language, religion, customs and ways of living. In 
this sense, it is closer to Benedict Anderson’s understanding of the nation as an imagined community (see 
Anderson 1991).  
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collectivist/socialist property: “We are INDIANS. A great race; virgin race; a great 
culture, millenarian culture; a great people, a great Nation” (54, Reinaga’s emphasis).57  
 This long “forgotten” history of the Indian Nation’s struggle is codified 
throughout Reinaga’s extensive work, beginning with Mitayos y Yanaconas in 1940, 
based on his final-year university thesis, where he studies the history of Tiwanaku and 
Inca civilizations in great detail, through to La Revolución India in 1970. The third 
chapter of La revolución India, for example, entitled “Indian Epic,” is dedicated to 
illustrating to the reader how the history of Indian resistance against its oppressors had 
defined the development of the Spanish colony and the modern nation-state of Bolivia. 
In the author’s own words:  
The Indian struggle for his/her liberation begins in the instant in which 
the white Conquistador imposes the chains of slavery on the autochthon 
of America. The Spanish had hardly occupied the imperial city of Cuzco 
when they saw themselves assaulted by Indians prepared to “die before 
living as slaves.” The Indian struggle for freedom is a grandiose epic 
which has persisted from 1526 until our days. (207)58  
 
 As he had written on many previous occasions, then, Fausto Reinaga details in 
La revolución India the Indian epic that had been historically covered up by the cholo 
elite and their official histories of the nation. The author describes in great detail the 
struggles of Tupac Amaru, Tomás Katari and Tupac Katari in the eighteenth century and 
of Zárate Willka at the turn of the twentieth century, showing how all of the major 
                                                
57 “Somos INDIOS. Una gran raza; raza virgen; una gran cultura, cultural milenaria; un gran pueblo, una 
gran Nación.” 
58 “La lucha del indio por su liberación, comienza en el instante en que el Conquistador blanco impone las 
cadenas de la esclavitud al autóctono de América. Apenas los españoles había ocupado la ciudad imperial 
del Cuzco, se vieron asediados por los indios dispuestos a “morir antes que esclavos vivir”. La lucha 
libertaria india es una grandiosa epopeya que se prolonga desde 1526 hasta nuestros días.” 
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upheavals of Bolivian political history, in fact, had the Indian Nation and their struggle 
behind them, though they were all ultimately co-opted by the cholo elite. 
 There is, however, something historically permanent about what it means to be 
Indian for the author, despite all of the historical changes, turmoil and traumas that the 
indigenous populations have lived throughout their almost 500 years of colonial 
oppression. For what is incredible about the Indian, according to Reinaga, is that he 
never essentially stops being Indian, no matter how hard cholo society tries to assimilate 
him or, for that matter, no matter how hard the Indian himself tries to fit in with the 
dominant caste: “The Indian, even if he may have by chance achieved the same 
‘doctorate,’ carries his ‘Indian culture’ from the cradle to the grave. The Indian, even if 
he dyes his skin, even if he shows off his title of ‘doctor,’ is ‘forever’ Indian” (73).59 
Given that the cholo nation is only ever an imitation, it has no proper identity, the Indian 
Nation has never in fact been historically conquered, and the Indian, as such, has never 
ceased to be Indian. 
 However, what is certainly true is that this Indian Nation has suffered centuries 
of oppression under the rule of, first, the Spanish, and later, the creoles of the Republic 
or what Reinaga calls the Bolivian cholaje. In fact, if anything should define what 
Reinaga means when he writes the word Indian, it is that the Indians share a common 
history of slavery and discrimination: “We are a discriminated race. We serve for 
working in the mines and factories and receive only hunger and gunshots in return” 
                                                
59 “El indio, aunque haya alcanzado por casualidad el mismo ‘doctorado,’ carga su ‘cultura india’ de la 
cuna al sepulcro. El indio aunque tiña su piel, aunque luzca su título de ‘doctor,’ es ‘para siempre’ indio.” 
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(53).60 It is curious that Reinaga includes under the umbrella term “Indian” indigenous 
cultures as diverse as the Aymara and Quechua peoples of the Andes and the Kamba, 
Guaraní and Moxeño peoples of the Amazon lowlands. These populations did not share 
the same history, languages, cultures or modes of life. What brings them together in 
Reinaga’s historical account is their shared history of colonialism and exploitation. 
 Finally, it is important to consider what Reinaga means when he speaks about the 
promise of Indian emancipation, which is in some way announced or anticipated in his 
work. What is the Indian Revolution? It is not only the victory of the Indian Nation over 
the “false” cholo one; it is not only the production of a culture, politics and civilizational 
model that is “proper” to the Indian Nation; it is not only the eradication of the cholo 
Nation to finally hand over power to the Indian race; nor is it only the full coming-to-
consciousness of the Indian race of its own true history and destiny; it is also a properly 
ontological revolution. The categorical imperative of Reinaga’s Indian Revolution would 
be: ‘Be free’, or, what is the same, ‘Be Indian!’ “The ideal of the Indian,” he writes 
during his reflections on indigenismo and indianismo, “is to be” (141). In typical 
Reinaga style, the author is unfalteringly ambiguous in terms of what this ontological 
revolution might mean. For we must not forget that, for this author, the Indian Nation is 
also an already existing nation, it already “is.” Indeed, to some extent the National being 
is always already Indian for Reinaga: “[The Indian], as racial unity, as historical unity, 
religious unity, linguistic unity, economic unity, is the National Being,” he writes (169, 
                                                
60 “Somos una raza discriminada. Servimos para trabajar en las minas y fábricas a ración de hambre y a 
ración de bala.” 
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my emphasis). Is it simply a matter of the Indian Nation achieving consciousness of 
itself as such? Reinaga never really answers this question. What is clear is that for him 
there is another, more authentic and complete way of being Indian that has yet to be 
achieved, and this for Reinaga would be the ultimate objective of the Indian Revolution. 
 
II.3 Limits of the Ontological Revolution 
 What does the Indianist categorical imperative – ‘Be yourself, be free, be Indian, 
be!’ – mean? Certainly, its aporetic structure cannot be fully appreciated without taking 
into account the way in which Reinaga constructs what it means to be Indian through a 
precise understanding of Bolivian history. As we have already seen, the Indian is nothing 
if it is not a historically discriminated, oppressed historical-racial category. This fact, 
indeed, explains part of the great appeal of Reinaga’s work, whose own experience as a 
discriminated-against Indian comes across in the author’s passionate writing and has 
appealed to many others who had suffered the same discrimination. However, Reinaga’s 
Indian ontology also creates a number of problems at a theoretical level. For we must 
agree, then, that part of the Indian’s ontological status lies in the fact that it is 
ontologically relational, that is, it can only be understood in terms of the historical 
discrimination that the Indian has faced at the hands of his or her oppressors. The Indian 
in Reinaga’s writings is therefore constituted, through a precise philosophy of history, as 
a historically wounded subject that must reconstitute itself in each and every 
(re)iteration. Its condition of possibility grounds itself on an originary violence – that of 
the Spanish conquest – that in some sense precedes the originary peoples themselves. 
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There is no being Indian without first of all being conquered. Reinaga’s writing is a 
restitution of the Indian Nation, a restitution which offers the antidote to its ills, a 
surgical operation which promises violently to remove a condition which is nevertheless 
the very material and textual possibility of its existence.  
 The eternal return of the Indian which is the “Bolivian History 101” of Reinaga’s 
work is conditioned by a perpetual work of mourning that seeks to revive the spirit of the 
Indian from the dead. And yet, that death is itself the sacrifice that gives birth to and 
sustains the Indian Nation as a millenarian community. The project of Indian 
emancipation appears to be here, in Reinaga’s writings, aborted at the very moment of 
its conception, long before it has chance to be born or, perhaps, in a certain sense, 
reborn. Each and every (textual) rebirth of the Indian is stillborn, the perpetuation of a 
birth defect granted by the very act of insemination. The elusive promise of indigenous 
emancipation, the remedy for the ills of the Indian subject, is only available here as a 
supplement which never properly belongs to it. It is the restitution of an excess, drawn 
from an irrecoverable past, projected as the possibility of a future yet to come.  
 We find ourselves falling into a problem that Reinaga himself never observes, or 
at least never seeks to resolve. There is a certain undecidability in his ontological 
division cholo-Indian that structures his philosophy of history, between who is the 
genuine, authentic, true Indian, and who is the dirty, hybrid, bastard cholo that 
constantly threatens the Indian Nation and the possible integrity of the Revolution. How 
to guarantee the Revolution, when the Indian has always already been potentially 
contaminated? The Indian Revolution is ultimately a Revolution based on an ethnic 
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purity which must conserve itself from its own originary self-separation, the kernel 
around which the entire development of Bolivian-indigenous history is understood. 
Reinaga finds himself faced with theoretical questions which are difficult to resolve and 
his own solutions are, to say the least, somewhat problematic. How to guarantee that the 
purity of the Indian Nation, which promises to be the antidote to the Indian’s colonial 
condition, does not become the very poison which threatens the integrity of the 
indigenous body from within?61 How to defend society, how to secure the population?62 
His solution to this problem is found in his claim to the truth. Reinaga establishes 
himself in his writing as having a privileged insight to the secret of that truth, 
establishing his authority to prescribe a new historical destiny for a Nation that had 
never, in fact, existed as such. We will return to this question in more detail towards the 
end of this chapter.  
 Another question that emerges in Reinaga’s work is his problematic relationship 
with a Marxism with which he is unable to do away completely. Despite his constant 
attack on Marxism and Bolivian Marxism/communism in particular, he himself remains 
                                                
61 My reference here is to the deconstructive work of Jacques Derrida, and in particular to his essay 
“Plato’s Pharmacy” (published in La dissémination, 1972). Derrida is able to trace the use of the word 
chain pharmakeia-pharmakon-pharmakeus in a number of Plato’s texts in order to show how the concept 
of the outside has always already contaminated the purity of the inside in Plato’s philosophy (one could 
claim for Derrida, by extension, that this is the case not only in Plato’s thought but for the entirety of the 
Western metaphysical tradition). The implication here, of course, is that Reinaga is unable to escape the 
totalizing and totalitarian temptation of the construction of grand narratives which belongs to the Western 
intellectual tradition, grounded on its claim to the purity of the whole.  
62 My reference here is to Michel Foucault’s series of lectures entitled Society Must be Defended (1975 - 
76) and Security, Territory, Population (1977 - 78). In this series of lectures, the question of how the 
nation-state was born of a particular historical discourse based on the notion of social war is central. A 
community’s claim to a shared history became in many ways the basis for the notion that there existed 
separated nations who had rights by virtue of a shared heritage. Emergent indigeneity in Bolivia is in many 
ways a continuation of this tradition identified and analyzed so astutely by Foucault in these seminars.  
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largely indebted to a specifically Marxist tradition. His La Revolución India and 
accompanying “Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia” clearly follow in the 
specifically Marxist tradition of manifesto-writing and vanguard movements. Indeed, 
Reinaga’s “Manifiesto” is arguably one of the last manifestos of political modernity. 
Moreover, Reinaga constantly paraphrases Marx, particularly from the Manifesto, 
writing calls to the Indian population such as: “Indians of America, unite!” (78).63 
Finally, his theoretical elaboration of the historical dialectic between Indians and cholos 
is clearly, as we will see later, indebted to his own personal, intellectual and political 
engagement with Marxist thought, particularly that of Lenin.  
 There are thus various problems in Reinaga’s proposals on a theoretical level 
which are difficult to immediately resolve. However, my argument is that it is necessary 
to work within these aporias rather than immediately dismiss his work as racist 
essentialism, as many previous commentators have done. Necessary because, and as has 
already been mentioned above, Reinaga’s work is simply too important to the legacy of 
emergent indigeneity in Bolivia for us to be able to dismiss it outright. In fact, 
dismissing Reinaga’s work outright on the basis of this would be to challenge the very 
grounds upon which indigenous struggles for emancipation would take place in Bolivia 
over the following decades. To overcome these initial theoretical limitations, therefore, it 
is necessary to turn to Reinaga’s previous writings and trace the development of these 
problems in his work. It is imperative to explore more fully the historicity of terms such 
as Indian, peasant and cholo/mestizo that lie at the base of his thought. Before moving 
                                                
63 “Indios de América, ¡uníos!”  
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into a more complete analysis of La Revolución India and Reinaga’s Indianist legacy, 
therefore, it is first of all necessary to understand it retrospectively from the view of a 
certain disillusionment with the National Revolutionary project of 1952, in which the 
author initially had a great deal of investment. We shall see that, for this author, there is 
a turning point in his work which forces him to reject the legacy of National 
Revolutionary discourse. This is not so much an abandonment of his previous 
convictions, however, but rather part of a process of reconsideration which becomes 
particularly apparent at a certain historical juncture. Finally, from here it will be possible 
to put forward a more careful, nuanced reading of this author’s intellectual project. 
 
II.4 Fausto Reinaga: A Man of the Revolution 
 The 1952 National Revolution probably stands as the most important social, 
economic and political transformation in twentieth-century Bolivian history. As Sándor 
John recounts (2009), in April of 1952, the MNR had planned to carry out a coup d’état 
without necessarily calling on the masses to mobilize to their aid. However, with their 
allies the Falange Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian Socialist Phalanx, FSB) backing out at 
the last minute, and receiving unexpected resistance from the army in whose ranks the 
MNR usually had strong support, they were almost ready to give up the attempt. As the 
army advanced on La Paz, however, “the civilian population waged street battles that 
rapidly became an all-out insurrection” (Bolivia’s Radical Tradition, 119). Suddenly, the 
sequence of events was no longer in the hands of the MNR. As political scientist 
Gonzalo Trigoso recounts: “Regardless of the MNR’s original vision of the process, in 
 85 
April 1952 the country was in the hands, not of the MNR’s military coplotters, but of 
hastily cobbled together militias of townspeople, and miners. Armed and radicalized, 
these people demanded more than another coup or rebellion — they wanted a 
revolution” (quoted in Bolivia’s Radical Tradition, ibid.).  
 Seizing the military arsenal of the capital’s Ayacucho plaza, which provided the 
civilian militias with arms and ammunition, the popular insurrection took the city and 
completely disbanded armed forces, which would have to be entirely rebuilt by the 
MNR. There was no doubt about it: the workers’ militias were the ones who were really 
in control. The Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Worker’s Center, COB), the largest 
and most powerful trade union which became a hub of leftist and worker activity, was 
established under the leadership of the left-wing MNR member Juan Lechín, on whom 
the other party members depended to keep the workers’ movement under control. 
Though the MNR took up the seat of government in the Palacio Quemado, the 
presidental palace, under the leadership of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, there was nevertheless 
a genuine situation of dual power during the first years of the Revolutionary government 
(ibid., 120).  
 The events of April 1952 were an important historical juncture which should also 
be regarded as part of a process that had been unfolding since at least the years directly 
preceding the Chaco War (1932 – 35), namely, the construction of a modern Bolivian 
nation-state. By this, I refer to a new political arena in which mass participation in the 
processes of the state became materially possible, perhaps for the first time in Bolivian 
history. A fundamental part of this process was the development of a modern printing 
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press and its concomitant culture industry, which established a new community of 
literate readers and writers who were actively engaged in the affairs of the state. The 
most important of such individuals, without doubt, were a new young intellectual elite 
which would be important in consolidating, alongside populist military leaders in the 
years following the Chaco War, the ideological parameters of the new Revolutionary 
Nationalism. Such figures as Augusto Céspedes and Carlos Montenegro were 
participating as early as 1936 (that is, directly following the Chaco War) in the political 
publication La Calle. They would later, in the 1940s, form the National Revolutionary 
Movement, which would be the party to adopt power following the insurrections of 
April 1952. They would also, therefore, be the party to reform the state in line with the 
new National Revolutionary ideology which drove these transformations.  
 To this extent, Benedict Anderson’s assessment of the nation as an imagined 
community is very much in line with the developments that took place in Bolivia 
throughout those years.64 Indeed, Luis Tapia, in his analysis of René Zavaleta Mercado’s 
work, which is also much more than a mere analysis of the content of this important 
Bolivian sociologist’s writing, makes the same observation. “Benedict Anderson’s idea 
that the novel and the press were the medium for representing the nation as an imagined 
community, corresponds to the Bolivian process,” he writes (Tapia 2002, 46),65 an 
interpretation of the modern nation-building process which can be complemented, in the 
Latin Americanist tradition, by Ángel Rama’s reflections on the Latin American city as 
                                                
64 Refer to Anderson 1991.   
65 “La idea de Benedict Anderson de que la novela y los periódicos fueron los medios para representar la 
nación como una comunidad imaginada, corresponde al proceso boliviano.”  
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the lettered city.66 The printing press and new literary trends created the conditions for a 
kind of participation on the national scene by a sector of the population who had never 
before been able to have such influence. This process was accelerated, of course, by the 
Chaco War which, by mobilizing the population to fight in the name of a country which 
for many before the war did not represent a tangible political entity, had suddenly 
created a reading audience who felt an entitlement to participate in national public life. 
The development of this national conscience, as it was explicitly theorized by its 
intellectuals, can be traced from Augusto Céspedes’s Chaco novel Sangre de mestizos 
published in 1936 (note here that it is projected as a specifically mestizo conscience) to 
René Zavaleta Mercado’s widely discussed work Formación de la conciencia nacional 
boliviana published in 1967 (written while the latter was already living in exile after the 
MNR government was toppled by the René Barrientos regime in 1964).  
 Yet it was not only a newly emerging middle class or petit-bourgeois class which 
made the conditions of modern national-popular state building possible in Bolivia. Many 
such new intellectuals depended, for their support, on the workers’ and peasants’ unions 
and institutions that had been developing since the 1920s, but whose proliferation was 
once again accelerated following the Chaco War. It is for this reason that we witness in 
the 1940s the explosion of modern political parties which would define the political 
scene throughout most of the next century, the MNR included. Among these parties 
should be included the Marxist/Communist parties which developed in light of worker 
mobilization and the entry of Marxist writings in Bolivia, often through the circulation 
                                                
66 Refer to Rama 1984.  
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of the ideas of Lenin and Trotsky, the news of the Russian Revolution, or through 
movements that were already taking place in Peru, Chile and Argentina. Four parties in 
particular emerged that would be of importance. The Bolivian Socialist Phallanx 
(Falange Socialista Boliviana, 1937) was a right-wing party that drew its influence from 
fascism. The Revolutionary Workers’ Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, POR, 
1935) was a Trotskyite party with tenuous relations to the Fourth International, a small 
party which remained nevertheless somewhat influential post-1952 through their 
connections to the miners’ union. There was also the Left Revolutionary Party (Partido 
de Izquierda Revolucionario, PIR [1940]) and the Bolivian Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Boliviano, PCB [1950]). The popular masses and their organizations, notably 
peasant-indigenous ones, would eventually be the forces that made the national 
revolution in 1952 possible, among other things completely eradicating the Bolivian 
Armed Forces. The leaders of the MNR would simply take up the president’s abandoned 
seat thereafter. 
 This was the social and political context in which Fausto Reinaga received his 
education. Reinaga had a very difficult background which was nevertheless exemplary 
of the times in which he lived; born José Félix Reinaga on March 27 1907, from an 
indigenous Quechua-speaking family in the north Potosí area, he was one of four 
siblings, two sisters and one brother, and the only one of the four to survive to 
adulthood. From what can be reconstructed from the autobiographical details provided 
by the author, his brother was shot while carrying out compulsory military service. His 
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sisters were raped and murdered by gamonales.67 Despite not beginning school studies 
until the age of 16 and at very irregular intervals, before which he was supposedly 
unable to speak Spanish,68 he eventually managed to attend his secondary education at 
the prestigious Colegio Nacional Simón Bolívar in the city of Oruro (1924 – 27). The 
results he obtained during his time there show him to have excelled across all areas of 
his studies.69 By 1932 Fausto Reinaga was attending the Universidad San Xavier de 
Chuquisaca in Sucre, where he undertook his studies to become a lawyer.  
 It was in the context described above, then, that is, in the context of the 
development of the national-popular state which would explode into life in 1952, that 
Fausto Reinaga began his university career. The Universidad San Xavier de Chuquisaca 
was a university with a special history: one of the most learned universities in the whole 
of Latin America at the time of independence, it had also traditionally been a place 
where ideas of dissent circulated, and it is no coincidence that many of the most 
important figures of the nineteenth-century Wars of Independence had studied in that 
same university. The 1930s were apparently no different; it is here that Reinaga comes 
into contact with Marxism for the first time. In an essay published following his 
experiences in the USSR during his visit in the late 1950s, Reinaga reflects on his first 
encounter with Marxism and with hearing word of the Russian Revolution:  
I was born in the town of Macha – Potosí. From my mother’s side the 
blood of Tomás Catari runs through my veins, the caudillo who managed 
                                                
67 See Reinaga’s Pensamiento amaútico (1972), 62. 
68 See Reinaga’s Sentimiento mesiánico (1960), 79. Also “Intelligensia” (1967), 18, 23.  
69 Gustavo Cruz’s investigation into the life and writings of Fausto Reinaga includes a summary of his 
examination results throughout his years as a student there, where he attained “honorífico” in six subjects 
and “sobresaliente” in five, including history, philosophy, French and Spanish (Cruz 2013, 69).  
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and led the peasant rebellion of 1780 – 81. This peasant uprising of the 
Indian race was the first of Bolivian national independence. Just like my 
parents, from a young age I worked in agriculture and mining. At 16 I 
learned to read. In the city of Sucre around 1930, my work colleagues, 
typography workers, spoke to me for the first time about the Russian 
Revolution and of Lenin, and they lent me the few books that were 
passing from hand to hand. Around that time I was an atheist; I no longer 
had God, I lived without faith nor hope; I walked without direction, 
without north; devoured by a cruel skepticism. When I became familiar 
with Lenin and learned of the miracle of the Great Russian Revolution, I 
felt from within my most deepest of cells the heat, the sacred heat of an 
Ideal… Lenin does incredible things in me… Contemplating his portrait I 
see an intense light coming out from his eyes which illuminates my soul 
with courage, truth and justice… As I am emotive, sensitive, I began to 
sob when I saw the mute film “Lenin in October”… In the religious 
silence of my library, how many times I have cried and found myself in 
meditation, in ecstasy before the effigy of Lenin. (“Mística remembranza 
de Lenin”, published in Sentimiento mesiánico del pueblo ruso [1960, 
79])70  
 
  Reinaga would be profoundly impacted by his contact with Marxist-Leninism 
and quickly became a political activist, an orator who spoke out against the Chaco War 
and was even imprisoned and tortured for having done so, only released after having 
written a “Letter of Confession.”71 He was also a teacher of philosophy in the Colegio de 
Junín, where he would teach on Marxist theory and, at least if we can believe what is 
                                                
70 “He nacido en el pueblo de Macha - Potosí -. Por mi madre corre en mis venas la sangre de Tomás 
Catari, el caudillo que gestó y encabezó la rebelión campesina de 1780 - 81. Aquel alzamiento campesino 
de la raza india, fue el primero de la independencia nacional de Bolivia. Igual que mis padres trabajé desde 
niño en la agricultura y en la mina. A los 16 años aprendí a leer. En la ciudad de Sucre hacia 1930, mis 
compañeros de trabajo, obreros tipógrafos me hablaron por primera vez de la Revolución rusa y de Lenin 
y me prestaron los pocos libros que pasaban de mano en mano. Por aquel tiempo yo era ateo; ya no tenía 
Dios, vivía sin fe ni esperanza; caminaba a la deriva, sin norte; devorado por un escepticismo cruel. 
Cuando conocí a Lenin y supe del milagro de la Gran Revolución rusa, sentí desde mis más lejanas células 
el calor, el santo calor de un Ideal… Lenin hace en mí cosas increíbles… Contemplando su retrato veo 
salir de sus ojos una luz intensa con la que se ilumina mi alma de valor, de verdad y de justicia… Como 
soy emotivo, sensible, me puse a llorar a sollozos cuando ví la película muda “Lenin en Octubre”… En el 
silencio religioso de mi biblioteca, cuántas veces he llorado y me he quedado en meditación, en éxtasis 
ante la efigie de Lenin”. 
71 The event is recounted by his niece Hilda Reinaga in a small booklet on Fausto Reinaga’s life and work 
published by the Fundación Fausto Reinaga (Hilda Reinaga 2011, 10). 
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contained in his own writings, had an important impact on his students. After being 
taken to prison for his rebellious behavior, the students, insisting on continuing classes, 
would crowd into the prison cell where Reinaga was kept, and he would dictate classes 
from his prison cell. As Reinaga recounts in La revolución amaútica (quoted in Hilda 
Reinaga’s Fausto Reinaga [2011], 9 - 10):  
…the Colegio de Junín students, when they had philosophy class, moved 
en masse to the prison; they burst in and filled up my cell; and so we 
would spend the classes there. The head of the School District and the 
Director of the Colegio de Junín, to put an end to the scene, managed to 
obtain an order from the Crime Judge for me to go to the establishment, 
that is, to the College, to give my classes, escorted by two armed guards. 
My escort would return to the prison enclosure at night firing shots at 
random to the shouts of “long live Communism” and “long live 
Reinaga.”72 
 
 Two observations should be made about the early work of Reinaga, before his 
political engagement with Bolivian Revolutionary Nationalism. The first is that Reinaga 
was a militant activist strongly grounded in Marxist-Leninist theory. Indeed, we can go 
as far as to say that a Marxist-Leninist philosophy of history defined the general 
framework of Reinaga’s thought up until at least the 1960s, including throughout his 
engagement with Revolutionary Nationalism. According to his own writings, he was 
even a founding member of the PIR.73 
                                                
72 “…los alumnos del Colegio Junín, cuando les tocaba Filosofía, en masa se trasladaban a la cárcel; 
irrumpían y llenaban mi celda; y, pues, allí pasábamos las clases. El jefe del Distrito Escolar y el Director 
del Colegio de Junín, para poner coto al escándolo, obtuvieron del Juez del Crimen, que yo con doble 
escolta armada me trasladase al establecimiento, esto es, al Colegio a dar mis clases. Mi escolta tornaba al 
recinto carcelario de noche largando tiros, y con vivas al comunismo y a mi persona.” 
73 Reinaga makes this claim in his work Tesis India (1971, 96). This fact is highlighted by Gustavo Cruz, 
who quotes the extract at length (2013, 80).  
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 The second observation is that Reinaga’s work would be defined from the 
earliest years by a perspective which would center on the “Indian question.” His 
understanding of this problem would not be unchanging throughout his time of writing; 
indeed, as we will see here, Reinaga proves to be a particularly difficult writer in that he 
adopts a malleable discourse which continuously changes throughout time as he 
encounters new intellectual and political obstacles. His key referents in regard to the 
Indian question would include Peruvian indigenistas such as José Carlos Mariátegui and 
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, as well as important Bolivian figures such as Franz 
Tamayo. It is clear that his principal engagement with the Indian question, however, 
beginning with his own humble indigenous background, and including his political 
formation with the government of Gualberto Villarroel and his experience working on 
the agrarian land reform under the MNR government, was an experiential, almost carnal 
or bodily engagement. This engagement which, it can be said, goes beyond a merely 
discursive one, and is largely affective, is an important axis for understanding the 
reception of Reinaga’s later work. It should also be noted that as Reinaga moves ever 
more closely towards the articulation of his radical Indianist ideology, he increasingly 
distances himself from the figures that had once been a fundamental reference for his 
understanding of the Indian question. One can refer here to his criticism of a figure 
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Reinaga had once held in high esteem, Franz Tamayo, in 1956,74 or to his increased 
distance from certain figures of the Peruvian indigenista tradition.75  
  Without doubt the most important political collaboration which would impact 
Reinaga’s work, and which he would mention on several occasions in his writings even 
in his later years, was his involvement in the Revolutionary Nationalism of the 
Gualberto Villarroel government. It is difficult to assess precisely to what extent this 
government represented a turning point in national life, that is, its importance as a 
predecessor to the 1952 revolution. Villarroel was a popular military caudillo who, like 
many of the popular military governments that would participate in national political life 
in the years preceding 1952, had fought in the Chaco War. He is remembered both as a 
revolutionary leader who placed the Indian question at the center of political 
consideration, and also as a fascist sympathizer (alongside the MNR, who were in part 
inspired by Nazi ideology during their early years), and often compared to Juan 
Domingo Perón in Argentina. Speaking about the 1947 Ayopaya indigenous revolution 
which is now regarded as an important precursor to the 1952 National Revolution, 
Claudio Ferrufino-Coqueugniot writes:  
The antecedents to the indigenous rebellion of 1947 in Ayopaya are long 
and complex. There was an old tradition of insurrections, but, this time, 
the root cause came from the Indigenous Congress of 1945 and the laws 
dictated during the government of Gualberto Villarroel. One can speak, in 
sum, of the fact that from that moment there began to brew a process in 
                                                
74 See Reinaga’s Franz Tamayo y la Revolución boliviana (1956), which is analyzed in further detail 
below. 
75 Gustavo Cruz’s in-depth analysis of Fausto Reinaga’s use of sources shows there to be an important turn 
away from these indigenista intellectuals in his Indianist phase. Luis E. Valcárcel and José Mariátegui, 
among others, nevertheless have a very strong presence in his work throughout the earlier periods of his 
writing (see Cruz 2013, 136–139).  
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which the indigenous desired to be the artifice of his or her own destiny, 
to freely elect his or her authorities.76  
 
He adds, however: “Although the laws of the Villarroel government were not 
ambiguous, one cannot say that they were totally clear”.77 In other words, Villarroel is 
one of many other leaders who placed themselves within and helped to define a new 
political ideology which was, nevertheless, not the property of any one single mind and 
never an entirely clear, coherent set of discourses.  
 Regardless of the particular historical interpretation that can be ascribed to 
Villarroel’s government, what is clear is that Reinaga’s experience in that government 
and as a member of the MNR made him a sympathizer of Revolutionary Nationalist 
ideology. As he recounts in Tierra y Libertad (1953), there were two events in particular 
which stood out for Reinaga as markers of great change: the Indigenous Congress of 
May 1945 and the Concentration of Kollana of October 1945, in which indigenous 
members of various ethnic groups reunited to discuss national political issues, something 
that, Reinaga claims, had not been witnessed since the times of the Inca (Tierra y 
Libertad 1953, 26).  
 It is clear that for Reinaga these events marked the beginning of a kind of pan-
indigenous consciousness in Bolivia. As Reinaga himself writes: “The National Indian 
Congress was a great historical-social event. From each confine of the Bolivian territory 
                                                
76 “Largos y complejos son los antecedentes de la rebelión indígena del 47 en Ayopaya. Había una antigua 
tradición de levantamientos, pero, esta vez, los gérmenes venían del Congreso Indígena del 45 y las leyes 
dictadas durante el gobierno de Gualberto Villarroel. Se podría hablar, en síntesis, de que a partir de 
entonces comenzaba a gestarse un proceso en el que el indígena deseaba ser artífice de su propio destino, 
de elegir libremente a sus autoridades.” 
77 “Si bien las leyes del gobierno Villarroel no eran ambiguas, no se podía decir que fuesen del todo 
claras.” 
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the two and a half million Indians abandoned their zoological, or perhaps vegetal, state 
of sleep” (ibid., 43).78 This formation of pan-indigenous consciousness is one which 
promises to “finally” restore the natural ownership of the land back to the indigenous 
peoples, the majority in the country. This is suggested by the opening lines of Tierra y 
Libertad, in which he states the following: “Villarroel, who saw clearly, strongly and 
deeply the national problem, could not get by without the Indian; given that the Indian 
constitutes the authentic majority of the Bolivian population” (17),79 and that “[the] 
Indian, throughout Tiwanakan, Incan, colonial and Republican life is the material and 
the spirit, the body and the soul of social existence” (18).80 What is already at stake here 
is a prototype of the historical interpretation of the two Bolivias, but one which is 
inscribed, at this stage, within a National Revolutionary horizon.  
 Villarroel was publicly executed in 1946 at the hands of a popular uprising 
provoked by members of the traditional political parties in reaction to the repressive 
measures that were being taken by his administration, bringing an end to three years of 
revolutionary government. The return of the traditional political elites meant a repressive 
clamp-down on the collaborators in Villarroel’s government, including the future 
president of the 1952 National Revolutionary state Víctor Paz Estensorro and, of course, 
Reinaga himself. Reinaga, like many other MNR members, was forced into exile in 
                                                
78 “El Congreso Nacional indio, fué todo un gran acontecimiento histórico-social. De un confín a otro del 
territorio de Bolivia los dos millones y medio de indios, abandonaron su adormecimiento zoológico, o 
quizá vegetal.” 
79 “Villarroel que vió claro, fuerte y hondo el problema nacional, no podría prescindir del indio; ya que 
éste constituye la auténtica mayoría de la población boliviana.” 
80 “El indio, a lo largo de la vida tiahuanacota, incaica, colonial y republicana es la materia y el espíritu, el 
cuerpo y el alma de la existencia social.” 
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Argentina. Reinaga makes contact there with a group of writer-intellectuals and becomes 
familiar with the government of Perón, with which at first he sympathizes.81 The trauma 
of exile is aggravated by the torture and murder of Reinaga’s father at the hands of 
gamonales, whose burial Reinaga is unable to attend because he is unable to return to his 
country of birth.  
 Most importantly for this analysis, however, is that it is from this period onwards 
that Reinaga engages in a very complex relationship with the MNR and its official 
ideology of Revolutionary Nationalism. It is important to understand that Fausto 
Reinaga’s relationship with the MNR was always contentious and difficult. He remained 
a militant activist who spoke vociferously against actions which he perceived to be 
against the interests of the working class and, of course, the “Indian.” While he 
continued, throughout the 50s, to be a strong believer in the cause of Revolutionary 
Nationalism, and in particular from a Marxist-Leninist theoretical position, he would 
nevertheless increasingly distance himself from the policies of the MNR government, 
which he saw to be working in the interests of the right-wing bourgeois. No doubt, his 
affective engagement with the Indian cause, which became the primary lens through 
which he came to regard the actions of the Revolutionary government, was a 
fundamental condition of possibility for the criticism he would aim at the party. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to understand the way in which Reinaga continued to 
work under both a Nationalist Revolutionary and Marxist-Leninist framework 
                                                
81 Reinaga’s relationship with Peronism is interesting and complex. As Gustavo Cruz notes (2013), in 
Víctor Paz Estensorro (1949), Reinaga writes that Perón was one of the great political leaders of the 40s. 
However, he was not very “enthusiastic” in his appraisal, writes Cruz, placing more positive emphasis on 
Víctor Haya de la Torre and Carlos Prestes (88).  
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throughout these years in order to better appreciate the transformations that his thought 
would undergo throughout the 1960s.  
 As has been analyzed in depth above, the National Revolutionary discourse in 
many ways operated as the collective political unconscious of the 1950s and 60s. There 
is no doubt that this new political unconscious defined to a large extent the work of 
Fausto Reinaga during his affiliation with Revolutionary Nationalist ideology. It is quite 
clear that this author follows the general schema that the National Revolution 
represented the eventual victory of the real nation against those sectors of Bolivian 
society that were “foreignizing,” exploiting the natural riches of the territory and 
handing them over to the interests of an international, and colonial, capitalist elite. In 
Nacionalismo Revolucionario: Teoría y programa (1952), for example, Reinaga makes 
it clear that for him there are two nationalisms at work in Bolivian politics: one 
oppressive and the other of liberation (10). He associates the former with the 
nationalisms of the industrialized world, particularly Nazism, and the latter with the 
nationalism of semi-colonial countries. It is clear, then, that this latter kind of 
nationalism finds itself at a head with a different, oppressive kind, and is moreover a 
question of national sovereignty. Throughout Reinaga’s work, the oppressive nature of 
the Rosca and Gamonalismo is reiterated, making out of them a kind of anti-national 
force, an idea that is compatible with the official MNR discourse. Nevertheless, an 
important difference in the work of Reinaga resides in the fact that the “real” Bolivian 
nation is not merely all of those groups which find themselves against the Rosca, as is 
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the case with MNR populist ideology, but refers exclusively to the working class and, 
more importantly even for him, the Indian population. 
 It is necessary to contextualize the Revolutionary Nationalism and the Marxist-
Leninism of Reinaga, then, within the very particular history of the movement and of 
Reinaga’s own personal and political turmoil in the MNR, where his membership was 
never guaranteed or certain. Indeed, in the years directly preceding the National 
Revolution, Reinaga published a fierce criticism of what he perceived to be the lack of a 
coherent program in the MNR, and which also amounts to a vociferous personal attack 
on the figure of Víctor Paz Estensorro (who would become president in 1952), entitled, 
appropriately, Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1949). He had already been thrown out of the 
party in 1947, allegedly for his fierce criticism of the right-wing sectors of the party, an 
expulsion which he nevertheless refused to recognize as legitimate (Cruz 2013, 94). 
After returning secretly to Bolivia in 1949, from where he published the pamphlet Víctor 
Paz Estenssoro, very quickly he found himself in a delicate situation when precisely 
those sectors of the MNR that he had fiercely criticized only three years earlier inherited 
the power of the state. On May 6th of 1952, therefore, Reinaga published an apologia to 
the MNR government in the daily paper El Diario, entitled “Me he equivocado” [I was 
wrong].  
 It is important to read this apologia and his return to the ranks of the MNR in all 
their complexity, in the historical necessities and conditions of the time. This short text 
is more than merely the reflection of Reinaga going back on his word and returning with 
his tail between his legs. In an edited version of the same letter (published May 6, 1952), 
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re-published and adapted in Tierra and Libertad (1953) hardly a year later, Reinaga 
states: “On May 6 of 1951, under the public eye, I worked for MNR candidature, 
because this is what the political moment of the worker’s cause demanded” (14).82 In 
other words, the choice to return as an MNR candidate was not based on an affiliation 
with its most important members, but a strategic decision which was motivated by 
Reinaga’s continued active participation in the Bolivian worker’s cause. It was only 
from within the MNR, from Reinaga’s perspective, that it was historically possible to 
fight the worker’s cause, and to defeat the right wing of the party’s membership in favor 
of its revolutionary leftist tendencies represented by the Bolivian Workers’ Central 
(COB) and Juan Lechín, among others. Obviously, this would be a position that with 
time Reinaga would also reject.  
 It is important to analyze in some detail the content of the apologia that he 
published in 1952. What it reveals is not a mark of approval for the MNR government as 
a whole, but rather a modification of his position which clarifies and reiterates the simple 
fact that there existed two wings of the MNR party membership, one which was right-
wing, and another that was left: “neither I nor others wandered far from the truth,” he 
states, “when we indicated that the MNR has two wings: right and left” (published in 
Cruz 2013, 99).83 “I am a revolutionary, as such, I was never outside of the files of the 
National Revolution” (ibid.),84 he claims, a statement followed by a list of actions by 
                                                
82 “El 6 de mayo de 1951, a ojos vista trabajé por la canditatura del MNR, porque así exigía el momento 
política de la causa obrera.” 
83 “…ni yo ni los otros anduvimos lejos de la verdad, cuando indicamos, que el MNR tiene tiene dos alas: 
derecha y izquierda.”  
84 “Soy un revolucionario, como tal, nunca estuve fuera de las filas de la Revolución Nacional.”  
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which Reinaga had participated as a politically active member of the MNR. Finally, he 
finishes the article by making a call to the left-revolutionary sectors in Bolivia to protect 
the party of the MNR and Paz Estensorro’s leadership: 
The capture of Political Power has today become the intellectual and 
institutional barricade; but the bellicose barricade has not passed. The 
Rosca is only wounded, not dead. As such, the duty of the historical hour 
of the Bolivian people [note the use of the pueblo, and the nation and 
anti-nation conflict – P.B.], of all the men and parties of the left, is to 
support and defend the party of Paz Estenssoro. (published in Cruz 2013, 
100)85   
 
 What Reinaga is stating is that he was wrong about two things. First of all, he 
was wrong to claim that the MNR would never manage to take state power without a 
coherent program. This statement is already clearly a kind of double-edged sword. His 
claim is that the MNR still do not have a coherent program to follow. Reinaga would 
attempt to amend this with a radical program, one that the MNR elite never took 
seriously, entitled Nacionalismo Revolucionario: Teoría y programa (Revolutionary 
Nationalism: Theory and Program), which will be discussed below. His second claim is 
that he was wrong not to support the MNR, and thereby calls upon the left-wing sectors 
of society to throw their support behind the regime in order to stop the foreign and 
foreignizing menace of the anti-national Rosca from returning. Here we witness a 
Reinaga willing to be complicit with the official National Revolutionary ideology of the 
moment, calling for various different social sectors to come together to defend the 
government of Paz Estenssoro. And yet, it is clear that for Reinaga the motive for 
                                                
85 “La captura del Poder Político, viene hoy, la barricada intelectual e institucional; pero la barricada bélica 
no ha pasado. La Rosca solo está herida, no muerta. Por tanto, el deber de la hora histórica del pueblo de 
Bolivia, de todos los hombres y partidos de izquierda, es apoyar y defender al partido pazentenssorista 
(sic)” 
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making this call is not to defend the MNR ideologues. Indeed, if one is to read between 
the lines, it remains clear that Reinaga does not retract the criticism that he made of the 
right-wing sectors of the MNR, of which Paz Estenssoro and Montenegro formed a part. 
His call for the nation to pull together to defend Bolivia from the anti-national forces of 
the Rosca implies, therefore, a very different conception of what the nation is to that of 
the ideological writings of Montenegro. As we shall see, this is a tension that will 
continue to define the work of Reinaga throughout his commitment to Revolutionary 
Nationalism and eventually cause his rejection of it.  
 In 1952 Reinaga publishes, under the pseudonym Ruy Ripac, a complete 
theoretical elaboration and program for the National Revolution called Nacionalismo 
Revolucionario: Teoría y programa. This short pamphlet represents no less than a 
totalizing vision of the national historical moment in order to understand what it means 
to speak of the National Revolution, thereby outlining a program of practical action 
which is consistent with his analysis. As can be expected, this historical interpretation of 
the national reality draws heavily from a Marxist philosophy of history and places its 
emphasis on the working class and Indian communities as being the true representatives 
of the national spirit. His theoretical elaboration takes place across three areas of 
analysis: economy, history and philosophy. In the economic domain, the author states 
that Bolivia’s condition is defined by its infra- and super-structural situation: semi-
colonial, mono-producer, dependent (4). He also criticizes the Rosca as the dominant 
class which has kept Bolivia in its semi-colonial condition, being extra-national and 
imperialist in nature (5). What we have here in Reinaga’s writing is an early elaboration 
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of what he is often famed for: developing a strong anti-colonial discourse, explaining 
why he is celebrated within postcolonial studies circles. However, what this close 
analysis also reveals is that this early anti-imperialism is entirely complicit with the 
development of a new national imaginary which continued to reproduce elements of so-
called internal colonialism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Reinaga places a particular emphasis 
in this section on the question of agrarian reform and the Indian. He calls in this 
pamphlet for a radical redistribution of land, a program which went far beyond what the 
MNR were willing to consider. He writes: “The Indian and the land are two inseparable 
elements. No partial solution is admissible nor rational” (6).86 He continues by making a 
powerful criticism of the system of the latifundio87 and calling to bring an end to the 
feudal system. However, his suggestion is not to abolish the latifundio through 
development programs like the MNR, but rather by making it possible for the 
indigenous-peasant populations to sustain themselves agriculturally.  
 As regards the historical domain, Reinaga continues to promote the notion that 
the history of Bolivia is the history of the true nation against all of those foreignizing 
elements of the anti-national rosco-gamonal. He begins his analysis by claiming that the 
National Revolution was a product of a series of popular uprisings that had been taking 
place since independence and was, presumably, represented by the “real” Bolivian 
nation. He affirms: “Our doctrine finds its historical roots in the Indian, mestizo and 
                                                
86 “El indio y la tierra son dos elementos inseparables. Ninguna solución parcial es admisible ni racional.” 
87 A latifundio is a great expanse of privately-owned land, which was very common in Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies. 
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criollo revolutionary epics of national liberation” (9).88 It is worth noting immediately 
here that unlike in his earlier publication Mitayos y Yanaconas (1940), the roots of 
national liberation are not only Indian in this account. Reinaga is clearly playing here to 
a broad-based nationalism that, even if it holds the figure of the Indian as a central one, 
is nevertheless defined by the possibility of a cohesive national people which operates 
beyond ethnic or even class lines, a fictive ethnicity. This will be another element of 
Reinaga’s personal philosophy of history that will be adapted as he increasingly comes 
to see the mestizo Bolivian nation as a threat to the possibility of an Indian revolution. 
He also defends here the use of the term nationalism against its possible interpretation as 
a right-wing framework, as briefly discussed above. For Reinaga, the nationalism of 
semi-colonial countries such as Bolivia is left-wing precisely because it is a popular 
nationalism (11). Once again, this confirms that Reinaga was convinced of the 
possibility of constructing a nation which was truly “of the people,” understanding by 
this expression the working classes and Indian masses.  
 Finally, the philosophical domain of the National Revolutionary agenda is 
defined for Reinaga by Marxism, showing his own personal ideas to still be strongly 
rooted in a Marxist-Leninist root. Above all, his emphasis is on a rejection of the Idealist 
European tradition which privileges thought over action in favor of a Marxist praxis. In 
other words, for Reinaga, the purpose of philosophy is not only grounded in the realm of 
ideas, but should transform the society in which it is produced. He writes: “We are not in 
                                                
88 “Nuestra doctrina arranca su raíz histórica de las epopeyas revolucionarias indias, mestizas y criollas de 
liberación nacional.” 
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agreement with the philosophers who have only fixed on interpreting the world and 
society; we think and we declare ourselves to be in agreement with those philosophers 
that sustain that: ‘philosophy should transform the world and society’” (14).89 This 
philosophical intervention should take the form of a cultural revolution for Reinaga: “our 
philosophy is the propelling and driving energy of substantial creation and concretion of 
autochthonous values,” he writes (15).90 It should be noted that always accompanied by 
the political fantasy of the national body lies the idea of the autochthonous, that which 
properly belongs to the people, somehow alienated by its condition of oppression or 
colonialism.  
 Fausto Reinaga makes eleven proposals for the program of the National 
Revolution, among which are included the defense of the nationalization of the mines, 
immediate nationalization of the latifundios, nationalism of culture, an Indians’ army, 
and a port for Bolivia, among others. In his proposal for an organized political program 
and party one can observe in Reinaga’s writings a number of unresolved tensions which 
would continue to haunt his work throughout his later years. On the one hand, there is a 
call to the MNR to remain true to the spirit of the revolution itself, which should 
represent the people of the Bolivian nation whose struggles and insurrections are the 
very condition of possibility of the Revolution. He writes: 
And here a reflection. Neither the Indian, nor the miner, nor the factory or 
workshop worker, nor the poorer sectors of the middle class, can follow 
                                                
89 “Nosotros no estamos de acuerdo con los filósofos que sólo se han concretado a interpretar el mundo y 
la sociedad; pensamos y declaramos estar de acuerdo con aquellos filósofos que sostienen que: ‘la filosofía 
debe transformar el mundo y la sociedad.’” 
90 “la filosofía nuestra es la energía propulsora e impulsora de creación y concreción sustantivas de los 
valores autóctonos.” 
 105 
anybody merely by virtue of their ‘pretty face.’ In the class struggle, in 
politics, nobody follows anybody out of pure platonic love. A 
revolutionary political party has the obligation to be familiar with and to 
feel sincerely and profoundly the necessities of the people, but above all, 
the necessities of the working class and the Indian, given that in them 
reside the right and the reason of the majority. (20)91 
 
 The problematic nexus of Reinaga’s political fantasy of a cohesive Revolutionary 
Nation resides, however, in the difficulty of claiming or knowing who or what represents 
the authentic core of this Bolivian nation. For example, in this text Reinaga calls for the 
necessity of a disciplined party with a rigid program which is capable of leading the 
Revolution. The particular influence of Lenin becomes apparent here in his writings: 
“Only an organized party, needs the creation of an authority, the transformation of the 
prestige of the idea [i.e. of the Revolution] in the prestige of authority, the submission 
of the inferior organs to the superior organs of the Party” (22, Reinaga’s emphasis).92 
Yet this is quite clearly laden with a number of problems at a theoretical and practical 
level: on whose authority, on what right, does one claim to be able to speak for the 
authentic “people” of National Revolution? Who is able to claim to be able to identify 
what is authentically autochthonous and what is not, and thereby take the necessary 
revolutionary/counter-revolutionary measures to fight the anti-nation? There remains in 
Fausto Reinaga’s work, here and later, the pretension to be able to produce a sound 
                                                
91 “Y aquí una reflexión. Ni el indio, ni el minero, ni el obrero de fábrica o taller, ni los sectores pobres de 
la clase media, pueden seguir a nadie por su sola ‘bonita cara.’ En la lucha de clases, en política, nadie 
sigue a nadie por el puro amor platónico. Un partido político revolucionario está en la obligación de 
conocer y de sentir sincera y profundamente las necesidades del pueblo, pero sobre todo, las necesidades 
de la clase obrera e india, ya que en ellas reside el derecho y la razón de mayoría” 
92 “Sólo un partido organizado, entraña la creación de una autoridad, la transformación del prestigio de 
la idea en prestigio de la autoridad, la sumisión de los organismos inferiores a los organismos superiores 
del Partido.” 
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historical analysis capable of making such political identifications. The futile search to 
accomplish the political fantasy of the “true” and “authentic” Revolutionary Nation, 
suppressed in secret for so many years of Bolivian history, reveals itself to have 
potentially violent and totalitarian pretensions. This is never problematized as such in the 
work of Fausto Reinaga.  
 On the other hand, it is clear that the Indian question remains at the heart of 
Reinaga’s political activism even during this moment of Revolutionary Nationalism. 
What must be considered in more depth, then, is the way in which Reinaga was able to 
reconcile these two poles; a broad-based nationalism on the one hand, and a population 
that had historically been excluded from the process of the nation-state formation on the 
other. There is a tension here between the idea of the “Nation” in Reinaga’s earlier 
writings and that of the “Indian.” Is the Nation itself always already an Indian nation, or 
is it the Indian that should finally, after years of exclusion, be admitted as part of the 
genuine Bolivian Nation? While Reinaga’s position is never entirely clear, often going 
back and forth, with many indications of the fact that the Indian composes the true life 
and blood of the Nation, it would seem that in practice during this moment of his writing 
Reinaga leans more towards the latter than the former. Regarding the question of land 
distribution, he affirms: “The National Revolution cannot avoid a just distribution of the 
land, between those that work it and fertilize it with their sweat, just as it cannot omit nor 
defer for another occasion, the reincorporation of the Indian into the civil life of the 
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Nation” (6-7).93 The National Revolutionary idea here takes precedence, absorbs all 
different classes and sectors of the population, and becomes able to project a collective 
destiny that is capable of alleviating for each and every one of its members the historical 
injustice they had experienced under the oppression of anti-national forces. 
 This tension between the Indian and the Nation continues to haunt the writings of 
Reinaga, especially as, throughout the 1950s, he increasingly distances himself from the 
MNR. It must be said though, at this stage, that Reinaga continues to privilege his own 
personal ideology of Revolutionary Nationalism over the particularities of the Indian 
cause. In this way, Reinaga looks at this moment of his writing to regard the right-wing 
and dominant sectors of the MNR as betraying the initial impulse of the Revolution, 
rather than regarding the continued exclusion of oppressed classes as a systematic 
problem of power within the discourse of Revolutionary Nationalism more generally.  
 His following publication, Tierra y Libertad (Land and Freedom), published in 
1953, is an in-depth exploration of the agrarian question in Bolivia following a 
government-sponsored trip to Mexico in which he had the opportunity to witness first-
hand the agrarian process taking place there. As always for a critical thinker like 
Reinaga, it has been suggested that his experience with the Mexican government made 
him suspicious that the interests of the indigenous population were never the greatest 
priority for the Mexican elites.94 Nevertheless, the journey clearly made an impression 
                                                
93 “La Revolución Nacional no puede dejar de hacer una justa distribución de la tierra, entre los que la 
trabajan y la fecundan con su sudor, como no puede preterir ni diferir para otra ocasión, la reincorporación 
del indio a la vida civil de la Nación…” 
94 Gustavo Cruz (2013) writes: “According to Reinaga’s interpretation, the Mexican politicians used the 
Indian discursively, but in their politics they did not do justice to the Mexican Indian (Según interpreta 
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on Reinaga, and the Zapatistas probably inspired the title of the publication. The main 
part of Tierra y Libertad is composed of three chapters. The first is a reflection on the 
government of Villarroel and of Reinaga’s participation in it, described briefly above. 
The most important contribution here is his feeling that the government of Villarroel 
awakened a dormant pan-indigenous consciousness, and that the Indian cause was 
Villarroel’s first priority. The second chapter is a description of the “Indian revolutions” 
of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here we see Reinaga returning to 
the notion, already laid out in Mitayas y Yanaconas (1940), that the principal historical 
revolutions in Bolivia were in reality Indian revolutions at heart. Here we find elements 
of a properly Indian history which would be developed in later years. Finally, the third 
chapter is an analysis of the legacy of gamonalismo as a feudal institution that keeps the 
Indians in slavery. Reinaga emphasizes the fact that the currently existing syndical 
organizations, as well as the structure of the ayllu in the indigenous communities, 
currently have the organization to manage themselves and even achieve a certain level of 
technical agriculture which is currently held back by the feudal system.  
 There are a number of developments in Reinaga’s writing here which are worth 
commenting upon at some length. The first of these is that he becomes more vocally 
critical of the MNR government’s direction, which he very quickly regards, hardly a 
year after the revolutionary process is underway, as not truly representing a revolution of 
the people. Already in the introduction to the volume Reinaga states: “The MNR is the 
                                                                                                                                           
Reinaga, los políticos mexicanos utilizan discursivamente al indio, pero en sus políticas no hacen justicia 
al indio de México),” (88).  
 109 
caudillo – at this stage – of the Revolution: but it is not nor does it identify with the 
masses of miners, workers, Indians; nor is it the polished spirit of the theoretical 
struggle; it is neither the very body nor the very thought of the National Revolution” 
(13).95 Reinaga takes a critical stance with certain sectors of the MNR, yet he does not, 
at this stage, distance himself more generally from the ideal of the National Revolution. 
It is still clear in Tierra y Libertad that there is a possibility, for Reinaga, of 
consolidating a nationalism which returns to the working classes and indigenous 
peasants what is properly theirs. His horizon continues to be that of the National 
Revolution.  
 Another development which must be taken into consideration is the 
radicalization of his perspective on the Indian cause. Perhaps a consequence of the 
nature of the thematic itself, Reinaga returns to a focus on the Indian question which at 
times marginalizes his more general aim of including a broader national political subject. 
The history of revolutions he describes is no longer those of Indians, mestizos and 
criollos, but exclusively a history of the Indian revolutions that lie at the base of 
National independence for Reinaga. Furthermore, in the second part of Tierra y 
Libertad, Reinaga includes a number of essays he had written on the agrarian question, 
where he reiterates that what is necessary in Bolivia is not an agrarian reform, as the 
MNR were implementing, but an agrarian revolution which would completely 
redistribute the land among the indigenous peasantry. In an essay entitled “Ministerio de 
                                                
95 “El MNR es el caudillo – en esta etapa – de la Revolución; pero no es ni se identifica con las masas 
mineras, fabriles, indias; ni es el espíritu bruñido en la lucha teórica; no es el cuerpo mismo ni el 
pensamiento mismo de la Revolución Nacional.” 
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Indios, no Ministerio de Campesinos” [Ministry of Indians, not Ministry of Peasants], 
Reinaga polemically argues against the MNR government’s decision to change the 
official vocabulary of the state, replacing the term Indian with peasant. Reinaga argues 
that the Nation is at heart, itself, Indian: “In Bolivia, the European has not Europeanized 
the Indian; on the contrary, the European is the one that has been Indianized” (60).96 As 
such, refusing Indians, albeit rhetorically, by calling them peasants, is to betray the very 
Nation of Revolutionary Nationalism itself: “Whoever does not begin by calling the 
Indian, Indian, carries the seed of treachery to the substance and form of our nationality; 
if you like, nationalism” (61).97  
 The importance of Reinaga’s rejection of the pseudo-Marxist language of the 
MNR should not be understated. What it meant to be Indian was, above all for Reinaga, 
an affective matter based on a daily experience of discrimination, of living something 
like what we could call the Indian difference. Whatever we are to understand by this 
enigmatic and apparently racist turn of phrase – “Indian difference” – it should be clear 
that there was a common experience of discrimination for indigenous peoples in Bolivia, 
or at least one common enough so that a book such as La Revolución India was able to 
speak to the experience of its hundreds and perhaps even thousands of indigenous 
readers. This fact becomes increasingly clear from this publication onwards, where the 
importance of being “Indian” for Reinaga is made increasingly explicit. As he writes in 
the conclusion to the prologue: 
                                                
96 “En Bolivia, el europeo no ha europeizado al indio; al contrario, el europeo es quien se ha indianizado.” 
97 “Quien no comienza por llamar al indio, indio, lleva gérmenes de traición a la substancia y forma de 
nuestra nacionalidad; si se quiere nacionalismo.” 
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I want to conclude this prologue with a confession: the Indian cause is 
sacred for me, because it is my own cause. For those who are my heritage 
and social standing: Tomás Catari and Macha,98 for my flesh and soul, for 
my blood and spirit, for the salt of my bones and the red tint of my 
dreams: I am so Indian, I feel so Indian, to such an extent that, for me, 
there is no other so profoundly Indian as I… in this land and in this 
pueblo, of Indian contours and depth, of Indian consistency and 
substance: BOLIVIA. (13)99 
 
 Yet the insistence on the continued use of the word Indian, rejecting the national 
shame of the Indian “problem,” is not merely affective in Reinaga’s writings. There is 
also a strategic relation, insofar as Fausto Reinaga knew that to speak of the Indian cause 
was not the same as speaking of the peasant cause. In the same essay cited above, this 
author reminds his readers: “We shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that the very gamonales 
that also work the land, they too are peasants” (62).100 It would be difficult to know for 
sure whether or not this demonstrates direct awareness on Reinaga’s part of the effects 
of a language that sought to appeal to a broad base and not one particular sector, as was 
employed by the MNR throughout those years. Certainly, it was true that by focusing on 
the modernization of the peasantry, the government of the MNR would reproduce a 
number of the inequalities that had been the daily reality for most of the indigenous 
peasantry before the National Revolution.  
                                                
98 Macha is a village in the north of the Bolivian department of Potosí where Reinaga spent his childhood 
and most of his adolescence.  
99 “Quiero concluir este prólogo con una confesión: la causa del indio es sagrada para mí, porque ella es 
mi propia causa. Por mi ascendencia y cuna: Tomás Catari y Macha, por mi carne y alma, por mi sangre y 
espíritu, por la sal de mis huesos y lo rojo de mis sueños: soy tan indio, me siento tan indio, a tal punto 
que, para mí, no hay otro tan hondamente indio.. en esta tierra y en este pueblo, de contorno y fondo, de 
consistencia y substancia indias: BOLIVIA.” 
100 “No hay que perder de vista, que los mismos gamonales no absentistas, son también campesinos.” 
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 The last in the series of publications in which Fausto Reinaga is entirely 
dedicated to the cause of Revolutionary Nationalism was published in 1956. It was a 
very powerful criticism of a tradition which with Reinaga himself had once identified: 
the legacy of Franz Tamayo.101 The publication was entitled Franz Tamayo y la 
Revolución Boliviana (Franz Tamayo and the Bolivian Revolution), and is probably one 
of the most complete and extensive works that belong to the author during these years, a 
difficult feat given that he had to find himself the means to publish his books. The work 
is a fierce criticism of Franz Tamayo, who became a vocal opponent of the revolutionary 
process. This fact was very difficult for Reinaga, given that, for him, Tamayo had been 
the first author in Bolivia to rise to the Indian cause. Given that the National Revolution 
was also, in some sense, an Indian Revolution, or at least a Revolution of the people 
(which, for Reinaga, was oftentimes the same thing), then he was necessarily forced to 
reconsider the relationship of Tamayo with the Bolivian-Indian population. The opening 
lines of this in-depth study reveal the extent to which a reconsideration of Tamayo is in 
fact a reconsideration of Reinaga’s own thought, his own engagement with the cultural 
and political heritage of his country: “As a living piece of the earth, son of the Andes, 
that is, as an Indian, I was an idolater of Franz Tamayo. But this thinker, by opposing 
himself to the Revolution, has struck me down. I suffered greatly” (5).102  As such, then, 
                                                
101 Franz Tamayo (1878 – 1956) was a Bolivian intellectual, writer and politician. He is one of the most 
important literary figures in Bolivian history and probably the first and most important writer in the first 
generation of Bolivian indigenismo. His most famous work is without doubt his Creación de la pedagogía 
nacional (Creation of National Pedagogy), originally published in 1910. 
102 “Por viviente pedazo telúrico, hijo del Ande, esto es, por indio, yo era un idólatra de Franz Tamayo. Le 
rendía culto. Pero el pensador al enfrentarse con la Revolución me dio un zarpazo. Sufrí mucho.” 
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“I have here the leitmotiv of this present essay; which is above all an examination of 
conscience; of mine, but also of the thought of the nation” (ibid.).103  
 I will not undergo here a detailed analysis of Reinaga’s complex and detailed 
reading of Tamayo’s work, whose methodology, it must be said, produces a very 
nuanced and historical reading of his place as an intellectual in national life. What is 
important here for this reading of Reinaga is the critique he develops of Tamayo’s 
Creación de la pedagogía nacional (1910), in the chapter entitled “Tamayo y el indio” 
[Tamayo and the Indian]. He writes: 
…the Indian, only the Indian, through means of the Revolution, will end 
up educating himself and educating all of the social classes which today 
rest upon him. Only when the Indian has or when he attains political 
power, only then, will there be in Bolivia a real and true Nation. To this 
and to no other place leads the substance of Tamayo’s “Pedagogy.” 
(135)104  
 
 We can detect a radicalization of Reinaga’s discourse in this extract. By 1956, 
the Indian has become the true driver of the National Revolution for Reinaga. It is also 
worth noting that this represents a turning point in Reinaga’s thought insofar as, even if 
the National Revolution remains the horizon of political thought for this author, Reinaga 
is about to undergo a radical reassessment of the legacy which he had for a long time 
held as that of the Indian population in Bolivia. The process which Reinaga begins with 
the publication of Franz Tamayo y la Revolución Boliviana is a criticism of the elites of 
                                                
103 “He ahí el leit motiv del presente ensayo; que es sobre todo un examen de conciencia; de la mía, pero 
también del pensamiento nacional.” 
104 “…el indio, sólo el indio mediante la Revolución terminará educándose y educando a todas las clases 
sociales que hoy descansan sobre él. Sólo cuando el indio tenga o cuando alcance el poder político, sólo 
entonces, habrá en Bolivia una Nación real y verdadera. A esto y no a ninguna otra parte conduce la 
sustancia de la ‘Pedagogía’ de Tamayo.” 
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Bolivian indigenismo for never having been genuinely concerned with the Indian 
population in Bolivia, but rather with an alternative project of development which 
actually worked to subordinate the indigenous population. What is begun here by Fausto 
Reinaga will be continued for the case of Bolivia and Latin America more largely in the 
books that Fausto Reinaga will publish in the 1960s, and will eventually culminate in the 
publication of La Revolución India.  
 It also must be emphasized that, in the same way that Revolutionary Nationalism 
remains an important horizon of thought for Reinaga throughout these years, he also 
never abandons his militant Marxist-Leninism. In his first chapter of Franz Tamayo y la 
Revolución boliviana, Reinaga summarizes the history of Western philosophy in a 
schematic way, running from Socrates to the atomic bomb, in order to conclude that the 
tradition of philosophy has always supported the elite classes, and that the only possible 
proletarian philosophy is that of Marx. He concludes: “from its beginnings philosophy 
finds itself at the service of the dominant social class; its specific function is the 
unfolding of ideological terror against the dominated classes, therefore, philosophy was 
never above controversial social interests: philosophy was always classist” (20).105 It is 
clear, then, that a Marxist understanding of history was not for Reinaga, at this stage, at 
all in conflict with his particular understanding of the Indian’s place in Bolivian national 
history. This would all soon be radically put into question.  
 
                                                
105 “desde su alumbramiento la filosofía, se halla al servicio de la clase social dominante; su función 
específica es el despliegue del terror ideológico contra las clases dominadas, por ende, a [sic] filosofía 
nunca estuvo por encima de los intereses sociales controvertidos; la filosofía siempre fue clasista.” 
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II.5 Disappointment and Disillusion 
 It is clear that, by 1960, Reinaga had lost faith in both Revolutionary Nationalism 
and in his Marxist formation as the possible paths to indigenous emancipation, at least in 
the forms in which he was engaged in these terms throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In 
1960, Reinaga publishes the book El sentimiento mesiánico del pueblo ruso [The 
Messianic Sentiment of the Russian People], based on travels he underwent to the USSR 
in the previous year. This journey is presented explicitly as a kind of pilgrimage for the 
author, the first of two such pilgrimages he would undertake within the space of just a 
number of years. This first pilgrimage was a Marxist-Leninist pilgrimage, the second, in 
1963, would be an Indianist one. His journey thus becomes a quest for self-discovery. 
Describing the chapters that are to proceed in the prologue, he provides the following 
outline of his first chapter: 
The chapter “Crisis of Conscience” that is about the worker’s movement, 
about the actions of the masses and the role that its leaders have played in 
the process of the Bolivian Revolution, has had to refer to facts and 
people that have produced negative consequences for the country. This 
historical accusation is a cry from my conscience; I could not nor should I 
have kept it quiet. (5-6)106  
 
 His perception of the MNR’s failures has brought about a crisis of conscience in 
the author that results in his choice to leave for Russia. However, we have yet to find in 
Reinaga’s writings a general rejection of the National Revolutionary experience; as it 
stands, so far, this crisis of conscience which was nevertheless a very determinate 
                                                
106 “El capítulo ‘Crisis de Conciencia’ que trata del movimiento obrero, de la acción de las masas y el 
papel que han desempeñado sus conductores en el proceso de la Revolución boliviana, ha tenido que 
referirse a hechos y personas que han arrojado una secuela negativa para el país. Esta acusación histórica 
es un grito de mi conciencia; no podía ni debía acallarla.” 
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experience of this author, concern doubts produced by the actions of certain individuals 
rather than by the Revolution as a whole. During the first chapter which he describes 
above, his dying faith in the Revolution is reiterated. Mentioning a number of anecdotes 
which caused him to increasingly lose any hope that the Revolution, as he understood it, 
could come to fruition, he reflects:  
For whole days I looked for my faith. How much I endured to uproot 
from my revolutionary conscience the syndical oligarchy. In this gigantic 
epic, under the onslaught of a stormy sea, the clearness of my 
revolutionary conscience became sluggish, and its solidity relinquished. 
Its fortitude and zeal broke down. (11)107  
 
 Upon reading El sentimiento mesiánico del pueblo ruso, one might be convinced 
that Reinaga’s commitment to the Marxist revolutionary cause had been renewed 
following his visit to the USSR, and they would not necessarily be wrong. Reinaga’s 
impressions of Soviet Russia are almost unequivocally positive, though he still clearly 
maintains his critical vision throughout the text, criticizing for example the conditions of 
factory workers in Moscow. He nevertheless calls Moscow the “new Jerusalem [i.e. 
Holy Land]” (59), and while critical of the working conditions there, sings the praises of 
the social care that is provided for factory workers. About the women of Russia, he 
writes: “women in Russia are the most dignified and sublime beings that exist on the 
face of the earth” (65).108  
                                                
107 “Días enteros buscaba a mi fe. Cuánto padecí para arrancar de mi conciencia revolucionaria a la 
oligarquía sindical. En esta gigantesca epopeya, bajo las embestidas de un mar embravecido, la limpidez 
de mi conciencia revolucionaria se empañaba, y su solidez cedía. Su fortaleza y su fervor se 
desmoronaban.” 
108 “…la mujer en Rusia es el ser más digno y sublime que existe sobre la faz de la tierra.” 
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 Most of all, however, Reinaga is impressed by coming into contact with the 
living-dead figure of his greatest revolutionary hero: Vladimir Lenin. Reinaga, wrapped 
up in a daydream, experiences a kind of epiphany while standing over the corpse of his 
immortalized hero. The religious sense of the word “epiphany” should not be lost here. 
Reinaga undergoes a kind of mystical experience while standing over Lenin’s tomb, one 
which appears to restore to him his lost faith. He describes that moment in detail, 
incorporating Biblical imagery to reinforce the religious and mystical characteristics of 
the event, utilizing a rhythm within the text that produces the impression of a slow climb 
to sexual climax, to ecstasy:  
A moment in which I felt that, like a volcano which cuts through 
mountains of solid rock, pulls up trees by the roots, and vomits fire from 
out of its crater; like this, like this, making my bones crunch, burning my 
entrails, flaying and lacerating my flesh, burning my soul into flames, 
afflicted with doubt; like this, like this, I felt come out of from deep 
within me, a faith of light and of fire. The miracle had occurred, Lenin, 
like Jesus to Lazarus, said to my faith: “Rise and walk!”, and she [i.e. 
faith] sold herself once again and resuscitated a faith alive in the 
Revolution: a faith alive in socialism. (88)109  
 
 Finally, it is worth copying another passage at length which shows the admiration 
that Fausto Reinaga acquires for the Soviet Revolution during his time in Russia. Note 
again the use of explicitly religious imagery, and the rhetorical devices that are 
commonplace in Reinaga’s writing:  
                                                
109 “Momento en que sentí, que como un volcán que raja montañas de roca maciza, arranca los árboles de 
cuajo, y vomita fuego por el cráter; así, así, haciendo crujir mis huesos, quemando mis entrañas, 
desollando y lacerando mi carne, hirviendo en llamas mi alma, enferma de duda; así, así, sentí salirme 
desde muy dentro de mí, una fe de luz y de fuego. 
Se había producido el milagro. Lenin, como a Lázaro Jesús le dijo a mi fe: ¡levántante y anda! y 
ella, se revendió, y resucitó una fe viva en la Revolución; una fe viva en el socialismo”. 
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Russian messianism is not a myth. On the contrary, it is the supreme and 
preeminent synthesis of all of the messianisms of human history [note the 
continued reference here to the historical dialectic – P.B.]. Buddha, 
Confucius, Zarathustra, Socrates, Jesus… are part of the essence of Soviet 
messianism, in whose standard, image and likeness of the pathetic cry of 
Vivekananda, we find the “Workers of the world, unite!” This messianic 
cry in Russia today is a preeminent and beautiful reality. In the blood and 
conscience of the people, that in this very instant were passing in 
triumphant march through the Red Square of Moscow, Marx in spirit, I 
was contemplating its “idea translated into reality.” (97–98)110  
 
 The textual citations here speak for themselves regarding Reinaga’s impressions 
of Russia. What above all should be noted is that, for the author, the Russian Revolution 
is an idea which is strongly rooted in the figure of Lenin. On very rare occasions does 
Reinaga mention Stalin, and certainly he is not regarded in Reinaga’s writings as the 
positive leader of the Revolutionary thrust. There is also very little reference to the 
situation of Cold War which was to become an important axis in Bolivian historical 
development, something of which Reinaga would become extremely critical in later 
years. For the moment, what appears to be restored is merely his faith in the Revolution, 
after living through quite an intense crisis of revolutionary conscience.  
 A mere three years after the publication of El sentimiento mesiánico del pueblo 
ruso, however, in 1963, Fausto Reinaga would undergo a very different kind of 
pilgrimage. This time, it was to the heart of the former Inka capital, Cuzco, and to the 
ruins of Macchu Picchu. His reflections on his experience here mark a clear turning 
                                                
110 “El mesianismo ruso no es un mito. Todo lo contrario, es la suprema y excelsa síntesis de los 
mesianismos de toda la historia humana. Buda, Confucio, Zaratustra, Sócrates, Jesús… bullen en la 
esencia del mesianismo sovíetico, en cuyo estandarte, a imagen y semejanza del grito patético de 
Vivekananda, está el: “Proletarios del mundo, uníos”. Este grito mesiánico en Rusia hoy es excelsa y bella 
realidad. En la sangre y la conciencia del pueblo, que en este instante pasaba en marcha triunfal por la 
Plaza Roja de Moscú, Marx en espíritu, contemplaba su ‘idea traducida en hechos.’” 
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point in his writings, towards what would become his Indianist core. Gustavo Cruz’s 
extensive study of Fausto Reinaga’s life and works includes a study of and extracts from 
the written piece, published in La Nación on September 23rd 1963, entitled “El Cuzco 
que he sentido” [The Cuzco that I have felt]. Cruz notes the introduction of three 
elements in his writing here which would mark Reinaga’s Indianist period: a subtle 
distinction between indigenista and indianista, the historical challenge and necessity of 
the Indian Revolution, and a certain distance from the language of class analysis of his 
previous work, producing a more pronounced emphasis on the racial question (Cruz 
2013, 170). 
 This change should not be considered in separation from the acquaintances that 
Reinaga was making in the early 60s and from his own political activism. In 1962, the 
Partido de Indios Aymaras y Keswas (Aymara and Quechua Indian Party, PIAK), which 
would later change its name in 1966 to Partido Indio de Bolivia (Indian Party of Bolivia, 
PIB), was founded.111 This represented the beginning of discussions and relations with 
others who identified with the cause of the Indian Revolution, from other members of 
the PIAK/PIB, many of whom would become important political activists (whether 
Indianist or katarista),112 to others outside of Bolivia who were working from similar 
perspectives – notably Humberto Mata in Ecuador, Guillermo Carnero Hoke in Peru and 
                                                
111 Fausto Reinaga was the main ideologue of the party, and for the most part of its short-lived political life 
it would merely exist as the name which Reinaga gave to the press which published his books (his books 
were nearly always self-published). As a politically active group the party would last until 1968, but its 
activity continued as the ideological name under which Reinaga published up until 1978.  
112 For the influence of Fausto Reinaga on younger, emerging Indianist and katarista groups, refer to 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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Guillermo Bonfil Batalla in Mexico.113 Reinaga also authors several of the political 
documents belonging to the PIAK/PIB throughout these years which, although it is 
difficult to know the impact that they actually made, were presented and made 
interventions in the national political sphere.114 
 It is during the 1960s that Reinaga publishes a trilogy of texts which form the 
foundations for his later Indianist writings. These texts form part of a larger project in 
the author’s work, which was to criticize the dominant culture in Bolivia for 
continuously subordinating the Indian to its cultural logic. However, the difference 
between these three texts and earlier publications lies in the fact that, for Reinaga, the 
entire history of so-called cholo-mestizo cultural production, and in particular that of 
indigenismo, is nothing but the continued history of the repression of the Indian, the only 
true subject of history and whose Nation is destined to be emancipated by the eventual 
Indian Revolution. Let us take a look at these three texts in more detail.  
 The prologue to the first of this trilogy, El indio y el cholaje boliviano (The 
Indian and the Bolivian Cholaje, 1964), opens with the following claim: “This essay is 
                                                
113 Reinaga’s influence on the development of an emerging set of discourses in Latin America must here 
be emphasized. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla in particular, whose Mexico Profundo (1996) was enormously 
important to the literature on emergent indigeneity in Latin America, shows himself to be clearly 
influenced by Reinaga’s writings, which he nevertheless does not cite to my knowledge. Humberto Mata 
in Ecuador was very active during these years, and in 1968 writes the only biography written about 
Reinaga while he was still alive, entitled Fausto Reinaga, akapi jacha’j.  
114 Reinaga and the PIB’s active participation in organizations such as the Confederación Nacional de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia, CNTCB) is 
evidenced in Tesis India (1971), a publication which also forms part of Reinaga’s Indianist phase. 
According to the author, this text was written because in December of 1970 he had been asked to provide a 
political thesis for the Federación Departmental Campesino de Oruro, a thesis that was extended as far as 
CNTCB and was eventually approved by them. He later publishes the text with his Ediciones PIB (Partido 
Indio de Bolivia) with a view to its being “the theory of Bolivian Indian action (la teoría de la acción india 
de Bolivia),” 7). In any case, what is clear is that Fausto Reinaga was consulted by and interacted with the 
most active political organizations of the time that supported the Indianist cause.  
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the first study of Bolivian society from an Indian point of view; a society in which 
through patient investigation and experience we have not found more than two ethnic 
forces, two races, in perpetual struggle: Indians and cholos” (5).115 The claim that 
Reinaga is making is as radical as it is clear, and it should be obvious that it is a claim 
which marks an important difference with his previous writings. The claim would be 
something like this: that the entirety of Bolivian history is marked by a secret struggle, 
one which nobody has been able to articulate but that I, Fausto Reinaga, present and 
articulate historically for the first time, that of the Indian race against the cholo-mestizo 
race. Moreover, it is I, Fausto Reinaga, who represents the most fully brought-to-
conscious member of the Indian race.  
 We can witness an important change here, then, in Reinaga’s interpretation of the 
driving force of history and of the historical dialectic that propels it. Gustavo Cruz 
remarks upon the same change, noting that the dialectic of right-left which defined 
Reinaga’s writings during his National Revolutionary moment is displaced by a new 
philosophy of history, in which the true historical dialectic takes place between Indian 
and cholo (175). What this means is a complete rejection on the author’s part of the 
National Revolutionary discourse as it had been understood in the national-popular 
domain and even by the author himself throughout the 1950s and until that time. The 
secret underground battle of the nation versus the anti-nation in National Revolutionary 
discourse is nothing more than a ruse, it is a theatrical act; and while it continues it is not 
                                                
115 “Este ensayo es el primer estudio de la sociedad boliviana desde un punto de vista indio; sociedad en la 
que tras paciente investigación y experiencia no hemos encontrado más que dos fuerzas étnicas, dos razas, 
en perpetua lucha: indios y cholos.” 
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possible to change the coordinates of history. If the National Revolutionary discourse 
had, following the particular historical interpretation that we gave it above, represented 
the political unconscious of that particular moment, then Reinaga’s discourse represents 
something like what in psychoanalytical terms we could call a hysterical discourse, 
insofar as, from this moment on, Reinaga will represent a voice which seeks to challenge 
the coordinates and the premises of the Master discourse’s claim.116 This is, of course, a 
complex matter. As we will see, while Reinaga’s discourse does effectively pose a 
constant challenge to many forms of the National Revolutionary political unconscious, it 
is also true that many of his Indianist proposals can be understood to be in some way 
transformations and substitutions of the National Revolutionary ones, not a complete 
rejection of their underlying premises.  
 He thus follows his argument, in the prologue to the book, with a detailed 
historical description of what he understands by this distinction: Indian/cholo. The 
history of the Indian, he writes, is the continuous history of domination and colonialism. 
But more interesting even than this statement is his historical analysis of the Indian’s 
economic condition, rejecting the reading of the Indian as a class under the same 
umbrella as the European peasant, thereby continuing his criticism of MNR official 
vocabulary. He writes: “And the Indian of Bolivia is anything but a peasant in the 
European fashion…” (10).117 So, then, what is the Indian for Reinaga at this stage of his 
thought? The Indian here adopts a racialized sense, similar to the extracts that we have 
                                                
116 I refer here to the Lacanian notion of the four discourses, which is elaborated by Lacan in his 17th 
Seminar The Other Side of Psychoanalysis.  
117 “Y el indio de Bolivia es cualquier cosa, pero menos un campesino al estilo europeo…” 
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already seen from his most widely-distributed work, La Revolución India. And, like the 
racialized image of the Indian from that same publication, this sense of race is closely 
tied up with that of an Indian Nation. This reminds us, once again, that this racialized 
understanding of the Indian is not intended to be an essentialized or static category; it is 
deeply historical, and is an intricate part of Reinaga’s new philosophy of history. It is the 
Indian Nation, as race, which has, throughout its development, been subordinated and 
secretly struggling for its emancipation in the dark obscurities of what is not written in 
the annals of history. Reinaga writes: 
Indians are a race, a people, a Nation; the Indian race is not a social class, 
a simple little class; no. In the Indian race there are even antagonistic 
social classes. To say peasant to the Indian, is a stupidity worthy of the 
sepoys of the West. This is why Fidel Castro, in the same way he calls 
imperialism, imperialism, calls the Indian, Indian. (10)118  
 
 What is immediately apparent from this citation is that what Reinaga understands 
in terms of the Indian is not entirely different to his understanding of the Nation under 
the ideology of the National Revolution. In many ways, then, this particular historical 
discourse becomes displaced and is subsequently replaced with another, which is not so 
very far from it. What is at stake is still a National Revolution; we were only wrong 
about which nation it was that was carrying out the Revolution. It was a mistake to think 
that the Bolivian cholaje could live side by side as a single nation, a single people. What 
was obviated from this idea of Revolution was the fact that the Indian Nation itself 
cannot be understood except as historically antagonistic to the Bolivian cholaje, as part 
                                                
118 “Los indios son una raza, un pueblo, una Nación; la raza india no es una clase social, una clasecita 
simplicísima; no. En la raza india inclusive hay clases sociales antagónicas. Decir campesino al indio, es 
una estupidez digna de los cipayos del Occidente. Por eso Fidel Castro, así como llama imperialismo, al 
imperialismo, llama al indio, indio.” 
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of a secret war in which even the Indians themselves, blinded by the rhetoric of National 
Revolutionary discourse and of indigenismo, could not see. Fausto Reinaga presents 
himself, then, as the Indian who has seen the light, the prophet that is able to predict the 
Revolution of the people, articulate the history of that people without history, of a people 
without people and without nation – or at least so it seemed until they understood, 
through Reinaga, their real historical destiny. In other words, Reinaga’s new philosophy 
of history replaces the historical ontology of war of the anti-nation versus nation 
properly belonging to the National Revolutionary discourse with another ontology of 
war, of the Indian versus cholo. As we will see later, however, there are important 
differences between the two that need commenting.  
 What is also clear in the above citation is that Reinaga explicitly demonstrates a 
preference towards thinking about the Indian in racial rather than class terms. This, in 
many ways, represents a continuation of his thought, given that we saw, from as early as 
1953, a strong rhetoric which spoke against the reduction of the Indian question to the 
pseudo-Marxist vocabulary of the 1952 government, which spoke in terms of peasantry. 
However, there is an important difference here. If the dialectical history of class struggle 
remained an important horizon for Reinaga throughout the 1950s, this is no longer the 
case in these texts. He rejects, at least in part, his Marxist formation as being insufficient 
for explaining the Indian’s place in Bolivian history. 
 We must nevertheless pay attention to the nuances of Reinaga’s argument. It is 
not that he is rejecting the role which social class antagonism has to play tout court in a 
possible historical understanding of the Indian. He states above: “[in] the Indian race 
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there are even antagonistic social classes” (ibid.). Moreover, to further complicate this, 
later in the prologue he writes the following:  
We Indians are not adverse to Marxism, on the contrary, we believe and 
we think that Marxism in Bolivia has no other object than the liberation 
of the Indian race [note, however, the continued use of the word race over 
and above that of class – P.B.]; given that the Indian in this country is the 
only enslaved, oppressed and exploited being. Enslaved, oppressed and 
exploited as an Indian; not only as a social class propitious to being 
extorted, but rather in his condition and through his situation of being 
Indian. (15)119  
 
 Clearly, Reinaga’s relationship with Marxism is still problematic. We can say in 
a somewhat schematic way, and I believe that this remains true of his work even in the 
instances where he is most critical of Marxist thought, that the real Marxist Revolution 
for Reinaga lies in the possibility of the Indian Revolution, only now, in this articulation, 
as a race and not merely as a class. This understanding of the Indian as a race and not 
merely a class, particularly in the citation above, operates as more than a historical 
register which refers to the continuous existence of the Indian Nation. It is also an 
observation made on the basis of a very affective and experiential understanding of what 
it means to be Indian, one that we cannot, I think, limit to the idiosyncrasy of Reinaga. 
Indeed, as I will argue later, we cannot understand the relative success of the Indianist 
writings as an intervention in Bolivian history and historiography without understanding 
how this affective element was able to articulate and communicate with a number of 
                                                
119 “Los indios no somos adversos al marxismo, todo lo contrario, creemos y pensamos que el marxismo 
en Bolivia no tiene otro objeto que la liberación de la raza india; puesto que el indio en este país es el 
único ser esclavizado, oprimido y explotado. Esclavizado, oprimido y explotado en cuanto indio; no 
solamente como clase social propicia a la extorsión, sino en su situación y por su condición de indio.”  
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problems and needs belonging to a diverse group of people which had only their shared 
experience of systematic discrimination in common.  
 The second part of the historical analysis that Reinaga makes in his prologue 
belongs properly to the cholo elite. It is striking that, for Reinaga, the Bolivian cholaje is 
also a particular historical-racial category, which must necessarily be separated from that 
of the Spanish colonizers. According to Reinaga, the cholo elite should be understood as 
a category specific to the Independence era, under which the conditions of the Indian 
Nation became much worse than under Spanish colonialism. Reinaga makes it clear, 
then, that his aim here is to provide an unprecedented critique of the cultural hegemony 
of the cholo elite, and that this will be the first of a series of books to do so (in reality, as 
I have already argued above, we could say that Franz Tamayo y la Revolución boliviana 
also represents an advancement in this kind of work, with all its differences). Hence this 
book is the first in a trilogy which is to criticize in the strongest possible way this 
Bolivian and Latin American tradition.  
 It is not possible here to give a detailed account of his criticism of cholo culture 
as expressed in this trilogy. In typical Reinaga style, the arguments are sharp 
rhetorically, with great detail and intelligent observations, not to mention supplemented 
by extensive bibliographical sources and footnotes, framed by his polemical and fiery 
style, as well as being ironically playful and frustratingly ambiguous and imprecise. The 
first book is a critique of the work and life of Fernando Diez de Medina, an important 
political figure in Bolivian national life, as well as sympathizer with Franz Tamayo (he 
published in 1944 an important study of his work called Franz Tamayo, El Hechicero 
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del Ande, a kind of antithesis of Reinaga’s own publication on this important Bolivian 
figure). In Reinaga’s own words, Diez de Medina is an “indigenista writer” of “universal 
reputation” (12). Nobody better, then, at whom to direct his first criticism of the 
indigenista legacy.  
 The second book, entitled La “intelligentsia” del cholaje boliviano (The 
“Intelligentsia” of Bolivian cholaje, 1967), is a continuation of the first volume in an 
extended form, and is presented as no less than a complete reconsideration of the role of 
Bolivian culture. Its aim is to show that the Bolivian superstructure, with culture being 
its most refined form, is one that serves a Bolivian cholaje elite which misrepresents the 
Indian, who is the true political subject of the nation. It is broken up into various 
chapters, some of which are dedicated to important literary figures in Bolivia, and some 
of which are composed of a more general analysis of certain cultural phenomena (in this 
Reinaga includes, for example, art, writing, music, politics and the press). It must be 
noted that Reinaga’s reading of Bolivia’s cultural tradition cannot be reduced simply to 
an overly manichean notion that the entirety of Bolivian history is the continued 
repression of Indian culture over that of the Bolivian cholaje. Indeed, he distinguishes 
between two types of indigenismo, one which encompasses the representatives of 
Bolivian cholaje, in which he includes Gabriel René Moreno, Franz Tamayo, Adolfo 
Costa du Rels, Guillermo Francovich, Augusto Guzmán, Porfirio Díaz Machicao, 
Alcides Arguedas and Roberto Prudencio. These writers are largely identified by the 
author as being anti-Indian cholo writers, foreigners in their own nation, who adopt 
European styles and apply them to the Bolivian context with no regard for its native 
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culture. However, Reinaga also mentions a second group of indigenistas, in which he 
includes Jaime Mendoza, “a spirit of combat and a sensibility, which borders on making 
him a genius, for capturing the pulse of the Indian race’s tragedy” (109),120 and Ignacio 
Prudencio Bustillo, of whom he writes: “In Ignacio Prudencio Bustillo, the Indian and 
the Indian Revolution have a distinguished ideological precursor…” (148).121 These 
writers are defined by their connection to the roots of the Indian Nation and their ability 
to express, through literature, the historical problems and concerns of the latter. He also 
analyzes the work of Carlos Medinaceli, whose work he gives a much more ambiguous 
and ambivalent reading. This all goes to demonstrate that Reinaga’s own intervention in 
the Bolivian cultural tradition is much more complex than many ideological readings of 
his work would perhaps allow.  
 The third and final publication in this proto-Indianist trilogy is Reinaga’s El indio 
y los escritores de America (The Indian and the Writers of America, 1969), in which the 
author’s scope moves from a national consideration of the relationship between high 
culture and the Indian Nation to one which has continental implications. Here, we see an 
important shift in Reinaga’s understanding of the Revolution, on the one hand, and the 
Nation, on the other, which extends beyond the borders belonging to Bolivia, borders 
which, as this writer understood well, were defined according to the geopolitical 
interests and circumstances of a particular socio-economic class. This shift in Reinaga’s 
work is difficult to account for, given the specific historicity in which he bases his own 
                                                
120 “un espíritu de combate y una sensibilidad rayana en la genialidad, para captar el pulso del drama de la 
raza india.” 
121 “En Ignacio Prudencio Bustillo, el indio y la Revolución India tienen a un insigne precursor 
ideológico…” 
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claims, and given that on many previous occasions Reinaga argued that the specific 
historical and geographical conditions of Bolivia made its relationship to the Indian 
question different from that of, say, Peru. Nevertheless, it is clear that this turn in his 
thought has to do with a change in his understanding of which was the Nation that was 
properly the subject of the Revolution. In other words, a recognition that the Indian 
question – and here his reflections are no doubt influenced by the emergence of Indianist 
parties across the Andes and by his interlocutors outside of Bolivia – must be considered 
beyond traditional national borders.  
 His critique and his particular philosophy of history are thus extended beyond the 
national boundaries of Bolivia to include the development of the Latin American 
continent as a whole. He begins with a history of Latin American independence which 
aims to show how the history of independence is no more than the history of power 
passing from one set of elites to another, in which satellite Republics circulating around 
the movement of Western capitalism continued to reproduce the Indian’s enslavement 
across the continent. He continues, finally, by dealing with the cultural history of various 
countries, attacking the figures that are most celebrated as symbols of the national 
character – Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina, Jorge Icaza in Ecuador, José 
Vasconcelos in Mexico – as well as broader cultural phenomenon such as the cult of 
Simón Bolivar. Reinaga expands upon his critique of the non- or anti-Indian cultural 
expression that had been hegemonic in the continent. What he seeks to claim in his 
writing is that the so-called cholo culture had actually veiled the struggle of the true 
American nation: the Indian Nation. 
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 The most obvious transformation in the thought of Reinaga which is evidenced in 
this trilogy, and which has already been briefly commented, is the racial division of 
cholo-Indian. It is worth looking in greater detail at how the author constructs these 
historical entities. The cholo for Reinaga is, above all, a bastard cultural-racial category, 
in the sense that it properly belongs to those who have no true roots or being. It is an 
ontology of pure imitation or mimesis, drawing its strength and its own self-feeling of 
superiority from its imitation of Western/European/Spanish modes of living (the latter 
are at times separate, at times unified concepts in Reinaga’s writing). This 
conceptualization of the Bolivian (and, at times, Latin American) cholaje as a bastard 
race with no true Father is both cultural and biological for Reinaga, a result of the Wars 
of Independence themselves, after which Bolivia was no longer Spain but neither did it 
embrace its Indian roots. The cholo is for him “product of the crossing of two races” 
(1964, 27), never itself becoming an authentic racial identity. And its central problem is 
precisely that it does not draw from what is proper to it: “Bolivian thought has always 
been fed and feeds off the foreign, what is most distant to it, ignorant of the reality of 
national life” (1964, 105).122 The cholo soul belongs to “Spain and Europe” (1964, 196). 
His critique of cholo culture in La“intelligentsia” del cholaje boliviano is based largely 
on the claim that the cholo elite has historically appropriated cultural forms that are 
properly Indian, in an attempt to imitate the arts and standards of beauty which belong 
properly to Europe, thereby ignoring their cultural manifestation and importance among 
                                                
122 “El pensamiento boliviano siempre se ha nutrido y se nutre de lo foráneo, de lo ajeno, ignorando la 
realidad de la vida nacional.” 
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the Indian population itself. In sum, for Reinaga: “The dilemma is terrible: [the choice is 
between] Indianization (sic) or the inexpressive vacuity of the copy; Indianism or 
nothing” (1967, 29).  
 The Indian, then, is quite simply the opposite of the cholo: the genuine racial 
expression of the native American lands, whose culture has been suppressed by some 
150 years of hidden war with Bolivian, and Latin American, cholaje. What is impressive 
about Reinaga’s racial thought is that, even if it remains based on an emphatically 
historical reading of Latin America, what he understands to be the Indian race remains 
largely unchanged in its “soul” or “essence” throughout the more than five hundred 
years of oppression. It is as if the spirit of the Indian Nation has persisted throughout the 
tumultuous history of its oppression to remain in an embryonic form of American 
authenticity which is still able to achieve the emancipation of its National being, in all its 
autochthony and with all that is proper to it. Reinaga writes in El indio y el cholaje 
boliviano (1964): 
Upon the arrival of the Spanish the Indian soul was the receptacle of a 
millenarian culture. And, it is because this culture is the daughter of 
millennia, and for no other reason, that she has persisted and resisted the 
tragic and Dantesque test of the Colony and the Republic for four 
centuries; until… until today, when the Indian soul remains intact. Its 
tradition, its language, its religion, fulfill, today as yesterday, this soul 
kneaded with the ermine of the Andes and the miserere of the High 
Plain’s wild straw. (195)123  
 
                                                
123 “A la llegada de los españoles el alma del indio, era un receptáculo de una cultural milenaria. Y, por ser 
hija de milenios, y no por otra cosa, es que por cuatro siglos y medio ha persistido y resistido la trágica y 
dantesca prueba de la Colonia y la República; hasta… hasta hoy, en que el alma del indio permanece 
intacta. Su tradición, su lengua, y su religión colman, hoy como ayer, esa alma amasada con el armiño de 
los Andes y el miserere de la paja brava de la Altipampa.” 
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 Reinaga emphasizes on several occasions the persistence of this Indian soul or 
character throughout time, and above all of its resistance to those elements of culture 
which would seek to change it, to assimilate it, politically, culturally and biologically to 
its standard, based always on a mimetic relationship to the European ideal. In El indio y 
el cholaje boliviano (1964) he writes: “The Indian, more than a people is a race, which, 
for its historical and cultural power and vital resistance, is indestructible” (191).124 And 
elsewhere, in El indio y los escritores de América (1969): “The West has not vanquished 
the Indian; it has not assimilated nor integrated him to its system, much less to its blood 
and its life. In sum, the West has not ‘civilized,’ with its ‘civilization,’ the son of the 
majestic Inka” (11).125 Continued here is the historical vision of a clash of civilizations, 
of two nations under one state, where one is a bastard hybrid of a colonial European 
legacy, and the other represents the authentic and true son of the land, with its culture, 
traditions and languages. 
 As a historical accompaniment to this vision of Bolivian and Latin American 
history, then, Reinaga returns to a more defined history of the indigenous peoples, a 
project which he more or less abandoned after his 1940 publication Mitayos y Yanaconas 
in search of a more unifying national approach in the 1950s. Here, we see him return to 
the idea that the Indian peoples of Bolivia are the direct inheritors of the utopian 
civilization of pre-Inkan Tawantinsuyu. He states that, “Tahuantinsuyu (sic), upon the 
                                                
124 “El indio más que un pueblo es una raza, la que por su potencia y su resistencia vital, histórica y 
cultural es indestructible.” 
125 “El Occidente no ha vencido al indio; no lo ha asimilado ni integrado a su sistema, mucho menos, a su 
sangre y su vida. En suma, el Occidente no ha ‘civilizado’ con su ‘civilización’ al hijo del mayestático 
Inka.” 
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arrival of the Spanish, was an organic Nation, governed by Statists. The authority and 
the law were respected and adhered to across the nation… being neither hungry nor cold 
was permitted” (1964, 193).126 Following the well-known Inkan expression that is still 
common today in indigenous communities, and now in public national discourse under 
the Morales administration, “ama sua, ama llulla, ama khella” (don’t steal, don’t lie, 
don’t be lazy), he writes: “Nobody lied nor did they stop working” (ibid., 194).127 
Indeed, throughout his texts the Indian represents the Truth (often spelled with a capital 
T) as opposed to the culture of the cholos, which was a culture of lies. He affirms that, 
on the one hand, “For 141 years, Bolivia is a society of lies and fraudulence” (1967, 15), 
whereas, on the other hand, the Indian speaks only the Truth.128  
 In the cultural domain, of course, this tension is expressed as a conflict between 
indigenismo (although his use of this term is ambiguous at this stage in his writing) and 
indianismo, something which would form a cornerstone of his critique of Latin 
American culture in relation to the Indian question. From what I have been able to find, 
                                                
126 “El Tahuantinsuyu [sic], a la llegada del español, era una Nación orgánica, gobernada por estadistas. La 
autoridad y la ley eran respetadas y obedecidas en todo el pueblo… no era permitido tener hambre ni frío.” 
127 “Nadie mentía y nadie dejaba de trabajar.” 
128 This is not necessarily a new thematic in the work of Reinaga, and certainly would continue to be an 
important element of his thought up until his death. A colleague of Hilda Reinaga who cooperates with the 
Fundación Fausto Reinaga commented to me, on the one and only time that she had the opportunity to 
meet Reinaga personally before his death in 1994, that he said to her, “The Indian never lies” (June 2014). 
This must be understood from an early moment in his work in a strongly historical sense, however, not 
necessarily as an essentialized view of what it meant to be indigenous. Perhaps, taking Reinaga further 
than he himself goes in his texts, we can say that the Indian never lies insofar as, historically speaking, the 
Indian is a symptom of continuous colonial oppression and capitalist exploitation. The Indian speaks the 
truth as a particular subject position in history, even as a political position or intervention in the national-
popular imaginary. This understanding of what it means to be Indian as a specific political positioning 
from within the social imaginary of the Bolivian nation is, I would argue, among the most important 
contributions of Reinaga’s work, and would have important political and historical effects and 
repercussions throughout the second half of the twentieth century.  
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the first appearance of this juxtaposition in his full-length publications appears in La 
“inteligencia” del cholaje boliviano (1967), in which he writes the following:  
This book is INDIANIST, it is not INDIGENISTA. It pertains to the 
granary of Indian ideology. Indigenismo is a literature produced by and 
for cholismo. Here is a declaration: all of my production speaks about the 
Indian, but in a diluted form. It is the cry of rebellion, not of Revolution. 
The Agrarian Reform has been the effective reason which has let my 
thought, breaking the cholo cocoon, take flight and be the first stretch of 
liberated Indian thought. (17, Reinaga’s emphasis)129  
 
 We can say that, to some extent, Reinaga’s assessment of his own thought is 
somewhat accurate. We have already seen how his criticism of the MNR which 
remained fierce, even if it was constantly changing throughout the 1950s, was in large 
part due to the lens through which he read and understood the actions of that party; 
through an indigenous lens, or one that was strongly in solidarity with the indigenous-
peasant populations in Bolivia. Nevertheless, there is markedly a change in his writings 
here, one which he himself wishes to pronounce. It may not be a stretch to claim that 
Fausto Reinaga understands his work up until this point as being unwillingly complicit 
in the Indian oppression which has been represented by some 150 years of cholo culture. 
Indigenismo, then, represents the hypocritical incorporation and celebration of 
indigenous culture by the cholo elite in an attempt to imitate European art forms. These 
art forms nevertheless leave the actual indigenous populations whose culture is 
appropriated always in a relation of subordination, given that their culture is only able to 
                                                
129 “Este libro es INDIANISTA, no es INDIGENISTA. Pertenece al granero de la ideología india. El 
indigenismo es una literatura producida por y para el cholismo. Aquí una declaración: toda mi producción 
habla del indio, pero en forma diluida. Es grito de rebelión no de Revolución. La Reforma Agraria, ha sido 
la causa eficiente para que mi pensamiento, rompiendo la crisálida chola, salga a la luz y sea el primer 
tramo del pensamiento indio liberado.” 
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pass to the level of high culture through the practiced cultural techniques of Bolivian 
cholismo. This claim was a radical one to make at the time, in a context where 
indigenismo was not only a cornerstone of the national-popular imaginary but 
understood as precisely that cultural manifestation that most “represented” the 
indigenous heart of the country. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see Fausto Reinaga’s 
insistence on his role in this cultural revolution, as the “first” to have fully come to 
consciousness and to have been able to speak out about this historical reality which has 
gone unnoticed or, at least, uncriticized, for over a century. We will return later to this 
point.  
 Reinaga’s sources throughout this time take a turn and we see this author 
becoming fully integrated in what we could go so far as to call a new episteme, an 
emerging global culture that would become known as anti-colonial discourse. Fausto 
Reinaga shows himself to be reading and in dialogue in these years with this emerging 
anti-colonial movement in all of its cultural expressions. In La “intelligentsia” del 
cholaje boliviano he mentions the non-European art movements that were becoming at 
that time influential on a global scale and which explicitly understood themselves to be 
working in a kind of anti-colonial mode. It is precisely during this discussion that 
Reinaga first makes mention of the author Aimé Césaire and his elaboration of 
négritude.130 Finally, in this same publication, he makes mention for what seems to be 
the first time of a specific vocabulary, employing the term “Third World” as a call for 
                                                
130 Négritude was an ideological movement developed by black francophone intellectuals, notably Aimé 
Césaire. Refer to his Discourse on Colonialism (1972).  
 136 
solidarity among numerous postcolonial nations, showing himself to be influenced by 
the discourse of thinkers such as Che Guevara (who, it must not be forgotten, was killed 
precisely in Bolivia during this time, an event with which Reinaga had tenuous but 
important relations).131 He writes in the conclusion to this 1967 book:  
The Indianist writer, the indigenista writer [here we see an ambiguous use 
of the word indigenista, referring to what Reinaga calls in this same 
publication the “second type” of indigenistas, closer to what Reinaga 
normally calls simply “Indianist” – P.B.], the free writer of today and of 
the new generations and the intellectual that takes charge of MAN, as 
essential and supreme value, do not have more than one path, one exit: 
the Third World. (235)132  
 
 At this point in his text Reinaga cites at length a quote from Franz Fanon’s 
Wretched of the Earth. The influence of so-called anti-colonial discourse on Reinaga’s 
thought is thus clear, and we need go no further to see that he was reading the 
intellectual production of such writers during those years. As we shall see in more detail 
later, the “black struggle” in particular, both in Africa in the writings of Franz Fanon and 
Aimé Césaire, as well as the Civil Rights struggle in the United States through thinkers 
such as Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, would be very important and influential in 
                                                
131 Gustavo Cruz (2013) has shown that, even though Che Guevara is largely absent from his writings, 
Reinaga must have been nevertheless aware of the events that were taking place in Bolivia between 1967 - 
8. Fausto Reinaga was the uncle of Aniceto Reinaga Gordillo, who was moreover the brother of Fausto’s 
secretary Hilda Reinaga. According to Cruz’s account, Aniceto was a teacher and militant in the 
Communist Party who joined Che’s guerrilla and was eventually killed in combat alongside Che himself. 
To confirm this account, there is evidence that one of the figures in Che’s diary is the very same Aniceto, 
though he is never mentioned by name. Cruz claims that the failure of Che’s guerrilla was another blow to 
Reinaga’s already dying faith in Communism’s promise to emancipate the downtrodden (181–83).  
132 “El escritor indianista, el escritor indigenista, el escritor libre de hoy y de las nuevas generaciones y el 
intelectual que se ocupa del HOMBRE, como valor esencial y supremo, no tienen más que un camino, una 
salida: el Tercer Mundo.” 
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the development of Reinaga’s Indianist thought.133 No doubt, these black struggles for 
emancipation which have complicated histories with surprising similarities to the 
Bolivian case, where a classist understanding seemed alone insufficient for explaining 
the precise nature of exploitation that took place, was profoundly important for the 
development of a more racialized thinking in his writing. This should above all 
complicate any easy notion of racialized essentialism in his work.134  
 This perhaps explains, to some extent, Reinaga’s continued emphasis on the 
question of colonialism, and of the emancipation of the Indian Nation as an act of 
decolonization. This would be a reading entirely compatible with a group of scholars 
that have identified Reinaga as a precursor to what is called the “decolonial option,” 
which we have already briefly analyzed in the introduction to this chapter. However, this 
interpretation fails to account for the historical development of Reinaga’s thought, of the 
continuities with his National Revolutionary moment. Fausto Reinaga’s work cannot 
simply be categorized as part of a general anti-colonial canon of work, by which we 
would lose the historical specificity of the author’s claims. What is more, rather than a 
radical rupture, on this point Reinaga’s understanding of the Bolivian cholaje actually 
represents a continuation in his thought. It is as if he is re-elaborating the figure of the 
                                                
133 For a detailed study of the relationship between Fausto Reinaga and Franz Fanon, refer to Lucero 
(2008).  
134 There is evidence that this productive exchange between the Black Civil Rights movement and the 
Indianist cause was not only one-sided. As Gustavo Cruz notes, in Fausto Reinaga’s Sócrates y yo, the 
author claims that his permission was once asked by a member of the Black Panthers to translate La 
Revolución India (Cruz, 191). I have no knowledge of any such translation ever being published. 
However, curiously, during my time in the Fundación Fausto Reinaga (June 2014), one of its members 
recounted to me how they had once been shown a translation by a person who claimed to have been an 
activist in the Black Panthers. 
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anti-nation which had been such an important part of Nationalist Revolutionary 
discourse, especially since Montenegro’s Nacionalismo y coloniaje. In a certain sense, 
Bolivian cholaje represents a (biological and cultural) contamination of the 
autochthonous Indian Nation by foreignizing European-like forces, and continuation of 
the anti-national essence which the National Revolution had promised, and failed, to 
extirpate from Bolivia. To that extent, Reinaga’s discourse cannot be so easily regarded 
as such a radical epistemological break from his revolutionary beginnings, nor as a mere 
expression of more general anti-colonial trends.  
 What we see re-emerge here, under a different guise, is a rhetorical device and 
political issue that was also always fundamental to National Revolutionary discourse, 
namely, the question of national sovereignty. In Reinaga’s writings throughout this 
period, the occupation of the state continues to be the main horizon of indigenous 
emancipation. If, historically, the power of the state has been held in the hands of the 
bastard hybrid non-race of the Bolivian cholaje in its underground war with the Indian 
Nation, then the aim of the Indian Revolution, for Reinaga, would be to return political 
sovereignty to the true blood of the Nation by taking the power of the state itself. This is, 
ultimately, the essence of the Indian Revolution for Reinaga. What should be 
immediately apparent is that this demonstrates an important distinction between 
Reinaga’s thought and the question of the pluri-national that would be introduced in 
Bolivia in the 1990s, largely due to the political claims made by indigenous peoples of 
the Lowlands, in which the focus was on local autonomy (i.e. there was never an attempt 
to occupy state power). As Reinaga himself writes: “We [the Indians of Bolivia] want 
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the running of the state and the Nation to pass to the Inka-Indians’ hands, so that with 
contemporary thought, science and technology [técnica], the United States of Latin 
America is edified: a modern and dignified society” (1967, 13).135 This (nevertheless 
modern) society would be, perhaps predictably, for Reinaga, the restitution of a pre-
Inkan indigenous civilization: “We want the resurrection and remodeling of the 
Tahuantinsuyu (sic) of the twentieth Century, as foundation and base of the real unity of 
Latin America” (ibid.),136 a gesture which is, of course, entirely compatible with this 
new historical reading of the Latin American tradition.  
 Within this new mode of understanding history as the hidden battle between 
Indians and cholos, it is important to note that, for Reinaga, the lack of self-
consciousness or self-awareness that belongs to the Indian Nation throughout its history 
(that is, its inability to see and understand that Bolivian history is no more than the 
continued subterranean struggle between Indian and cholo) is not merely circumstantial, 
but enforced by an official silence imposed from above. In other words, it is no accident 
that the Indian is unaware of his or her historical destiny – cholo culture intentionally 
masks from the Indian his or her true place in history. This is an official silence of which 
Reinaga is himself victim, or perhaps above all victim, for his status as the first self-
aware Indian. This particular interpretation of events was of course influenced by the 
historical context in which Reinaga was writing. In 1964, the MNR government which 
                                                
135 “Queremos que pase la conducción del Estado y la Nación a manos del indio – inka, para que con el 
pensamiento, la ciencia y la técnica contemporáneas, edifique los Estados Unidos de Latinoamérica: una 
sociedad moderna y digna.” 
136 “Los indios de Bolivia, queremos la resurrección y remodelación del Tahuantinsuyu del siglo XX, 
como fundamento y base de la unidad real de Latinoamérica.” 
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had been at the reins of the country since the 1952 Revolution was toppled by a military 
coup carried out by a strongman called René Barrientos. This inaugurated important 
changes in the national political scene which, although continuing with the rhetoric of 
National Revolutionary ideology, implied a political reconfiguration which had 
particular consequences for the indigenous-peasant population. The latter became 
politically mobilized in favor of the oppressive regime under what became known as the 
Military-Peasant Pact.137 It was also a moment of much more intense censorship from 
the government, which Reinaga claims to have suffered. Already in 1964 he writes in the 
prologue to La “intelligentsia” del cholaje boliviano, presumably as a sort of defense of 
his own writings in increasingly oppressive conditions, the following notes: “If it is not 
the outbreak of silence, it is the kick from the stubborn and narrow-minded oligarch or 
from the irresponsible and bastard ‘communist’ who has come down on the pages of my 
books or on my Indian back. The thing is that in Bolivia nobody tolerates an Indian who 
can write…” (1967, 8).138  
 This last citation also brings up another motif in this author’s work which we 
have yet to analyze fully at this moment of his writing: the question of Reinaga’s 
relationship to Bolivian communism and to his own Marxist-Leninist formation. We 
                                                
137 Following military leader René Barrientos’s seizure of power in 1964, dissolving the MNR government 
that had democratically won in the elections, the new president of Bolivia proceeded to sign what was 
called the Military-Peasant Pact. This was an agreement between the military rulers and the peasant 
militias for mutual support. Barrientos was a man of great charisma and managed to move peasant 
sympathies away from their MNR base. This support in the countryside would be used to consolidate 
power against the more left-wing tendency of the miners and popular urban sectors. This would be the 
beginning of the dismantling of the cross-class alliance that had been achieved by the MNR government.  
138 “Si no es la conflagración del silencio, es el puntapié del oligarca cerril o del ‘comunista’ irresponsable 
y bastardo que ha caído sobre la páginas de mis libros o sobre mis espaldas de indio. Es que en Bolivia 
nadie admite que un indio escriba…” 
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have already seen that, for whatever he publishes during these years, Reinaga still 
appraises Marxist thought as an important theoretical axis. Yet as we can see above, his 
writings distance themselves greatly from the Bolivian communism of his 
contemporaries, with whom he had once been in solidarity under the banner of the 
National Revolution. This distance from Bolivian Marxism would increase over time 
and eventually express itself as a general anti-Marxist thought, even if Reinaga still 
remained largely dependent on certain Marxist analyses in his work. In 1967, Reinaga’s 
criticism of Bolivian communism continues with the following remarks: “Bolivian 
communism is a focal point of ignorance and putrefaction, in which ‘principles’ have 
turned into appetites, and appetites into ‘principles’” (233).139 He goes on to write: 
“Communism has become in this ground and in this land, a malignant, dehumanized and 
reactionary force, as bad or worse than the Rosca-gamonal, from whose entrails have 
emerged the epigones of the splendid ‘red bourgeois,’ touristic and pornographic” 
(ibid.).140  
 We see here the constant repetition of themes which we have discussed at length 
above. First of all, there is the idea of all that is anti-Indian as also the anti-nation, in 
which Bolivian Communism is now directly compared to the anti-national force par 
excellence of the Rosca-gamonal. Finally, these anti-national forces are guilty on behalf 
of their blind imitation of models which they never convincingly manage to imitate. 
                                                
139 “El comunismo boliviano es un foco de putrefacción y de ignorancia, donde ‘los principios’ se han 
convertido en apetitos, y los apetitos en ‘principios.’” 
140 “El comunismo ha devenido en este suelo y en este pueblo, en una fuerza maligna, deshumanizada y 
reaccionaria, igual o peor que la Rosca-gamonal, de suya entraña han salido los epígonos de la espléndida 
‘burguesía roja’ turística y sicalíptica.” 
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They are no more than mere “epigones” of real Communist or Marxist doctrine, 
becoming therefore possible sources of contamination at the heart of the real Nation’s 
struggle, “malignant” like a cancer. Bolivian Communism is, therefore, no more than a 
reproduction of the cholo culture that must be eradicated if the Indian Revolution is to be 
successful.   
 All of the above should be contextualized, finally, with a precise historical 
account of the Indianist struggle throughout the late 1960s. We have already seen that, 
beginning in Bolivia in 1962 with the foundation of the PIAK as described above, there 
is a proliferation of movements, at the continental level, that seek to reclaim a special 
place for indigenous peoples in the political life of their respective nations. Naturally, 
Reinaga was the most important interlocutor in this movement at the national level, and 
arguably among the most important in Latin America. As the 1960s advanced, these 
movements became stronger in terms of articulation, organization and representation in 
public and political life, particularly in the highlands of Bolivia and, more specifically, 
La Paz. The katarista and indianista movements were by the late 1960s gaining force in 
organizations such as the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(CNTCB), where, meanwhile, continuous resistance from the Bolivian Workers’ Central 
to such Indianist proposals only stood to strengthen Reinaga’s disdain for the traditional 
Bolivian left. Meanwhile, in 1968, the Julián Apaza University Movement was 
established, an important Aymara intellectual collective, among a group of young 
scholars for whom Fausto Reinaga was probably the most important and influential 
interlocutor. On a regular basis they would meet in his house and personal library near 
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Killi-Killi in La Paz, where they would participate in intellectual discussions.141 All of 
this clearly influenced Reinaga who, ever the realist and strategist, saw the very real 
possibility of a fruitful revolution led by these emerging forces. In 1969, only a year 
before the publication of La Revolución India, he affirms the following: 
The Indian sea has started its movement. The tide is already presenting 
itself in determinate areas; and it rises, and it will rise adorning its waves 
with bursts of fire, like feathers… Not to see, not to feel, to close one’s 
eyes before the Indian sea that has begun moving, and that crashes against 
us and bites our flesh and our conscience, it is like discussing the 
squaring of the circle when igneous tongues lap at the city. (8)142  
 
 This is the context in which he published, finally, La Revolución India in 1970, 
arguably the most important and influential Indianist work to be published in Latin 
America. We are now in a position to give a more nuanced analysis of Reinaga’s 
particular historical reading, and to understand how he both opened Bolivian history and 
historiography onto new possible courses, on the one hand, while, on the other, 
continuing to reproduce a certain vision of history which is strongly grounded in what 
we could call an ontology of war, a certain production of ethnicity: an ethnogenesis.  
 
II.6 Towards a Historical Understanding of Reinaga’s Indianism 
 Armed with a deeper historical understanding of Reinaga’s intellectual trajectory, 
we are now able to account for some of the initial theoretical limitations that were 
                                                
141 Verushka Alvizuri dedicates a chapter to the influence of Fausto Reinaga in the construction of Aymara 
identity, in which these meetings are discussed at some length. Refer to her La construcción de la 
aymaridad (2009).  
142 “El mar indio ha iniciado su movimiento. La marea ya se presenta en determinadas zonas; y crece, y 
crecerá empenachando sus olas con llamaradas de fuego… No ver, no sentir; cerrar los ojos, antes el mar 
indio que se ha puesto en movimiento, y que nos topa y que nos muerde la carne y la consciencia, es 
discutir la cuadratura del círculo cuando las lenguas ígneas lamen la ciudad.” 
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encountered in La Revolución India. On the one hand, we saw that Reinaga was at once 
deeply critical of Marxism as a practice and ideology, while at the same time adopting 
Marxist modes of analysis in his work and openly working in such Marxist traditions as 
manifesto writing. On the other hand, the limits of Reinaga’s understanding of what it 
meant to be Indian have been analyzed in some depth. We saw that the Indian 
Revolution was primarily an ontological revolution, but one that was self-limiting. The 
Indian condition was constructed as a relational ontology, in which what it meant to be 
Indian could not be separated from a history of Conquest and colonialism. Despite this 
fact, Reinaga always insisted on the possibility that the Indian Nation could be given in 
its own terms, as the pure lifeblood of the American earth. Yet his elaboration of this 
Indian, which is strongly connected in his writing to a history conquest, never seems to 
be able to come to fruition. The Indian Revolution thus seemed doomed to fail from the 
outset.  
 By carrying out an in-depth analysis of Reinaga’s writings, it has been possible 
to trace the way in which his Marxist formation was not entirely rejected by the author, 
but rather shifted and was substituted for a more racial emphasis. His underlying 
assumption of history as being the result of a dialectical struggle, and his analysis of the 
exploitation of Indians by colonial forms of domination, continue to be dependent on 
and show a continuation with his previous Marxist-Leninist thought. Reinaga shows 
himself as wishing to exorcise from his own writings the traces of those traditions which 
he nevertheless undoubtedly works within. This problematic relationship with Marxism 
would be reproduced in future years among other indigenous intellectuals, some of 
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whom would explicitly attempt to adopt a modified Marxism, and some of whom would 
reject Marxism outright in the same way that Reinaga’s Indianist writings do. What is 
important, however, is that somehow Reinaga’s Indianism always already operated 
within that tradition of Marxism that he tried to expel. His ambiguous relationship with 
Marx and the Bolivian left, therefore, can only be explained by understanding how 
Reinaga was constantly attempting to break away from a legacy which nevertheless 
grounded the very conditions of possibility of his writing.  
 The theoretical limitation that we encountered in Reinaga’s Indian ontology, 
which adopted a kind of aporetic structure in which the promise of Indian emancipation 
could never entirely separate itself from a certain history of colonialism, is a problem not 
immediately so easy to explain. Understanding Reinaga’s historical trajectory does not 
reduce the problems posed by his relative ontology and the way in which he proposes a 
road to Indian emancipation through a very partial reading of Bolivian society. 
Nevertheless, what such a close reading does allow us to consider is the way in which 
Reinaga’s recovery of a specifically Indian history responds to a number of questions 
and problems that emerged during a particular historical conjuncture, which was at the 
same time accompanied by a general feeling of disillusionment with the National 
Revolutionary project. Rather than trying to assess the viability of Reinaga’s political 
project and the theoretical soundness of his Indian history (something which, as we have 
seen, will only lead us to theoretical dead ends), adopting this perspective allows us to 
assess why Reinaga’s Indianism was so effective in its critique of the ’52 state and 
understand how it managed to interpellate so many actors who had perhaps never before 
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considered themselves to be Indian. In other words, we become able through this 
historical reading to analyze the historical effectiveness of Reinaga’s Indianist discourse 
and thereby measure its effects on what we have been calling emergent indigeneity.  
 Once again, then, it is important to understand that Reinaga’s historical 
intervention, what we could call in Lacanian terms his un-suturing of National 
Revolutionary discourse as a Master discourse, that is, as the collective political 
unconscious of the time, was fundamental to the success of his discourse in historical 
terms. The fact that Reinaga’s Indianism became a viable counter-hegemonic discourse 
in the political arena throughout the late twentieth century can only be explained by the 
fact that it effectively challenged a certain cultural logic which had been the logic par 
excellence of ’50s and ’60s Bolivia, a logic which had fed and fed off of the official 
discourse of the National Revolution. In fact, we could go so far as to say that La 
Revolución India challenged the very nomic order of Bolivian society on which its 
construction of national sovereignty was based. For if it is true, following Carl Schmitt, 
that the friend-enemy distinction is properly that distinction which defines the political 
field as separate from, say, the economic, social or cultural fields, we must nevertheless 
agree with Alberto Moreiras (2006), insofar as the manifestation of this friend-enemy 
distinction can only take place within the cultural sphere.143 Furthermore, as we saw in 
the introduction to this dissertation, the nation-state or national-popular form was always 
                                                
143 Moreiras writes that: “If the cultural mediates the political, then, in spite of Schmitt, the political is not 
the final instance of sovereign constitution: politics is not the field of the decision, if the decision must 
appeal, in every case and in order to be able to produce itself as decision, to the transpolitical dimension of 
the cultural [Si lo cultural media lo político, entonces, a pesar de Schmitt, lo político no es la instancia 
última de constitución de soberanía: la política no es el campo de la decisión, si la decisión debe apelar, en 
cada caso, y para poder producirse como decisión, a la dimensión transpolítica de lo cultural]” (2006, 55). 
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given as a neutralization of conflicts of value in the name of a national-popular subject 
or fictive ethnicity, by which the state appropriated the power to be able to manage and 
categorize the nature of political conflict internal to the national territory. The 
hegemonic National Revolutionary discourse that over-determined the cultural sphere 
during the Revolutionary years in Bolivia made it impossible for even the most radical 
political group to challenge directly the MNR’s or, later, military governments’ hold on 
power. Even the most dissident groups never opposed themselves to the national state 
apparatus as such (with the possible exception of the POR, who were only ever a very 
marginal group within the COB). Even long after the Rosca had been removed from 
their position of power, the Bolivian national body continued to conceive itself as the 
construction of the nation against the anti-nation. This struggle became the marker of the 
friend-enemy distinction, which continually reaffirmed the legitimacy of the 1952 
government’s claim to sovereignty. The sovereignty of the National Revolutionary state 
was like the camel in the Qur’an: it was so ingrained as a part of daily life that its 
presence was assumed.144 Reinaga’s discourse was, then, the first to directly confront the 
political myths of the 1952 state and, thus, the first to be able to propose a radical 
challenge to it. 
 Another important axis of Reinaga’s work which explains its powerful influence 
in popular culture is an easily comprehensible dualist vision of history. Reinaga 
conceives of this history as the recovery of a lost Indian past, and it is by virtue of this 
                                                
144 There is no mention of any camel in the Qur’an. This was pointed out by Argentine writer Jorge Luis 
Borges, who said that this proved beyond doubt that the Qur’an was an Arabian text. Only from within 
Arabian culture, he wrote, would the presence of a camel be so quotidian that there would be no need to 
make mention of it. 
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recovery that his writings become able to interpellate new political subjects. I would 
argue that this is so effective in Reinaga’s work not because of his re-reading of history 
as such, but rather due to the way in which a sector of the Bolivian population who had 
suffered a shared experience of discrimination were able to identify with that history as 
their own. Reinaga’s intellectual work was thus a counter-cultural production and act of 
resistance capable of forming alternative cultural trends and communities. Writing and 
reading Indianist texts, taking part in Indianist intellectual discussions, participating in 
party activism: all of this formed constant acts of daily resistance which subjectivated 
those involved. In other words, Reinaga’s re-reading of history was not merely an 
academic enterprise but properly took place on what we can call, following Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the imaginary rather than the symbolic plane. Reinaga claims, when 
writing his history, to be able to explain to the Indian who he really is, reveal the secrets 
of his past, create an identification on his or her part with a community that had never 
properly existed prior to Reinaga’s writing it into history. His historical narrative is like 
a mirror of truth through which the Indian is able to see him or herself for the first time. 
Reinaga is like the father figure in a second Oedipal rite of passage.  
 It is important to stress this affective element of Reinaga’s understanding of the 
Indian, without which the historical efficacy of the term cannot be properly appreciated. 
We have seen that, for Reinaga, what it meant to be Indian was strongly grounded in a 
sense that there was something permanent about the Indian. He felt himself called, 
through his own identification with the Indian cause which was also, as he himself 
writes, his own cause, to the aid of the indigenous populations across Latin America: 
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from his experience in post-revolutionary Mexico, in the Indigenous Congress of 1945, 
and throughout his interactions with indigenous activists from the 1960s onwards. It is 
always difficult, theoretically speaking, to talk in terms of affect, and I do not wish to 
study this affective relation here in precise philosophical terms, which are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Rather, what I would like to suggest simply is that this affective 
relationship to what it means to live something like what we could call the “Indian 
difference,” a life experience which inspired much of Reinaga’s writing, would mark 
several generations of indigenous activists who identified with Reinaga’s teachings. In 
an encounter with a young Indianist who was involved in the 2003 Gas Wars in El Alto 
(June 2014), for example, I was told that Reinaga’s writings had a profound effect on 
him when he began to read them. Having always been ashamed of his humble roots, he 
recounted how, by reading Reinaga, he realized that Reinaga was writing about him and 
how he had to reclaim his own “Indianness.” The fact that Reinaga’s texts can speak so 
strongly in affective terms to someone who is distanced from him by three to four 
generations is a testament to the power of his texts, and the fact that this element must be 
accounted for. We see this same affective relation in the testimony of Sofía Nina Phajsi, 
whose emotive language shows her to have been profoundly interpellated by Reinaga’s 
text. Despite generational and lived differences, the author of this testimony seems to 
feel almost as if La Revolución India had been written for her: 
In “La Revolución India” our eyes were opened to the epic feats that our 
race has been the protagonist of in search of its liberation, feats that the 
“Official History” hides and ignores; of course, from our School days 
they make us repudiate the race that was oppressed for centuries, and they 
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make us believe that we are the scum of “civilization.” (Mallki No.6, 
2004)145   
 
 The most powerful comparative case study with the work of Reinaga in this 
respect, and one about which Reinaga himself wrote, is the Black Civil Rights 
movement in the United States. It is important to the extent that it is also a racialized 
political movement which, at the same moment in which Reinaga was writing his 
Indianist texts, sought and continues to seek political mobilization based on a sense of 
racial difference. What is important about this comparison is that the Black movement in 
the United States, like the indigenous movements in Bolivia and the Andean region more 
generally, has found much more powerful tools for mobilization and for understanding a 
history of oppression in specifically racial terms, rather than those traditionally provided 
by Marxist narratives framed in the language of class struggle. Whatever we are to 
understand by the term “race” in this context, what is clear is that it offers alternative 
theoretical tools which have been useful for blacks or the indigenous in a way which was 
not true of class categories. Reinaga was deeply aware of this for the North American 
case, and tried to convince others in Bolivia of how the state-sponsored language of 
“indigenous-peasants” was an inadequate vocabulary for understanding the Indian 
problem. 
 Thus Reinaga’s emphasis on race offers a new lens from which to understand the 
problems of Bolivian society. It makes visible certain problems that had not been 
                                                
145 “En ‘La Revolución India’ nos abre los ojos con los hechos epopéyicos que ha protagonizado nuestra 
raza en busca de su liberación, hechos que la ‘Historia Oficial’ oculta o los ignora; claro, desde la Escuela 
nos hace repudiar a la raza oprimida durante siglos, y nos hacen consentir que somos la escoria de la 
‘civilización.’” 
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perceptible within the framework of National Revolutionary discourse, albeit is also 
plagued by its own theoretical limitations. Indeed, one can regard Reinaga’s discourse as 
a new mode of making visible the indigenous population and their role in Bolivian 
history, of making apparent a historical injustice which was not detected or sensible in 
previous historical accounts. It was, in some sense, a new common sense concerning the 
historical devenir of the Bolivian nation, a new “state of things.” To adopt the words of 
Jacques Rancière that were cited in the introduction to this dissertation, Reinaga’s 
historical re-reading represents a reconfiguration of the relation between sense and sense 
(“In What Time Do We Live,” 2013). And this new relation “between sense and sense” 
must be understood at both the collective discursive level, as a new elaboration of 
official histories, a new corpus of texts and historical figures as key referents in the 
canon of Bolivian literature and history, as well as on a personal, almost bodily level, as 
a new way of feeling oneself and understanding oneself as Indian, a new corpus, like the 
recomposed body of the dismembered Tupac Katari, a new historical awareness of 
oneself and one’s historical destiny. It included a “recuperation” of history which 
required a new historical archive, narrating the story of a section of the population that 
had traditionally possessed no voice. “For Reinaga,” affirms Marcía Stephenson, “the 
indigenous struggle for power and knowledge must be connected with the recuperation 
of native historical memory” (Mallki No.11). Yet this history was not seen as merely 
being the past, but was felt to explain to those who had shared this experience of 
discrimination their own identity. Both an ethnogenesis and a savage nomadism.146 All 
                                                
146 Refer to the introduction of this dissertation for an explanation of my use of these terms.  
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of this finds root in the work of Fausto Reinaga, and it was to be passed down to a new 
generation of (largely Aymara) activist scholars in the following decade. 
 I do not wish to overstate here the newness of Reinaga’s discourse. Indeed, this 
analysis has tried to carefully show the ways in which Reinaga’s thought actually 
represented a continuity with the previous National Revolutionary discourse in many 
respects, in spite of Reinaga’s own claims to be doing something entirely new in his 
writings. This continuity is doubtlessly important for understanding Reinaga’s 
arguments during his Indianist phase. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to stress, if only 
to understand what is new about emergent indigeneity, that there was indeed something 
at the heart of his discourse which was in some way novel. What we have is a historical 
reading of older notions such as nation and race which actually challenge the old 
European tradition from which they evidently take root.  
 This point can be illustrated by adopting Michel Foucault’s reflections on the 
representation of the savage and the barbarian in European political thought, which he 
presented on March 3, 1976, in the Collège de France as part of his series of seminars 
entitled “Society Must be Defended.” Foucault argues that the figure of the savage 
belongs to classical political philosophy, which was always concerned with juridical 
sovereignty (he has in mind here authors such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke). The 
savage is the natural, pre-societal man, or that bestial creature which is inspired only by 
his passions. It therefore properly belongs to an early modern tradition in which the 
legitimization of political sovereignty turned on a precise distinction between natural and 
man-made right. The figure of the barbarian thus appears in its modern form for the first 
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time in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries alongside the emergence of a new 
understanding of history and of right, not based on notions of natural law, but rather on 
common cultural heritages, in a European space which began to understand itself as 
divided into historically distinct nations. The barbarian thus emerges as a figure who, 
unlike the savage who always in some way precedes history, is always already historical. 
The barbarian exists only insofar as he or she has a relationship to civilization, an 
antagonistic relationship, a will to destroy and to dominate it. In other words, the 
barbarian as a historical metaphor emerges in the moment that history begins to be 
conceived of as the constant perpetuation of war, of politics as the clash between 
different historical nations. 
 In many ways, Reinaga’s discourse perpetuates the modern European one that 
Foucault outlines in his seminar. The history that Reinaga writes is still a history of 
perpetual war, a war between different nations with their own cultural heritages. The 
figure of the barbarian is clearly present in his writings, whose archetype is to be found 
in this case in the image of the Spanish Conquistador, drawing from the tradition of the 
Black Legend. This Conquistador is cruel and destructive, always already an actor in 
history, much like the barbarian with whom Foucault presents us. There is an important 
difference, however. The barbarism of the Spanish colonial legacy in La Revolución 
India is not the barbarism of that figure which stands always outside of the gates of the 
polis, not a figure marginal to civilization, not its constituted outside. Indeed, in 
Reinaga’s account, and in emergent indigeneity in Bolivia more generally, the marginal 
population in this historical account continues to be the Indian or indigenous one(s). The 
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barbarity of Spanish and cholo colonialism is already a civilizational barbarity. In other 
words, it is civilization itself in this model that is barbaric. The polis is corrupted from 
its center. More than a war of nations, then, the race war of Reinaga’s thought is a war of 
civilizations. The image of the savage is also recycled and given a different emphasis in 
this reading, where the purity of the savage’s pre-historical nature becomes a purity of a 
pre-colonial and pre-modern nature. If the savage and the barbarian in early European 
political thought were figures which it was the task of civilization to tame or rationalize 
through law, then, here the figure of the noble savage of the pre-Conquest inverts this 
logic. The Indian Nation has the task of taming civilization, of keeping European or 
Western-style civilization at bay. This is so precisely because Western-style civilization 
is always already a barbaric civilization, plagued by a history of oppression, exploitation 
and colonialism. This analysis would be coherent with the notion that emergent 
indigeneity represents a shift in the form of political conflict that is taking place today in 
society as a result of globalization, where we see national conflict replaced by a clash of 
civilizations.  
 
II.7 Aporias of the Indian Writer 
 Against the larger part of secondary bibliography on Reinaga, which has failed to 
provide a sufficiently historical account of his writings, I have attempted to outline the 
work of the father of Indianism in a historical framework which is capable of going 
beyond accusations of his work as a racist endeavor, and with a view to understanding 
how his writings mobilize a number of problems and questions specific to Bolivian 
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society. In this sense, Reinaga’s thought must be considered together with this history, 
rather than in pseudo-universalist terms. What I have tried to compile is a critique of his 
work which is capable therefore of understanding why Reinaga’s central theoretical 
tenets were to become a common recourse for many indigenous intellectuals in the 
coming years. Rather than attempting to find grounds upon which to attack or appraise 
his work, I illustrate how it intersects with a number of theoretical and practical 
problems which can be thought through more effectively by virtue of a fuller analysis of 
this author’s oeuvre. 
 However, there are still a number of problems in Reinaga’s work which are 
important to analyze here to the extent that they would also be inherited by the tradition 
of Indianism and katarismo that followed him. These problems can be said to revolve 
around a single kernel which concerns the place of Reinaga as an intellectual. Or, 
perhaps it is more accurate to say, the place with which he endows himself as an 
intellectual. On various occasions, Reinaga draws attention to himself in his writings as 
the first true Indianist, as he who was capable of bringing to light for the first time the 
secret dialectic of the cholo-Indian racial war that formed the axis of Bolivian historical 
development. He called his own writings “the first stretch of liberated indigenous 
thought” (Reinaga 1967, 17).147 Indeed, Indianism was the ideological doctrine of the 
Indian Revolution, and its ultimate aim was to make the Indian aware of his historical 
destiny, of his place in history. Reinaga was, properly speaking, and in his own terms, 
                                                
147 “el primer tramo del pensamiento indio liberado.” 
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the first Indian and first Indianist, insofar as he considered himself to be the first to be 
truly aware of his place in history as an Indian.  
 Yet on what grounds does Reinaga, as a public intellectual, endow himself with 
the special right to be able to decide on the cholo-Indian distinction? On what grounds 
can he claim to be able to give the “correct” reading of history, one which permits him to 
finally reveal history’s secrets and show the Indian to himself for the first time, as if in 
some form of historical mirror of truth? There is a certain undecidability in Reinaga’s 
ontology of war that he himself never appears to account for. Indeed, it would seem that 
Reinaga would grant himself the unique privilege of being able to distinguish these two 
races, two races which are the driving force of history but which only Reinaga is able to 
make apparent for the reader. Reinaga’s implicit claim to be able to distinguish between 
the authentic Indian Nation and that of cholo-mestizo Bolivia cannot be separated, of 
course, from this author’s constant claim to the truth. “The truth is my weapon,” he 
claims, “… I have the sacred responsibility to speak the truth. The truth is the only 
sacred thing” (La Revolución India, 45).148 This truth is based always on a historical 
reading, but that is not to say that it is not always a very particular historical reading, one 
which interpellates new subjects and creates new senses of historical destiny, new 
historical myths. Fausto Reinaga never problematizes these new historical myths as 
such, however. For all that he criticizes the artifice of the National Revolutionary 
discourse as a false history, he is unable to do entirely away with a tradition in which 
                                                
148 “La verdad es mi arma … tengo el santo deber de de hablar la verdad desnuda. La verdad es la única 
cosa sagrada.” 
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historical narrative functions as a technique of power, interpellating political 
subjectivities, and which makes its task the construction of a people without remainder.  
 In this respect, Reinaga forms part of a long tradition in Latin America which 
critic Ángel Rama has described at length in his work The Lettered City. In this Latin 
American Cultural Studies classic, Rama writes that the urban tradition in the Americas 
was distinct from the European one insofar as the American cities were the direct 
product of an imperial utopian fantasy. Rather than being built organically around the 
changing needs of the population, they were built for order. The literate classes, what 
Rama calls the lettered elite, thus always had a particularly special place in the Latin 
American city, where administration and bureaucracy were key to establishing and 
maintaining this kind of order. The role of the intellectual in Latin America was thus 
more directly political in cultural life, and Rama sought to show with his study how 
lettered elites and literary men and women continued to have a powerful influence in 
public life even after Latin American independence. Reinaga’s work, I would argue, can 
only be understood from within this same tradition. This author opposes himself to a 
cultural elite which he accuses of oppressing the Indian, and yet he himself forms part of 
this same cultural elite. While Reinaga is certainly a figure of counter-culture, a marginal 
character that operates on the frontiers of the lettered city, he is nevertheless a part of 
that culture industry, and determined by its material conditions. With his Indianism, 
Reinaga attempts to distance himself from what he calls cholo culture, yet is only able to 
do so through the very same techniques of intellectual work that his enemies also 
employ.  
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 In other words, we should not take Reinaga’s radical anti-colonialism at face 
value. This author is in fact complicit in the co-determination between the cultural 
sphere and the political domain that is part and parcel of a hegemonic Latin American 
cultural legacy, thereby participating in the systems of power which have conditioned 
the modern Bolivian Republican tradition. Reinaga places himself in the tradition of 
such MNR ideologues as Carlos Montenegro and Víctor Paz Estenssoro through his 
prolific writings, manifestos and party memberships. As part of this lettered elite, 
Reinaga regards himself as being capable of diagnosing the historical symptoms of the 
nation’s ills and thereby prescribing its remedies. 
 The limit of Fausto Reinaga’s work, then, is that his radical Indian Revolution 
does not represent a radical break with the traditional place of literatos in Latin America. 
On the contrary, Reinaga worked strategically within this tight nexus between the 
production of knowledge and the control of power in an attempt to bring the Indian 
Revolution to fruition. By “recovering” an Indian history of oppression and resistance 
that he sought to make a collective historical memory of society’s downtrodden, Reinaga 
interpellated new subject positions and thereby changed the conditions of the political 
struggle. Reinaga inserted himself within a tradition of which he was also fiercely 
critical. By doing so, he then became able to appropriate and in some way colonize the 
technologies of power that had belonged to the governing elites and change their 
conditions from within.  
 This also means, therefore, that Reinaga’s Indianism is not immune to the 
critiques made from all corners of contemporary continental philosophy against onto-
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theological metaphysical discourse. Reinaga’s philosophy of history remains, ultimately, 
a normative history in the tradition of Western political theology. To incorporate words 
more specific to the canon of reflection within Latin American Cultural Studies, we can 
say that the thought of Fausto Reinaga is not post-hegemonic.149 Like the National 
Revolutionary discourse that preceded it, Reinaga’s thought turns on the construction of 
a people in which the distinction between the true Nation and its anti-Nation, or the 
Indian and the cholo, is decisive. It has no room for a politics outside of the friend-
enemy distinction, which always already depends on Reinaga’s very particular reading 
of the Bolivian historical devenir.  
 Reinaga’s Indianist thought thus finds itself wrapped up in a double bind which 
will continue to haunt the writings of those that would follow in his footsteps. On the 
one hand, he is radically critical of the Western tradition and offers his thought as a 
radical break from it. Yet by offering itself as the promise of an indigenous emancipation 
which is based on a specific historical interpellation making its claim in the name of the 
truth, Reinaga’s Indianism finds itself unable to separate itself from that of which it is 
most critical. The specter of a Western tradition in which truth and power come hand in 
hand continues to inhabit Reinaga’s thought. Or, perhaps, it is precisely the other way 
around: that Reinaga’s thought always already inhabited this Western tradition, and to 
                                                
149 I am not thinking here of the use that is made of this concept by Jon Beasley-Murray (2010), probably 
the scholar who has done most to popularize the term. For Beasley-Murray, post-hegemony is a concept 
which proves that “[there] is no hegemony and never has been” (Posthegemony, ix). However, I am more 
interested in the way that this concept has been adopted by thinkers such as Alberto Moreiras (2001) and 
Gareth Williams (2002), who understand the posthegemonic as that element which is not reducible to 
hegemonic articulation. Thus, posthegemony would be more like a certain resistance to all that defines a 
politics of cultural hegemony, such as identity and representation.  
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that extent can only rhetorically put itself forward as an anti-Western discourse. His 
discourse would instead represent, more accurately, an alternative hermeneutics within a 
specifically Western and Latin American tradition that would produce a number of 
political effects at the level of public national discourse in Bolivia.  
 We should not be blind to the fact that, just as in the Western tradition that he 
criticizes, this nexus between knowledge production and power is not a merely 
theoretical problem in Reinaga’s writing. It is also a properly political problem insofar as 
Reinaga always regarded his writing as offering a program for action. In other words, we 
should not regard Reinaga’s alliance with military popular governments throughout his 
life as incidental to his theoretical work. If the people were unaware of what was best for 
them, Reinaga had no issue with the idea of a military government acting on their behalf. 
Indeed, one can argue that throughout his intellectual production, Reinaga continuously 
sought a caudillo figure who would be capable of guaranteeing the revolution. His most 
admired figures in the tradition of indigenous resistance are all such caudillo figures, 
beginning with that of Tupac Katari. He is strongly influenced in his political career, as 
we have already seen, by the government of Gualberto Villarroel, a figure who, as 
complicated as his legacy is, was nonetheless never democratically elected as such. As 
Gustavo Cruz analyzes in great detail, it must also be taken into consideration that the 
Indian Revolution was very nearly a realizable feat for Reinaga under the rule of another 
strong military leader. The support he found in the ranks of the short-lived (1970-71) 
Juan José Torres administration, the government of a popular military leader, revived his 
hope in the possibility of the Armed Forces being protagonists of the Indian Revolution. 
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In Tesis India (1971), Reinaga claims that under the Torres administration an Indian 
Revolution may have been possible. He even gave lectures in those years at a military 
school in order to spread his ideas among the military. As Gustavo Cruz (2013) affirms:  
What was clear was that at the end of the ’70s Reinaga had a political 
conviction: the Indian that was in the barracks was the “rifle of the army,” 
and history showed that this rifle had been used against the Indian. But it 
was a question of using [this arm] against the “Bolivian cholaje and 
gringo,” who oppressed the Indian. For this reason, Reinaga thought that, 
by changing the military’s, the soldier’s ideology, he would manage to 
form an Indian army for an Indian revolution. (189)150  
 
 Finally, Reinaga was greatly criticized in the 1980s for his apparent approval of 
the so-called “narco-dictatorship” of military leader Luis García Mesa, who ruled from 
July 17 1980 - August 4 1981. In his publication Bolivia y la revolución de las Fuerzas 
Armadas (Bolivia and the Revolution of the Armed Forces, 1981), Reinaga appears to 
praise Mesa’s government. For many thinkers, this became a reason not only to criticize 
Reinaga’s later writings, but indeed the whole of his thought.151 Gustavo Cruz (2013), 
however, regards Reinaga’s reflections on Mesa’s government as an indication of what 
Reinaga thought the government should do rather than an appraisal of their actual 
leadership (291). In any case, what is clear is that this element of his thought cannot be 
read as a radical rupture from, but a continuation with, his previous convictions: the 
search for a military strongman who is able to guarantee the stability of the revolution.  
                                                
150 “Lo claro es que a finales de los sesenta Reinaga tenía una convicción política: el indio que estaba en 
los cuarteles era el ‘fusil del ejército’ y la historia mostraba que ese fusil había sido usado contra el indio, 
pero se trataba de usarlo contra el ‘cholaje blanco y el gringo,’ que oprimía al indio. Por eso, Reinaga 
pensó que cambiando la ideología del militar, del soldado, lograría un ejército indio para una revolución 
india.”  
151 See, for example, Stefanoni’s “Qué hacer con los indios…” (2010).  
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 Ultimately, Reinaga’s understanding of his place as an intellectual takes part in a 
complex network of power structures with a top-down control, where political action is 
always subordinated to what Reinaga calls the “truth.” Reinaga, as the one who knows 
and can explain this truth, is the intellectual arm of a movement which also needs force: 
it needs a military arm in order to enforce and guarantee it. And it can do so, it is right to 
do so, precisely to the extent that it is always already the bearer of the truth, and 
therefore can prescribe the new historical destiny of the nation, even if against an 
unwilling population. For if the population is an unwilling one, this is precisely because 
it is part of the internal enemy itself, the Bolivian cholo-mestizo, or because it is unaware 
of its own need for an emancipation which only the strength of force guided by the 
standard-bearer of truth can provide. Reinaga’s writings, therefore, also seek to justify 
the forceful bringing to consciousness of a population which is unaware that it needs 
such an awakening.  
 
II.8 Conclusions 
 The Indianism of Fausto Reinaga is more than a new ideological doctrine, or a 
new philosophy of history: it is a fundamental stage in the development of a process 
which represents a whole new way of seeing, being and acting in the world. This 
process, which I am calling emergent indigeneity, was not authored as such by Fausto 
Reinaga. Indeed, Reinaga was one of a number of indigenous activists who at that time 
were participating in emerging indigenous parties and writing on specifically indigenous 
problems. However, in this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that Fausto Reinaga was 
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fundamental to the development of this discourse on indigeneity in Bolivia. His 
influence was so important, in fact, that it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
discourses of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia today all in one way or another work 
within the legacy of Reinaga. It is in this way that we should understand this Bolivian 
intellectual as the father of Indianism.  
 Given that his place in this historical development is so important, and given that 
there is a dearth of scholarship which considers Reinaga from this perspective, it has 
been necessary to give a complete and in-depth account of his work. By doing so, I have 
tried to show how Reinaga’s work is better appreciated when one suspends the 
immediate theoretical problems that are encountered in his Indianist writings, in favor of 
a perspective that accounts for the specific set of historical problems he is responding to, 
as well as his reception among an emerging generation of Aymara intellectuals. His 
writings are a response to the decline in the hegemonic power of National Revolutionary 
discourse, and were perhaps the first to challenge so fiercely the cultural legacy at the 
base of its ideological discourse: mestizaje, indigenismo, and a certain Marxist tradition.  
 Though he is by no means a historian, Reinaga’s most important influence on 
emergent indigeneity in this sense is without doubt in the historical sphere. Or, to be 
more precise, his most important influence is found in the recuperation of a collective 
historical memory of indigenous struggle for emancipation. I have argued that it is not so 
much the specific historical reading that Reinaga provides in his writings which is 
important in this respect, but rather the way in which this historical account is used to 
challenge the national-popular legacy of the 1952 Revolution and to interpellate new 
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historical actors. By calling them to a historical destiny that had supposedly always 
awaited them but that had been masked by the official silence of Bolivian cholaje, 
Reinaga will make a whole new generation of people identify with this history and 
develop a new consciousness concerning what it means to be indigenous. 
 Reinaga’s thought was to take yet another turn towards the end of the 1970s, in 
which a specifically Indian perspective became less and less important for the writer. 
Instead, he would go further in his rejection of nationalism and Marxism, and conceived 
of a revolution that would take place not among the Indian population, but the whole of 
humanity. This is what Reinaga would call pensamiento amaútico. However, by this 
phase in his writing Reinaga had lost a great deal of the influence that he had previous 
gained with his activism in Indianist parties and political organizations, with the new 
Aymara youth and within the Bolivian political scene more generally. His writings had 
already seen the apogee of their influence on the emerging discourses of indigenous 
activists in Bolivia. These discourses, which owed a great deal to Reinaga’s Indianism, 
would instead gain influence and be popularized by a diverse and complex number of 
activists and intellectuals working in political organizations and universities, not all of 
whom would identify as indigenous. From the late 1970s onwards, emergent indigeneity 
comes into its own and begins to become an important contender in the public national 
area. A cultural revolution was about to take place in Bolivia that would shake the 
Bolivian elite and reconfigure the conditions of cultural and political life.  
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CHAPTER III                                                                                                                
THE BOLIVIAN PACHAKUTI: EMERGENT INDIGENEITY IN BOLIVIA 1970 - 
2000 
 
Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole 
cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of 
such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weighs 
like an alp upon the brain of the living. At the very time when men appear 
engaged in revolutionizing things and themselves, in bringing about what 
never was before, at such very epochs of revolutionary crisis do they 
anxiously conjure up into their service the spirits of the past, assume their 
names, their battle cries, their costumes, to enact a new historic scene in 
such time-honored disguise and with such borrowed language.  
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
 
III.1 Something Borrowed, Something New 
 As was seen in the previous chapter, in La Revolución India, Fausto Reinaga 
makes his own history, but not out of the whole cloth; not out of conditions chosen by 
himself, but rather out of conditions he finds close at hand. The weight of history falls 
heavy on Reinaga’s thought of emancipation, from which he conjures the spirits of 
ancestors long past to the aid of his revolution. This conjuring of the ghosts of the past as 
resistance to the present, as an elusive promise for future emancipation, would become a 
practice popularized in certain activist circles from the late 1960s onwards. To bring 
about an unprecedented visibility to issues of indigeneity in Bolivia, indigenous activists 
and university scholars would anxiously conjure up into their service the spirits of the 
past — a past which was felt to be in some way their past. And indeed, they would 
assume their names, integrating indigenous languages, above all Quechua and Aymara, 
as part of the corpus of the Bolivian intellectual tradition. They would assume their 
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battle cries, fighting in the name of Tupac Katari and Zárate Willka. And they would 
assume their costumes, returning to Incaic traditions and habits, expressing indigeneity 
in the public sphere as never before. These would be the movements that would forever 
change the course of history, marking the ineluctable emergence of indigeneity as a part 
of public and political life in Bolivia.  
 Fausto Reinaga, as has already been argued, in fact represents a particularly 
intense node of expression for a more general phenomenon which sees in the last four 
decades of the twentieth century the indigenous granted a new place in public civil life. 
This phenomenon, that I am calling here emergent indigeneity, is a result of both local 
and global processes and is a multifaceted dynamic, in which the term ‘indigeneity’ 
itself is constantly defined and re-defined as part and parcel of a struggle over 
signification. The processes that drive this struggle over signification include the golden 
age of Cultural Anthropology, leading in the 1960s to an explosion of scholarly interest 
in the linguistic structure of indigenous languages and in understanding indigenous 
‘cosmovisions’ in particular communities. This would later be followed by the influence 
of Postcolonial Studies and Cultural Studies, in which suddenly these same communities 
would come to be perceived as sites of resistance to the global imperial order. This 
would be accompanied by the continuation of indigenous activist groups such as the 
kataristas, which would grow in influence throughout the decades by virtue of a series of 
political reconfigurations in the country which favored indigenous-peasant grassroots 
politics. Finally, one cannot account for these processes without also taking into 
consideration the influence of the discourse of Human Rights which gained ground on 
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the international scene during these years, and of the exponential growth of Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs) on a global scale, which would become particularly 
influential in Bolivia as a result of the country’s decentralization policies.   
 This new beginning for indigenous peoples, coinciding with the celebration of a 
half-century of ‘discovering’ the New World in 1992, was experienced during these 
years as a kind of turning upside-down of history. The ghosts of a past once destined to 
oblivion now burst into the present and lived alongside the most modern and 
contemporary. History appeared as if in reverse.152 In fact, in Quechua and Aymara there 
is a word for this reversal of time and space — pachakuti. Since the election of Evo 
Morales in 2006 in Bolivia, this word has been invoked on numerous occasions, as if it 
somehow mystically were able to explain and justify the coming to power of an 
indigenous president. Nancy Postero confirms that current Bolivian President Evo 
Morales’s “uses of imagery are symbolically rich, reminding people of the pachakuti 
prophecy, filling many with pride and hope” (“Andean Utopias,” 16). In their recent 
study of Bolivian revolutionary moments Revolutionary Horizons, Forrest Hylton and 
Sinclair Thomson support this vision of recent Bolivian history as a pachakuti. They 
explain the concept in some detail:  
For those who identify with indigenous movements, the notion [of 
pachakuti] invokes a time-cycle corresponding to the five hundred years 
elapsed since the Spanish conquest – 1992 was a moment of particular 
efflorescence for this historical imaginary. If the conquest was a 
cataclysmic rupture that brought about European ascendency and 
                                                
152 Indeed, since the summer of 2014 it would appear that time literally counts backwards in Bolivia, 
where the clock that hangs on the House of Congress in the Plaza Murillo in La Paz actually turns counter-
clockwise. The Ambassador David Choquehuanca calls this monument the “clock of the south.” Refer to 
the report in BBC Mundo “Por qué el reloj del congreso de Bolivia gira al revés.”  
 168 
indigenous subordination, today it means a turning of the world right side 
up. (Hylton and Thomson, 28-9) 
 
 These authors describe the pachakuti as “a returning to a new beginning” (ibid., 
30). A brilliantly paradoxical syntagma, no doubt. It is not only about returning to a 
beginning, not only about tracing back one’s roots, or at least certain roots, chosen 
strategically from the rhizomatic labyrinth of history. It is also about the newness of such 
a beginning. Not beginning anew, then, but a new beginning. Curiously, the term 
pachakuti itself indicates that which many indigenous scholars today would deny or 
refuse: so-called emergent indigeneity in Bolivia from the late 1960s onwards is not 
about returning to the past, but of producing something new, just as in the bourgeois 
revolutions of nineteenth-century France (which called upon the ghosts of an Imperial 
Rome to gain their strength of force) modern history was being made. As Marx writes in 
The Eighteenth Brumaire: “[the actors of the French Revolution] achieved in Roman 
costumes and with Roman phrases the task of their time” (10). The modern 
revolutionaries charged onto the stage of history dressed in Roman costume, but only in 
order to draw the curtain down over a previous historical epoch and issue in something 
entirely unforeseen in European history. There is a caveat, however: “Wholly absorbed 
in the production of wealth and in the peaceful fight of competition,” writes Marx, “this 
society could no longer understand that the ghosts of the days of Rome had watched over 
its cradle” (ibid.). Just as something new is composed from the traces of a borrowed 
past, something borrowed wedges itself into the interstices of the new, haunting it from 
within by making itself felt without ever revealing itself as such. If we can talk of a 
cultural revolution, it should be understood in the sense of the revolutions of a ferris 
 169 
wheel, different each time in the repetition, a turning in the wheel of time. Here I 
propose to offer a precise theoretical understanding of emergent indigeneity that can 
help us understand the nature of this so-called pachakuti, and thereafter provide a brief 
overview of its historical development from the late 1960s to the year 2000. I will 
conclude this chapter with a textual analysis of Aymara politician Luciano Tapia’s 1995 
autobiography, Ukhamawa Jakiwasaxa (Así es nuestra vida) in order to ask about the 
limits of this process in the cultural and political sphere.  
 
III.2 That Which We Call a Rose, or Tell and Show 
 What’s in a name? In Shakespeare’s romantic tragedy Romeo and Juliet, its 
protagonists betray the family feud that makes their two houses the worst of enemies by 
planning to run away and elope together. In Lacanian terms, the starcross’d lovers were 
willing to traverse the fantasy in the name of love, renouncing thereby the Name of the 
Father. “Deny thy father and refuse thy name,” speaks Juliet to her imaginary Romeo, 
unaware that he has clandestinely intruded on her garden and is listening to her speak her 
most intimate desire. In a radical act of subversion which breaks with the strict codes of 
family honor to which the European aristocracy was bound, Shakespeare’s timeless 
couple risks it all in an act of love by renouncing their heritage, everything that is their 
past. Like the tragic hero Antigone, having renounced their social-symbolic life, they are 
fated to death in the crypts of their ancestors. This act of love is the kind of act which, to 
adopt Lacanian terminology, breaks with the Law of the Father, that is, the symbolic 
order. It is what Slavoj Žižek calls the impossible or ethical act. However, the ethical act 
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for Žižek is not simply a moral act, a good act instead of a bad act, but rather the act 
which leads to a subject’s jouissance and breaks with the discourse of the Other, the 
unconscious, thus changing the coordinates of history itself. In fact, the tragic end of 
Shakespeare’s play belies its resolution: the death of the lovers was the necessary rupture 
of the name which finally brings the two families of Capulet and Montague together.   
 It would seem that in the case of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, however, that 
which we call a rose may not smell as sweet by any other name. Even in breaking away 
from the heritage of the Bolivian Republican tradition, emergent indigeneity expresses a 
melancholic drive which clings onto the sweet smell of names of old. Such can be 
inferred by the debates surrounding the adoption in the 1990s of the term “originary 
peoples” to refer to the indigenous population as a whole. As Xavier Albó notes (1993), 
this was a contentious process in which members from the highlands favored the term 
“peasant” as a result of the historical hegemony that unionization had produced in those 
areas, whereas those from the lowlands favored the term “indigenous,” possibly a result 
of their historical identification as such, or possibly a result of its being the term by 
which they came to be politicized in the late 1980s. The term “originary peoples” was 
thus seen as a compromise position. These discussions perfectly display the blend 
between the drive to melancholia and the drive to jouissance present in indigenous social 
movements. On the one hand, the act of naming is here an act of resistance, one which 
refuses to be assimilated to an older tradition which designated indigenous populations 
simply as “peasantry.” While the term “originary peoples” would appear to indicate 
something timeless, therefore, as the united presence of autochthonous nations, it 
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actually represents something entirely new. Indeed, this would be the first time in history 
that the diverse indigenous populations of Bolivia would attempt to act according to a 
common name, to a name that was felt to be common to them. It is an example of 
Žižek’s impossible act, of traversing the fantasy, by claiming one’s loyalty to ancestry in 
defiance of one’s obligation to the national political order. At the same time, the 
contentious nature of these discussions reveals something that the indigenous 
populations were not quite willing to let go of, a certain tradition which they had felt 
somehow came to define them. The difficult conversations over a single name reveal a 
node of resistance which shows that, for its participants, not just any name would 
suffice.  
 What’s in a name? Of proper names John Stuart Mill wrote: “A proper name [is] 
a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about, 
but not of telling anything about it” (System of Logic 1.ii.5, 34). At first glance, then, the 
term indigeneity would appear to share with the proper name its non-connotative status 
by which it designates a particular set of people without describing their particular 
characteristics. For while the term indigeneity or, at least, its referent (the indigenous 
peoples themselves), would be given increasing attention in the cultural and political 
sphere from the 1970s onwards, its meaning would be more and more elusive as the 
indigenous-peasant movements became increasingly heterogenous and complex towards 
the end of the century. Indeed, the substantive at the core of the expression emergent 
indigeneity is defined precisely by its malleability, by its relative vacuum of content. 
Indigeneity should be understood in this context to represent a kind of floating signifier, 
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an effect of the struggles over meaning that were to take place throughout these years, 
over what it meant to be indigenous, and what the place of indigenous populations had 
been and should be in the Bolivian political sphere. In fact, emergent indigeneity should 
be understood primarily as this struggle over meaning: what it means to be indigenous, 
but also the meaning of history, of colonialism, and of the resistance struggles against 
indigenous subalternity in the Bolivian context.  
 The emphasis in this case should therefore not be on the substantive of the term, 
void of any particular content, but on its qualifier: emergent. Whereas in traditional 
literature on emergent indigeneity, the qualifier emergent has often been used simply to 
refer to the idea of “resurgent,” as if the indigenous peoples of Bolivia had been dormant 
throughout the previous five hundred years of colonial and Republican history, here I 
wish to emphasize its specifically aesthetic dimension. Indigeneity’s “emergence” is its 
rise to visibility within the fabric of civil society. By the term civil society, I refer to a 
specifically modern political tradition in which an aesthetic-historical perspective 
grounds the modern political community as embodied by the state, something to which I 
have alluded in the analysis of Reinaga’s work. We have seen that Reinaga’s specific 
contribution to this history was to negate the mythical foundation of civil society as its 
immunization from the state of nature. This is the myth which founds the doctrine of 
political sovereignty in the work of Thomas Hobbes, and which Michel Foucault 
analyzes through the figure of the savage, as described in the previous chapter. Reinaga 
negates this myth by displacing the natural man that is the Indian (and in Reinaga’s 
writings, the connection between the Indian and the natural is explicit), making him a 
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resistant node of modern Bolivian history and the founding myth not of a civilized order, 
but of a new (Indian) order. The emergence of indigeneity is not only about the 
increasing visibility of the indigenous in the public sphere, but of a certain kind of 
visibility. Indeed, it is not that indigeneity did not have a kind of visibility in the old 
Western myth of development, which relegated all that was indigenous to the mythical 
space of natural law. In this space, indigeneity had been considered as necessarily 
excluded because of its natural dimension, becoming the pre-political space that had to 
be eventually neutralized by the grand Leviathan of Latin American Republicanism. 
And, indeed, the revolutionary state of 1952 would be consistent with this model. What 
we see emerge for the first time in the late 1960s, then, are certain discourses on 
indigeneity circulating within civil society, not this time as part of the political 
imaginary of the elites, but as properly political on their own grounds. In other words, 
rather than the metaphor that repeatedly reaffirms the necessity for political order, lest 
the savage barbarian at the gate undermine the state of peace, the figure of indigeneity 
becomes a challenge to the foundations of modern civil society and the state, proposing 
in its place alternative models.153  
                                                
153 As a small parenthetical detour, it is important to emphasize, from a theoretical point of view, that such 
an unprecedented intervention in the history of Western political modernity (which is not to say that the 
phenomenon is unique to Bolivia) necessarily challenges the basic tenets of said modernity. That is to say, 
while being a properly political intervention in its own right (we will return to this point), one of the 
effects of emergent indigeneity in the history of political thought is to blow open a void at the heart of the 
Leviathan project itself. It has not only a political dimension, therefore, but also necessarily points towards 
the shadowy, infra-political underside of contemporary conflict. However, this shadowy underside, which 
forms part of the conditions that make a politics possible in the first instance, is only ever an effect of 
emergent indigeneity, not its field of effectivity properly speaking. We shall return to this point briefly in 
the conclusion to this dissertation.   
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 Thus the emergent dimension of this indigeneity operates in a strictly aesthetic 
register. By reconfiguring the terrain of the aesthetic-historical narrative of the Bolivian 
national devenir, it both produces a vacuum at the heart of the Bolivian Republican 
tradition (and, by extension, the Western project of political modernity upon which it is 
based), while at the same time producing new senses of history. It is for this reason that 
we should rephrase Mill’s reflections on the nature of the proper name, which tell us, to 
re-quote the passage already cited above, that a proper name “answers the purpose of 
showing what thing it is that we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it” 
(ibid.). In fact, in the case of emergent indigeneity, ‘it answers the purpose of showing 
what thing it is that we are talking about, by telling something about it.’ Emergent 
indigeneity tells tales, it provides a certain narrative account about the Bolivian historical 
process based on notions of internal colonialism and long and short memories of 
indigenous resistance. However, these tales are not its primary purpose. These tales are 
told as an answer, as a response, a response to an urgent need in the present which is 
nevertheless an immemorial haunting from the past. It answers, then, it responds to, “the 
purpose of showing what thing it is.” The question of being, of what it means to “be” 
indigenous, is immediately and logically suspended here. This “showing” only ever 
indicates the possibility of being, of being as a kind of dwelling in language which is 
only ever an index, never revealed as such. Yet emergent indigeneity is a showing, it 
reveals something, there is something which is felt differently as a result of indigeneity’s 
emergence.  
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 This should clarify, once again, the importance of the work of Fausto Reinaga, 
and why it was necessary to dedicate so many pages to this author. We have seen that 
this Indianist author does tell tales. That is, he not only recounts historical details of the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia (probably based on a combination of written and oral 
testimony), but he creates a narrative from those historical accounts. The trials of 
indigenous struggles for independence such as that led by Tupac Katari become 
metaphors for the general and lasting struggle of the indigenous peoples themselves, first 
against Spanish colonialism and, later, against Republican mestizaje. Yet, Reinaga’s 
principle purpose in his writing is not to tell tales, even if this becomes his method on 
occasion. It is rather to show, to reveal what it is to be indigenous by fabricating a 
completely new sense of history. The aesthetic property of the verb “showing” should 
thus be stressed once again, whereby Reinaga’s writings give a different sense to history, 
a different meaning by which, at the same time, one feels (“senses”) history differently. 
The interpellation on the basis of being Indian that Reinaga’s writings provoked in his 
readers, and that was analyzed in the previous chapter, is based on such a different sense 
of history, which is in turn a different sense of self-identity, of subjectivity. 
 I draw here on the work of Jacques Rancière, and specifically his notion of 
fiction. In an inaugural lecture given at the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in 
Venice in June 2011, Rancière makes the following clarification: “A fiction is not an 
imaginary tale. A fiction is the construction of a set of relations between sense and sense, 
between things that are said to be perceptible and the sense that can be made of those 
things” (“In What Time Do We Live?”). His definition plays with the three meanings of 
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the French sens (sentido, in Spanish, contains these three same meanings). Firstly, sense 
can be understood in its biological and epistemological determinations as what is 
perceptible, referring to the human senses and the human capacity for feeling or 
perception. Secondly, sense can be understood in its linguistic determination as meaning, 
as signification. The two contain a strong relation of mutual dependence, given that 
meaning only “makes sense” in so far as it bears a relation to something that is made to 
be felt or is perceived by a subject. What is more, the two senses of sense have strong 
biological implications. In the first definition, sense as perception, there is an implicit 
reference to the five human senses of smell, sight, sound, touch and taste. In the second 
definition, sense as meaning, there is an implication of logos, of speech, of that which, 
according to Aristotle, makes the human distinct from the animal.154  
 The French sens contains a third meaning which is missing from the English, 
though it emerges in the syntagma “between sense and sense” by way of implication. 
Sens also means direction, and it is in this respect that this third definition could come to 
represent the relationship that binds sense to sense, perception to meaning. This 
                                                
154 This is the famous discussion in Book I, 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle defines man as 
being an animal with the capacity for logos, often translated as ‘rationality’ (zoon logon echon) – which,  
as many commentators have noted, cannot later be disconnected from the notion that man is principally a 
political animal for Aristotle (zoon politikon). This has become a point of contention in contemporary 
continental philosophy, which has challenged the metaphysical assumptions regarding the human-animal 
distinction (such philosophers would include, but are not limited to, Jacques Derrida and Giorgio 
Agamben [refer specifically to The Animal That Therefore I Am by Derrida and The Open by Agamben]). 
This, in turn, is reinforced by contemporary biology (particularly contemporary neuroscience) and 
ecology, which has de-centered or re-centered in new ways the question of the human in relation to its 
environment and to other animals. Without space to expand on this important vein of contemporary 
inquiry here, one should nevertheless be conscious of its relevance to any discussion of indigeneity in the 
post-modern political sphere. The mythical place of the indigenous in Western thought as “natural man,” 
that is, as a kind of transient space between  civilized humanity and animality, must be a central 
consideration in understanding the stakes of such a debate.  
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movement that oscillates between the perceptible and its meaning, and the direction 
which that movement adopts, this is how we should understand the role of our third 
definition of sense. It is important to the extent that it stresses the constantly changing 
character of this relation “between sense and sense,” highlighting the non-presence of 
meaning, the iterability of logocentric language, questioning even our ability to 
apprehend the perceptible as such.  
 Departing from Rancière’s definition, I would suggest that a fiction is the making 
sense of the world. In the precise understanding that has been given the term in this 
analysis of Rancière, emergent indigeneity is a fiction. And it is a fiction precisely to the 
extent that it is a relation between sense and sense, a making sense of the world. It 
produces new senses, new meanings of history and the place of indigenous peoples in 
modernity. At the same time, and keeping in line with the strong biological emphasis of 
Rancière’s own reflections, it also effects and affects bodily behaviors. On the one hand, 
these bodily effects and affects are symbolic, that is to say, cultural: bodies perform 
differently as a result of these new senses of indigeneity and Bolivian history, they adopt 
new costumes and habits. On the other hand, however, these bodily effects and affects 
are also imaginary, that is to say, psychical: they produce new horizons of perception 
while simultaneously closing off others. By producing new senses of destiny for the 
indigenous peoples, new subjects emerge which are capable of seeing, hearing, smelling, 
tasting and feeling their surroundings differently, that is, in some sense, of inhabiting 
their surroundings differently. These subjects also become capable, therefore, not only of 
sensing in new ways what is at hand, but of pre-sensing in new ways what is to come. It 
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becomes possible to anticipate the future as the messianic coming of something new in 
ways which before were unthinkable. Indeed, the use of the term pachakuti in the public 
domain is precisely a symptom of this new mode of anticipating future possibilities.  
 The question of a new historical memory of indigenous struggles, its strictly 
aesthetic dimension and in particular its relation to the body, also necessarily entails a 
forgetting, an active forgetting. That is, it is also a question of repression: “Forgetfulness 
is not just a vis inertiae as superficial people believe,” writes Nietzsche in the second 
dissertation of Genealogy of Morals, “but is rather an active ability to suppress, positive 
in the strongest sense of the word” (35, my emphasis). Amongst the noise that lies in the 
background of human existence (let us not forget that Rancière too speaks of noise, in a 
context altogether different but not, I think, incompatible with the sense ascribed by 
Nietzsche in the passage that follows), memory is formed by holding onto what is 
necessary while allowing all that noise, which lies beyond human comprehension, to fall 
beneath the threshold of perceptibility. Nietzsche writes: “To shut the doors and 
windows of consciousness for a while; not to be bothered by the noise and battle with 
which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and against each other; a little 
piece, a little tabula rasa of consciousness to make room for something new, above all 
for the nobler functions and functionaries, for ruling, predicting, pre-determining” (35, 
my emphasis). Everything that we have analyzed above in the work of Jacques Rancière 
concerning the conditions of emergent indigeneity applies here: a taming or training of 
the body to hear, see, feel a certain way, a new distribution of the sensible, as Rancière 
would have it, the closing off or necessary forgetting of other dimensions which are lost 
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in the folds of this aesthetic organization, and above all the making necessary of 
something new, something which makes the human, or in this case the Indian, 
predictable and pre-determinate, and able to be governed (Nietszche will identify this 
process with the possibility of individual sovereignty). Though it is also the making 
predictable and pre-determinate the future, future here as eternal return of the past, or as 
circular history, and thus also of pachakuti. Emergent indigeneity is a transformation of 
the sensible therefore that creates the conditions of possibility for determining what 
indigeneity is, for showing or revealing what it is, making the Indian “reliable, regular, 
necessary, even in his own self-image, so that he, as someone making a promise is, is 
answerable for his own future!” (Genealogy of Morals, 36).  
 As was stated earlier in the chapter, however, the emergence of indigeneity is not 
only about the increasing visibility of the indigenous in the public sphere, but of a 
certain kind of visibility. It was clarified that this kind of visibility should be understood 
in strictly political terms. In other words, if indeed the way that emergent indigeneity 
intervenes in political life is primarily aesthetic, by transforming the sense of history 
from within, indigeneity itself should be understood as a political positioning within this 
transformation. I am not the first to make a claim of this kind. Writing about the current 
Movement to Socialism (MAS) government that took power in 2006, Andrew Canessa 
writes:  
Morales and others do not invoke an indigenous primitivism which Kuper 
suggests is at the center [of] indigenous identity but, rather, an indigenous 
positioning: indigenous peoples, because they have been excluded from 
the processes of colonization and globalization, are in the best position to 
develop critiques of neocolonialism and globalization (2007, 207). 
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 While Canessa primarily identifies the government of the MAS with this notion 
of an indigenous positioning, it must be admitted that this positioning is a rather strategic 
instrumentalization from the apparatus of the state of something whose primary 
intervention lies elsewhere, outside of or in the folds of the classical juridical forms of 
sovereignty. If the rhetoric of the MAS does indeed adopt indigeneity as a strategic 
political positioning, this is because emergent indigeneity is itself already the art of this 
strategic positioning.  
 A number of preliminary clarifications become necessary at this point. First of 
all, it should be clear that the term emergent indigeneity as I have elaborated it here 
operates not merely as a metaphor, that is, as a method of visualizing the way in which 
the dynamic of new discourses on indigeneity intervened in the public arena and 
transformed the old political imaginaries of the national-popular state during these years. 
It is also itself a concept, insofar as it is able to act upon the field of discursivity in which 
emergent indigeneity partakes of and makes interventions in it. As such, emergent 
indigeneity can be said to, on the one hand, account for a state of affairs, which would 
not be so much the description of how a certain state of affairs ‘is,’ but rather the way in 
which the what ‘is’ (i.e. indigeneity) becomes revealed by a redistribution of the sensible 
at the heart of civic life. On the other hand, however, it is also a concept which can 
intervene discursively at the level of academic scholarship, used to challenge ideas of a 
pre-formed indigenous ‘identity,’ where this ‘timeless indigeneity’ would in some way 
be the condition of possibility for the emergence itself, a ‘revelation’ as the ‘showing of 
what was always already there from its origin.’  
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 Secondly, we must admit that, to the extent that emergent indigeneity is a 
properly (post-)modern intervention made from within Bolivian civil society, and 
therefore directly contends with that tradition within that same public, civic sphere, it 
must necessarily be separated from other, more traditional forms of indigeneity, for 
which this is not the case. It is difficult to speak of such “more traditional forms” without 
producing a necessarily exoticizing effect, an “othering” of the indigenous that this 
dissertation seeks precisely to resist at every moment. Nor should any distinction 
between forms of indigeneity be considered absolute, pure, and indivisible. 
Nevertheless, it is true that, historically, a majority of communities within Bolivian 
national territory were marginalized and largely ignored by processes of modernization 
throughout the Republican era, and thus maintained in more or less continuous ways 
modes of existence based upon pre-Columbian civilizationary models, inherited from the 
relative autonomy of said communities under the colonial República de indios. Indeed, it 
is this deep-set separation between these different forms of life that has led many 
scholars to accuse the Republican state of a Bolivian apartheid. This “more traditional 
form,” then, which had defined in some way a colonial separation of the political body 
since the defeat of the Inca empire, must be separated from what I am calling here 
“emergent indigeneity.” This is not so much in terms of content. As we have already 
noted, the main substantive “indigeneity” in any case does not presuppose specific 
content. It is rather in terms of what we might call techniques and habits. If one form of 
indigeneity is reduced to localized techniques and habits as a result of historical 
exclusion from larger networks, the other is already fully integrated into the complex 
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networks of global capitalism in the new political order after the collapse of the nation-
state model (we shall return shortly to this point).  
 Yet this is not to say that these two forms of indigeneity do not mutually shape 
and inform one another. Just as discourses of emergent indigeneity were strongly 
grounded in the actual techniques and habits of traditional indigenous communities, 
transplanted in some way to urban communities, so too would the discourses of 
emergent indigeneity have a profound impact on community life itself. This is an 
infinitely complex phenomenon that should not be conceptualized in a back-and-forth 
dialectical process of cause-and-effect; but rather we should understand multiple forms 
of indigeneity, through their interaction in globalized networks of communication, to be 
mutually influencing and transforming one another. I will limit myself here to just two 
examples: political organization and women’s rights. On the one hand, the political 
organization native to certain Andean communities led in the 1990s to a participatory 
process of decision-making in certain areas in which their populations elected municipal 
representatives that would later fight for community rights at a national level. On the 
other hand, scholarship originating in urban zones and from abroad on the traditional 
ways of life in the ayllu has led to certain indigenous experts “teaching” other mallkus or 
indigenous leaders how to recuperate or re-establish the ayllu on their land. Meanwhile, 
on the one hand, traditional (and largely conservative) views on gender distinction in the 
ayllu have led to a popularization of the myth of the chacha-warmi (roughly translated to 
husband-wife) in urban zones, where chacha and warmi are regarded as harmonizing 
opposites, and have produced an essentialized vision of gender relations. On the other 
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hand, discourses in urban circles which incorporate feminist investigation with a view to 
indigeneity (the work of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui is notable in this respect) have brought 
about an increased awareness in some indigenous communities of the plight of women’s 
inequality and popularized discourses against patriarchy, even in rural areas.  
 Finally, as has already been mentioned, if this more precise conceptual 
understanding of emergent indigeneity that I have outlined allows us to understand 
something about the form or structure — if you like, the grammar — of emergent 
indigeneity, it nevertheless tells us nothing about its content. While indigeneity comes to 
function as a floating signifier which is shaped according to the particular political or 
social struggle to which it is put to use, not all cows are black in the world of 
indigeneity. Indeed, not everybody has a right to indigeneity, and some may claim to be 
more indigenous than others.155 In this process of (re-)defining what it means to be 
indigenous and thereby transforming the perceived place of indigeneity as such in the 
national chronicles of history, emergent indigeneity is conditioned by a number of 
factors. These factors have both material and imaginary dimensions. 
 As regards the material dimensions of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia, it is 
important to understand how these local and global processes form part of a larger 
                                                
155 One could refer here to the debates over Fausto Reinaga’s indigeneity, where Luciano Tapia (1995) 
questions Reinaga’s claim to being indigenous, after meeting with his nephew in San Pedro prison. The 
newphew defines Reinaga as being from a “mestizo middle-class family” [familia mestiza de clase media] 
(345). More recently, it has been questioned whether Evo Morales is actually still able to speak either 
Aymara or Quechua fluently (see Canessa 2006, 250). The facts of the debate are irrelevant; what is more 
important here is what is implied by the need for such a debate. Indigenous groups effectively seek to 
undermine the former leaders’ claim to indigeneity on the basis of biological race, in the first case, and 
culture, in the second. This shows to what extent the struggle for meaning in emergent indigeneity is 
overdetermined by certain factors. Indeed, the fact that Morales has neither denied nor confirmed such 
accusations is perhaps testament to the extent to which even he, as the political leader of a new 
indigenous-hegemonic bloc, is subject to its conditions.  
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transformation in the political conditions not just of the country but of the international 
scene. This transformation has essentially to do with the collapse of nation-state 
sovereignty in the contemporary world. The modern nation-state model, which had 
become the global political model par excellence with few exceptions by the time of the 
Second World War, was the product of a specific historical conjuncture in which, from 
the eighteenth century onwards, European polities began to abandon medieval 
conceptions of political space and began constructing what would become known as 
civil society, based on the theory of the Leviathan (Thomas Hobbes) or the social 
contract (John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau). Imperialism and, in the words of 
Immanuel Wallerstein, the expansion of a capitalist world-system, were enough to 
spread this political order to the rest of the ‘civilized’ world. According to political 
philosopher Carl Schmitt, the ‘political’ as an autonomous field of conflict negotiation, 
at least during the time that he wrote his most widely-read essay The Concept of the 
Political (1995, published originally in German in 1932), was grounded on the modern 
political system of a balance of powers between nation-states that emerged in the 
aftermath of the Westphalia treaty of 1648. What defines the political, for Schmitt, is the 
sovereign exceptional decision over the friend-enemy distinction: who is a friend, and 
who is an enemy of the state. “The specific political distinction to which political actions 
and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy,” he writes (The Concept 
of the Political, 26). What is important here is that this friend or enemy is always a 
friend or an enemy of the state. There is no other political entity in the modern political 
tradition; no practice of politics can extract itself or immunize itself from that of the 
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state. Schmitt writes: “The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” 
(19).  
 However, recent scholarship (Galli 2010, Hardt and Negri 2000, Marramao 2012, 
Moreiras 2006, Cabezas 2013) has shown that, today, such an understanding of the field 
of the political cannot be sustained. This is the case because that process which we call 
globalization, in its political, economic and social dimensions, has led to a reduction in 
nation-state sovereignty, which is unable to control global flows of people and capital, 
and divides and spreads its sovereignty across international institutions, whether they be 
political ones such as the United Nations or economic ones such as the International 
Monetary Fund. In the political sphere, the breakdown of the order that had been 
provided by the Leviathan nation-state model has also led to a breakdown of the 
traditional categories of political modernity, such as the friend-enemy distinction itself. 
For example, Carlo Galli (2010) has claimed that we no longer live in a world of clear 
friends and enemies: each and every person is always potentially an enemy in the new 
global order (his example here is the new figure of the ‘terrorist,’ who is never 
identifiable to any defined geopolitical space, and is potentially able to be anywhere and 
anyone at any one time). Meanwhile, Moreiras (2006) has argued that the current crisis 
of political order opens non-nomic spaces of the political, that is, spaces beyond the 
geopolitical legal ordering of the world. 
 In the economic sphere, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) have shown 
that the new global order — Empire — represents a uniquely contemporary historical 
moment in which the expansion of capital is now totalizing and absolute — what they 
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call, following Karl Marx, the real subsumption of living labor by capital. As such, we 
no longer live in an age where it is possible to think forms of resistance ‘outside’ of 
capital. The new locus of power is found within the global capitalist order itself, where it 
deploys a specific apparatus of power, what Michel Foucault called biopower, that is, the 
control of populations, and even of the production of life itself.156 Given that there is no 
outside to capital, new (potential) communist resistance to capital must thus come from a 
place internal to this new development in the world capitalist system. This new subject 
of resistance Hardt and Negri call multitude. Building upon the writings of Karl Marx in 
Capital, the authors claim that, today, the force of living labor is no longer to be found in 
the factories, which have all but disappeared or been made invisible by the international 
division of labor. Instead, what we witness today is the increasing importance of 
intellectual labor, supported by the technologies that belong to the capitalist mode of 
production itself, something which Marx wrote about extensively in Capital using the 
term the ‘general social intellect.’ 
 What I am suggesting with this summary of recent scholarship on the effects of 
globalization on modern political life is that emergent indigeneity should not be 
considered separately from these transformations in the global political order.157 
                                                
156 Refer to the series of lectures by Foucault that have been published and translated into English on 
biopower and biopolitics, that were given in the Collège de France between 197 -79, with a sabbatical year 
during the 76-77 academic year (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2008).  
157 Karen Engle’s excellent study on the politics of indigenous rights in the Americas has shown that the 
critique of assimilationist policies of indigenismo was not only being attacked in the Andes during these 
years, but in all those places on the continent where such policies had been put in place as part of a 
national-popular state building project, particularly in Mexico (Elusive Promise, 68). This confirms that 
emergent indigeneity should not be considered as part of specifically local processes but rather in a 
structural relation to the global transformation of politics, and specifically its changing relationship to 
capitalist accumulation.  
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Emergent indigeneity is part of what Giacomo Marramao calls ‘nostalgia of the present.’ 
In Marramao’s essay to which he gives this title, “Nostalgia of the Present,” he explains 
the object of his work in the following way: “we must elaborate a theoretical model of 
world-modernity … in which the aspects of the global and the local, technological and 
communicational uniformity, and the differentiation of culture and identity are not set 
against one another in a static alternative, but interpenetrate dynamically, as though 
forming an interface” (14). His point here is that the process we call secularization which 
marks the rise of the nation-state model in Western history represents the neutralization 
of the question of culture and identity over politics: cultural identities could co-exist 
within the same space in political modernity where they were neutralized by the nation-
state, which claimed the monopoly over framing what questions were strictly political 
and which were not. However, for Marramao globalization implies glocalization, as the 
production of the local that passes no longer through the nation-states’ monopoly over 
politics (as well as economic and social exchange), but rather through globalized 
communication technologies. Rather than a pluralism of interests, then, which would be 
the political form of conflict under the nation-state (there is no political identity outside 
of the nation-state; being Catholic or Protestant, one is still French: the conflict is 
presented only in terms of civilian interests), Marramao claims that we see a pluralism of 
identities, producing an excess of political antagonism, given that “conflicts of identity 
overflow all attempts to confine them within a logic of redistributive quotas” (44).  
 The particular form that this pluralism of identity takes is what the author calls a 
‘nostalgia syndrome,’ “harking back to a past that is supposedly endowed with an 
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identifying symbolical charge” (64), a past which is “generally constituted by a nostalgic 
reference to an image of complete and harmonic community that is considered to be 
definitively dispelled or irredeemably damaged by the processes of globalization” 
(ibid.).  While Marramao’s examples are largely from Europe or the Middle East, it 
should be immediately apparent that his analysis applies to the Bolivian case. The rise of 
indigenous nationalisms, then, should not be considered as separate from the processes 
of globalization. At the same time, the emergence of a new global order makes the very 
articulation of such nationalisms possible, as a particular (global) production of the local, 
glocalization, even if such nationalisms are articulated as antagonistic to the processes of 
globalization itself. This is what Marramao means when he claims: “The demand for 
community, even in the extreme fundamentalist forms, is a strictly modern 
phenomenon” (30).  
  This appears to go against, at first, a common-sense understanding of what 
indigeneity means. As was seen in Fausto Reinaga’s written account, what it means to be 
Indian was in some way grounded upon the notion of a timeless essence of Indian nature 
that had resisted change since Spanish colonialism, which needed to be recuperated 
against bastard hybrid cholo culture in order to re-instate the glory of the Tawantinsuyu. 
In reality, this element of Reinaga’s writing reveals a perspective which is already 
complicit in a modern social imaginary which would have it that the indigenous are the 
natural state of humanity from which the nation-state project had to immunize itself in 
order to establish properly political life. This is how the project of civil society is 
explicitly proposed in Hobbes’s work, where civil society is a kind of auto-immunization 
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from the state of perpetual war that is the state of nature, as laid out in this author’s 
classic work The Leviathan. That this is the case accounts for the fact that, since at least 
Sarmiento’s 1845 Civilización y barbarie, the presence of indigenous life in Latin 
America became a marker of the failure of the Republican state to achieve the kind of 
modernity that its liberators had dreamed up. It is a social imaginary that is persistent 
even today in the ruins of the modern political project of the state. It is reflected, for 
example, in the writings of Peruvian Nobel-laureate winner Mario Vargas Llosa when he 
claims that the Peruvian tradition of indigenismo holds today a nice, literary quality 
because it is a pure fantasy which Peruvian society had been lucky enough to supersede 
through mestizaje.158 In Bolivia this imaginary, as we have seen, has been particularly 
powerful, and is arguably the very foundation for the ’52 state’s official politics of 
mestizaje as a kind of capitalist developmentalism. From this perspective, there are 
elements of Fausto Reinaga’s writings which are nothing more than the mere reversal of 
this logic, turning it upside down but ultimately failing to challenge its basic 
metaphysical assumptions. The power of the theoretical determination of emergent 
indigeneity as I am offering it here is that, by providing an account of indigeneity which 
does not take recourse in notions of essentialized identities but rather in the particular 
conditions of indigenous reproduction (both in the biological and the Marxist sense), that 
is, how what it means to be indigenous is constantly produced and re-produced anew, 
like the turning or revolutions of a wheel, it is possible to account for the new material 
                                                
158 For a close analysis of this debate between Vargas Llosa and Peruvian indigenismo, refer to Mabel 
Moraña (2013) and Bram Acosta (2014, refer specifically to Chapter 2).  
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conditions of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia. These new material conditions are 
intimately tied up with the structural and qualitative change in the nature of political 
antagonism in the new, globalized world order.  
 Secondly, as was already mentioned previously, while the term indigeneity 
operates as a kind of floating signifier, defined by the struggles over meaning that are 
part and parcel of emergent indigeneity’s aesthetic-political dimensions, this does not 
mean that its meaning is not already conditioned by certain over-determinations. So who 
has the right to indigeneity? Is it claimed, or is it a right of birth? As Andrew Canessa 
(2007) explains,“who is and who isn’t indigenous and what it means to be indigenous in 
Latin America is highly variable, context specific and changes over time” (197). 
Furthermore, while “outside groups, agencies, and indigenous leaders are creating and 
recognizing an indigenous identity based on a particular view of history and conquest, 
many other people have a much more complex sense of who they are” (195–6). It is 
perhaps this specific complexity involved in the question of definition that resulted in the 
United Nations providing two definitions of indigeneity, both of which must be present 
for the term to apply: “the first is understanding indigenous people primarily in terms of 
their being descended from pre-conquest or precolonial peoples; and the second is the 
issue that self-definition is a key component in indigenous identity” (204). This two-
pronged strategy effectively navigates the problematic of balancing a certain historical 
condition with the real identity politics that are played out at the grassroots level. Yet 
these two dimensions in practice are highly debatable. Is such heritage from pre-
conquest or pre-colonial peoples to be understood in terms of culture or biology, for 
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example? At what point does one stop being “genuinely” indigenous? And what happens 
to groups of people who refuse to identity themselves as indigenous, but clearly belong 
to the same communities or heritage of others who are considered to be indigenous?  
 The complexity of this question of definition comes out in Canessa’s own essay 
on what it means to be indigenous in contemporary Bolivia in two ways. The first is 
explicit in his writing. By arguing that it “is by no means clear … that all people who 
might be considered indigenous think of themselves in these terms at all, even if their 
putative leaders express their collective identity in these ways,” (208) he shows that the 
2001 census effectively over-determined peoples’ rights to self-definition. In the 
highlands of Bolivia in particular, the complicated history of unionization and the 
relative integration of its populations as part of the 1952 state capitalism have meant that 
many populations identify themselves as peasants, while they identify the originary 
peoples of the lowlands with the term “indigenous.” In one such example, the people of 
Pocobaya were not asked by those compiling the census if they were indigenous, 
because the question was “redundant” due to their status as native language speakers. 
“At root,” Canessa writes, “is the issue of the state deciding who is and who is not 
indigenous and of indigeneity being conceived as a particular relationship with the state, 
rather than a system of meanings generated from within a particular culture” (210). 
 The second reflection is more implicit in his writings. Despite his effective 
relativization of what it means to be indigenous in Bolivia today, Canessa nevertheless 
insists on the need to study the population of Pocobaya as indigenous people. There 
appears to be a separation here in Canessa’s writings between a political indigeneity and 
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a scholarly indigeneity, wherein scholarship permits itself the privilege of being able to  
determine identification in the last instance in the interests of scientific objectivity.  
 What is clear in any case is that what determines indigeneity in Bolivia today 
involves one’s proximity to those communities that are imagined to be the direct 
inheritors of pre-conquest civilizations. This can be expressed in terms of dress, 
language, rites and customs, continued contact with rural communities (if one lives in an 
urban area), skin color and physiognomy. How these factors influence one’s claim to 
indigeneity varies greatly from region to region. Self-identification is clearly an 
important factor in considering who is and who is not indigenous in Bolivia today, 
marking a certain show of respect for the right of people to self-identify. However, 
imposed identification is also clearly just as important, and works in both directions: just 
as scholars may hold a privileged right to identify those that might not otherwise identify 
as indigenous, some indigenous groups claim the right to be able to denounce others for 
not being as indigenous or sufficiently indigenous in the making of certain claims to a 
privileged status.  
 We must therefore agree that the meaning of indigeneity as it becomes a field of 
political struggle is determined and intersected by a complex array of power relations as 
well as general imprecisions. Nevertheless, its general characteristics follow the 
comments that Guillermo Bonfil Batalla made in 1981 about the character of Indian 
political thought in the Americas more generally. As Karen Engel has noted, there are 
five such characteristics: 1) a denial of the West; 2) the affirmation of a pan-indigenous 
civilization; 3) the recovery of history; 4) a revaluation of indigenous cultures, and; 5) an 
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understanding of nature and society in which man is nature, and therefore there is no 
clear separation between the two orders (Elusive Promise, 60). It should already be clear 
that all five of these dimensions are central to the thought of Fausto Reinaga, whom we 
have analyzed in some detail. However, it should be noted that in the Bolivian case, 
while indigeneity is usually framed in pan-indigenous terms (Reinaga and the kataristas 
speak of the Indian or indigenous, not of the Aymara), it is nevertheless true that until at 
least the 1990s, the notion of what it meant to be indigenous in Bolivia was strongly 
ethnocentric, based normally on Aymara, sometimes Quechua, cultural specificities, but 
in any case focused on the culture of the Andean highlands. The indigenous peoples of 
the Bolivian lowlands would not enter in any significant way into the scene of public 
debate until the early 1990s, a fact which would also change the tone of the discourse 
itself.  
 To add to the complexity of this floating signifier that is indigeneity, one must 
necessarily engage with the question of race, ethnicity and of class. Indigeneity is not 
quite any of these three categories, and yet strongly implies each of them and, in fact, 
even brings into question their very conditions of possibility. Is being indigenous also an 
ethnicity or race in Bolivia, and how would the two indices be measured? Certainly, the 
use of the plural — indigenous ‘peoples’ — would generally refer to the idea that there 
are a number of ethnic minorities in Bolivia that fall under these categories (Aymara, 
Quechua, Guaraní, Moxeño, etc.), and many of these ethnic minorities may in fact 
consider themselves as a race or, more recently, even a nation or a people. Furthermore, 
the question of the indigenous in understanding class relations has been a topic of great 
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contention, which is enhanced by the fact that many radical expressions of indigeneity in 
Bolivia present themselves as antagonistic to Marxist scientific analysis (we have 
already seen this in the case of Fausto Reinaga).  
 In order to better understand how this theoretical treatment of emergent 
indigeneity materially manifested itself in Bolivia during the thirty years that concern us 
here, I will provide a schematic historical account which emphasizes the particular way 
that discourses on what it means to be indigenous intervened in and transformed 
traditional Bolivian historiography and understandings of politics, particularly the 
national-popular tradition and ideology of mestizaje. During the early years of this 
emergent indigeneity, two major trends are important to note. On the one hand, we see 
an alliance of domestic and foreign scholars who begin to engage seriously in the study 
of linguistic features of indigenous languages, largely Quechua and Aymara. This is 
simultaneously accompanied by cultural anthropology and a cultural linguistic 
perspective which seeks to employ this knowledge of the language in order to analyze 
the specificity of Aymara and Quechua cultural difference, producing new ideas on what 
it means to belong to these indigenous groups. On the other hand, these are the early 
years of katarista and indianista mobilizations in which, drawing from the early years of 
indigenous activism in which Fausto Reinaga played a pivotal role, a number of 
indigenous intellectuals and activists became more directly political actors and important 
figures in their own right in the national arena. Let us analyze these two movements of 
nascent emergent indigeneity.  
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III.3 1960 - 1985: Nascent Emergent Indigeneity 
 We have already identified the early emergence of Indianist activism, where a 
number of parties are formed during the ’60s throughout the Andes region. The first to 
be identified in Bolivia is, naturally, Fausto Reinaga’s Bolivian Indian Party (PIB), 
originally founded under the name Indian Party of Aymaras and Keswas (PIAK) in 
1962. Diego Pacheco, whose extensive analysis of the Indianist movement is no doubt 
the most comprehensive to date, although he has been accused of some inaccuracy,159 
identifies a number of other wings of Indianism to arise during these years. For example, 
in 1968 the Movimiento Nacional Tupaj Katari was founded (National Tupac Katari 
Movement, MNTK), which would eventually, following a period of repression that 
silenced the group’s activities, reform as the most important wing of Indianist activity. 
Of notable importance too is the Julián Apaza University Movement (MUJA) which, as 
has already been identified, was an essential contribution to the formation of the 
katarista movement that emerged at the end of the 1970s. The group consisted of young 
university students who had emigrated to the city of La Paz from rural communities, 
where they were influenced by the political atmosphere of the moment and of the 
discourses of activists such as Fausto Reinaga (an especially important member of this 
                                                
159 Luciano Tapia (1995), for example, in his autobiography, accuses Pacheco of not checking his sources 
with sufficient care when, adopting supposed mis-information from other sources, he accuses Tapia of 
having participated in the coup of Natusch Busch, a rumor that had apparently been spread by Constantino 
Lima himself. Tapia states: “[Constantino Lima] told that [i.e. that Lima had participated in the coup] to 
the French anthropologist Marie-Chantal Barre, author of the book Ideologías indigenistas y movimientos 
indios and also to the Bolivian anthropologist Diego Pacheco, author of El indianismo y los indios 
contemporáneos de Bolivia who, without worrying themselves with confirming this despicable version, 
irresponsibly repeat Lima’s nasty remark” [Eso le dijo a la antropóloga francesa Marie-Cantal Barre 
autora del libro Ideologías indigenistas y movimientos indios y también al antropólogo boliviano Diego 
Pacheco, autor de El indianismo y los indios contemporáneos de Bolivia, quienes, sin preocuparse de 
confirmar esa infame versión, repiten irresponsablemente la canallada de Lima] (415) 
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group was Jenaro Flores, who would later be an important spokesperson for the 
kataristas). Upon returning to their communities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many 
would immediately take up significant positions within their community and local union 
organizations, and had an important influence on the general politicization of its 
members. 
 However, a change of regime in 1971 would put a halt to the development of 
these nascent revolutionary movements. Historians and testimonies all provide detailed 
accounts of the Banzer years from 1971-78 as ones of brutal repression against any 
sector of the population perceived to be a “communist threat,” a ruse that was often used 
to penalize anybody who came into disagreement with the regime. Indianist parties 
would continue to operate during these years either clandestinely, as was the case of 
many of the members of the later MINKA, or from exile, as would be the case for a 
number of important members of the karatista movement, particularly those who would 
later form the MRTK. While some organizations such as the kataristas would actually 
grow in influence and popularity during these years despite government censorship, it 
was nevertheless not until the late years of the Banzer regime that they were able to 
organize themselves openly.  
 While the Banzer regime did a great deal to put a halt to the activism of these 
nascent indigenous movements, however, it had less impact on a growing network of 
scholarship which emerged during those years and that were to contribute in important 
ways to the visibility of discourses on indigeneity in the public sphere, and shape the 
directions that indigenous activism would take in later years. For example, in the 1960s, 
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professional linguistics begins for the first time to compile scientific studies of the 
Aymara and Quechua languages. These studies would quickly develop, in alliance with 
cultural anthropologists largely from France, to a study of the socio-linguistic features of 
Aymara and Quechua, with an eye to explaining their specific “cosmovisions” or 
particular history, as considered separately from that of the Creole cultures. Verushka 
Alvizuri (2009) notes how, in turn, these studies fed off contemporary research on the 
Andean economy carried out by John Murra who, seeking to complicate the notion that 
the pre-Columbian Andean economy could be considered as a kind of utopian socialism, 
proved that it rather works as what he calls a “vertical archipelago,” with independent 
units being controlled from the top (see Murra 1956). While Murra’s study was 
important for reconsidering the way the Andean economy functioned, Alvizuri warns 
that:  
From then on, the theory of vertical archipelago has fed two types of 
discourse. One is more scientific and consists in applying this theoretical 
model to new case studies in order to show that, effectively, the model is 
common to the Andes. Although it has been said with frequency that the 
romantic descriptions of culture made by foreigners do not please the 
local anthropologists, the ideas of Murra have not been truly challenged 
in the terrain of studies on culture. Instead, where they have had greatest 
force is in development projects, where they are applied assuming a priori 
that the model is a faithful reflection of truth. (162)160  
 
                                                
160 “A partir de entonces, la teoría del archipiélago vertical ha nutrido dos tipos de discurso. Uno es más 
bien científico y consiste en declinar el modelo teórico en nuevas investigaciones de caso, para mostrar, 
efectivamente, que el modelo es común a los Andes. Aunque se ha dicho con frecuencia que las 
descripciones románticas de la cultura hechas por extranjeros no son del agrado de los antropólogos 
locales, las ideas de Murra no han sido verdaderamente confrontadas al terreno de los estudios sobre la 
cultura. En cambio, donde sí han tenido fuerza es en los proyectos de desarrollo, donde son aplicadas 
asumiéndose a priori que el modelo es fiel reflejo de la realidad” 
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 Alvizuri recounts how, after retiring in 1983 from Cornell University, Murra 
comes to Bolivia to direct more closely the museographical system of which he had been 
in charge since 1974, which includes the important Museo Nacional de Etnografía y 
Folklore (National Museum of Ethnography and Folklore, MUSEF). The author notes 
that his taking charge of the museum saw a transformation from a more folkloric vision 
of pre-Columbian civilizations to a more serious study of anthropological currents, 
always centered of course around the personality of Murra himself. Two important 
trends emerge from this intervention. In 1983 the Carrera de Antropología y Arqueología 
decides to change its folkloric view and begin to study the multicultural character of 
society, beginning the Taller de Historia Oral Andina (Andean Oral History Workshop, 
THOA) and directed, in part, by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. This research center focuses 
on the recuperation of indigenous, largely Aymara, histories, through the accounts of 
oral testimony recorded in interviews carried out with the local population, and was 
important in contributing to research already taking place in social linguistics and 
anthropology.161  
 The second of the developments to emerge from Murra’s direct intervention was 
a more serious engagement with the linguistic structure of the Aymara language. Before 
this time, very few scholarly studies of the Aymara language were in existence. 
According to Martha Hardman, the first Aymara grammar which adopts concepts, forms 
and techniques of modern linguistics was not published until 1963, a study by Ellen H. 
                                                
161 Refer to the 1989 publication Metodología de la historia oral [Methodology of Oral History] by former 
THOA director Carlos Mamani Condori for an insight into the methodological suppositions of the group 
during this time period.  
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Ross, which was part of a Baptist mission (Hardman 1988, 6). Martha Hardman, with 
the collaboration of the University of Florida, Gainesville, where she worked, was the 
driving force behind a series of new studies on the language. In 1965, she, together with 
Julia Elena Fortún, established the National Institute of Linguistic Studies (Instituto 
Nacional de Estudios Lingüísticos, INEL) in La Paz. Juan de Dios Yapita, who worked 
closely with Hardman and was a fundamental to the institutionalization and 
normalization of the Aymara language in the Bolivian education system, writes that the 
objective of INEL “was to undertake the formation of human resources in the field of 
linguistic science and thereby to contribute new knowledge to the national education 
system, to overcome the linguistic barriers that exist in Bolivia” (“Aymara Linguistics in 
the Past 22 Years”). The project was of no small scale. It consisted of a scholarly 
enterprise of professors and students which incorporated 180 professionals as part of its 
first team. In 1966 and ’67, scientific linguistic studies took place in Bolivia for the first 
time. By 1968, a standardized phonemic alphabet of Aymara had been established by 
Dios de Yapita. That same year, in the Department of Languages at the Universidad 
Mayor de San Andrés, materials were prepared for teaching in Aymara and Quechua. 
Between the years 1969-1972, Hardman began working as the director of the Aymara 
Language Materials Program, run out of the University of Florida, which would exist for 
21 years, until 1990. During this time extensive studies of the Aymara language and 
many teaching resources were published, both in the United States and Bolivia.162  
                                                
162 Refer, for example, to the enormous compilation of teaching resources for the Aymara language 
entitled Aymara ar yatiqañataki (literally ‘to teach the Aymara language,’ 1974) and the linguistic study 
 
 200 
 Yet these linguistic studies very quickly became more than mere scientific 
studies into the structure of the language. As Alvizuri notes in her study of Hardman’s 
work, the idea quickly emerged that, “through language it is possible to access a 
particular mentality, distinct from the Western one, and characteristic of the ‘Aymara 
world’” (164).163 Hardman herself held a chair in linguistic anthropology, and she 
collaborated during her years as director of the Aymara Language Materials Program 
with several cultural anthropologists who began work in Bolivia, often from France, but 
some of whom were native to Bolivia.164 In 1981, Hardman edited a collection of essays 
on social aspects of the Aymara language, which seeks to broaden the appreciation of 
Aymara cultural specificity gained through a linguistic perspective. While in these 
essays, all written by scholars who at the time of writing were students under the 
tutelage of Hardman, the focus continues to be on specific linguistic features of Aymara, 
there is nevertheless an additional emphasis on cultural features that are somehow 
connected to the language and are used to draw a portrait of Aymara cultural difference. 
Miracle Jr. and Yapita Moya, for example, study the use of time and space in the 
Aymara language, whereas Comstock Pile analyzes the terms used in family relations to 
study Aymara kinship, both real and spiritual. While statements are made about the 
specificity of Aymara culture in these writings, however, they nevertheless still remain 
strictly within the field of linguistic observations.  
                                                                                                                                           
Aymara: compendio de estructura fonológica y gramatical (1988).  
163 “a través del idioma se puede acceder a una mentalidad particular, distinta de la occidental, y 
característica del ‘mundo aymara’” 
164 In 1975, for example, a number of Bolivian scholars published one of the first studies of this type 
entitled La cosmovisón aymara, where what was considered were questions of particular systems of 
economy, religion, technology, history and language among Aymara-speaking peoples.  
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 The particular contribution of French anthropology is not only in contemporary 
linguistics, but also in historical studies of the Andes, where scholars point to the 
specificity of the economic, political, and symbolic forms of the region. Often, there is 
an emphasis in this work on cultural difference as a marker which continues from pre-
Columbian times into the present. One of the earliest examples of this work is the 1978 
special issue of Annales on the Historical Anthropology of Andean Societies 
(“Anthropologie Historique des Sociétés Andines,” issue 5/6). John Murra and Nathan 
Wachtel jointly write a presentation of the texts, and the issue includes contributions 
from important anthropologists on Bolivia today such as Verónica Cereceda, Trystan 
Platt, Olivia Harris, Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne and Thierry Saignes. In his introduction 
to the volume, the author “J.R.” observes a particular difference in the nature of this 
monographic issue when compared to the last Annales dedicated entirely to the topic of 
Latin America, which had been published in 1948, and was organized by Lucien Febvre. 
The author notes that, in the 1948 issue: “In the aftermath of the war, Europe, in an quest 
for identity, sought a mirror in the civilizations of the New World in which to recognize 
itself: it, and its history” (887).165 If this is the case, then there is an important difference 
between the 1948 texts and those produced by a new generation of anthropologists in 
1978. J.R. writes: “We insist … less today on what could bring the Andean world closer 
to our own, than on what separates it from ours, and which founds its particularity in the 
                                                
165 “Aux lendemains de la guerre, l’Europe, en quête d’identité, cherche dans les civilisations du Nouveau 
Monde un miroir où se reconnaître: elle, et son histoire” 
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very longue durée” (888).166 It is a question, then, of what makes the Andean world 
separate from “our own” (presumably, meaning the Western world more generally), and 
also of the continuity of this difference, of its passing from the pre-Columbian world in 
order to better understand the Andean specificity of today.  
 A history of this trend in socio-linguistics and anthropology would not be 
complete without accounting for the work of Xavier Albó, who has become one of the 
leading public authorities in Bolivia on indigenous questions, as well as in his role 
within the Catholic Church. In an interview carried out in the summer of 2014, Xavier 
Albó recounts how he arrived to Bolivia as a Jesuit priest in 1952, just following the 
famous National Revolution, and directly before the Agrarian Reforms were to take 
place (Personal interview, 19 Jul. 2014). A Catalan born in Franco’s Spain, he 
recognizes himself as a product of the Baby Boom, a moment in which many people 
decided to enter the ‘religious life.’ Originally, Albó had sought to go to India for his 
mission trip, but the wait was in vain. The Catholic Church in Bolivia was encouraging 
members of the clergy to carry out their mission there, and the young Albó, alongside 
numerous other priests, arrived in Bolivia in 1952 to the chaos of the National 
Revolution. Albó immediately began to work with the peasantry and very quickly 
learned Quechua. His experiences in Bolivia, where he worked in one of the 
communities run by the son of the Tin Baron Simón Patiño, and in Ecuador, which 
                                                
166 “On insiste donc moins aujourd’hui sur ce qui pourrait rapprocher le monde andin du nôtre, que sur ce 
qui l’en sépare et qui fond sa particularité dans la très longue durée” 
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lacked an equivalent agrarian reform, showed Albó the realities of life on the latifundios, 
where the gamonales were still in power.  
 Xavier Albó’s interest in Quechua and the realities of the Bolivian peasantry led 
to his undertaking more seriously socio-linguistic approaches. In the 1960s, Albó 
embarked upon the doctoral program in Anthropological Linguistics at Cornell, where 
he wrote for his dissertation a comparative study of the socio-linguistics of Catalan and 
Quechua. The second part was published in a 1974 book called Los mil rostros del 
quechua. Albó was responsible, alongside two other Catholic priests in 1975, for the 
opening of the Center of Research and Promotion of the Peasantry (Centro de 
Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, CIPCA), which was dedicated to studying 
the peasantry in Bolivia and to compiling an impressive library of such studies as they 
were being undertaken. The effect of this center was not only to promote studies such as 
those under discussion here. It also promoted an extensive cultural program aimed at 
revalorizing Aymara culture and language, and was among the first to organize radio 
programs broadcast in Aymara.  
 It was in 1988 that Xavier Albó coordinated a collective publication which 
comes to represent, for our purposes, the fossilization of these trends in socio-linguistics 
and anthropology that have been studied above. Entitled American Roots [Raíces de 
América], there is a clear allusion to the book’s pretension to recuperate foundations 
which represent the ‘deep America’ of indigenous life. In his introductory essay, Albó 
departs from the Brazilian writer Darcy Ribeiro’s notion that Latin America consists of a 
number of “testimony peoples” (pueblos testimonio),  where “even today in this group 
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there persists ethnic, cultural and linguistic unities that maintain their identity and 
consciousness, despite the centuries of oppression, first in the colony and then in the new 
states” (22).167 For Albó, then, the Aymara form part of this testimony people: “The 
Aymara world, part of the Andean world, is one of the testimony peoples that have best 
conserved their vitality” (ibid.).168 There is a clear notion throughout the work, from its 
title to the content of its essays, of the idea of recuperating a particular Aymara tradition 
which is somehow continuous with and able to bring light to the present. Through the 
analysis of certain historical features of Aymara civilization — analyzed in 
ethnographies, historical work and linguistics — the attempt is to ‘excavate’ these roots 
to provide an understanding of an Andean/Aymara difference which is somehow still 
present in contemporary Bolivia, perhaps even ‘uncontaminated.’ Each author is called 
upon as an authority on the topic, thereby “fossilizing” in some way two decades of 
work on the excavation of these histories and cultural features. Albó offers this as a 
reason for the lack of general bibliography in each of the chapters (39): we are to 
understand that this work is in some way the summary of these authors’ contribution to 
an entire field. 
 It is not my intention to criticize the work of these authors per se. Xavier Albó’s 
analysis, in the last instance, is impressively attentive to historical subtleties that would 
make any claim to an “Aymara” identity that is pure and indivisible all but impossible. 
                                                
167 “hasta hoy persisten en este grupo unidades étnicas, culturales y lingüísticas que mantienen su 
identidad y conciencia, no obstante los siglos de opresión en la colonia primero y después en los nuevos 
estados” 
168 “El mundo Aymara, parte del mundo andino, es uno de los pueblos testimonio que mejor ha 
conservado su vitalidad” 
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What I wish to draw attention to — and this is also Verushka Alvizuri’s objective in her 
own analysis — is the way that this discourse tends to strategically adopt the language of 
cultural difference and identity in order to mark out its path in the various academic 
disciplines in which its authors work. As I have tried to show here, the reclaiming of 
indigenous identities in Bolivia today is impossible to imagine without the historical 
intervention which permitted certain groups to make claims in the name of particularism. 
Albó announces at the end of his introduction to the 1988 publication a task: that of 
underlining “the possibility and desire that the Aymara people are also protagonists of 
history” (39).169 No doubt this belongs to the group’s most important contributions. 
Nevertheless, the reterrorialization of history along the lines of an Aymara-Andean 
“difference,” which is also the fossilization of this difference as historical fact, has also 
resulted in a certain normalization of the different disciplines which works towards the 
understanding of Aymara-Andean culture as resistance to, as negation of, Western 
culture.  At a certain point, the focus of the studies becomes less a question of bringing 
to light particular cultural aspects of the Aymara people, and more about proving the 
basic hypothesis that there is an Aymara essence which has managed, through resistance, 
to maintain itself in some pure, undivided way, since the Conquest, and that it is 
therefore possible somehow to return to. 
  Alvizuri appears to suggest the same criticism when she notes that: “Today it is 
worth asking ourselves if one is not looking in this language for a series of idealized 
                                                
169 “la posibilidad y deseo de que este pueblo Aymara sea también protagonista de la historia” 
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attributes” (171),170 and that, “[from these studies] one tends to think about Aymara 
identity as a continuation which has known no breaks, given that it was always in 
resistance” (176).171 Indeed, according to this author the very idea of “Andeanness” or 
“Aymaraness,” ideas which are today taken for granted, were actually found or 
‘invented’ by this process of investigation (her study is appropriately called, The 
Construction of Aymaraness [La construcción de la aymariedad]). She is also insistent 
on the idea that this historical recuperation or even ‘excavation’ is part of the more 
general movement she groups under the label of “cultural studies” (although these 
studies predate the emergence of the actual field by a number of years). What is 
important about this is that, as Alvizuri intuits here, this change of perspective in 
scholarship cannot be considered separately from a general shift in scholarly work which 
focuses on the question of culture as a structure, and as a non-Western site of resistance 
to a colonialism and domination which is still present today. These studies would later 
be adopted as part of the more general set of discourses on emergent indigeneity as it 
gained hegemonic ground in the public political sphere. 
 Meanwhile, the downfall of Banzer’s government in 1979 resulted in the re-
emergence of radical indigenous activism that had been forced underground during eight 
years of oppression by the military regime. The most important Indianist party to emerge 
in the years immediately following the collapse of the Banzer regime was the 
Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (Tupac Katari Indian Movement, MITKA) in 1978. 
                                                
170 “Hoy vale la pena preguntarse si no está buscando en esta lengua, una serie de atributos idealizados” 
171 “De ahí que se tiende a pensar en la identidad aymara como una continuidad que no conoció rupturas, 
pues siempre estuvo en resistencia” 
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Diego Pacheco (1992) describes in some detail the history of this movement. It arises 
from the former organization MNTK, an Indian Party formed by members of MUJA in 
order to compete with Fausto Reinaga’s PIB. It emerged from peasant syndicalist 
movements which would become, ironically, this Indianist party’s most important 
competitor within the various ideologies of indigenous activism, in the form of the 
kataristas and their union representation in the CSUTCB (see below). In 1970, various 
ideologues met to discuss the direction of the party, including Nicolás Calle and Luciano 
Tapia, in which they adopt Fausto Reinaga as the official ideologue of the party (as 
Luciano Tapia writes in his testimony Ukhamawa Jakiwasaxa, however, differences 
between Tapia and Reinaga would create a divide between these two wings of 
indigenous activism). The party later joined with a katarista vein of MINK’A with 
Constantino Lima, eventually forming the united front of MITKA. Personality clashes, 
however, plagued the movement with organizational divisions from its beginnings. 
When Luciano Tapia and Constantino Lima begin to compete for who should be put 
forward as the candidate for winning seats in the 1980 elections, the party splits into 
MITKA and MITKA-l (the last adding only “of Liberation” to its title), with Luciano 
Tapia and Constantino Lima respectively leading the two factions. Each of these two 
leaders would win seats in the 1980s elections and become increasingly influential 
within their particular milieus.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly given its adoption of Fausto Reinaga as an official 
ideologues for the party in its early years, the Indianism of the MITKA(-l) shows a fierce 
resistance to Marxism as both a theoretical framework for the revolution and the 
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traditional organizational structure of the Bolivian left. In a 1983 meeting in which 
Luciano Tapia and Constantino Lima presided, a statement was approved which was 
called the “Declaración de principios del movimiento indio tupaj katari uno” (“Statement 
of the Principles of the Tupac Katari Indian Movement One”). Among its objectives 
included: “The reconstruction of the Kollasuyu-Tahuantinsuyu as a model of 
organization … which reinstates the communitarian system of Ayllus” (quoted in 
Pacheco, 75).172 Once again, we find the theme of an indigenous civilization that must 
become the state, in some way eradicating Western society in order to replace it through 
a return to an idealized Indian past. Just as in Reinaga’s text La Revolución India, this 
also necessarily involves the rejection of a Marxist-based class analysis for one which 
emphasizes an Indian nation or people. “THE INDIAN IS AN ENTIRE PEOPLE AND 
NOT A SIMPLE SOCIAL CLASS” (ibid.),173 the statement affirms, adding that the 
group rejects imperial domination, which is understood to be both from the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  
 An analysis of the Indianist study of the contemporary indigenous situation in 
Bolivia by Ramiro Reynaga Burgos (aka “Wankar”), entitled simply Tawantinsuyu 
(1978), also demonstrates the continuity between this Indianism and that of Fausto 
Reinaga’s (Wankar is, incidentally, one of Fausto’s sons). The book is split into three 
parts: “Yesterday”, “Today” and “Tomorrow”, outlining the situation of the indigenous 
from a perspective which accounts for the history of indigenous (principally Highland 
                                                
172 “Reconstruir el Kollasuyu-Tahuantinsuyo como modelo de organización … que reimplante el system 
comunitario de Ayllus” 
173 “EL INDIO ES TODO UN PUEBLO Y NO UNA SIMPLE CLASE SOCIAL” 
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indigenous) struggle and oppression, speaks about the continuation of this oppression 
into the present, and ends with the proposal of a need for a revolution. In the historical 
analysis, the most important observation is the continued idea of the pre-Colombian and 
pre-Incan civilization as a kind of socialist paradise, in which work was an object of 
“enjoyment” and there was no hunger. “In the Tawantinsuyu,” he writes, “nobody felt 
lord of creation nor … of plants, animals, lands, nor humans. We are the other forms of 
life with other faces” (16).174 According to Wankar, there was no linear conception of 
time, the people were defined by their proximity to nature, human laws were natural 
laws, the Indian was community, life was unity, there was no individualism and work 
was something that people “enjoyed.” He also describes in detail to what extent these 
pre-Incan civilizations were already ‘developed,’ with advanced communication 
systems. There is little or no historical bibliography provided to justify these statements, 
but they nevertheless form an important part of the notion that the Indian nation must 
necessarily replace the current white-capitalist one. 
 The general structure of his argument for describing the contemporary 
indigenous ‘reality’ is based on the notion that the Indian is a slave who works for a 
Master: the mestizo is he who possesses material wealth and the Indian is deprived of it, 
even though it is the Indian that is the source of labor for producing such wealth. He 
applies this analysis to various areas of contemporary society: the economy (The 
                                                
174 “En el Tawantinsuyu nadie se sintió rey de la creación ni amo de plantas, animales, tierras ni humanos. 
Somos las otras formas de vida con otra caras” 
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qheswaymara is the arm, the Spanish is the direction” [275]);175 religion (“The 
qheswaymara is the catechized, the objective of all evangelizing campaigns. The white 
man is the owner of divine truth” [288);176 and politics (“The Spanish is the state, the 
qheswaymara is the vassal” [291]).177 As we saw with Reinaga’s writings, the Indians 
are suppressed through an official silence which makes their eventual elimination also 
imperceptible: “Silence permits the abuse. The world knows about minority oppression 
in the United States and Europe. And it ignores the oppression of the qheswaymara 
majorities by a minority of Spanish people in the Andes which is comparable only to 
Rhodesia and South Africa” (267).178  
 While this kind of separation between those who have and those who have not 
would apparently be compatible with a Marxist-style analysis of exploitation and class 
struggle, Wankar is insistent on the Indianist tradition of rejecting Marxist-style 
analyses, which must be considered as a form of imperial epistemology (interestingly, 
Wankar, like Fausto Reinaga, began his activist career as a Marxist; see his publication 
Ideología y raza en América Latina [1972]). He writes that: “Andean Marxism is not 
born through the contemplation of Andean problems. It comes from afar, traveling from 
within the colonialist interchange” (310).179 It would seem that, for Wankar, the ultimate 
                                                
175 “El qheswaymara es el brazo, el español es la dirección” 
176 “El qheswaymara es el catequizado, el objectivo de todas las campañas evangelizadoras. El blanco es 
dueño de la verdad divina”  
177 “El español es el Estado, el qheswaymara es el súbdito” 
178 “El silencio permite el abuso. El mundo conoce la opresión sobre minorías raciales en Estados Unidos 
y Europa. E ignora la opresión de las mayorías qheswaymaras por minorías españolas en Los Andes 
parecida sólo a Rodesia y África del Sur.” 
179 “El marxismo andino no nace de meditar problemas andinos. Viene de lejos, viajando dentro del 
intercambio colonialista” 
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limit of Marxism is the fact that classes are a product of capitalism, and as Tawantinsuyu 
is a kind of ‘Incan socialism’, the ethnic question precedes class and comes to the fore as 
the real possibility of the irrelevancy of class struggle. All of this is strongly connected, 
of course, to the continued critique of the assimilation policies of the 1952 state and its 
politics of mestizaje. The author clarifies that: “As their fathers could not finish us off 
with bullets, the creoles try to finish us off with neither noise nor blood. Given that they 
can change neither the form of our bones nor the color of our skin, our eyes, our hair, 
they change our life, feelings and beliefs” (268).180  
 Finally, there is a strong effort in his writing to reinscribe the idea of two 
Bolivias into the writing of Bolivian history. Wankar writes that, “in the Andes, there are 
two opposed worlds. The Qheswaymara and the Spanish. Tawantinsuyu and Europe” 
(263).181 In this gesture, he recycles the idea of the mestizo as being neither the one nor 
the other, but rather a kind of bastard hybrid who cannot authentically belong to any 
particular civilizationary regime. The mestizo is the “inauthentic being in movement”, he 
writes, continuing to add: “The mestizo is an Indian on the road to being conquered” 
(263).182 His call for a revolution (presumably, though he never uses these words, an 
‘Indian Revolution’), would therefore simply be a question of giving the political 
structure to a Nation which already exists, but is maintained in a form of slavery and 
                                                
180 “Como sus padres no pudieron acabarnos a bala, los criollos tratan de acabarnos sin ruido ni sangre. 
Como no pueden cambiarnos la forma de huesos ni el color de piel, ojos, cabellos, nos cambian nuestra 
vida, sentimientos y creencias” 
181 “en Los Andes hay dos mundos opuestos. El qheswaymara y el español. El Tawantinsuyu y Europa” 
182 “ser inauténtico en movimiento”… “El mestizo es indio en camino a ser conquistado” 
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servitude. “All that we are lacking to be a nation is a state,” he affirms (360).183 All of 
this forms part of a careful and strategic re-reading of Bolivian history which is largely 
that re-reading that had already been performed in Fausto Reinaga’s work. Wankar 
nevertheless does not hesitate to emphasize the necessity for continuing with this 
historical work: “The world does not know our history,” he writes (280).184 Just as in 
Fausto Reinaga’s writings, for Wankar this history is closely identified with the question 
of the truth. He states: “The official Andean history is full of holes and contradictions … 
The truth of a fact is a single truth” (284).185  
 While the ideological trend which labelled itself as ‘Indianist’ would continue in 
many ways with the general trajectory already outlined by Fausto Reinaga in his La 
Revolución India, however, other emerging indigenous organizations and ideologies 
would take these lessons in different directions. One of the other most important 
tendencies of indigenous activism became known as katarismo, based on the name of 
Tupac Katari. One of the most important scholars in contemporary Bolivia, Silvia Rivera 
Cusicanqui, participated in this nascent movement. Her 1984 publication which details 
its emergence, Oprimidos pero no vencidos (Oppressed but not defeated), would be 
considered one of the most important contributions to scholarship in late twentieth 
century Bolivia.186 The author recounts that following the end of the Barrientos regime 
at the close of the 1960s, the Military Peasant Pact went into crisis and a number of 
opposition movements within the peasantry emerged. On the one hand was the 
                                                
183 “Apenas nos falta Estado para ser nación” 
184 “El mundo desconoce nuestra historia” 
185 “La historia andina oficial está llena de agujeros y contradictions … La verdad de un hecho es una.”  
186 Refer also to the English translation that was published in 1987. 
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Independent Peasantry Bloc (Bloque Independiente Campesinado, BIC), an outgrowth of 
the old syndicalist left which affiliated itself with the COB. Meanwhile, an independent 
vein of peasant syndicalism emerged from out of the colonizers of Santa Cruz, Alto Beni 
and the Chapare region during this time, and consolidated into the National 
Confederation of the Colonizers of Bolivia (Confederación Nacional de Colonizadores 
de Bolivia, CNCB), which was also to affiliate itself with the COB. However, according 
to Rivera Cusicanqui, neither of these movements was able to consolidate a lasting 
organizational structure because they were unable to appeal to the peasant masses at 
their base. Javier Hurtado’s study El katarismo confirms this fact when he writes that the 
BIC, unlike the nascent katarista organizations, did not maintain organic ties to their 
base (1986, 37).  
 By 1969, however, the caciques of the Barrientos regime had already come to be 
displaced in a number of areas in the Andean highlands by a new generation of leaders 
which had above all come to occupy positions in the department of La Paz. In particular, 
Aymara activists such as Jenaro Flores (who had also participated in the Julián Apaza 
University Movement or MUJA), after having returned to their communities following 
their studies in the major urban areas, rapidly ascended to the highest ranks of communal 
and syndical representation. The political career of Jenaro Flores is particularly 
remarkable in this respect. On August 2, 1971 in the VI Nacional Congress of the 
CNTCB (National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia), the largest and most 
important peasant organization in the country, Flores was elected as the organization’s 
Executive Secretary. These new leaders were influenced by the migrational tendencies 
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between rural communities and urban centers which have already been remarked upon 
here (above), as well as a generational change which partly resulted from these new 
demographic movements.  
 While the political organization of the early katarista movement was deeply 
affected by the Banzer regime, Rivera Cuscanqui nevertheless points out that “during the 
first years of the Banzer Government, the katarista movement constituted itself as an 
authentic bridge between the Aymaras of the countryside and the city, allowing for a 
complex flux of ideological influences in both directions” (122).187 The word itself, 
katarismo, became a generic name for a wide ideological movement with multiple 
institutional and organizational manifestations, according to the author (123). In 1973, 
the now infamous Manifiesto de Tiwanaku (Tiwanaku Manifesto) was signed and made 
public. The important difference worth noting in both its organizational structure and its 
vocabulary, in comparison to Indianist movements such as the MITKA, is that since its 
earliest moment katarismo showed itself to be more open to negotiating with other 
organizations in the political system, and emphasized the word ‘peasantry’ while 
continuing to emphasize Aymara and Quechua cultural differences. In the manifesto, for 
example, the “aymara and qhechua peasants”188 are defined as being “economically 
exploited, and culturally and politically oppressed” (124),189 appearing not to privilege a 
particular register of exploitation or oppression over another (i.e. the cultural over the 
                                                
187 “Durante los primeros años del Gobierno de Banzer, el movimiento katarista se constituye en un 
auténtico puente entre los aymaras del campo y la ciudad, permitiendo un complejo flujo de influencias 
ideológicas en ambos sentidos.” 
188 “campesinos qhechuas y aymaras” 
189 económicamente explotados y cultural y políticamente oprimidos” 
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economic). Throughout the Banzer regime, while katarista opposition remained 
repressed and censured, the final blows were nevertheless made to the Military Peasant 
Pact by the eventual displacing of officialist ideology with that of the emerging 
kataristas, who became important in the organization and effectuation of a series of 
uprisings across the highlands which forced Banzer to call for democratic elections. In 
1978, Jenaro Flores, who had already, alongside a group of other kataristas, renamed the 
CNTCB by adding the words “Tupac Katari” at the end (CNTCB-TK) and proclaimed 
the previous six years of officialist syndical organization as being illegitimate, was 
named the Secretary General of the new organization. The organization became the 
officially recognized source of all katarista ideology and action.  
 In March of this same year, 1978, conversations were to take place which would 
eventually lead, one month later, to the formation of the two major katarista-Indianist 
parties: MITKA, which has been discussed above, and the Revolutionary Movement 
Tupac Katari (MRTK). Rivera Cusicanqui explains this split in the following way: 
“Once katarismo became the majority syndical current, these differences of perception 
and emphasis [within the movement] began to be elaborated more deeply, and became 
factors of internal controversy” (142).190 With the advantage of having access to 
testimonies of participants such as those of Luciano Tapia and Felipe Quispe, we can 
confirm that this separation that occurred in 1978 actually reflects more fundamental 
differences in ideology that existed and were perceived by its members prior to the 1978 
                                                
190 “Una vez que el katarismo se convierte en la corriente sindical mayoritaria, estas diferencias de 
percepción y de énfasis comienzan a ser elaboradas más profundamente, y se convierten en factores de 
controversia interna.”  
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meeting. It is difficult to speak of the former members of the MITKA, for example, as 
belonging properly to the syndical organizations of katarismo in the years prior to 1978. 
In this sense, and for the sake of ease, here I shall distinguish between Indianism, which 
is more resolutely based upon the ideology of Fausto Reinaga and privileges the racial 
category of the Indian over any other, and katarismo, which adopts a more mixed 
strategy of appreciation for cultural and political differences, while not altogether losing 
the focus on economic exploitation of the popular masses as peasantry, which would be 
expressed in its political organization by the MRTK.  
 Rivera Cuscanqui provides the following description: “The MRTK, in which 
Jenaro Flores, Macabeo Chila, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas and other leaders participated, 
adopted relatively more flexible positions towards leftist organizations and, in 
consonance with a deeper rural and syndical experience, demonstrated better receptivity 
towards the heritage of the revolution of 1952 in the countryside” (142).191 Meanwhile, 
“[the] MITKA, directed by Constantino Lima, Luciano Tapia, Julio Tumiri, Jaime Apaza 
and others shows itself on the other hand to be more radical in its denunciation of the 
q’ara left and more emphatic in indicating that racial oppression and discrimination are 
the principal problems that the popular majority suffers, as much workers as peasants” 
(143).192 Once again, both Luciano Tapia’s and Felipe Quispe’s testimonies make 
                                                
191 “El MRTK, en el que participan Jenaro Flores, Macabeo Chila, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas y otros 
dirigentes, adopta posiciones relativamente más flexibles hacia las organizaciones de izquierda y, en 
consonancia con una experiencia sindical más profunda, muestra una mayor receptividad hacia la herencia 
de la revolución de 1952 en el campo.”  
192 “El MITKA, dirigido por Constantino Lima, Luciano Tapia, Julio Tumiri, Jaime Apaza y otros se 
muestra en cambio más radical en su denuncia a la izquierda q’ara y más enfático en señalar que la 
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constant reference to the MRTK ‘betraying’ their Indianist roots by negotiating with the 
traditional left, confirming Rivera Cusicanqui’s account.193  
 What is clear is that while the Indianist MITKA would suffer internal divisions 
that made its organizational capacity very weak, the organizational structure of 
katarismo went from strength to strength during these early years. In 1979, a meeting 
was held to discuss organizing an overarching syndical structure which could represent 
all of the peasant organizations under one umbrella institution: the peasant’s version of 
the COB. The Unified Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(CSUTCB) was founded and Jenaro Flores immediately elected as its Secretary General. 
Despite being hidden from public life because of the dictatorship of García Mesa, in the 
early months of the 1980s Jenaro Flores became the clandestine General Secretary of the 
COB, the first time a peasant leader was in charge of this important historical 
organization. However, his tenure abruptly came to an end on June 18, 1981, when he 
was shot by a military patrol. Despite being paralyzed by the event, Flores would 
continue to play an essential role in the development of katarismo throughout the ’80s, 
only losing political influence in 1988 with the split of the katarista movement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
opresión y discriminación racial son los principales problemas que sufren las mayorías populares, tanto 
obreras como campesinas.”  
193 Refer to Tapia (1995) and Quispe Huanca (1999).  
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III.4 1985 - 2000: Shock Therapy and the “Multi Pluri,” or the Many Eyes of 
Katari 
 By 1985, the Bolivian economy was in ruins and the traditional left had lost all 
legitimacy in civil society. Levels of inflation had increased to some of the highest levels 
ever recorded in world history (Sachs 1987). Meanwhile, the tin mines, which since the 
early twentieth century had been the cash cow of Bolivian export trade, had become 
almost entirely unproductive and were failing to cover their costs. GDP had declined 
every year since 1981. Pressure from the United States and global financial institutions 
such as the IMF put increasing pressure on Bolivia to adopt their economic restructuring 
plans. 
 In 1985, the symbolic leader of the 1952 National Revolution Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro was elected president after the national elections failed to give a clear victory 
to any single party. Ever a man of pragmatism, in a seeming about-face, and under the 
guidance of technocrats such as his Minister of Planning Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, 
Paz Estenssoro would dismantle the very ’52 revolutionary state that he himself was 
fundamental in establishing. In its place, he would reduce the role of the state in the 
national economy and liberalize markets, opening up to foreign investment in a series of 
neoliberal reforms. This was called the New Economic Policy and was pushed through 
government by Supreme Decree 21060. It adopted what is called in economic theory 
“traditional shock therapy” measures, and the Bolivian government was closely advised 
by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who would claim the Bolivian case to be evidence 
of neoliberal reform’s successes in the Third World (he would later go on to apply these 
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measures in Eastern Europe). This would include policies aimed at reaping profits from 
the massive informal economy which thrived in Bolivia (especially that of the coca and 
cocaine trade), dismantling the trade unions (especially targeting the miner’s unions and 
in particular the COB, which had been the most powerful organ of working-class 
political intervention since 1952), and promoting a rapid decentralization of organization 
which included an influx of NGOs and foreign aid to support the new economic 
structure of the country.  
 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing in their 2006 study show how the 
aforementioned factors contributed to the construction of a neoliberal hegemonic bloc in 
Bolivia, a reading that can be supplemented with David Harvey’s understanding of 
neoliberalism as part of a new global hegemony.194 Kohl and Farthing show that the 
implementation of neoliberalism in Bolivia can be considered to take place in two 
phases: the first in 1985 with the Paz Estenssoro administration which implemented the 
policies mentioned above; the second with former Minister of Planning Sánchez de 
Lozada’s first term of presidency in 1993, where more durable and wide-reaching 
policies were implemented as part of the government’s Plan de todos (Everyone’s Plan). 
The plan provided for: the expansion of neoliberal economic policies through the 
continued privatization of state-owned companies and opening up of capital to foreign 
investment; political decentralization which was regarded as being compatible with the 
latter; and relatively progressive social policies which gave cultural recognition to 
indigenous peoples for the first time. The major policies that were implemented under 
                                                
194 Refer to Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2007).  
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the first Sánchez de Lozada or “Goni” administration included the 1994 constitutional 
reform. This reform modified the proportional representation system in the Chamber of 
Deputies (which is the lower house of Congress), whereby fifty percent of the deputies 
would now be elected not by political party lists but by districts, opening up possibilities 
of local representation (this was based upon the German model). Often, this led to 
traditional political parties making alliances with local representatives and saw a much 
celebrated increase in indigenous participation in the Chamber of Deputies.195 Another 
important reform to the Constitution was the popularly celebrated first and third 
paragraph of Article 171 of the Constitution, which recognized “the social, economic, 
and cultural rights of indigenous peoples who live within the national territory, 
especially those relating to the communal origin of their lands, guaranteeing the 
sustainable use of natural resources, their identity, values, language, customs and 
institutions” and granting relative autonomy to the traditional authorities of indigenous 
and peasant communities as long as they did not come into conflict with the Constitution 
and other laws” (quoted in Kohl and Farthing, 91). However, the Constitution did not 
pose a challenge to the unitary state structure.  
 The 1994 Law of Popular Participation sought to decentralize state planning by 
turning over a significant proportion of the national budget to municipal governments. 
As Kohl and Farthing demonstrate, the contradictory result of such a policy was to: 
firstly, allow for a shrinking of state participation in economic life compatible with the 
                                                
195 This phenomenon has been given a great deal of scholarly attention. Refer, for example, to Xavier 
Albó’s study entitled Pueblos indios en la política (Indian peoples in politics, 2002).  
 221 
government’s overall neoliberal policies and thereby reduce opposition to or the 
possibility of mobilizing against a general deregulation of the economy; but also, 
secondly, contribute to the growth of grassroots movements and organic intellectuals 
with the capacity to make use of the new spaces of financial regulation to intervene in 
national political life. The second effect, as the authors demonstrate, had somewhat 
mixed results: whereas in some areas the decentralization of funds led, often with the 
organizational support of NGOs, to local development agendas and the occupying of 
new democratic spaces (the Chapare region and the lowland Guaraní organizations are 
notable in this respect), in other places local elites merely occupied the new places of 
power (94). The two authors describe the effects of the Law: “Decentralization and 
political restructuring have fostered the emergence of new local leaders — ‘organic 
intellectuals’ to use Gramsci’s term. This has transformed formal politics in Bolivia as 
for the first time in history, indigenous grassroots movements have been elected to 
municipal and national offices” (125). Assies and Salman (2005) also explain that: 
[The law brought] an extensive decentralization of the country’s political-
administrative structure through the upgrading of the, until then 
insignificant, municipal level of government. The new law meant that 
over 300 municipalities now became meaningful administrative entities 
that received a significant share of the national budget. The municipality 
became a significant political arena. Among the municipal councilors 
elected in 1995 some 460, or 29%, had a peasant-indigenous background 
(276).  
 
 One of the effects of this form of decentralization was the breaking down of the 
traditional forms of opposition in Bolivian politics, which since at least 1952 had always 
articulated itself in terms of national and class-based lines. As Kohl and Farthing write: 
“Adapting the strategies employed by class-based union movements to new arenas, [the 
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government administration] have redefined opposition to incorporate a greater emphasis 
on identity and territorial demands” (125). This conflict between class-based opposition 
and new forms of opposition based on cultural claims to identity and territory has been 
further aggravated by the dividing effects of the law. The Law of Popular Participation 
gave representation to what were called Grassroots Territorial Organizations (GTO), and 
nearly 15,000 such organizations were recognized by the government during Goni’s first 
term as president (Kohl and Farthing, 132). Yet, given that each municipality was 
allowed only one GTO to represent them, conflictive areas such as the northern 
department of Potosí, which has historically been divided by Quechua-speaking syndical 
organizations and Aymara-speaking ayllu organizations, have been in conflict over the 
GTO that best represents their municipality.  
 The year 1994 was also that of the so-called Law of Capitalization, the center of 
Goni’s economic program for the Plan de todos, which sought to shift the economy from 
its corporatist state model to a neoliberal regulatory model, a policy which was only 
partially successful. Kohl and Farthing demonstrate that, while the rates of foreign 
investment did indeed grow during this time, the state did not receive the growth and 
thus the returns it expected, leading to a capital problem which would result, among 
other things, in a crisis in the pension scheme (104). Nevertheless, the program can be 
considered successful from the perspective of economic deregulation, where it 
effectively continued the reforms initially made in the 1985 New Economic Plan by 
reducing state participation in the economy and increasing private ownership of 
enterprises. It did not, however, manage to limit in any significant measure the enormous 
 223 
informal economy, which continued to account for the majority of its urban economic 
activity.  
 A year later, in 1995, the Goni administration also implemented an educational 
reform which sought to put into practice the government’s formal recognition of the 
pluri-ethnic composition of the country. The most important aspects of this reform from 
the perspective of indigenous rights were without doubt the implementation of a 
bilingual and multiethnic curriculum, recognizing the importance of Aymara and 
Quechua in particular as national languages.  
 Finally, in 1996, the Law of National Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de 
Reforma Agraria, ley INRA) was implemented, hailed as the second Agrarian Reform 
(the first being the 1953 reform implemented after the MNR took power in 1952). 
Nominally, the law provided protection for peasant and indigenous landholdings, 
including provisions for relative autonomy of indigenous territories and the extension of 
equal rights to women for the inheritance of territory. In actual fact, the law ended up 
also protecting abandoned lands whose owners could keep this property merely by 
paying taxes on it. Meanwhile, indigenous and peasant groups lacked resources to claim 
land titles and were subject to disputes over ownership. What is worse, under the law 
communal lands were often sold without the permission of the communities themselves. 
Not only did the new law do little to contribute to the enormous inequalities that still 
existed regarding material ownership of property in Bolivia, especially in the lowlands; 
the law actually contributed to a monopolization of ownership in the hands of the elites, 
under a logic by which communal lands became commodities to be bought and sold.  
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 Yet perhaps one of the most surprising eventualities of the political 
reconfiguration that took place after 1985 is that Sánchez de Lozada’s MNR had 
strategically allied with the katarista MRTK-l (a branch of the MRTK that had broken 
off in 1985) in the 1993 elections. Goni’s vice president, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, was one 
of the most important ideologues of the kataristas. Xavier Albó’s scholarship documents 
this surprising turnaround in indigenous political activism. In a 1987 essay entitled 
“from MNRistas to Kataristas to Katari,” Xavier Albó explores the implications of this 
unexpected emergence of radical indigenous activists from within the Bolivian political 
system. “[What] catches the eye,” writes Albó, “is that after the reform and the lethargic 
two decades that followed, the Bolivian peasantry has begun to agitate once again in a 
manner reminiscent of that distant Katari of the colonial period. This new awakening 
toward the future through a reencounter with the past [reminiscent of the pachakuti 
discussed above — P.B.] … will constitute the topic of this essay” (380, my emphasis). 
Only three years later, however, Albó publishes a response to this same essay in a 
publication entitled ¿…Y de Kataristas a MNRistas? (…And from Kataristas to 
MNRistas?). He begins by reminding the readership of the roots of the katarista 
ideologue Hugo Cárdenas, quoting the latter from a symposium given in 1984: “Faced 
with a state of this nature [i.e. of a semi-colonial type], the CSUTCB — and in some 
way even the COB — is turning into a Germinal state and parallel to the official state” 
(5).196 A situation of double power or of a power which extends beyond the state is 
                                                
196 “Frente a un Estado de esa naturaleza la CSTUCB — y de alguna manera la propia COB [Central 
Obrera Boliviana] — se va convirtiéndose en un Estado Germinal y paralelo al Estado oficial.”  
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announced here by a figure that will, less than a decade later, be incorporated into this 
state of which he is so critical. Cárdenas repeats a katarista trope that was popularized 
by his role as an ideologue here in which he insists that one must “see reality with both 
eyes” (6).197 That is, in contrast to the Indianist parties such as the MITKA where the 
category of race is privileged over that of class, he claims that one must see with: “[The 
eye] of the exploited peasants, together with all of the exploited class, and that of the 
oppressed Aymaras, together with all of the other oppressed peoples (or “nations”) of the 
country” (6).198  
 Albó emphasizes the contradiction that we see here between these two moments, 
placed somewhere between the two essays of which he himself is author. The 
contribution of the MLTK-l to the 1993 coalition, he adds, only seems to include one of 
the two eyes, and the question of class is entirely excluded. Thus, while Goni is able to 
carry out his economic reforms in order to minimize the state’s role in the economy and 
ultimately contribute to the privatization of capital, largely in the hands of foreign 
enterprises, the MLTK-l collaborates with the neoliberal hegemonic bloc, working 
towards the recognition of cultural rights and languages, including such measures as the 
educational reform discussed above, but not challenging the material basis of the state. 
Albó is not blind to the fact that this broad-base appeal which brackets out the question 
of class is merely the extension of a political strategy that was inaugurated by the MNR 
in 1952. He maintains that the participation of the MRTK-l remains within the neoliberal 
                                                
197 “ver la realidad con los dos ojos” 
198 “el de campesinos explotados, junto con toda la clase explotada, y el de aymaras oprimidos, junto con 
todos los demás pueblos (o ‘naciones’) oprimidas del país” 
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structure of a “poly-classist translation of the MNR” (50).199 In this strong criticism of 
Cárdenas’s participation in the MNR administration, Albó goes as far to rename the ex-
vice president’s ideological stance a “neo-katarismo” (51), calling him “a kind of key 
new informant of the new power” (ibid.).200 Albó provides the following reflection: 
Now [Cárdenas] analyzes reality more with the eye of the oppressed 
nation than with that of the exploited class: the second eye now perceives 
rather the vision of a modernizing bourgeois which has recently begun to 
speak of solidarity in order to pay off its social debt, above all in the form 
of welfare services (ibid.).201  
 
 Scholarship on indigenous rights demonstrates that this trend, where the 
reclaiming of cultural rights and neoliberal policies go hand in hand, is a generalized 
phenomenon. The general consensus is that multicultural politics should be considered 
an important part of neoliberal policies rather than antagonistic to it (we should 
remember here Marramao’s writings on the nostalgia of the present studied above). In 
The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development, Karen Engle demonstrates that during 
the second half of the twentieth century, when indigenous rights were given increasing 
attention by both national and international jurisprudence, discourses for local autonomy 
have given way to those which lay claim to ‘cultural rights,’ because the latter were seen 
to be more successful. This is particularly so in Latin America, where local autonomy 
has been more difficult to claim than in other areas of the world such as Canada. She 
claims that the continent’s approach to “the revitalization of culture and reclaiming of 
                                                
199 “traducción policlasista del MNR” 
200 “una especie de informante clave del nuevo poder” 
201 “Ahora analiza la realidad más con el ojo de nación oprimida que con el de clase explotada: el segundo 
ojo percibe ahora más bien la visión de una burguesía modernizante, que recién empieza a hablar de 
solidaridad para pagar su deuda social, sobre todo en la forma de servicios asistenciales.”  
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indigenous identity … set the stage for the focus on the right to culture (as opposed to 
strong claims to self-determination) that we see in Latin America in subsequent decades” 
(56). The trajectory of Cárdenas in this case would appear to confirm Engle’s statements.  
 Nancy Postero (2007) has argued that this alliance between neoliberal policies 
and multiculturalism holds in the Bolivian context of the 1990s, where multiculturalism 
should be seen not as a goal but a specific set of government strategies. She argues that, 
“[where] neoliberalism is the key organizing principle of government, it acts to define 
citizen participation in accordance with its logic” (15). This includes, in the Bolivian 
case, effecting a change in the relationship between state and citizens according to a 
neoliberal integration with the market. This is carried out through the sharing of political 
responsibility upon lines which integrate citizens to the state specifically as individuals 
operating in a market, subject to making wagers and taking risk (what Foucault 
describes, in his 1978-79 seminar, as homo economicus [see Foucault 2008]). Thus, for 
example, the Law of Popular Participation “encouraged a specific form of civil society 
participation intended to make the economic system run more efficiently and with less 
conflict” (16). Hence the neoliberal politics of multiculturalism actually foster a 
particular relationship towards capitalism and the state, where cultural difference is 
merely a marker of cultural capital that operates from within the market and does not 
challenge it, and therefore neither does it challenge the distribution of wealth and 
resources nor the market’s relationship to the state. This is what anthropologist Charles 
Hale identified in 2002 as the politics of the indio permitido or permitted Indian 
(“Rethinking Indigenous Politics”). In Postero’s own words:  
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This valuing of civil society can be compatible with some facets of 
indigenous cultural rights — but only as long as there are no fundamental 
threats to the productive regime or to state power. The bottom line is that 
successful neoliberal subjects must govern themselves in accordance with 
the logic of globalized capitalism (16).  
 
 However, what Postero wishes to show with her research is that “Bolivian 
Indians and their allies in civil society have pushed beyond the limitations of such roles” 
(ibid.). Indeed, not all wings of the traditional katarismo-Indianism bloc would follow 
this general trend modeled by Cárdenas’s alliance with the Goni administration. A very 
different model would be forged by Felipe Quispe, an Indianist who was actively 
involved in the MITKA from the late 1970s onwards. This thinker distanced himself 
from the compromised position of katarismo that sought to continue speaking of 
‘peasantry’ and privileged the category of race over class. He was particularly influenced 
by the writings of Fausto Reinaga and by a history of indigenous struggle which he knew 
well, especially that of Tupac Katari (Quispe published a historical study in 1990 titled 
Tupak Katari vive y vuelve…carajo [Tupak Katari is alive and returns… damn it]). 
Following the split in the MITKA between Tapia and Lima in the late 1970s, Quispe 
opted for a more radical path and founded the militant wing of the Indianist party, the 
Ofensiva de Ayllus Rojos (Red Ayllu Offensive). In 1989, in alliance with a number of 
young Marxist activists, Quispe co-founded the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (Ejército 
Guerrillero Tupac Katari, EGTK) with the aim of taking the state. However, while the 
EGTK was still in the planning stages its activities were discovered by the authorities 
and a number of its most important members were sent to prison, including Quispe and 
current Vice President Álvaro García Linera. Released in 1997, in 1998 Quispe was 
 229 
elected the Secretary General of the CSUTCB and was pivotal in reorganizing this 
important syndical body around communal ayllu organizational structures. He became 
known as the Mallku in popular discourse (literally meaning ‘condor,’ it is a term that is 
used for indigenous leaders in the ayllus). In 2000 began the first in a series of popular 
uprisings in the La Paz department directed by Quispe’s leadership. He would later be an 
important strategist in the 2003 Gas Wars that saw Sánchez de Lozada forced to resign 
from his second presidency. As his political trajectory shows, Quispe continuously 
resisted negotiating with mainstream political parties in favor of organizing grassroots 
resistance to the state.  
 “We consider ourselves as followers and continuers of Tupaj Katari,” says 
Quispe in an interview in 2011 (Cúneo, 51).202 Ezcárzaga, in his study of Felipe 
Quispe’s political thought, confirms that: “Felipe Quispe’s revolutionary katarismo is a 
reaction from the left against the neoliberal hegemony within katarismo,” one that 
recuperates the thought of Fausto Reinaga and the long memory of indigenous political 
struggles (201).203 As Quispe presents in the aforementioned study Tupac Katari vive y 
vuelve… carajo, the Mallku’s primary theoretical position resides in the study of the 
political thought and anticolonial war strategy of Tupac Katari, and of his revolutionary 
war of the ayllus, in order to apply these procedures in the present struggle. In this way, 
states Ezcárzaga, “Quispe’s central aim is to learn the military strategy and tactics 
employed by the katarista forces, which fed off the knowledge and command of territory 
                                                
202 “nosotros nos consideramos como seguidores y continuadores de Tupaj Katari” 
203 “El katarismo revolucionario de Felipe Quispe es una reacción desde la izquierda en contra de la 
hegemonía neoliberal en el katarismo” 
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by the Indian population, and above all in the participation of the ayllus” (202-3).204 
What is impressive about this political strategy is that it is the clearest manifestation of 
the effectivity of emergent indigeneity in mobilizing social and political actors around 
the recuperation of a past and historical memory. The katarista army in this instance is 
metaphorically, and perhaps more than metaphorically, brought back to life, embodied 
by the peasants of the ayllus of the La Paz Department. Quispe’s success, therefore, was 
to be able to adapt organic forms of ayllu organization and mobilize it as part of the 
struggle for autonomy. One such example in the 2000-2001 roadblocks around La Paz 
was that Quispe used the rotative labor system native to the communities known as mita 
to share the work of watching over the road blocks between a number of the 
communities who participated in the struggle (Cúneo, 54).  
 It is worth asking whether one must revise Cárdenas’s concept of “seeing reality 
with both eyes” in light of this history, and in particular giving it a certain relation to the 
aesthetic-political dimension of what we have above called “emergent indigeneity.” This 
would be particularly important given that, as we have seen repeatedly in the writing of 
the authors that concern themselves with this phenomenon, the debate over whether 
indigenous struggle should be framed in terms of race or class has been pivotal. 
Paradoxically, whereas Cárdenas’s elaboration of “seeing reality with both eyes” 
ultimately failed to face the problem of class exploitation head on, Felipe Quispe’s 
political interventions in the late 1990s, which emerged from the Indianist MITKA party 
                                                
204 “El propósito central de Quispe es aprender la estrategia y tácticas militares empleadas por las fuerzas 
kataristas, que se sustentaron en el conocimiento y dominio del territorio por la población india, y sobre 
todo en la participación de los ayllus” 
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and thus emphatically insisted on using racial over class categories, effectively managed 
to challenge in important ways the uneven distribution of the conditions of production in 
the region. Indeed, Marxist intellectuals belonging to the Grupo Comuna or Comune 
group that will be analyzed in the following chapter would use the example of the 
dissidence enacted by groups under the tutelage of Felipe Quispe as instances of the 
reappropriation of capital by the masses (see in particular Álvaro García Linera’s Forma 
valor, forma comunidad [Value Form, Community Form]). Quispe claimed himself to be 
both Indianist and katarista, and was successful in revalorizing the place of the ayllu’s 
social, economic and political organization while simultaneously leading the most 
important syndicate body for peasant representation in the country.   
 For Javier Sanjinés, the theory of both eyes is “the most interesting proposal to 
arise from this history [i.e. that of katarismo]” (Mestizaje Upside Down, 12). This is so 
because it challenges the basic foundations of the national-popular state and its politics 
of mestizaje (I have analyzed this in Chapter II for the work of Fausto Reinaga). 
Ultimately, this theory of both eyes is regarded as so interesting for this author because 
it deals with a certain threshold of vision by which a radical politics becomes possible 
through an alternative relationship to the aesthetic. The author writes that new 
indigenous social movements in Bolivia today “introduce new ways of seeing that may 
well be the product of a radical reversal in the hierarchy of visual subcultures. They are, 
therefore, a way of seeing from ‘inside’ the periphery that attempts to overturn Cartesian 
perspectivism” (28). Cartesian perspectivism, the idea that reality can be perceived from 
the perspective of an objective standpoint external to the observed space, the focus of a 
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single gaze which can map the coordinates of reality like in a mathematical equation — 
which for Sanjinés is also tied up with the question of the centrality of the subject which 
Descartes also in some way inaugurates — this is the effective ‘monocular’ vision of the 
mestizo national-popular political imaginary for Sanjinés. The theory of both eyes is, 
therefore, for the author, “one new way to see through subaltern sensibilities” (ibid.). 
This double vision, “a border way of seeing,” according to the author, “is only possible 
from the subaltern’s exteriority, never from inside modernity” (31). What stands out, is 
revealed or emerges from the theory of both eyes, therefore, what is interesting about it, 
is that it acts upon the monocular field of vision that is the political ideology of mestizaje 
by looking at it differently, awry, acting upon it without being of it. 
  In respect to the theory of both eyes, then, Sanjinés remarks on the difference 
between the political ideology of Cárdenas and his party and that of Felipe Quispe. He 
calls the former a ‘moderate’ katarismo, criticizing its inability to truly threaten the logic 
of mestizaje politics, with its emphasis on modernization and acculturation, due to its 
complicity with the mestizo-criollo Republican political system. He contrasts this to the 
Indianism of Felipe Quispe, which Sanjinés calls ‘radical’ katarismo, and insists that it 
offers a visceral bodily metaphor of the theory of both eyes which is capable of turning 
the bodily metaphor of mestizaje upside down. This is supported in Sanjinés’s work by 
Quispe’s own constant call in interviews to “indianize the q’ara,” which literally 
suggests the reversal of a process of mestizaje by which all of those policies that 
encouraged Indian integration into national-popular unity based on the ideology of 
mestizaje would be replaced by ones that sought the opposite movement. Sanjinés’s 
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insistence on the visceral in Quispe’s bi-ocular vision of Bolivian society is important 
here. On the one hand, this emphasis on the visceral breaks down the classical 
metaphysical distinction between thought and feeling, the rational and the irrational, 
intelligibility and perception, in which a visceral relationship to reality is not only able to 
perceive but also apprehend and think that reality differently. On the other hand, the 
visceral as a question of sense is also a matter of apprehending that which was below the 
threshold of sensibility. Sanjinés writes that Quispe’s visceral katarismo “does away 
with the tendency to anesthetize reality” (163). If the official ideology of mestizaje in the 
new national-popular state building project of mid-twentieth-century Bolivia was a form 
of neutralizing, which is also to say anesthetizing, indigenous difference in favor of a 
strategy of assimilation in the name of modernization, then visceral katarismo feels the 
pain of the Bolivian apartheid in order to undo this surgical procedure of 
anesthetization. 
 One must necessarily ask the question, however: what is it that one is able to see 
clearly through a visceral bi-ocular vision that before had been neutralized or 
anesthetized? Perhaps the author’s interpretations, by attempting to read the possibility 
of a decolonized subject that can be revealed by such a bi-ocular vision, give way to a 
certain metaphysics of presence. Indeed, Sanjinés’s discourse makes recourse to a visual 
lexical field which suggests that there is a kind of transparency that would belong to the 
indigenous populations of Bolivia, beyond or perhaps below the colonial wound which 
has historically trapped them within a Cartesian field of vision. The visceral theory of 
both eyes is, according to the author, “one new way to see through subaltern 
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sensibilities” (28, my emphasis), seeing through as one might be able to see through any 
transparent substance: a pane of glass or a crystal ball, both into the present as well as 
into the future. The indigenous seen through both eyes casts no shadow, it projects no 
distorted image: neither opaque, nor translucent, but entirely transparent. The indigenous 
become absolutely see-through, and therefore absolutely present to the two-eyed gaze. 
And this transparency would have a very precise relationship to “border thinking,” 
where the contours of an inside/outside are given by this transparency itself; they are 
seen clearly: “a way of seeing from ‘inside’ the periphery,” writes Sanjinés (ibid.), 
something “only possible from the subaltern’s exteriority” (31). The notion of turning 
the bodily metaphor of mestizaje upside-down for Sanjinés is not merely a reversal of 
the logic of the Bolivian elites, nor, he writes, is it a dislocation, but a real turning 
upside-down of history (152). In an appeal to the visceral, which bears the colonial 
wound as its condition of possibility, however, one must ask what the conditions that 
would make it possible to see in a whole and undivided way this viscerality of the 
colonial wound, which could supposedly destabilize and perhaps even replace the 
Cartesian field of vision, are today. No further indications are given by the author. 
 We must nevertheless agree with Sanjinés’s overall formulation of the 
importance of the theory of both eyes for contributing to a better understanding of 
emergent indigeneity’s specifically aesthetic-political dimension, one which breaks 
down classical metaphysical distinctions and distorts the political theology of Bolivian 
Republican history. Felipe Quispe’s discourse and political activism have been so 
successful in mobilizing indigenous-peasant actors because they have strategically 
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broken down the political dogmas of the Bolivian tradition in such a manner that has 
interpellated actors in new ways, actors who have themselves been able to adopt this 
discourse strategically in order to transform it and, with it, their working conditions. 
Quispe’s call to the memory of Tupac Katari’s insurrection when he mobilized the road 
blocks in 2000 does not attempt to reproduce those insurrections in a strict political 
sense, and neither should his call to the Indian essence be necessarily interpreted as 
essentialist. Quispe has shown himself to be a great strategist in his confrontation of the 
Bolivian elites and their hegemonic bloc. If strategic, however, there is nothing ‘behind 
the veil’ of the monocular Cartesian field of vision that Sanjinés identifies with the 
politics of mestizaje in Bolivia that can be revealed as such through a call to a new, bi-
ocular vision. Quispe’s thought and practice (the two are often indistinguishable here) 
offer a consideration of what it means to be indigenous or a peasant in Bolivia, an 
oscillation between ethnic and class lines, that works within their own non-presence or 
iterability, where signification is constantly deferred in the cultural sphere and is never 
able to pinpoint a systemic Real of (neo)colonialism or capitalist exploitation. It does, 
however, produce a certain effectivity which challenges the dominant state ideology, 
both of national-popular mestizo unity and of neoliberal hegemony.    
 Finally, the late ’80s and early ’90s also see the displacement of the 
ethnocentrism of earlier discourses on indigeneity, where the largely Aymara based 
political organizations would eventually be complemented by a number of other 
emerging organizations with a different cultural and ethnic composition. Two major 
examples are worth noting here for the influence that they were subsequently to have on 
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the discursive possibilities concerning the political place of indigenous peoples in the 
country. The first is the Chapare region, which had been developed as a colony to 
reallocate workers that found themselves marginalized by the changes of the 1952 
revolution, and since the 1970s, encouraged by Banzer’s economic policies, had become 
the center of the lucrative production of coca, which was largely exported to Colombia 
for the production of cocaine.205 Following the closing down of state mines in 1985, 
large numbers of ex-miners (who, we should not forget, have traditionally been the most 
politically dissident sector of the Bolivian population) were relocated en masse to the 
Chapare colony. With increasing pressure from the government in alliance with the 
United States to reduce coca production in the so-called War on Drugs, leading to the 
militarization of the area, the workers of the Chapare began to mobilize in an 
unprecedented. Their organizations became the most important representatives in the 
CSUTCB in the 1980s, displacing the hegemonic katarista bloc. The most significant 
leaders in this movement were Alejo Véliz and Evo Morales, future president of Bolivia. 
Willem Assies and Ton Salman provide the following account: 
Under the leadership of people like Evo Morales, [the cocaleros] have 
become a well organized group, desperate enough to fiercely defend their 
newly acquired livelihood after having migrated to the region as low 
agricultural yields on the Altiplano and mass lay-offs in the mining 
branch forced them to develop another survival strategy. (283)  
 
                                                
205 The coca leaf is an important part of traditional Bolivian culture and is used for medicinal purposes, 
ritual purposes, as well as for general daily consumption either as the leaf itself or in tea or foods. 
However, while the coca leaves that are used for domestic production tend to come from the areas of the 
Yungas, the Chapare region has been known to cultivate the coca used in the production of cocaine for the 
external market.  
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 The second example is that of the lowland indigenous peoples, whose presence 
was largely ignored in these political processes up until the year 1990, when they 
underwent the historical March for Territory and Dignity, where almost 1,000 finally 
joined, some en route, in a march that began in Trinidad and ended in La Paz. The 
indigenous march was greeted by the president and is often identified as the impetus 
behind a number of reforms giving cultural and territorial recognition to indigenous 
peoples, including the recognition of a number of territories as belonging to the 
indigenous and the ratification of the ILO Convention 169 (Assies and Salman, 275). As 
Assies and Salman confirm, the march was “the emergence of a movement of the 
indigenous peoples of the eastern Bolivian lowlands. Since the late 1970s 
anthropologists and NGOs had promoted encounters among these groups and in 1982 
this led to the formation of an umbrella organization, the Confederación Indígena del 
Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia de Bolivia [Indigenous Confederation of the Orient, Chaco 
and Amazonia of Bolivia, CIDOB]” (ibid.). Fundamental in the growth and organization 
of these movements were the NGOs that had become increasingly important in Bolivian 
economic life. Canessa affirms that:  “It is worth noting that international NGOs had a 
prominent role in organizing indigenous groups for the March … The role of 
international NGOs in this and other mobilizations has remained significant and 
underlines the globalised contest in which such mobilizations occur; indigenous 
mobilizations are never simply local events” (2006, 247).  
 These two examples are important because the participation of indigenous 
activism from areas with a different ethnic composition and different demands was to 
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transform the discourse of indigeneity itself in important ways. While the kataristas had 
already proposed the notion of a pluri-national state in the 1980s, it was really in the 
1990s that such a proposal was to be given increased emphasis in light of the multi-
ethnic composition of the new demands. Furthermore, we find during these years that 
more attention is given to the question of territorial claims that refuse the state as the 
legimitate administrator of power, rather than those aiming to transform the state from 
within and in some way ‘indianize’ it, as had been the case for previous Indianist 
movements. What we see undermined during these years is the radically particularistic 
vein of indigenous activism that was largely Aymara both in origin and nature, a fact 
that was reflected in the general voting trends. Parties that sought a more broad-base 
approach to the question of indigeneity (such as that of Evo Morales) would quickly 
become an important contender in the political field, whereas radical Indianist parties 
(such as that of Felipe Quispe) would only ever remain marginal.   
 In this chapter, I have provided a general account of emergent indigeneity 
between the years 1970-2000. Firstly, I have provided a theoretical framework from 
which it becomes possible to understand the particular way in which emergent 
indigeneity acts upon the field of intelligibility and perception as both discourse and 
subjectivation, where it changes the sense of Bolivian history and historiography and 
produces new political subjects. I have argued that it is a primarily aesthetic procedure 
which is also a political positioning within the new distribution of the sensible that 
ensues. It must be emphasized that this framework provides a way of thinking about 
emergent indigeneity that collapses the traditional binaries of discourse and bodily 
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affect, theory and praxis, by being a field where new senses are produced both textually 
and corporeally. Secondly, I have provided a brief historical outline of the most 
important trends that define the changing contours of emergent indigeneity throughout 
these years. My account does not pretend to be exhaustive, but merely serve as an 
example to demonstrate empirically, on the one hand, what I have identified as the 
material conditions for emergent indigeneity, and, on the other hand, to demonstrate how 
the meaning of what it means to be indigenous, as a political positioning expressed in the 
cultural sphere, is a malleable, continuously changing phenomenon.  
 To conclude this chapter, I wish now to engage in a textual reading of an 
autobiography written by an Aymara activist, Luciano Tapia, who was a leading member 
of the MITKA. In this publication, what is at stake is the condition of possibility for 
speaking in the name of a radical particularism that is nevertheless sufficiently 
universalized to be able to create identifications with other Aymaras. It will therefore be 
an exploration of the aesthetic-political dimension of emergent indigeneity in writing, 
and while it is merely one example of such writing, from a marginal writer and 
politician, it should nevertheless be considered exemplary from the standpoint of all that 
is unique to emergent indigeneity as it has been outlined here: a particular aesthetic 
relation to traditional Bolivian history and an affective identification that interpellates 
certain actors.  
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III.5 Tracing the Outer Curve of a Parenthetical Relation 
 Ukhamawa Jakawisaxa (Así es nuestra vida) was the first testimony by an 
Aymara activist involved in the Indianist MITKA movement to be published, and can be 
translated into English as This is Our Life or This is the Way Our Life is. Based in part 
on a written testament that was developed by the author between 1985 and 1991, and in 
part on tape recordings made in 1992 which were eventually transcribed, the testimony 
was published in La Paz in 1995. The author, who signs the work Luciano Tapia (Lusiku 
Qhispi Mamani), recounts in this work the story of his life beginning as a child growing 
up in the Corocoro mining colony, traveling to and fro between the colony and his ayllu 
Qallirpi, through a number of experiences which eventually lead him to take on a leading 
role in the making of one of the most important Indianist parties, the MITKA. The 
subtitle for the publication is autobiografía de un aymara (autobiography of an Aymara). 
The publication is therefore an autobiography, but also a testimony, which testifies to the 
life of a member of a group, an Aymara. This is not the autobiography of just any 
Aymara, however. As the subtitle appears to suggest, Luciano Tapia is somehow an 
exemplary member of an ethnic group. This publication testifies, therefore, not only to a 
life: it is not only the graphical representation of a life (bio-graphy), but it also testifies 
to a certain way of life, a certain reality, making visible a way of life that was presumed 
to be beneath the threshold of articulation, at least in lettered culture. It is about a life, 
but it is also about more than a life – more, perhaps, than life. About something that is 
even, perhaps, worth dying for, worth more than life itself.  
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 Ukhamawa Jakawisaxa (Así es nuestra vida) by Luciano Tapia (Lusiku Qhispi 
Mamani): immediately, before even turning the cover, one is faced by the expression of 
two languages, even of two cultures. It is a parenthetical relation, where one is 
subordinated to the other, is bracketed out or, perhaps, bracketed in, and is included by 
way of a certain kind of exclusion, or excluded by a certain kind of inclusion. What is 
striking is that the culture which is being bracketed in/out in each case is not the same 
for both the title and the signature. The title is given in Aymara, in a certain sense 
reclaiming the language, placing at the center of consideration, in a book which is 
nevertheless written in Spanish, an element of language which is also representative of a 
culture, a people, an ethnicity. What is bracketed out, or bracketed in, in such a way in 
which there is a certain undecidability over whether what is bracketed is excluded or 
included, is an address to the non-Aymara speaking – the Spanish-speaking – reader. A 
question immediately arises concerning the reader to whom such an autobiography is to 
be addressed. The central title reclaims a certain language and culture, makes reference 
to an ethnic group or people, and yet is not necessarily intended for an audience with 
exclusive use of that language.  
 This fact is complicated further by the Aymara title:  Ukhamawa Jakawisaxa. In 
Aymara, unlike in Indo-European languages, there are two verb forms and pronouns 
which refer to the first-person singular and plural. One is exclusive of the person to 
whom the enunciation is addressed. The singular pronoun for this form is naya (which 
can be translated directly into English as ‘I’), and the plural form is nayanaka (which 
means ‘we, but not you’). The other form is inclusive of the person to whom the 
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enunciation is addressed. The singular pronoun for this form is jiwasa (meaning ‘you 
and I’), and the plural pronoun for this form is jiwasanaka (meaning ‘all of you and all 
of us,’ often implicating others who may not be directly involved in the conversation and 
are in some way ‘not present’). In the title to this autobiography, what is translated into 
Spanish as nuestra vida (our life) adopts the possessive suffix for the jiwasa form of the 
‘we,’ sa: Jakawi-sa-xa. The address is therefore an inclusive ‘we,’ the ‘we’ of ‘you and 
I.’ Not just my life, then, but our life, our life, meaning, in place of ‘us but not you,’ 
‘you and I.’ The addressee of the enunciation is therefore not excluded from this life, the 
life of an Aymara which is nevertheless our life, the life of you and me. This exemplary 
life is therefore addressed not to someone who does not share this experience, but rather 
to someone who can lay claim to this life, who can recognize him or herself in this life, 
in this graphical inscription of a life. Such a fact immediately comes into conflict, of 
course, with the exemplarity of the testimony itself, its claim to represent not just a life, 
but also a certain way of life and a certain reality. To whom would such a reality be 
addressed, if not to a reader in some way unfamiliar with such a reality? It also comes 
into conflict with the fact that another addressee, bracketed out of or bracketed into the 
enunciation by a parenthetical translation, is included by way of exclusion, or excluded 
by way of inclusion. To whom, then, is the testimony addressed? Let us suspend this 
question for a moment.  
 The autobiography’s double signature raises equally perplexing questions. The 
author is at once Luciano Tapia and Lusiku Quispi Mamani. The traces of a signature 
from two cultural identities are imprinted in a relationship which is not one of equality, 
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but of a bracketing in/out. In this case, the order is re-arranged. Luciano Tapia is the 
principal signature for the author, his public persona, the signature of his authorship in a 
publication which is also his entry into the world of the lettered elite. Somehow, the 
author desires to include by way of exclusion, or exclude by way of inclusion, another 
name, another signature. It is a trace of the imprinting of his life, of another life, within 
the same autobiography. Tapia explains the origins of these names or signatures in his 
testimony. Luciano was the name given to him when he was baptized, three days after 
his birth. Given that his parents had not complied with the formalities of Christian 
matrimony, Luciano was given only his mother’s surname, Mamani. His father’s 
surname was Qhispi. Having grown up in an exclusively Aymara-speaking context, 
however, Luciano became Lusiku, with his given name of Luciano being used by his 
mother only on rare occasions. “That is the name that unites me with my heritage,” 
writes Tapia (171).206 Yet this name quickly becomes “archived,” as Tapia phrases it, 
when he moves to the city and undergoes what he describes as a process of 
‘traumatizing’ acculturation, where he is prohibited from speaking Aymara.  
 Finally, when Tapia signs up for military service he is told to declare his name, 
which was also to be the name that would appear on his citizenship card, officially 
incorporating Tapia into civic life after 19 years of living on its margins. “In those days I 
was like a thing hanging in the void,” writes Tapia (172),207 referring to his status as an 
“hijo natural” (bastard child). Unsure of his parents’ marital status, Tapia hesitates over 
                                                
206 “Ese es el nombre que me une con mi ancestro.” 
207 “en esos días yo era como una cosa colgada en el vacío” 
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how to proceed. In what might seem an unexpected response to such a problem, he 
adopts two surnames which he has not inherited by blood. The first is Tapia, which is the 
second, that is, the maternal surname, of a mestizo from La Paz who had provided a great 
deal of support to Luciano throughout his time there. For the second, normally maternal, 
surname, Tapia adopts an acculturated version of his father’s surname, Quisbert. In a 
curious move, Tapia exorcises all trace of maternal lineage through what appears to be 
an entirely arbitrary choice, adopting the maternal lineage of a third party as his paternal 
first name, and an acculturated paternal name in place of the mother’s. Yet, as Tapia 
himself appears to confess albeit more subtly (not just testimony and autobiography, 
then, but also a confession), perhaps the choice is not so arbitrary. Tapia and Quisbert 
are, after all, identifiably creole or mestizo names, whereas Qhispi and Mamani are 
unmistakably Aymara. Tapia writes: 
At nineteen years old the name Luciano Tapia Quisbert arises from the 
bottom of the iniquity and infamy of the Bolivian apartheid, in so far as 
my legitimate name of Lusiku Qhispi Mamani became buried in 
forgetting and shame (172).208 
 
 Although chosen, although based on a decision which could not have been 
overdetermined by the bureaucratic process itself, where no proof of identification was 
requested (Tapia confirms as such), Tapia’s chosen name is somehow a product of the 
iniquity and infamy of the Bolivian apartheid. And there is here, no doubt, a certain 
displacing of gender at stake, in which we find traces of femicide, of forced migrations, 
                                                
208 “a mis diecinueve años surge el nombre de Luciano Tapia Quisbert del fondo de la iniquidad y la 
infamia del apartheid boliviano, en tanto que mi nombre legítimo de Lusiku Qhispi Mamani queda 
soterrado en el olvido y la vergüenza.” 
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and of selective breeding, which should not be altogether removed from this history of 
Bolivian apartheid, although Tapia does not present these connections explicitly. It is 
curious that Tapia identifies his ‘legitimate’ name (the question of legitimacy, for what 
or for whom a name or a signature is more or less legitimate – all this is at stake here) 
precisely with a name which he was never in fact given – Lusiku Qhispi Mamani. We 
know that he was baptized only with the maternal name. Displacing the name of the 
mother to a place destined to oblivion in the following generations, it would seem that, 
for Tapia, his secret name can only gain legitimacy through the name of the father, or 
perhaps even the unity of the two names, in which a heteronormative displacement 
would attempt to exorcise the problem of the hijo natural. This name, this secret, 
bracketed name, included by way of exclusion or excluded by way of inclusion, signifies 
something attached to the memory of the self, as part of the construction of the self, of 
the ipse, part of the process of anamnesis as autobiography. Something which the self 
cannot let go of, but must nevertheless be lost to the self. It is only by its constant 
repetition or iteration in Tapia’s writing that this thing that is and is not the self 
continues to work on the self as self, as a constant work of mourning.  
 In those days I was like a thing hanging in the void. As we will see, by the end of 
this autobiography, this testimony, this confession, Tapia appears to tell us that he has 
found his feet, no longer hanging, no longer subject to the void. Yet perhaps this 
undecidable question of bracketing in/out already lays bare that the void is only kept at 
bay at a certain price, through a certain debt where the stakes and the interest are very 
high, and that the void always comes back to haunt us in the moment that we are certain 
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to have cast it away. By offering a response to the question of to whom this 
autobiography is addressed, on the one hand, and to the question of the self, signature, 
ipse, on the other, it may become possible to question in more detail the conditions of 
possibility of the construction of an Aymara people as part of emergent indigeneity in 
Bolivia in the last forty years.  
 Let us, for the moment, keep these questions open. To respond to them, to 
respond before them, one must, at least, turn the front cover and enter into the matter 
itself.  
 Structurally, Tapia’s autobiography is composed of two parts. The first makes up 
some three quarters of the entire publication, and is actually the first four of five 
sections, the part of the autobiography that was actually written by Tapia. This first part, 
this ‘old(er) testament’, if you like, adopts the structure of a bildungsroman. It is about 
Tapia’s own coming to consciousness, his eventual revelation of himself as Indian. The 
economy of this first part is complex. It is like a tapestry in which Tapia’s growth from 
boy to man to Indian weaves in and out of different contexts and cultures, where the 
division between Indian and acculturated society would be superimposed on the 
narrative retrospectively, in light of Tapia having ‘seen the light,’ that is, in light of his 
revelation in the hills of Alto Beni, which brings him to the realization that he identifies 
with the Indian race. We shall see how that identification takes place; it is not as simple 
as one might imagine. 
 The second part of the autobiography is actually the fifth and final section of the 
publication and the part that had been originally based on voice recordings of Tapia and 
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was later transcribed. It is thus somehow neither oral, nor written testimony, but contains 
traces of both. This ‘new(er) testament’ adopts a very different structure and aim, where 
Tapia seeks to glorify his position within the MITKA. This was important as it was 
above all the conflict between the personalities of Luciano Tapia and Constantino Lima 
that drove a fissure into the overall party unity in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Tapia 
takes every opportunity to blame this on Lima’s corrupted leadership and to defend his 
innocence against a number of attacks made against him (not only autobiography, 
testimony, and confession, then, but also apologia). This second part truly has the ability 
to fascinate in the strongest sense of the word: by giving testament to each of the party 
member’s individual roles, Tapia’s writing becomes the scene of a kind of ‘show trial’. 
And we should not be blind to the fact that every show trial is always and in every case 
about an attempt to consign the accused to death.209 For lack of space, I will limit myself 
only to commenting on the first of the two parts, and specifically on the question of the 
construction of the Aymara ‘we’ as it comes across in Tapia’s scene of revelation.  
 The first part of this autobiography, Tapia’s bildungsroman, is marked by a 
double narrative voice, revealing the traces of an omniscient narrator who is able to 
speak from the perspective of the past and the present simultaneously, and oscillate 
between the two at will. Thus, on the one hand, Tapia describes his childhood up until 
the moment of his revelation from the perspective of his younger self. I will recount 
                                                
209 The story does not end with Tapia’s autobiography. Constantino Lima, the accused, would write a 
counter-testimony to exorcize the effects of Tapia’s claims (see Lima, 1996), and Felipe Quispe would 
give his own version of the events in a short testimony published in 1999. According to Quispe, Tapia 
would be the real person upon whom the blame is placed for the eventual collapse of the MITKA, though 
he was also critical of many aspects of Lima’s leadership.  
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briefly here the events he describes in this part of the autobiography from this 
perspective. Growing up in a mining colony in Corocoro with his parents, and very 
regularly visiting his ayllu in Qallirpa which he remembers with great fondness, for 
economic reasons the family is forced to move to La Paz where Tapia’s process of 
acculturation begins. They live initially with the mother’s family, who are from La Paz, 
where he remembers with scorn his father’s rejection by the mother’s family, apparently 
for reasons of racial discrimination. The father eventually leaves, marking a period of 
‘present absence’ in which the specter of the father looms large in Tapia’s life. The 
father himself does not seem to take a great deal of interest in Tapia, who nevertheless 
continues to justify his father’s absence throughout this first section. When the Guerra 
del Chaco begins, this is intensified by the father’s being called into war. 
 During this time, the first of three important women in the life of Luciano Tapia 
dies: his little sister (‘hermanita’), presumably through malnutrition (Tapia constantly 
brings attention to the extremely poor background of his family). Unable to be sustained 
economically, as a young boy Tapia begins working as a muru yuqalla (servant boy) for 
a chola in La Paz who completely abuses his situation, beating him and refusing to pay 
his salary. However, while he is still offered lodging and food in her house and not 
wanting to be a burden, he decides not to mention anything to his family. It is at this 
time that his mother suddenly becomes ill and dies (second of three women to mark his 
life), leaving him without mother nor father, without direct ties of filiation, to fend for 
himself. His grandmother has little sympathy for him, but he is lucky enough to get to 
know his great aunt, who finds Tapia work in the Casa España. As Tapia moves in and 
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out of jobs, he begins to learn to read and write in Spanish, and his father returns (but 
never to live with him), often leaving for the ayllu. Eventually, Tapia goes with his 
father to the ayllu, but this experience is difficult and traumatic for him, first of all 
because, following a process of acculturation in La Paz where he had not been allowed 
in his work as muru yuqalla to speak Aymara, he was no longer able to communicate 
with the people of the ayllu (though apparently he could understand them). Secondly, 
because his father gravely mistreated him, often being impatient with him for not 
knowing how to work the land and beating him (a fact which Tapia, again, justifies).  
 Tapia’s formation continues when he finds work at the Chojlla mine, learning 
about the local mining culture including the curious presence of folkloric figures such as 
El Tío (the Uncle). He is eventually forced to go to the city again when he enlists for 
military service (as we saw above, it is here that he receives his citizenship and literally 
gives himself the name of Luciano Tapia Qhisbert). Returning to Qallirpa for a second 
time, he becomes tied up through his father in an arranged marriage with a woman from 
the ayllu (the third of three women to mark his life, it is already clear that she is 
condemned to die). Luciano begins, through his relationship with his wife, who manages 
the communication between their household and the other members of the ayllu, to 
‘return to his roots.’ This returning to his roots is, as we shall see, also the finding of a 
new family, or the re-finding of his ancestral family. 
 With Tapia being unable to provide for his family, they move to work at the 
Corocoro mine. Tapia shows that the working conditions are in many ways more 
difficult in Corocoro than at the Chojlla mine, and speaks about the miner’s ‘self-
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slavery,’ which ensues from a competitive male environment. The tragic death of a 
friend in the mines, however, makes Tapia conscious of this exploitation and he becomes 
involved in the nascent activities of syndicate organizations (the year is 1949). He 
becomes the general secretary of the union at Corocoro, as a result of which he loses his 
job and his salary. He is popular, it would appear, with his fellow miners, but suffers an 
extended period where he is taken in and out of prison, and depends on the political 
support acquired during his time as a syndicate representative to get himself out of 
trouble. On the last occasion where he is taken to prison for his syndicate activity, he is 
released after the 1952 National Revolution takes place. However, unable to go back to 
his old post which is now taken up exclusively by MNR sympathizers, he returns 
temporarily to his ayllu in Qallpiri.  
 In an attempt to relocate all of those workers that no longer have a place like 
Luciano Tapia, the government resorted to a tactic that would be used continuously 
throughout Bolivian history since 1952: the development of rural colonies. Tapia goes to 
Alto Beni to develop the land as part of a new colony. There are no unions or workers’ 
collectives in these colonies, but nevertheless the difficult working conditions bring the 
workers together, and Tapia very quickly adopts (according to his autobiography) a role 
of leadership. As the military dictatorships of the 1960s begin to take hold, repression 
becomes increasingly problematic and Tapia finds it difficult to be mobile. His wife, for 
reasons of health, stays behind in the ayllu to raise the children while Tapia is in Alto 
Beni. In an event which is represented as highly traumatic for Tapia, it is during this 
time that his wife dies of ill health, leaving the older children to look after the younger 
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ones while Tapia works the land and from time to time clandestinely makes his way to 
the ayllu with rice, which is what he cultivates in the colony. After a short period of 
relaxation of repression under the government of J.J. Torres, the Banzer administration 
takes power and the repression becomes so fierce that Tapia is forced to take permanent 
refuge among the tropical wilderness of the hills of Alto Beni. It is here where Tapia 
experiences his revelation, to which we will return in what follows.  
 As previously mentioned, throughout this account a second narrative voice 
appears intertwined with the first (i.e. that of the younger Tapia), which retrospectively 
provides meaning to his experiences by reading them through what we might call an 
‘Indianist’ lens, that is, from the perspective of the present, of the post-revelation Tapia. 
For example, when writing about his experience of working in La Paz while the Guerra 
del Chaco was taking place, Tapia writes the following:  
Before sacrificing ourselves unconditionally in service of foreign 
processes, before spilling our blood in defense of a racist oppressor state 
that has given us nothing and taken everything from us, before being 
rushed into another War and into the condition and situation of repete 
[from the Latin solve et repete, Tapia is referring here to the idea that in 
order to make a claim from the state one has to first give payment to it in 
the form of military service — P.B.]; first one should resolve the 
liberation of the Indian, in the just dimension of a millenarian people and 
real nation (86).210 
 
 This is repeated in his account of his time in military service, where he explains 
his experience in terms which are clearly inherited from Reinaga’s thought, such as “the 
so-called national army in actual fact is simply the principal police officer of the internal 
                                                
210 “antes de sacrificarnos incondicionalmente en servicio de procesos ajenos, antes de derramar nuestra 
sangre en defensa de un estado racista opresor que nada nos ha dado y todo nos ha quitado, antes de ser 
arreados a otra Guerra e la condición y situación de repetes; primero se deberá resolver la liberación del 
indio, en la justa dimensión de pueblo milenario y nación real.” 
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and external colonialism of this country” (165).211 His recuperation of cultural roots in 
the ayllu is laden with explanations concerning the essential differences between the 
political organization of the ‘two Bolivias,’ even if he himself does not use that word. He 
compares, for example, the democracy of the q’aracracia (a word which he also 
employs retrospectively) to that of the ayllu: “As that democracy of the Aymara ayllus 
realized itself in the framework of our own culture, naturally it gave the total 
manifestation of the values which shape and define our identity” (182).212 Or, in another 
passage, which appears almost as if it could have been written by the very hand of 
Fausto Reinaga: 
In a pitiful reaction, over time I was able to reverse my acculturation by 
becoming aware of my cultural identity. In an act of expiation I believe to 
have fulfilled, upon proclaiming historically the natural rights of my race 
and ancestral people of the Qullasuyu, donned with my Indian 
personality, which takes up the wiphala of Julián Tupac Katari and 
founds the thought of Zárate Willka with the postulates of the 
contemporary Indian movement that transcends the borders of the 
fictitious Bolivian state. Upon becoming aware of my identity, I 
understood that the cultural expressions of my ancestry, the personality of 
my people and its millenial history were the key for founding and 
sustaining a struggle for liberation. In this sense, one could say that my 
consciousness of cultural identity was undergoing a transformation into a 
revolutionary consciousness, as my reasoning of political-cultural 
reclaiming matured (188).213  
                                                
211 “el llamado ejército nacional en la realidad de los hechos, es simplemente el principal gendarme del 
colonialismo externo e interno de este país.” 
212 “Como aquella democracia de los ayllus aymaras se realizaba en el marco de nuestra propia cultura, 
naturalmente se daba la manifestación total de los valores que conforman y definen nuestra identidad” 
213 “En una penosa reacción a través del tiempo pude revertir mi aculturación en la toma de conciencia de 
mi identidad cultural. En un acto de expiación creo haber cumplido, al proclamar históricamente los 
derechos naturales de mi raza y de mi pueblo ancestral del Qullasuyu, revestido de mi personalidad india, 
que recoge la wiphala de Julián Tupac Katari y funde el pensamiento de Zárate Willka con los postulados 
del movimiento indio contemporáneo que trasciende las fronteras del ficticio Estado boliviano. Al hacer 
conciencia de mi identidad comprendí que las expresiones culturales de mi ancestro, la personalidad de mi 
pueblo y su historia milenaria eran la clave para fundamentar y sostener una lucha de liberación. En ese 
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 Finally, the typically Indianist trope of privileging readings of race over class 
overdetermines the biographical details of Tapia’s account retrospectively by 
interpreting Tapia’s syndical activism as a kind of error which Tapia could not yet see: 
he had not yet seen the light, not yet experienced the revelation. Upon writing about his 
decision to become involved in union activity following the death of his friend in the 
mines, he writes:  
In an attempt to know the history of my people, the causes of its slavery 
and the validity of its centuries-long struggle, I have had recourse to a 
cycle of many years trying to clarify my understanding thanks to the 
permanent motivation that the memory of the tragic death of my 
companion in the mines has caused me. So, I would look for an 
explanation only by virtue of my condition as a miner worker; I didn’t 
know anything about politics, economics nor social history. If at some 
time I would hear commentaries concerning politicians and personnel 
from the government it would seem to me as if it concerned alien beings, 
perhaps because nobody knew them or what they did. I could not inform 
myself of the basic problem of that reality, which was surely a result of 
the profound traumatization that the cruel oppression of which I was an 
object caused me (233).214 
 
 However, if there is indeed a double narrative at work in Tapia’s autobiography, 
this double narrative, by necessity, doubly doubles in on itself. And this is the case to the 
extent that the very structure of the text, its economy, is already determined by a process 
of writing in which meaning is produced in the movement between the two narrative 
                                                                                                                                           
sentido, podría decir que mi conciencia de identidad cultural se iba traduciendo en una conciencia 
revolucionaria, a medida que maduraba mi razonamiento de reivindicación político-cultural.” 
214 “En un esfuerzo por conocer la historia de mi pueblo, las causas de su esclavitud y la validez de su 
lucha de siglos, he recorrido un ciclo de muchos años tratando de esclarecer mi entendimiento gracias a la 
motivación permanente que me ha causado el recuerdo de la trágica muerte de mi compañero en la mina. 
Entonces, yo buscaba una explicación sólo en mi condición de trabajador minero; no sabía nada de 
política, economía ni historia social. Si alguna vez escuchaba comentarios sobre los políticos y personal de 
gobierno me parecía como si se tratara de seres extraterrestres, quizás porque no se los conocía ni se sabía 
lo que hacían. No podía entonces advertir el problema de fondo de aquella realidad, seguramente como 
resultado de una traumatización profunda que me causó la cruel opresión de que fui objeto.” 
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voices. It is the moment of writing itself that gives meaning to the past, whereby the two 
narrative voices collapse in on one another and become indistinguishable and 
undecidable. Indeed, this ‘moment’ (of writing) is not countable or calculable, it is not 
unproblematically given in the moment of the ‘present’: meaning is constantly deffered 
in the text, and hangs in the balance between two narrative voices that become 
impossible to define. The way that Tapia attempts to resolve this problem in his writing 
is by way of determining his own body, and the body of his writing, as the site of an 
authentic, pure Indian essence which can only be inscribed into the text of his life 
retrospectively by virtue of a revelation.  
 Tapia’s reinscribing of an Indian essence retrospectively on himself adopts a 
double dimension. On the one hand, his body becomes the literal site of that essence, a 
metaphor for and marker of his heritage. We can call this the internal dimension of his 
Indianness. He insists on his Indian roots, and his connection to the ayllu through his 
family ties. Indeed, Tapia seems to suggest that his revelation of his Indian heritage does 
not come from any place external to him: his body becomes the book itself of Indian 
history in the text. As he writes towards the end of his account of his second return to 
Qallirpa: “I started to understand that it wasn’t necessary to read any book or to hold on 
to the dogmas of my oppressor as guides to orient me because I was myself an open 
book, containing experiences and lived realities, irrefutable truths which overcame all 
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theoretical, alienating and colonizing fantasies” (188, my emphasis).215 Tapia is not just 
a book, then, but an open book, that is, easy to read and interpret, without complications, 
transparent. There are no phantasmatic traces on the page of the open book of his body 
that would be capable of hiding or distorting the truth. Here is this word that we saw so 
many times in the writings of Fausto Reinaga: truth. There is a truth, an irrefutable truth, 
Tapia appears to tell us, or to show us through telling his story, and that truth is inscribed 
onto my body, not as cipher or secret, but as an open book. That book contains realities, 
lived realities. Not just my reality, then, but my body as the site of community, my blood 
as communal blood. Tapia’s bibliography is like drinking from the Eucharistic cup, at 
least for those who belong to these lived realities. Through his body, and the body of his 
text, speak not only an Aymara but an Aymara people. Such, at least, is Tapia’s 
suggestion. Hablad por mis palabras y mi sangre, we hear him say from the heights of 
Alto Beni’s hills.216 
 The second dimension of this textual inscription of Indian essence is an explicitly 
nostalgic relation to the community of the ayllu, from which Tapia finds himself 
somehow exiled until the moment of his revelation (we can call this the external 
dimension). This exile largely takes place through a process of acculturation which 
makes him unable to re-integrate into ayllu life upon his return to Qallirpa some years 
                                                
215 “Fui comprendiendo que no tenía necesidad de leer ningún libro ni agarrar los dogmas del opresor 
como guías de orientación porque yo mismo era un libro abierto con un contenido de experiencias y 
realidades vivas, de verdades irrefutables que superaban toda fantasía teórica, alienante y colonizadora.” 
216 The citation, which translates into English as “Speak through my words and my blood,” is taken from 
Pablo Neruda’s poem “Las alturas de Macchu Picchu” (“The Heights of Macchu Picchu”), where Neruda 
creates the same textual effect by calling on the people to ‘return to their roots’ at the site of Macchu 
Picchu, where he, as poet, would be the spokesperson able to bring about such a prophesy.  
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later. His nostalgic relationship to the ayllu is based not only on cultural factors, 
however, but also on ties of blood: “I am a member and son of an Aymara ayllu” (17),217 
he writes. While the majority of his time as a child was spent in the mining colony of 
Corocoro, without doubt his strongest attachment is to the life on the ayllu, which is 
represented from the very beginning in an idealized and nostalgic way. Tapia writes: 
“One could say that in those times Indian children lived on the ground in a completely 
natural way” (30).218 Despite his being very young, Tapia claims to be able to describe 
the ayllu life precisely as it was at that time, a claim that comes in part from the notion 
that the ayllu is an unchanging, natural relationship to the earth. And thus, Tapia makes 
claims such as:  
As a result of what has been said here, one can understand that the ayllu 
was the democratic expression of its members, where there was no space 
for despotism, arbitrariness, state coups, and much less the servile and 
corrupt caciquismo [referring to local leaders or despots called caciques, 
who since colonial times had been the ‘middle-men’ between 
communities and the Spanish conquerors – P.B.] that since peasant 
syndicalism 1952 has introduced. (35)219 
 
 After undergoing a process of acculturation as a servant boy in La Paz, Tapia 
finds himself exiled from his community: he is no longer able to speak the language of 
its members. This is a shameful and painful fact for Tapia, who thus somehow also 
regards himself as being exiled from himself. Despite feeling “happiness, wonder and 
                                                
217 “soy miembro e hijo de un ayllu aymara.” 
218 “Se podría decir que en aquellos tiempos el niño indio vivía sobre el suelo de una manera 
completamente natural.” 
219 “Por lo expuesto se podrá comprender que el ayllu era la expresión democrática de sus miembros, 
donde no cabía el despotismo, la arbitrariedad, el golpe de Estado, y mucho menos el caciquismo servil y 
corrupto que ha introducido el sindicalismo campesino después de 1952.” 
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affection, like the son that returns to see his mother” (126)220 upon returning to Qallirpa, 
he describes in great detail his own distance from the community and the terrible effects 
of an acculturation which makes him neither a member of his ayllu nor an urban cholo-
mestizo. It is a rich description which is worth transcribing at length: 
In the time that I was outside of the community, without realizing it, I had 
suffered an acculturation to such an extent that I could not pronounce a 
single word of Aymara. Later it would be confirmed that I was not a very 
useful kid for country life: I didn’t know how to hold a plough and even 
less how to guide a yoke over the furrows; I was scared of the oxen at the 
moment of yoking, because the bigger livestock, especially the tricky 
animals, always suppose a risk when you handle them. Equally, I didn’t 
know how to adjust the ropes on the cargo animals, especially for the 
transportation of barley on llamas; I had to learn everything relative to the 
work and life in the country. I would prefer to pass unnoticed for the 
people of the community because of the shame I felt due to my blunders 
and almost zero pronunciation in Aymara and in the meetings and parties 
I kept myself semi-hidden.  
 
Upon remembering those vicissitudes of my infancy, I can now 
understand the tremendous damage that they had done to me in the city 
by imposing upon me a traumatizing acculturation that made me feel 
ashamed of my ancestry and of myself. How many years I would take to 
recuperate my expression and cultural values once my consciousness of 
cultural identity had been put to sleep. The recuperation of my 
consciousness was slow and pitiful, in which time I was a person without 
face for the traumatizing negation of my oppressors, on the one hand, and 
the shame of ridicule, on the other. For the community I inspired 
curiosity, perhaps due to the fact that their sons and daughters were just 
beginning to learn Spanish and I could only speak Spanish; acquiring in 
this sense a certain superiority even over older people who, in their status 
as ex-combatants, had returned to the community knowing some Spanish. 
(127)221 
                                                
220 “alegría, admiración y cariño como el hijo que vuelve a ver a su madre" 
221 “En el tiempo que estuve fuera de la comunidad, sin darme cuenta, había sufrido una aculturación a tal 
punto que no podría pronunciar una sola palabra de aymara. Más tarde comprobaría que era un muchacho 
poco útil para la vida de campo: no sabía agarrar un arado y menos guiar el paso de una yunta sobre los 
surcos; tenía miedo a los bueyes en el momento de enyugar, porque el ganado mayor, especialmente los 
animales mañosos, siempre supone un riesgo el manejarlos. Igualmente, no sabía hacer el ajuste de las 
sogas en los animales de carga, especialmente en el transporte de cebada en llamas; tuve que aprender todo 
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 This internal exile takes place through both language and work in this passage. It 
is striking that a central consideration in this experience of internal exile is that of 
visibility. Tapia’s exile is defined by an attempt to withdraw from the community, to 
make himself hidden from the community, going unnoticed or desapercibido, which 
would also mean to be beyond or below the threshold of perception. Moreover, his 
consciousness, through this experience of exile, had fallen asleep or had even been put to 
sleep (adormecida, the agent here is not clear, and while the suggestion appears to 
attribute the action to the mestizo oppressors, there is no reason why this should not 
indeed be an internal movement, ‘my brain switched itself off,’ or even an action that 
does not properly belong to any one agent). But adormecida can also mean to go to sleep 
or to be put to sleep in the same way that the expression can be used in English, that is, 
to anesthetize, to place in a state of numbness, of non-feeling. Once again, below the 
threshold of perception. If there is an Indian consciousness, then, the suggestion here is 
that it was numbed to Tapia’s perception, he could not feel or perceive it as such. It 
would seem that for the author, however, it is possible to recuperate this consciousness, 
                                                                                                                                           
lo relativo al trabajo y la vida del campo. Prefería pasar desapercibido para la gente de la comunidad a 
causa de la vergüenza que sentía por mis chamboneadas y casi nula pronunciación en aymara y en las 
reuniones y fiestas me mantenía medio oculto.  
 
Al recordar aquellas vicisitudes de mi infancia, ahora puedo comprender el tremendo daño que me habían 
hecho en la ciudad al imponerme una aculturación traumatizante que me hizo sentir vergüenza de mi 
ancestro y de mí mismo. Cuántos años iba a tardar en recuperar mi expresión y valores culturales una vez 
adormecida mi conciencia de identidad cultural. La recuperación de mi conciencia fue lenta y penosa, en 
cuyo tiempo fui una persona sin rostro por la negación traumatizante de los opresores, por una parte, y la 
vergüenza del ridículo por otra. Para la comunidad yo era un motivo de curiosidad, quizás por el hecho de 
que sus hijos apenas estaban aprendiendo el castellano y yo únicamente podía hablar en castellano; 
adquiriendo en ese sentido cierta superioridad aun sobre personas mayores que en su calidad de 
excombatientes habían vuelto a la comunidad sabiendo algo de castellano.” 
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return to feeling it again. The movement of revelation is then, for Tapia, a circular 
movement, a movement backwards as a movement forwards, a returning to the 
homeland from exile. Indeed, this could be a way to explain Tapia’s double dimension, 
where the returning to a homeland is at the same time the realization of his body as the 
open book of lived realities and irrefutable truths.  
 Yet it must be admitted upon a close reading of this passage that this 
consciousness is not entirely unfelt or unperceived by Tapia. There is a feeling that is 
expressed repeatedly here and throughout the work in respect to his Indian roots, and 
that feeling is shame. How to be ashamed of that which you do not feel, that which has 
been put to sleep? And why feel, therefore, that one must hide, one must, if you like, put 
oneself to sleep, that is, condemn oneself to death, or at least a certain kind of death, of 
death as the the experience of exile par excellence? We touch here upon a complex topic 
that would need further elaboration and for which there is not space here — being Indian 
as condemnation to death in Bolivia, and throughout Bolivian history. For now, what I 
would simply like to do is articulate this internal contradiction between a sense of what 
is not perceived and the feeling of shame, by which we must have recourse to the 
unconscious in order to shed some light on the matter. Is there an Indian subject of the 
unconscious? What is its structure of desire? Certainly, shame would form an important 
part of this structure. Shame, and perhaps the shame of being ashamed. This is ultimately 
what is at stake in this first part of Tapia’s autobiography. Retrospectively, he is able to 
read his shame, and be ashamed of his shame for his race, his ancestry. Shame of shame 
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as the call to reclaiming the Indian subject, as the possibility of inscribing an Indian 
essence into Tapia’s body, and the body of his text.  
 While recuperation continues to be an important motif in Tapia’s account, then, 
taking recourse in the idea of an originary Indian essence which is lost, from which one 
is exiled, which has been put to sleep, even put to death, but which can be revived from 
the dead, the author nevertheless portrays an impossible nostalgic desire for an 
experience of the ayllu forever lost to him. One such example is when he and his father 
go to a neighboring ayllu to join in the celebrations. Tapia finds himself, of course, 
marginalized for not knowing either the language or the customs or rituals behind the 
celebration. He nevertheless describes this scene, in which he watches his father 
participate with the other member of the ayllus, with great nostalgia:  
Upon remembering that time of my life, where I would also observe my 
father dancing side by side with our community, if it were possible I 
would desire to return to that moment to be one of the participants of that 
Aymara solemnity and pronounce Jallalla Qakinqur ayllu! [roughly, long 
live the Qakinqur ayllu – P.B.]” (128-9, my emphasis except for passage 
in Aymara).222  
 
 If it were possible. The nostalgia for the ayllu passes through a certain 
impossibility, the memory of a place that is also non-place, a u-topia, to which there is 
no return. It must be emphasized that this place of the non-place, the home to which 
there is no return, is marked fundamentally here by the relationship between the father 
and the son, and by that father which appears in the text as a present absence, that father 
                                                
222 “Al recordar aquel pasaje de mi vida, donde también observaba a mi padre bailar junto a nuestra 
comunidad, de ser posible desearía volver a aquel momento para ser uno de los partícipes de aquella 
solemnidad aymara y pronunciar ¡Jallalla Qakinqur ayllu!” 
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figure that abuses Tapia and his mother, but which Tapia constantly seeks to justify. This 
question of filiation returns in Tapia’s second return to Qallirpa, where this time he 
becomes more integrated with the community and ‘reverts his acculturation in a taking 
of consciousness of … cultural identity’, as he himself states (188, also quoted above). 
For Tapia, the feeling of belonging to the community is grounded in his adoption by the 
family of the ayllu, to which he is in some way ‘returning’. Here, the linguistic features 
of Aymara, which strongly associates familial relations with the members of the ayllu, is 
fundamental:  
In the most immediate [aspect] of my daily life nobody made me feel the 
racial and social scorn that had always weighed down on me in the midst 
of colonial creole society. On the contrary, the elders affectionately called 
me wawa [child or son, daughter], which was not merely out of courtesy 
but an expression of sincere esteem and respect. My contemporaries 
called me jilalo or little brother, and the younger people greeted me in 
familiar terms calling me “tío” [uncle], which made me feel like I was 
part of a big family. (179)223 
 
 This attachment to a home-coming in which Tapia is adopted as part of the 
family of the ayllu, then: is it not in some way inseparable from that impossible u-topia 
to which their is no return, from his traumatic cut from filial ties through the death of his 
mother and the present absence of his father? A substitution for that family from which 
Tapia was robbed all too early? Tapia’s revelation must therefore be framed by this 
impossible desire, by this desire to return to the law of the father and to the mother’s 
breast, that is, by the death drive itself. Tapia’s impossible return to the mother(land) 
                                                
223 “En lo más inmediato de mi diario vivir nadie me hacía sentir el desprecio racial y social que siempre 
me había abrumado en medio de la sociedad criolla colonial. Por el contrario, las personas mayores me 
decían wawa, que no era simple cortesía sino más bien una expresión de sincera estimación y respeto. Mis 
contemporáneos me decían jilalo o hermanito, y la gente menuda me saludaba en términos familiares 
llamándome “tío”, que me hacía sentir como miembro de una gran familia.” 
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adopts the structure or topography of desire and jouissance, where the ayllu itself, and 
all that would be associated with it, is Tapia’s petit objet a (here we can include, among 
other things, his father’s dancing, his mother, even his hermanita or little sister. This 
space would be, after all, and despite Tapia’s desire for the law of the father, a 
predominantly female space of desire, or a space of desire for the female, in the traces of 
a femicide which is repeatedly mourned).  
 This double dimension of Tapia’s Indian essence grounds the conditions which 
make his revelation comprehensible (and yet, as I have already tried to show above, it is 
only comprehensible as an undecidable oscillation between past and present, where the 
structure of revelation overdetermines Tapia’s destiny and essence as Indian from the 
very beginning, writing it onto his body as the site of ‘lived realities’ and ‘irrefutable 
truths’). I will allow myself to cite at length this passage of Tapia’s revelation, at the end 
of this first part of the autobiography, in order to analyze this passage in depth. Once 
again, it is important to pay close attention to the notion of visibility, of the repetition of 
the word ‘clearly’ and the appeal to the senses, but also to the notion of metaphor and 
artistic expression, and especially of his life as filmic production:  
All of these bitter memories [of repression and oppression] formed in me 
an untamable consciousness, for this reason I realized that I could not 
leave Alto Beni, that I had to be side by side with my companions and I 
had to continue the struggle to the extent of my possibilities. I reflected 
on how I had been treated overall, according to the labels of the day or 
according to how it was given circumstantially given the vocabulary of 
the government of the day. I asked myself, moved, why I had had the bad 
luck of being pursued by all these governments. And while finding 
myself in that reflection I seemed to feel a kind of illumination, as if 
suddenly my eyes had been opened, eyes that had been blindfolded, in 
order to see clearly something that I had not been able to understand until 
then: I wasn’t pursued because I was a counter-revolutionary, as the 
 263 
MNR qualified me, nor because I was a communist as Barrientos or 
Banzer called me, or for any other title that they could put on me. 
 
Clearly, I arrived at the understanding that if they pursued me in that way 
without my ever having done a political action, without maintaining a 
political connection with any group, it was because I was an Indian. That 
was for me a great revelation, something strange, which I myself was 
surprised by: how was it possible that I hadn’t been able to be aware of 
my reality, of my personal situation; the problem was in my race and my 
culture. So I made another revision of my life and clearly, like in a 
cinematographic screen, I could see reproduced all of the situations of my 
life in racial oppression, they had always treated me as an Indian left, 
right and center, in all circumstances. As an Indian I had no justice. I 
knew very well that mine was the side of truth, but nevertheless for me 
there was no justice because I was Indian. 
 
All those situations made me understand the problem clearly. Thus, there 
was born the great revelation, but I don’t have enough words to describe 
my surprise upon realizing that I had not been able to discover in so many 
years of my life something that was latent, that was in me. (325-326)224  
 
 Through this revelation, then, suddenly Tapia is able to see, ‘clearly,’ something 
that had always been within him (the internal dimension of his Indian essence is strong 
                                                
224 “Todos esos recuerdos amargos formaron en mí una conciencia indomable, por eso pensé que yo no 
podría salir del Alto Beni, que tenía que estar junto a mis compañeros y tenía que seguir luchando en la 
medida de mis posibilidades. Reflexioné cómo me habían tratado de todo, según las etiquetas de turno o 
de moda que se daban circunstancialmente según el vocablo de los gobiernos de turno. Me preguntaba 
conmovido por qué había tenido yo la mala suerte de ser perseguido por todos los gobiernos. Y estando en 
esa reflexión me pareció sentir como una especie de iluminación, como si de pronto se me abrieran los 
ojos que hubieran estado vendados para ver clara una cosa que yo no había podido comprender hasta 
entonces: a mí no me perseguían porque era contrarrevolucionario como el MNR me calificó; o porque era 
comunista como Barrientos y Banzer me llamaban o por cualquiera otro título que se me pudiera poner.  
 
Claramente llegué a comprender que si me perseguían de esa manera sin que yo nunca hubiera hecho una 
acción política, sin mantener conexión política con ningún grupo, era porque era indio. Eso fue para mí 
una gran revelación, algo extraño yo mismo me quedé sorprendido: cómo era posible que no hubiera 
podido darme cuenta de mi realidad, de mi situación personal; el problema estaba en mi raza y en mi 
cultura. Entonces hice otra revisión de mi vida y claramente, como en una pantalla cinematográfica, pude 
ver reproducida todas las situaciones de mi vida en la opresión racial, pues siempre me trataron de indio 
arriba, indio abajo en toda circunstancia. Como indio yo no tenía justicia. Sabía yo muy bien que de mi 
parte estaba la verdad, pero sin embargo para mí no había justicia porque era indio.  
 
Todas esas situaciones me hicieron comprender claramente el problema. Así pues, ahí nace la gran 
revelación, pero no tengo la suficiente palabra para describir mi sorpresa al no haber podido descubrir en 
tantos años de mi vida algo que estaba latente, que estaba en mí.” 
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here, but is complicated, as we shall see, by another dimension), that had been latent, 
that is, that which is not yet manifest, which is hidden, concealed, that which lies 
dormant, has been put to sleep. The aesthetic dimension of his revelation is strongly 
expressed, adopting an ocular dimension, where a blindfold has been removed. The 
question of understanding [comprender] is repeated several times in the passage, as is 
the word ‘clearly’ [claramente], meaning ‘obviously’ but also ‘lucidly’ in this case. Yet 
all is not quite as clear as it seems. There is an element of surprise which Tapia insists 
on, indicating something unanticipated or unexpected, even uncanny (strange, he writes) 
at the heart of this bildungsroman where Tapia’s fate is decided from its beginnings. 
Despite his insistence on understanding, there is still something which he cannot quite 
grasp, cannot quite comprehend: how did I not see it before? If it was always in me, 
latent, what blinded me from seeing it? This surprise disrupts the narrative, confusing the 
field of intelligibility that would make Tapia otherwise see things so clearly, like on a 
cinematographic screen or, perhaps, an autobiography. I seemed to feel a kind of 
illumination, he writes, the double recourses to perception (seem, feel) undermining one 
another in an undecidable way (did he feel, or did he only seem to feel?). What is clear is 
that Tapia nevertheless feels it is his right to lay claim to the truth — mine was the side 
of the truth. Yet this truth appears to be overdetermined already by the fact that such a 
truth, given by virtue of illumination, emerges on a field of perception that in the last 
instance remains undecidable, where something always lies beneath the threshold of 
perceptibility.  
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 Tapia’s question in this scene of revelation is: why have I been called to fighting 
for my fellow men? Who, or what, has called me into action, to or before what do I 
respond? The call comes from something which is located in alterity but is beyond 
solidarity. “What other explanation could there be?” Writes Tapia, “Out of human 
solidarity, sure, I could have been in solidarity, sympathized, helped [my fellow man], 
but not have put myself in a struggle to the point of exposing my own life, but this is not 
how it went” (325).225 Tapia is called to something, something which is for him worth 
more than life itself. This revelation therefore is also more than a personal revelation, it 
is a revelation that concerns something that transcends him and concerns many lives, 
both past, present and future. Yet this revelation remains caught in an aporetic structure 
in which this call to an alterity is undermined in the same instance by the presumption 
that everything is given internally, in and on his body as text, from its origins.  
 Perhaps the only solution to the aporetic structure of Tapia’s revelation is to 
dislocate the traditional, one could say the metaphysical or onto-theological, 
understanding of revelation onto another site. This would necessarily have to pass 
through a certain relationship to alterity and respond to a certain call. This understanding 
of revelation would not be a matter of finally bringing to light that which had already 
been planted or inseminated from its origins, allowing to mature or come to light that 
which was latent. The emphasis would rather be on dissemination, where what is 
revealed by writing, in this case autobiographical writing, is the instability of meaning, 
                                                
225 “¿Qué otra explicación puede haber? Por solidaridad humana, es cierto, podía haberme solidarizado, 
simpatizado, ayudado, pero no meterme en una lucha hasta exponer mi propia vida, pero no fue así.” 
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its deviance, the reflection-effect of signification which is given in writing, and the 
ability to relocate and dislocate meaning beyond specific contexts. This ability that 
makes it possible, for example, to re-signify the meaning of Bolivian history from the 
perspective of different lived experiences of that history.  
 This mode of thinking about revelation resists any idea of essence anterior to the 
production of signification itself in the writing machine, or of essence tout court, given 
that the writing machine only produces meaning within the constantly deferred relation 
of signifier to signified. So what is then revealed, if not essence? What is Tapia’s 
revelation?  
 Indian or Aymara subjectivity, if there is to be such a thing, must be considered 
as an effect of Tapia’s writing. The chain of effects both within and outside of the text 
produced by the inscription of an Aymara life is therefore able to lay claim to 
exemplarity, to speaking to lived realities and irrefutable truths, because his writing is 
iterable, that is, it is able to be employed beyond Tapia’s specific context, the 
particularity of an Aymara life to which nobody else can have access. However 
particular that universal may be, Tapia’s writing is universalizable among a certain 
people because its meaning is differed and deferred in the same instance, it is 
comprehensible outside of that particular context and speaks to a number of other lived 
realities. That is to say that Tapia’s writing also depends on its reading, on how its 
readers receive and interpret that writing. While there is no evidence to suggest that 
Tapia’s writing has produced effects of identification (also a kind of revelation, where 
the text is regarded as revealing the self to the self) in its readers, the logic is 
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nevertheless clearly the same as that of Reinaga’s texts, where we know this to have 
been the case. An affective identification is established with the reader who somehow 
understands this text about the life of another to be about their life, enabling the reader to 
re-read their lived experiences under this new lens in the same way that Tapia does in his 
autobiography.  
 Jakawisaxa. Our life, not ‘us but not you,’ but ‘you and I.’ The title is explained 
by a movement which disseminates Indian life, an Aymara life, among different 
contexts. The people in those contexts are nevertheless able, or at least this is the 
pretension of the work, to recognize themselves in this description of a life, this writing 
of a life, as if in a mirror where they are revealed to themselves for the first time (the 
reflection-effect of writing). Indeed, it is the reflection-effect itself which dislocates the 
traditional understanding of revelation here for one which privileges dissemination over 
insemination, and the constant deferral of meaning over the origin of essence.  
 We are now in a position to return to the question of the publication’s title and 
signature. The only academic study of Tapia’s autobiography is written by Josefa 
Salmón, which also forms a chapter in a book entitled Decir nosotros (Saying We). It is 
Salmón who is the first to observe this curious tension in the title and its signature, 
calling the autobiography a “double history” (36). For this author, the condition of 
possibility for an Aymara ‘we’ subject, speaking in both linguistic and cultural-political 
terms, is brought to light in Tapia’s autobiography. First of all, she indicates that the 
jiwasa form of the ‘us’ (the ‘you and I,’ inclusive of the addressee) breaks the unity of 
the ego, including in some way the other within the first person singular, by which “its 
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individuality is not that of a single subject, although this does not take away from the 
authenticity of his or her experience as an individual” (44).226 As Salmón indicates, 
however, the nayanaka (‘us but not you,’ the plural form of the first-person pronoun 
which is exclusive of the speaker being addressed) is implied in the jiwasa in this 
particular context, giving way to a double register. Because if the ‘you and I’ of the 
jiwasa of ‘our life’ — jakawi - sa - xa — is inclusive of the reader as a fellow Aymara, 
this inclusion can only be based on another kind of exclusion, that of the q’ara or non-
Indian Bolivian, reverting to an address which belongs to the nayanaka of ‘us but not 
you.’ Salmón explains: “This ‘us’ of Tapia’s text turns into the collective subject of 
Indianist discourse and here obtains the sense of exclusion of the nayanaka because upon 
saying ‘us’ it is clear that it is ‘us’ the Indians and not the q’aras” (45).227  
 For this author, then, Tapia’s autobiography is important because “it is not only 
an individual autobiography, but the voice that transmits the history of the entire Aymara 
people” (22),228 whose singular contribution to the Indianist perspective resides in the 
value of a mode of thought “which departs from lived experiences and not from purely 
intellectual postulates” (25).229 Yet, by reading Tapia’s writing and revelation not in 
terms of insemination but in terms of dissemination, whereby the iterability of writing 
becomes dislocated by virtue of its possibility of making sense outside of its immediate 
                                                
226 “su individualidad no es la de un sujeto único, aunque esto no le quita autenticidad a su experiencia 
como individuo.” 
227 “Este ‘nosotros’ del texto de Tapia se convierte en el sujeto colectivo del discurso indianista y aquí 
obtiene el sentido de exclusion del nayanaka porque al decir ‘nosotros’ se clarifica que es ‘nosotros’ los 
indios y no los q’aras.” 
228 “no es sólo una autobiografía individual, sino la voz que transmite la historia de todo el pueblo 
aymara.” 
229 “que parte de las vivencias y no de postula dos puramente intelectuales” 
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context, it becomes immediately difficult to delimit to whom these experiences belong, 
and who belongs to the Aymara people. The instability of these two forms of the 
Aymara ‘we’ is also the instability of the Aymara ‘decir nosotros’ or speaking in the 
name of the ‘we’: the jiwasa always already implies a nayanaka. And yet, while these 
two forms of the ‘we’ are a specific linguistic feature of Aymara, one should not 
consider that the parenthetical translation of this ‘we’ into Spanish by way of bracketing 
in/out in the title, as analyzed above, either adds or subtracts anything to or from this 
radical instability of meaning. It merely opens it up to other contexts, thereby giving it 
other types or possibilities of dissemination. What is important here is that the voice of 
Tapia’s authorship and authority is ultimately unable to control the effects of his own 
writing, which is always open to an ‘us’ beyond the Spanish nosotros, and even beyond 
the Aymara nayanaka or jiwasa(naka): the arrival of that other that one can never 
anticipate or expect prior to the encounter, that which Jacques Derrida calls the arrivant, 
and is the condition of possibility for all hospitality.230  
                                                
230 Jacques Derrida describes the advent of the arrivant in the following way in the Specters of Marx 
(1994), when speaking about the structure of a certain democratic or communist promise: “To this extent, 
the effectivity or actuality of the democratic promise, like that of the communist promise, will always keep 
within it, and it must do so, this absolutely undermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological 
relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated. Awaiting 
without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality without 
reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the arrivant from whom or 
from which one will not ask anything in return and who or which will not be asked to commit to the 
domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, 
culture in general, even humanity), just opening which renounces any right to property, any right in 
general, messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that cannot be awaited as such, or 
recognized in advance therefore, to the event as the foreigner itself, to her or to him for whom one must 
leave an empty space, always, in memory of the hope — and this is the very place of spectrality” (81-82). 
I cite the passage at length because it makes a powerful intervention into what is at stake for me in this 
analysis of Tapia’s work. If the Aymara ‘we’ takes its condition of possibility from a certain reflection-
effect, as a response to a feeling of injustice grounded in the experience of a colonial heritage which 
expands far beyond any strictly ethnic, class or gender boundaries, then it is this memory, both short and 
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 The publication’s signature also reveals something particular about the 
possibility of speaking in the name of an Aymara ‘we’ through its operation of 
bracketing in/out which Salmón does not address in her text. What is bracketed in/out in 
Tapia’s signature here are the traces of a life which is altogether lost to Tapia, and yet is 
both the driving force and possibility of his claim to collectivity. The parenthetical name 
(Lusiku Qhispi Mamani) is the name which ties Tapia to the u-topic ayllu of his infancy, 
to his father prior to the latter’s present absence, to his mother, and even, one might say, 
to the ayllu of his adulthood, his late wife and even his children, from whom he has also 
been severed. His parenthetical name is his attachment to all that he understands to be 
his Indian roots, which is nevertheless nothing other than an impossible desire or fantasy 
of returning to the mother’s womb, a home-coming in its most radical sense. Emergent 
indigeneity is not only a site of writing, operating as a revelation which privileges 
dissemination over insemination: it is also produced by a death drive which seeks in the 
post-political and post-historical u-topia of communal life a home-coming. Its political 
unconscious belongs to the grammar of a neurosis whose petit objet a is located at the 
sight of its origins and end (the ‘restoration’ of the Qullasuyu). It is, above all, a 
radically particularistic political grammar which nevertheless, and despite its textual 
attempts to keep at bay the instability between the nayanaka and the jiwasa(naka) 
                                                                                                                                           
long memories of oppression, of having no place (a utopia, which we will return to in what follows), [it is 
this memory] which must be constantly awaiting the unexpected arrival of a specter — not the specter of 
an Aymara ancestry tied to a process of ethnogenesis, but as that specter which is never recognized as 
such in advance of its advent or arrival. This specter would be in memory of a hope or a promise, which 
can be given no genetic coding. For more information on Jacques Derrida’s understanding of the arrivant, 
refer to Aporias (1993).  
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(another bracketing in/out), is never able to decir nosotros or ‘say we’ without that ‘us’ 
being radically undermined by its own iterability.  
 
III.6 Conclusions 
 By drawing on recent developments in Continental philosophy, on the one hand, 
and by providing a general historical account of the material and imaginary conditions 
by which the indigenous populations of Bolivia became integrated into public civil life 
in the latter half of the twentieth century, I have provided a theoretical framework by 
which it becomes possible to understand emergent indigeneity’s qualitative field of 
effectivity. I have argued that, following the work of Jacques Rancière, emergent 
indigeneity is a fiction which acts upon the political and cultural field of intelligibility 
specific to the Bolivian tradition, displacing the politics of mestizaje of the 1952 
national-popular imaginary and its political theology for a re-interpretation of that 
history from an ethnic, particularist viewpoint. This displacement cannot be separated 
from its material conditions of possibility which include a more general structural shift 
in political relations due to processes of globalization, whose communicational 
technologies have undoubtedly been fundamental to the emergence of new forms of 
indigeneity in Bolivia. Yet we have also seen that this discourse is highly malleable: in 
the 1990s, it became instrumentalized in many respects by the neoliberal hegemonic bloc 
which rhetorically adopted much of katarista-Indianist vocabulary in the name of a 
multiculturalism that ultimately did not radically challenge the relationship of the state to 
the indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, many activists and scholars continued to act upon 
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the field of emergent indigeneity in order to challenge the elite’s hold on power and 
reclaim a certain autonomy of indigenous populations over their own social conditions.  
 Luciano Tapia’s autobiography helps us to understand what it is in emergent 
indigeneity that ‘shows by way of telling,’ or what emergent indigeneity reveals. As has 
been analyzed above, the possibility of universalizing an ethnic or racial particularism in 
this case, or constructing an Aymara ‘we,’ is made on the basis that both Tapia’s body 
(as lived experience) and the body of his text is somehow iterable or able to be 
disseminated. The writing machine as the disseminator of Aymara life ultimately 
becomes the lettered space through which possible identifications are made on behalf of 
readers who are also writers, scholars and activists. Tapia also shows that emergent 
indigeneity is a work of mourning, oscillating between the desire to recuperate its 
idealized origins and the impossibility of that very recuperation. Where that possibility 
for recuperation is fetishized, as in Tapia’s text, mourning becomes melancholia and 
suspends the possibility of an affirmative action which is able to do any more than aspire 
to an irreparably lost fantasy. Yet, in activists such as Felipe Quispe where greater 
emphasis is placed on the possibility of breaking with the state’s sovereign claims over 
the political field of intelligibility (in this case as mestizaje, as the neutralization of the 
Indian question), this work of mourning can become affirmative and productive, 
allowing populations to reappropriate the means of social production and re-production 
against the state and its primitive accumulation of capital.  
 My analysis has also shed light on some of the specific ways that this aesthetic-
political process called emergent indigeneity cannot be removed from bodily affects and 
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the human psyche. It should be clear by now that emergent indigeneity works 
simultaneously on the field of intelligibility and of perceptibility, or perhaps it would be 
more accurate to say that it collapses the mark which distinguishes the two, working in 
the interstices of text and body, rationality and irrationality, non-feeling and the visceral. 
As has been mentioned above, emergent indigeneity should be considered in this sense 
to be not only a description concerning how the question of what it means to be 
indigenous in Bolivia has intervened in public and political life in the last forty years, 
but also a concept in the Deleuzian sense, whereby metaphysical dichotomies between 
perception and reason are broken apart by the concepts acting upon them. It must be 
insisted upon that if this word is able to operate as a concept in such a way, it is because 
the phenomenon of emergent indigeneity itself already breaks apart these binaries in its 
own effectivity, that is, in its historical articulation as it has been outlined here.  
 By the year 2000, the process that had brought indigeneity to the center of 
political consideration in Bolivia was irreversible. It would no longer be possible to 
neutralize the alternative social, economic and political structures that belonged to 
indigenous populations by means of a Bolivian apartheid, or by their neutralization in 
the politics of mestizaje or the economic doctrine of modernization. In fact, the 
neoliberal patrimonial state, whose restructuring of the political conditions of the 
country had in many ways provided the base conditions for the expansion of emergent 
indigeneity, was about to experience a deep crisis whereby it found itself unable to 
contain these movements that directly challenged its legitimacy and political 
sovereignty. The years of 2000-2005 saw the explosion of what would be called new 
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social movements, where an alliance of indigenous and popular, rural and urban sectors 
brought the traditional elites to their knees. In 2005, following the forced resignation of 
two presidents, Evo Morales was voted into power with an electoral majority as the first 
indigenous president of Bolivia. His party, the MAS, had risen out of a social movement 
in the Chapare and therefore was not a traditional political party, but a grassroots 
organization. Emergent indigeneity was to continue to play a decisive role in the 
reorganization of the state that was to follow Morales’s election, albeit a complex and 
contentious one. This will be the subject of the next chapter.  
 275 
CHAPTER IV                                                                                                       
BEYOND SUBALTERNITY? THE MORALES GOVERNMENT AND THE 
CHANGING DYNAMIC OF OFFICIAL STATE INDIGENEITY  
 
              It was easier to combat neoliberalism, because it is not hooded.  
Felipe Quispe231 
 
 
It’s not possible to change the neoliberal model overnight. 
Marianela Prada Tejada, Ministry of Economic and Public Finance232 
 
 
 The turn of the twenty-first century in Bolivia witnessed an explosion of social 
movements which directly challenged the sovereignty of the neoliberal state that had 
emerged since 1985 and put it into crisis. These so-called new social movements had a 
strong indigenous presence, and in many ways were influenced by, and took their power 
from, what we have been calling emergent indigeneity and its ability to bring the 
traditional field of politics into question. What this also meant, at the same time, was that 
the fate of emergent indigeneity became wrapped up in the general meaning of the 
national articulation of discontent that emerged during that historical moment. After a 
long five years of social unrest beginning in the year 2000, Evo Morales was voted into 
power in 2005, becoming the first indigenous president of Bolivia. His party, the MAS, 
won a majority of the votes. The victory was immediately celebrated as the triumph of 
indigenous and popular sectors who had managed to bring a rancid and corrupt regime 
                                                
231 “Era más fácil combatir al neoliberalismo, porque no está encapuchado” (Cúneo, 57) 
232 Jeffrey Webber 2014 
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down to its knees, and words such as socialism, decolonization and pachakuti began to 
circulate to describe the quality of the new government. Responding to the demands of 
the new social movements that brought it to power, the MAS government immediately 
began to nationalize key industries that were extracting important national resources and 
began the process for a constituent assembly. By popular vote, the new Constitution was 
approved in 2009, making Bolivia the “Plurinational” State of Bolivia, giving, in 
principle, unprecedented legal recognition to local indigenous forms of representation 
and ways of life. It arrived as both a victory and a new moment for emergent indigeneity 
in Bolivia. 
 However, the process has not been entirely smooth and uncontentious. Since its 
beginnings, and in a much more intense manner in recent years, the nature of the so-
called proceso de cambio (Process of Change) has been questioned by precisely those 
sectors which brought it about: new social movements, and in particular indigenous 
groups strongly tied to the tradition of emergent indigeneity. While the government 
defends its position through recourse to claims that the pressure of global capitalist flows 
makes it impossible to change the current state of affairs in the political economy in the 
desired way, opposition to the government accuses the MAS of staging a false 
revolution.  
 What is clear in all of this is that the meaning of emergent indigeneity becomes 
transformed and metamorphoses as it becomes appropriated by and shapes a new 
national articulation, first of all in the form of a general revolutionary epoch, and then in 
the form of a new state transformation. In other words, what it means to be indigenous, 
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and the place of the indigenous in the national Bolivian devenir, becomes entirely 
inseparable during these years from the meaning of the revolution and of the general 
reform of the Bolivian state. This is what I propose to study in this final chapter. In order 
to do so, I will first of all give a brief account of the events that took place between 2000 
to the present in Bolivia, in order to contextualize the meaning of Morales’s election to 
power and the contentious process that was the general social unrest of those years. In 
the second half of the chapter, I will analyze the work of Álvaro García Linera, current 
vice president and official ideologue of the State, and the numerous interpretations that 
have been made of his work, in order to demonstrate how emergent indigeneity becomes 
wrapped up in his discourse — and in the discourse of those who read him — in a way 
that becomes difficult to distinguish from the current state transformation.  
 
IV.1 Whose Revolution?  
 In the 2010 film También la lluvia, the filmmakers that are the movie’s 
protagonists find themselves caught up in a social conflict in Cochabamba. That social 
conflict presented to the viewer is based on the first appearance of a number of 
confrontations between the state and what would be called ‘new social movements’ in 
Bolivia. To recapitulate, in the movie, we see a number of social activists, including 
indigenous peasants responsible for irrigation, come together to protest the privatization 
of a water resource that they have collectively harnessed over the years. This depiction is 
based on the real events leading up to what became known as the Water Wars in 2000, 
when the government decided, without prior consultation of the local authorities that 
were already managing and distributing the water, to centralize the resource and put it in 
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the hands of a private company called Aguas del Tunari, which was partly owned by the 
U.S. multinational Bechtel. The government plans leaked by social activists revealed 
that this proposal included inflated water prices which would have been beyond the 
means of the local population to meet. The film’s name — Even the Rain — highlights 
the absurd heights that the neoliberal reforms of the MNR had reached in Bolivia. Even 
the most basic products of the earth were now not a common good to be enjoyed 
collectively, but a strategic resource to be appropriated and used by global capitalist 
companies.  
 It is no accident that all of the various manifestations of social conflict that 
emerged during the years 2000-2005 in Bolivia were fought over the question of the 
‘common.’ With the term common, I refer not to the distinction between public and 
private, which is ultimately a distinction provided and maintained by the state in its 
relation to civil society, but rather by that which is available to enjoy by the population 
beyond the state’s appropriative machinery: the air that we breathe, for example, and the 
exchange of ideas are things that still in the Western world, although subject to 
restrictions, can be considered as sites of the common. The fight for the common often 
implies something that was absolutely decisive during these years in Bolivia: the 
questioning of the state’s own authority to mandate how resources are used, the 
traditional vertical decision-making relationship that it entails, and its articulation of the 
social according to individual ‘interests.’ From the Water War, to the Coca War, the Gas 
War and the Aymara struggle over the use of their land, ultimately the question in the 
social conflict was the right of common use which the state wanted to lay claim to and 
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hold sovereign decision-making power over. It also implied, as a result, a question over 
the meaning of social emancipation and whether the horizon of the new social 
movements should indeed be the state, or perhaps an absolute rejection of the state 
should be the ultimate goal.  
 In any case, what was clear was that Bolivia was witnessing the most radical 
rejection of the neoliberal consensus —  a consensus which had brought about a 
disintegration of the 1952 state and of a somewhat unified civic discourse — that had 
been seen up until the present moment. This crisis of the neoliberal hegemonic bloc was 
also a crisis of the neoliberal state. Unlike previous state crises that had affected Bolivia, 
however, this state crisis had a double dimension. On the one hand, it represented the 
collapse of the legitimacy of the neoliberal state, of that state which had been effective 
since the 1985 New Economic Plan and was based upon a destructuring of a protectorate 
state apparatus and an opening up to global flows of capital. Such policies had brought 
about a general dispossession of the material conditions of production among popular 
and indigenous sectors and had produced a general discontent within the population. On 
the other hand, this state crisis was also a general crisis of the state form, of the suturing 
power of what Étienne Balibar calls fictive ethnicity on a global scale, where those same 
neoliberal policies had reduced the sovereignty of the state itself. ‘Glocal’ networks — 
that is, in the short-circuit between the local and the global, without passing necessarily 
through the state233 — now became central sites of social organization, some of which 
                                                
233 For a detailed description of the way in which I use the word ‘glocal’ in this context, refer to Marramao 
2012.  
 280 
went so far as to reject the state’s authority to intervene or to see the state as necessarily 
antagonistic to this circulation. As we have seen, this effect of the neoliberal reforms 
actually accelerated, ironically, the processes of emergent indigeneity that would be a 
central locus of anti-neoliberal contestation. As the crisis of the state and the new social 
movements that arose as a result of it were such a fundamental part of the rise of the 
MAS to power, I will provide here the most important features of those social 
movements, particularly in relation to transformations in what we have called emergent 
indigeneity.  
 The threat of the privatization of water in Cochabamba — that had been in the 
hands of communal forms of circulation and had been legitimately placed under the 
management of local organizations prior to the government decision of privatization — 
saw the formation of La Coordinadora de la Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coalition 
for the Defense of Water and Life), which more often referred to itself simply as La 
Coordinadora. Through this common site of exchange and decision-making, and largely 
thanks to the activism of the peasants who had been responsible for the irrigation around 
Cochabamba, a series of actions took place which sought, among other things, the 
reversal of government policies to privatize water. Oscar Olivera, who had already 
gained prestige locally as an activist who had denounced the government on a number of 
occasions for restricting labor union rights, quickly became an official spokesperson for 
La Coordinadora. Even after the initial success of the movements in Cochabamba in 
forcing the government to withdraw its plans to privatize the water following a popular 
movement in April 2000 — the first success for popular sectors against the onslaught of 
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the neoliberal consensus — La Coordinadora continued to be a place of heated 
discussion where people debated the topics that would be important to the general 
orientation of the new social movements in the following years: the question of local 
autonomy, that is, of the right to the natural resources of the land and over the question 
of a constituent assembly for the people to decide their own legal conditions for 
themselves. What is important about La Coordinadora’s social organization was that it 
was formed and took on life in a kind of ‘spontaneous’ manner, seeing the agglutination 
of many disparate social sectors that had previously not been in communication with one 
another and that would disband to continue their everyday lives following the various 
meetings called by its organization. Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar highlights the horizontality 
of relations within the group, which never became an officially recognized institution 
within the national legal framework, and thus also never received funds (2014, 22-27). 
Indeed, Gutiérrez Aguilar makes fun of the various protestations by people who, in their 
conversations with members of La Coordinadora — which also means ‘the female 
coordinator’ in Spanish — claimed that it was ‘high time’ that they met the Coordinator 
responsible for the organization (ibid.).  
 The lessons of La Coordinadora and the key demands that it put on the table 
were so important to the general orientation of the new social movements, in part, 
because the other two most important movements during this nascent stage of the 
popular uprising had participated alongside Oscar Olivera and La Coordinadora during 
the Water War and were influenced by its discourse. The first of these were the Aymara 
communities in the Department of La Paz, who around the same time began to protest 
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against the conditions that the MNR government wanted to impose over surveying the 
land in order to determine its capital value as part of the INRA agrarian reform described 
in the previous chapter. Felipe Quispe became the effective leader of this general 
movement. Having been released from prison for his participation in the Tupaj Katari 
Guerrilla Army in 1997, by 1999 he was elected Executive Secretary of the all-powerful 
peasant union CSUTCB, following a clash between the former hegemonic leadership of 
the Assembly for the People’s Sovereignty (ASP), Evo Morales and Alejo Véliz. Felipe 
Quispe quickly began to organize grassroots support for popular mobilization against the 
government, staging a series of roadblocks which reached their highest intensity in the 
months of September and October 2000. In June 2001, an Interunion Pact was signed 
making demands from the government, overseen by Felipe Quispe but essentially 
consisting of a collaboration among the CSUTCB, teachers’ unions from rural La Paz 
and Bolivia as a whole, among a number of other trade unions. Again, it is worth noting 
here the surprising number of different groups that it was possible to agglutinate in a 
temporary manner under the banner of anti-neoliberal protest. These demands included: 
a change to current laws; social security measures for citizens; lands and titles to be 
given to the CSUTCB to distribute immediately among peasants; and the replacement of 
statues of national figures such as Simón Bolivar with indigenous symbolic figures, to 
vary depending on the area of the country. As Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar has analyzed in 
great detail, how negotiations came to articulate these demands, and which demands 
would ultimately be given more importance, would remain watered down by the 
centralized union organizations that had to present these demands in their dependence 
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upon the state (Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2014, 69-72). Nevertheless, the Interunification Pact 
would continue to define the political terms of the social movements’ demands through 
to the showdown with the government in October 2003.  
 An important element of the social movements based in the Aymara communities 
was the question of Quechua and Aymara autonomy over and above the government, 
expressed in terms similar to those we have seen in Indianist and katarista discourse, 
that is, in a register clearly inherited from the tradition we are calling here emergent 
indigeneity. Such a fact should not be surprising given that Felipe Quispe, who has a 
long history of involvement with Indianism and katarismo, was the nominal head of 
these movements. He appeared in the press during these years on several occasions 
making cries to the on-coming civil war between the Indian nations of the Tawantinsuyu 
or Qullasuyu and the Bolivian nation. When asked in interviews if he wanted to divide 
Bolivia, he would simply reply that Bolivia is already divided (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014, 
43). The Manifiesto de Achacachi or Achacachi Manifesto, signed by the CSUTCB in 
2001, reflects the wider demands of the new social movements in a register which 
clearly pertains to the tradition of emergent indigeneity. An extract from the Manifesto 
suffices to show the similarities between it and other Indianist/katarista writings and 
speeches already presented as part of this study:  
We cannot keep saying nothing and bearing the weight of injustice and 
violence that governments have historically used against us since colonial 
times, during the republic, and now in the current neoliberal governments 
today. The moment has come to denounce and demand respect for our 
millennial rights for self-determination and autonomy for our ancestral 
nations.  
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Are we the other Bolivia? No. We are Qullasuyu. The Bolivian 
governments speak of “integrating us” into the Bolivian nation and 
civilization. What civilization and nation are they referring to? The 
Bolivian nation as such does not exist on its own. We are the ones who 
give Bolivia the cultural identity it presents to the world, knowing that 
“Bolivians” are nothing more than an imitation of Western cultures. (qtd 
in Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014, 53).  
 
 The description here of Bolivians is not far removed from how Fausto Reinaga, 
some thirty years earlier, described the cholo-mestizo nation. The idea of two Nations or 
civilizations under one territorial space is strongly expressed. What should perhaps be 
surprising is how easily such a particularist discourse managed to insert itself and 
become popularized in a general feeling of discontent that was essentially national in 
character. Such a fact speaks to the plasticity of the discourses belonging to emergent 
indigeneity and the way in which the development of this history of resistance was 
constantly transforming its coordinates. As Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar remarks, the type 
of resistance displayed by the Aymara during these years depended heavily on 
communal ways of life which were applied to the actual forms of resistance themselves 
(2014, 30-37). All of this adopted a strong and explicitly pro-indigenous character. 
Nevertheless, under the leadership of Felipe Quispe this nationalist discourse always 
regarded itself as being intimately connected to the popular struggles of those involved 
in the Water War, Coca War and Gas War.  
 The second social movement implicated in the Water War alongside La 
Coordinadora was the grassroots social movement of the coca-growing Chapare region. 
The area of the Chapare already had a long history of social conflict, following the so-
called ‘relocation’ of ex-miners to cultivate the region after the reforms of 1985 which 
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had closed down the national mines. It was during the same years of the Paz Estenssoro 
administration that the U.S.-backed and U.S.-funded War on Drugs turned the Chapare 
area into a militarized zone. Social mobilization in the region was therefore based 
around the issue of being able to maintain coca as a primary product to be cultivated. 
While it is true that the Chapare region was the area from which coca was produced for 
use in the cocaine industry and eventually imported into the United States (a percentage 
of the Chapare production of coca which it is difficult to estimate), the argument from 
the coca growers was that they could not be held responsible for the conditions of the 
market; given that they had been placed in a position of dependence on that market, they 
could not be prohibited from growing their only viable export. Another argument soon 
emerged, however, that was to become much more powerful on the national scene: it 
was argued that coca was sacred according to Andean cosmovisions, and that it was the 
right of the ancestral users of the land to be able to cultivate the product.  
 By the time of the new social movements, the Chapare had become a region 
under an almost permanent state of emergency, and regular conflict with the government 
army led to deaths and injuries among the local activists, as well as innocent bystanders. 
This came to a head when Evo Morales was expelled from parliament. Morales was, at 
this time, the head of the FECTC (Cochabamba Tropics Special Federation) — an 
important union in the Chapare which did not come under the coordination of the 
CSUTCB — as well as having been voted in as a deputy in parliament. The parliament 
expelled Evo Morales following a conflict in the Chapare region between coca growers 
and government forces in December 2001. By January and February 2002 the nation was 
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mobilizing over the issue of coca in reaction to Morales’s expulsion: the Coordinadora 
and, in a more complex way, the CSUTCB became involved and staged their own 
popular uprisings. The government was forced to make a number of concessions to the 
coca growers.  
 Interestingly, while the social mobilization that had been achieved up until this 
point would continue to be the driving force of change for the next three years in 
Bolivia, it is during this conflict and in the run up to the 2002 General Elections that the 
electoral platform was seen as an opportunity to consolidate the gains won thus far by 
the social movements. The political rivalry between Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales that 
had been evident already for a number of years came to a head, particularly in 2002 
when Quispe refused to cooperate with Morales in signing an agreement on the terms of 
the demands following the victory of the 2002 social unrest. Felipe Quispe put himself 
forward as the presidential candidate for an Indianist party of his creation, the MIP 
(Pachakuti Indigenous Movement). Meanwhile, Evo Morales put himself forward as 
president for a party based on the general structure of the FECTC but that would expand 
to the national scene: the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism). While Quispe’s party 
would remain a minority as a result of its radically particularist Aymara discourse, the 
party of Evo Morales found much more support among the general working classes. In 
an impressive campaign for the 2002 elections which was almost nationwide despite 
having no funding bodies (the transport and subsistence were provided by each 
individual group that Morales visited), candidates were put forward in many regions to 
represent the MAS. The electoral results went beyond what the party could have 
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possibly imagined, gaining 21% of the vote, only a small margin behind the winning 
party, the MNR, which received 22.5%. The MAS was so unprepared for such an 
achievement that they had to improvise strategies to nominate candidates to seats they 
had never expected to win. Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar sees in these electoral strategies the 
beginning of the disarticulation of movements that had seen themselves as appropriating 
power from the state in their own right, without need for state recognition (89). 
 The general articulation of these loosely-connected social movements came to a 
head in October of 2003 over the question of gas. The complexities of this particular 
juncture are too many to detail in this brief historical contextualization, but needless to 
say that the general uprising was composed of all the movements previously mentioned 
articulated together in a somewhat loose way over the question of the nationalization of 
hydrocarbons, or gas, leading to the 2003 conflict known as the Gas War. It began in 
response to a new government deal to export gas resources through Chile to the United 
States and Mexico. An ad-hoc organization was given the name of Coordinadora por la 
Defensa y la Recuperación del Gas (Coalition for the Defense and Recuperation of Gas), 
and once again Oscar Olivera became its most important spokesperson. This was 
supplemented by road blocks from Aymara communities in the Department of La Paz, 
originally protesting over the question of community justice, where the imprisonment of 
the leader of the Cota Cota community held responsible for vigilante killings had 
sparked widespread social protest. Meanwhile, the residents of El Alto, who had become 
increasingly politicized and made themselves relatively autonomous of traditional 
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municipal authorities, were simultaneously protesting against the so-called Maya Paya 
(“one two” in Aymara) tax.  
 From April until September 2003, the social movements were more or less 
always in mobilization, and the events of those months consisted of a constant to and 
fro-ing between the movements and the government over negotiations. However, it was 
the government conflict with the city of El Alto that brought the struggle to a head. On 
October 8, 2003, citizens of El Alto began an indefinite strike, and roadblocks, in a 
country with already poor infrastructure, were erected at all the main entries and exits. 
By this point, the social movements nationwide were clear on their aims, which had 
become known as the “October Agenda” — the nationalization of hydrocarbons, a 
constituent assembly (though not necessarily held by the state itself, but rather directly 
by the social movements) and the immediate resignation of President Sánchez de 
Lozada. The lack of food and fuel in La Paz was becoming an increasing problem, and 
on October 11, 2003 the government signed what became known as the death decree. It 
declared a national emergency asking the military forces to use any means necessary to 
pacify the population — granting, essentially, a license to kill which would go without 
reprimand. This is also how the military forces interpreted the decree, and a violent 
social conflict ensued.  
 By this time, even the middle classes of La Paz had accepted that there was a 
desperate need for a new governmental organization, that the current neoliberal system 
was unsustainable. The government cabinet fell apart. On October 17, 2003, President 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada left in a helicopter for Santa Cruz, and from there left the 
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country. Carlos Mesa, the vice president, took power in an enormously tense climate. 
With the new social movements watching and feeling the strength to remove him at 
anytime, the October Agenda had made the conditions of Mesa’s stay clear. They had 
achieved the ‘assassin’ president’s resignation. They now demanded the immediate 
nationalization of hydrocarbons and a constituent assembly.  
 The new Carlos Mesa government set about immediately to address the most 
urgent and pressing issue from the perspective of the social movements and which 
thereafter became the center of contention in the political process for the next two years: 
what to do with the hydrocarbons. In a political game between the government and the 
various forces of social unrest that had undermined its sovereignty, the terms of that 
reform were explicitly an attempt for the government to gain some political control over 
the situation, to control decision-making power in the long term over the use of key 
resources, and, ultimately, to contain the abilities of social movements to question key 
government policies. This was how the referendum in July 2004, which supposedly 
allowed the Bolivian people to “democratically” decide the future of Bolivian 
hydrocarbons, was interpreted by the movements themselves: as an act of bad faith. The 
traditional strongholds of opposition to the government — the Aymara communities 
under the CSUTCB, Oscar Olivera and the Coalition for the Defense and Recuperation 
of Gas, as well as various other groups in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz — all 
encouraged their grassroots bases in one way or another to reject the terms of the 
referendum. This general rejection of the terms of Carlos Mesa’s referendum was 
complicated, however, when the MAS came out in favor of participating in the 
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referendum, encouraging its supporters to answer ‘yes’ to a number of the questions and 
‘no’ to a number of others, in a strategic fashion. Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar interprets this 
as a key moment of breakdown within the social movements, which had always been at 
least in agreement on their opposition to accepting the government’s terms, even if their 
various modes of opposition to it had been expressed differently (2014, 139-140).  
 By March 2005 it was clear that the strategy of Carlos Mesa’s government to rein 
in social mobilization had not only failed, but it had served to deepen the institutional 
crisis, exemplified by Mesa’s own ‘threat’ to the nation to resign if it refused to 
cooperate with the government’s ‘reasonable’ provisions. The new social movements 
had been reactivated, on the one hand, by the new hydrocarbon law proposed by the 
government following the perceived success of the referendum, which was immediately 
interpreted by the social movements as a rearticulation of the same law passed by 
Sánchez de Lozada (and opposed by these same movements in 2003). On the other hand, 
an attempt by Mesa to come to a negotiation over the terms of a contract regarding 
public access to water in El Alto — the second Water War, if you will — with the 
company Aguas del Illimani was met with fierce resistance. The Aymara citizens of El 
Alto demanded that the contract be immediately terminated and that management of 
local water come back into the hands of the city’s residents.  
 A new development, in the meantime, was taking place in the eastern lowlands. 
The department of Santa Cruz, since the 1985 neoliberal reforms, had been an example 
of the greatest ‘success’ of the development of new transnational networks of capitalism 
in the country. Once dependent on subsidiaries from the western part of the country, a 
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new globalized business elite had emerged. This new elite was producing exports for the 
international market, and very quickly the ‘Camba’ nation, as its members called 
themselves, regarded themselves as more modern and civilized than the qullas, which is 
how they called the western Bolivians, associated by the Cambas with indigenous and 
popular backwardness. From 2004 onwards, the Santa Cruz elite began to push a 
political agenda  in which they demanded regional autonomy from La Paz, with the idea 
that their progressiveness was being held down by an ungovernable majority of the 
western part of the country which was backwards and unable to modernize. The 
campaign took on, unsurprisingly, right-wing and racist overtones. Yet the threat was 
very serious. The social movements from the western part of Bolivia began to put 
pressure on Mesa to take action as it became clear that the eastern political bloc was 
planning a coup d’état to put Hormando Vaca Díez in power. He was considered by the 
eastern elites to be a stronger leader capable of pacifying what had become known in the 
Department of Santa Cruz as ‘roadblock Bolivia,’ the unruly areas of social unrest.  
 Just as with the ‘Red October’ of 2003, detailing the full extent of the events is 
impossible here due to their complexity. Needless to say that, as the inevitability of 
Carlos Mesas’s resignation became clear, the various forces at work in society vying for 
different results from such an event began to mobilize and attempted to out-strategize 
one another. The person who had most immediately to gain from the resignation of 
Carlos Mesa was Hormando Vaca Díez, next in line to take up the presidency in that 
case. As stated above, this was ultimately the political strategy of the eastern lowland 
elites to take back control of the situation, and it was unacceptable to the new social 
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movements. Given that the whole of La Paz was effectively shut down by early June, as 
well as more than 60% of the country’s highways being blocked (Gutiérrez Aguilar, 
170), the government ministers were forced to fly to the country’s historical capital 
Sucre, where Mesa’s resignation could take place. Anticipating the possible outcome, 
indigenous popular movements mobilized from nearby to lay siege to Sucre, surrounding 
the historic Liberty House, where the resignation would take place. They demanded the 
“triple resignation” of those that would inherit the power of presidency, as a result of 
which, constitutionally, new General Elections would have to be called. The social 
mobilizations of those months were the most far-reaching that had been seen throughout 
this entire period. Without other options, the triple resignation was agreed to and 
elections were announced for December 18, 2005.  
 These were the elections that would see the rise of the MAS and of Evo Morales 
to presidency with a large majority of the votes. There are two observations that can be 
made regarding this last period of social unrest that are important for interpreting the 
present rise of the MAS. The first has to do with the actions of the social movements 
themselves, particularly of the Aymara communities of the Department of La Paz and 
citizens of El Alto, which had in many ways always shown themselves to be the most 
radical in terms of their demands from — and against — the government. During the 
most intense period of social mobilization in 2005, Gutiérrez Aguilar (2014) testifies to 
the fact that many of the proposals made by popular, spontaneous energies suggested the 
possibility of building popular assemblies and constituent assemblies from the ground up 
(169-171). In other words, at this stage, it is still not clear that the social unrest that had 
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been witnessed since the year 2000 saw the state apparatus in its current form as an 
acceptable platform for the transformation of society.  
 Meanwhile, it is necessary to take some time to comment upon the ambivalent 
attitude of the MAS during those years. Initially, the MAS were critics of the Mesa 
government only from the perspective that the current hydrocarbon law proposed by the 
administration did not go far enough in its proposal to place high taxes on the current 
corporations extracting natural resources from the earth for the purpose of redistributing 
wealth among the population. The problem for the MAS was, therefore, not so much the 
way in which extraction took place in Bolivia and in whose hands the decision-making 
for that extraction was placed, but rather with an equitable redistribution of the profits 
gained from that extraction once it had already taken place. After a march called by 
Morales and carried out by the MAS reached La Paz from Caracollo, however, on May 
23, Morales found himself faced with enormous numbers of Aymara protesters that had 
come down from La Paz, unwilling to accept what they regarded as a mediocre 
compromise. They demanded nationalization of the hydrocarbons. After being booed for 
a quarter of an hour, Morales was finally permitted to give a speech in which he 
accepted the call for nationalization, apparently abandoning the earlier compromise on a 
more equitable distribution of taxes from current corporations. The MAS’s program for 
nationalization of gas nevertheless remained ambiguous. 
 In all, it is clear that the symbolic act that was the election of Evo Morales to the 
presidency was extremely contentious. It incorporated a multitude of ideological 
horizons, complex and even contradictory demands. What is apparent is that, as 
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Gutiérrez Aguilar affirms: “More than anything else, the massive, overwhelming 
electoral triumph by Evo Morales and MAS in the elections on December 18, 2005, 
attested to the widespread decision to continue the social transformations that had begun 
years before” (2014, 174). And yet, as the author herself points out, the meaning of those 
transformations, and the possibility of their direction, were never things that had been 
completely worked out by the movement. The movement itself had always been united, 
in its difference, by the necessity for an opposition against a neoliberal elite and a series 
of policies that were regarded as imperialist, colonial and exploitative. Yet beyond that, 
the horizon internal to the groups’ own understanding of those transformations and of 
themselves remained undecided. If many who elected the MAS to power did so wanting 
the social transformations that had taken place during those years to continue, they also 
placed a large amount of that responsibility in the hands of the MAS, and not the masses 
who had been largely responsible for opening new horizons of social emancipation.  
 What of emergent indigeneity in all of this process? How to locate it, define its 
shape, make it out from the murky epistemic scene that is the colliding of numerous 
social actors and horizons of thought and practice from 2000-2005? It is clear enough 
that what we have been calling emergent indigeneity — this discourse on the place of 
indigeneity in contemporary political life and, consequently, the reconsideration of its 
place in the national historical narrative — was strongly associated with, and made itself 
felt in and through, these social movements in various different ways. It complemented 
and at times came into conflict with the other various modes of social expression, that 
went from having a national-popular horizon to radically particularist discourses, such as 
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the right-wing nationalism of the eastern lowlands. What can be said with certainty is 
that we witness, throughout these years, a radical transformation of what had been an 
Aymara-centric discourse which we have associated with emergent indigeneity in the 
previous chapters. Starting in 1985 with the growth of the coca growers movements in 
the Chapare, influenced by the neoliberal reforms of the 90s and the emergence of the 
lowland indigenous peoples on the political agenda, already by the year 2000 what it 
meant to ask about the place of indigeneity in modern political life was very different 
from that which had been expressed in the ’60s and ’70s by the Indianists and the 
kataristas. It is not that the Indianist and katarista versions of this discourse would lose 
their hegemonic place, and they still remained an important source of new 
manifestations of indigeneity. Nevertheless, the multiple interpretative lenses that 
accumulated around the meaning of indigeneity in Bolivian national history and the 
groups that this came to somehow ‘represent’ were clearly more diverse by 2000 than 
what they had been in the earlier years of their development. 
 From 2000 onwards, then, we see this already broad-based and more ambiguous 
discourse about indigeneity being absorbed by, and influencing, a number of anti-
neoliberal movements which adopted different personalities and rhythms in each locale. 
Ultimately, we can say that emergent indigeneity from that moment onwards could not 
be separated from the question of the meaning of the social movements and the direction 
in which they should go. When Felipe Quispe spoke about the return to the 
Tawantinsuyu but simultaneously included the agenda of other popular classes in his list 
of demands, immediately the question of Aymara nationalism, on one side, and of a 
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broader struggle for social emancipation, on the other, became wrapped up in the same 
discourse. Quispe himself always presented this apparent contradiction in a completely 
natural way, as does Morales still today when he speaks in both a national-popular and 
indigenous-popular register. The great malleability of emergent indigeneity, as a way of 
sensing and making sense of what it means to be indigenous in Bolivia, therefore 
became inseparable in these years from ways of sensing and making sense of what it 
meant to fight against the neoliberal consensus and the colonial state with Sánchez de 
Lozada at its head. It became inseparable from the question of what it meant to 
participate alongside one’s ‘brothers’ in the struggle, whether they be Aymara brothers 
(jilatanaka) or working class/peasant brothers of different ethnic backgrounds 
(hermanos). It became inseparable, ultimately, from how one was to read history from 
below, and thereby re-read one’s own place in that history, producing new collective 
senses of selfhood which were nevertheless indefinitely fluid and mobile.    
 It is impossible in these pages for me to provide a development of the direction 
of the MAS since the years of its election. This would require not one but several studies 
in its own right. One can refer to publications by James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer 
(2009) and Jeffrey Webber (Red October and From Rebellion to Reform) for critical 
reflections and detailed descriptions of the direction of the MAS government since 2006. 
What is clear, however, is that by continuing to push for a solution to the contemporary 
Bolivian crisis through electoral means, specifically within the platform of the state and 
in the form of a constituent assembly (we should be reminded here that, for the social 
movements from 2000-2005, the question of the constituent assembly did not necessarily 
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have to pass through the state apparatus), the MAS has somewhat normalized the 
process of these transformations under the assemblage of a new articulation of society 
without changing its general political and economic structure. The MAS government 
therefore represents a new ‘hegemonic bloc’ — this is referred to by García Linera 
explicitly as an indigenous-popular hegemony (Postero 2010, 31) — without, for all that, 
changing the traditional relationship of the state to society.  
 The effects of this solution have been somewhat mixed. The MAS continues to 
reproduce the traditional relationship of state to society, where decision-making power is 
monopolized by the state in vertical relationships with civil society. This has been most 
clearly the case with the development of natural resources in the MAS’s economic 
policy. Álvaro García Linera, shortly after the elections, officially declared that the 
economic strategy for the new government would be one that focuses on Andean-
Amazonian capitalism: a form of capitalist development that nevertheless was sensitive 
to the specificity of the Bolivian structure of the economy and therefore represented a 
kind of ‘compromise’ with indigenous forms of managing the economy and the 
continuation of developmentalism.234 Despite this apparent sensitivity to the economic 
organizational practices of indigenous communities, however, in reality, the economic 
focus of the Plurinational State of Bolivia continues to be an entirely capitalist, 
developmentalist one based on the extraction of natural resources from the earth. This 
has, in turn, produced a need for a somewhat technocratic government which allows for 
                                                
234 Refer to the news article published in Le monde diplomatique: García Linera, “El capitalismo andino-
amazónico” (January 2006).  
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less representation among traditional indigenous sectors than perhaps might be 
expected.235 While the MAS had promised to nationalize the gas resources — the 
question that had been the center of social mobilization since 2003 — in reality their 
compromise was closer to the original proposal announced before Morales was forced 
strategically to support the policy of nationalization when faced with the radical 
demands of his grassroots base in 2005. In other words, what the MAS called 
nationalization was in reality a renegotiation of contracts with the companies that 
extracted hydrocarbons, and the creation of a new state company which nevertheless 
continues to operate like any other in its extraction of natural materials. While the high 
tax rates on these companies extracted by the state are currently being used to fund a 
number of very popular policies whose aim is the redistribution of social wealth, what 
ultimately remains true is that the principal economic organization of Bolivia, mediated 
by the state, is neoliberalism. Jeffrey Webber has called this MAS economic policy a 
‘reconstituted neoliberalism’ (Webber From Rebellion to Reform 2011) or, more 
recently, ‘compensatory neoliberalism’ (Webber 2014). Nevertheless, it must be stated 
that the MAS as a party does not adopt the same structure as traditional parties such as 
the MNR. It continues to be strongly associated with the grassroots movements that 
brought it to power. These social forces have maintained a position of power within the 
general framework of civil society, even if this appears to be increasingly coopted by the 
State as the MAS has consolidated its authority over the years.  
                                                
235 Raúl Zibechi cites García Linera on this point, in a quotation later taken up by José Rabasa (2010, 272-
273): “the existence of non-capitalist productive structures, of non-commercial sharing schemes, are (sic) 
an obstacle to the constitution of equal subjects with the ability to take the market as the rational 
foundation of their social behavior, including the political” (2010, 117).  
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 The question of the constituent assembly also clearly resembles this ambivalence 
in the position of the MAS. This is particularly so in terms of their approach to the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia. The democratic vote for the approval of the Constitution 
was a complex process, which the autonomy project of the eastern lowlands attempted 
from the beginning to boycott, and certain negotiations with the radical right were made 
during the course of its drafting. When it was finally passed, however, it was celebrated 
as a victory for the left and for the originary nations of Bolivia in particular. The second 
article of the Bolivian Constitution is widely cited in that respect, in which it is written:  
Given the precolonial existence of originary peasant nations and peoples 
and their ancestral domain over their territories, their free determination 
in the framework of the unity of the state is guaranteed, which consists of 
the right to autonomy, to self-government, to their culture, to the 
recognition of their institutions and the consolidation of their territorial 
entities, in agreement with this Constitution and the law. (Bolivian Const. 
art. 2)236  
 
 While the recognition of originary nations in the Constitution should be 
applauded, a conflict has nevertheless arisen over its meaning. The conflict here is not so 
much with the fact that this free determination must happen within the ‘framework of the 
unity of the state,’ which more than anything else was a strategy to out-maneuver the 
right-wing claim for autonomy from the state in the name of a profoundly more racist 
project. The conflict is, rather, what capacity this framework has to be able to recognize 
such autonomy, self-government, institutions, etc., when that framework remains 
primarily one of a traditional state form which mediates its relations as capitalist 
                                                
236 “Dada la existencia precolonial de las naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos y su dominio 
ancestral sobre sus territorios, se garantiza su libre determinación en el marco de la unidad del Estado, que 
consiste en su derecho a la autonomía, al autogobierno, a su cultura, al reconocimiento de sus instituciones 
y a la consolidación de sus entidades territoriales, conforme a esta Constitución y la ley.” 
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relations. For example, while, according to the eleventh article of the Constitution, many 
different types of democracy are officially recognized in Bolivia (“The Republic of 
Bolivia adopts for its government participatory, representative and communitarian 
democratic forms, with the equivalence of conditions between men and women” 
[Bolivian Const. art. 11 § I]),237 it is nevertheless unclear how participatory and 
communitarian forms of democracy may be considered equivalent to representational 
ones. That is to say, how direct participatory democracy may be able to orient the public 
or common use of natural resources extracted by state companies remains unclear. 
 The most explicit way that the government has provided for guaranteeing these 
rights under the new Constitution is the possibility to apply for official status as 
indigenous autonomies. However, once again, the exact status of this category is still 
being resolved in government negotiations. In a recent communication from the most 
important broadcasting station in Bolivia, Radio ERBOL, a discussion took place 
regarding the fact that out of the current eleven regions that had expressed interest in 
declaring their community an ‘indigenous autonomy’ under the MAS government, and 
that had filed a request with the government that was awaiting processing, no such 
indigenous autonomy had thus far been declared.238 In an interview with a representative 
of the Totora Marka community, the representative explained to the radio presenter: 
“What we have understood is that there is no political will to continue with this 
initiative” (“Balance de las Autonomías Indígenas en Bolivia,” Radio ERBOL February 
                                                
237 “La República de Bolivia adopta para su gobierno la forma democrática participativa, representativa y 
comunitaria, con equivalencia de condiciones entre hombres y mujeres.” 
238 Recording published on line by iVoox on 02/09/2015: http://www.ivoox.com/balance-autonomias-
indigenas-bolivia-febrero-audios-mp3_rf_4059127_1.html 
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2015).239 Whether this is true or not remains unclear. What is certain is that the outcome 
is still being negotiated and its current meaning cannot be determined.  
 Two events that took place between the years 2010-2011 exemplify the conflict 
which arose between the social movements and the MAS as a result of this ambivalence. 
The first of these was the so-called gasolinazo affair, where the government 
unexpectedly announced on December 26, 2010 that it was canceling subsidiaries on the 
costs of fuel, which would have resulted in an enormous 73% increase in the prices of 
gasoline, the largest in 30 years (this would have made gasoline cost more in Bolivia 
than in the United States).240 The decision was made abruptly at the level of state 
management, without prior consultation of the local population through their respective 
channels of political representation. The social sectors which had traditionally been the 
stronghold of support for the MAS — neighborhood councils in El Alto, miners in 
Potosí and the coca growers from Chapare — held massive protests and civil strikes 
which by December 30 had paralyzed most major cities in the nation, demonstrating to 
what extent the social mobilization of 2000-2005 still retained some of its former 
strength. National mobilizations by the COB and the indigenous union of ayllus 
CONAMAQ were planned for January 3, 2011. Faced with the disparity between the 
new government recomposition and the social movements that became clear in the 
conflict, the government’s reaction was once again ambivalent. Evo Morales made a 
public appearance on New Year’s Eve announcing that he would ‘command by 
                                                
239 “Hemos entendido que no hay voluntad política en continuar con ese proceso.” 
240 Refer to Achtenberg, “Gasolinazo Challenges Bolivia’s ‘Process of Change’”  
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obeying,’ adopting the well-known phrase from the Zapatistas’ Subcomandante Marcos, 
and while the policy was a necessary economic measure, he would suspend the decree 
until he could consult the local organizations on the best way to negotiate the change. On 
the one hand, this event indicates the open nature of the so-called Process of Change that 
is still being defined. On the other hand, a clear difference between what is understood 
by the decision-making capacities of the government over natural resources — precisely 
in this case gas, which had been the subject of such intense debate during the years 
leading to the rise of the MAS — appeared between the MAS and the social movements. 
As Emily Achtenberg wrote following the events:  
The gasolinazo has opened a new chapter in Bolivia’s “process of 
change.” The social movements historically aligned with MAS have 
shown renewed strength and independence, effectively renegotiating their 
relationship with the government. At the same time, the loyalty to 
Morales demonstrated by organized peasant groups—arguably those most 
negatively impacted by the gasolinazo—signifies a new cleavage in the 
popular alliance that brought him to power. (“Gasolinazo Challenges 
Bolivia’s ‘Process of Change’”) 
 
 The second event, which took place throughout 2011 and continues to be a point 
of contention within the current Morales administration, now in its third term, is the 
conflict over the planned construction of a highway to connect Cochabamba to the 
Departments of Beni. The highway had been part of government plans for many years 
already, and became possible in 2011 thanks to a loan from Brazil’s National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Yet the construction of the highway 
would have to pass through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory 
(TIPNIS), home to many indigenous peoples and a group of territories protected by the 
government according to current law. These populations were not consulted before the 
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announcement, where prior consultation remained a condition for intervention according 
to the new Constitution approved only two years previously (Svampa 2013). In reaction 
to the announcement of these plans in April, the indigenous organizations CIDOB and 
CONAMAQ planned a national march from Villa Tunari to La Paz. The march was part 
of a series of historical marches that had been celebrated as fundamentally important for 
the recognition of indigenous rights from the government, beginning with the March for 
Territory and Dignity in 1990. On September 25, 2011, as the march passed through 
Chaparina, the national police brutally repressed indigenous marchers. The nation 
reacted in uproar. Although Evo Morales and government ministers denied any prior 
knowledge of this supposedly spontaneous police insubordination, facts released at the 
time remained ambiguous, and the official investigation into the events still lags on 
without results.241 Once again, the government reaction was disingenuous. Despite 
Morales’s promise that “like it or not, in the current administration” (i.e. his second 
administration) the TIPNIS highway would begin construction, in October of that same 
year the government withdrew its initial plans. While there has been an official process 
of consultation with different representatives of the TIPNIS, in April 2013 Evo Morales 
announced that he would be putting the TIPNIS highway project on hold for three years 
to deal first of all with extreme poverty in the area (Achtenberg, “TIPNIS Road on Hold 
until Extreme Poverty Eliminated”).  
                                                
241 Emily Achtenberg: “Bolivia: Two Years After Chaparina, Still No Answers” (NACLA, 11/21/2013), 
Emily Achtenberg: “Bolivia: TIPNIS Road on Hold Until Extreme Poverty Eliminated” (NACLA, 
04/25/2013), Elisa Medrano: “García afirma que no sabía del operativo en Chaparina” (La razón, 
04/16/2013).  
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 The issues which were central to the conflicts between the years 2000-2005 
appear here, then, unresolved, despite a long process of constituent reform which has 
supposedly consolidated the changes sought for in the famous “October Agenda” of 
2003. The central question in the TIPNIS affair, as in the gasolinazo affair before it, is 
how rights, responsibilities and the capacity for making decisions and having direct 
control over the local resources of the land are distributed among the many and complex 
expressions of Bolivia’s ‘motley’ society. If the construction of a highway through the 
TIPNIS is a question of national interest, it nevertheless affects the way of life of a 
number of different communities which, partly through the process that has been lived in 
these last years, feel the right to prior consultation and to reject proposals that make use 
of their ancestral lands. This conflict remains in force in the current consultation process. 
In a consultation over the TIPNIS highway that took place in 2012, 58 of 69 
communities participated, of which only 3 rejected the proposal for the construction of 
the highway (Usi, “TIPNIS: más que un conflicto por una carretera”). Yet of those 
eleven communities that chose not to participate in the process, these were the 
communities most fiercely in opposition to government intervention in what they 
regarded as their territories, and it is reported that in some cases these communities 
prohibited the entry of government officials into their land (ibid.). The question is that of 
whether accepting a majority vote as the legitimate democratic election of the people for 
the construction of the TIPNIS highway would be consistent with a constitution that 
purports to respect all different forms of democratic decision-making at the local level. 
This problem is intensified by the fact that the TIPNIS as a historical region is caught 
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between a ‘pachamamista’242 versus ‘developmentalist’ vision, where this home to 
numerous originary territories is also the area that has been developed by the coca 
growers of the Chapare, who have a great deal to benefit in economic terms from the 
construction of the proposed highway.  
 It seems clear that these two conflicts form part of the double horizon of the 
current direction of the Process of Change. This has been given comment by previous 
supporters of the MAS such as Pablo Stefanoni and Maristella Svampa. Stefanoni wrote 
in 2011 that the current process of state transformation was caught up between two 
illusions that found themselves competing at the same time within the country. The first 
of these is ‘developmentalist,’ associated with the neo-extractivist policies of the MAS 
government, and the other is ‘communitarian’, associated with the indigenous influence 
upon the contemporary political configuration. Svampa noted two years prior to this that 
“the ideology of Evo Morales articulates a double dimension” (59) in which “we have 
the case of an intertwining between a communitarian project, still in process, conceived 
of as a project and a horizon, and of a national-popular path, as a means of conceiving 
and doing politics, with all of its regulating, centralist and verticalist dimensions” (2009, 
60). It is clear that the legacy of emergent indigeneity allies itself, immediately, with the 
so-called ‘communitarian’ illusion or dimension. However, one should be careful not to 
reduce the role that emergent indigeneity plays in the current political process — and 
simultaneously how it is defined and transformed by it — to a binary vision of that same 
                                                
242 This is used to refer to the Andean deity of the earth pachamama (something like ‘mother earth’), and 
is usually adopted as part of a discourse which claims that indigenous ways of life respect natural 
resources, unlike the developmentalism associated with capitalism and modernity.  
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process. As we have seen, emergent indigeneity also intervened during the years 2000-
2005 with a general nationalist vision of transformations for the country, even if this 
relation was conflictive and contentious.  
 The historical contextualization of the so-called Process of Change, seen in light 
of the social movements that carried it forward, demonstrates to what extent emergent 
indigeneity transformed and was transformed by the general social and political changes 
that took Bolivia by storm during these years. It presents some of the central problems in 
considering, in any systematic way, how we are to understand the place of the 
indigenous in contemporary Bolivia, and how the production of the meaning over this 
place, and its necessary relation to the history of the Bolivian nation, was carried out. 
What is clear is that any entirely systematic, scientific, calculative way of measuring 
these subjective processes caught among various different horizons and senses of 
community and belonging is impossible. And yet, it is possible to analyze the various 
intensities and transformations of this discourse in and through the debates that took 
place during these years over the general direction of the political process. Ultimately, 
the question over how to understand the current historical conjuncture and how to 
respond to it became the arena in which emergent indigeneity defined (and continues to 
define) itself and its positions with respect to historical developments as they occurred 
(and are still occurring). I suggest, therefore, that an analysis of these debates with a 
specific view to the question of indigeneity can help us to understand the transformations 
that took place in these years over the question of what it meant to be indigenous in 
Bolivian society. These debates cannot escape, in one way or another, the work of 
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current Vice President Álvaro García Linera. I therefore take his work, as well as the 
numerous interpretations that have been made of that work, Indianist or otherwise, as the 
focus of my analysis. By focusing on the discourse of Álvaro Garcìa Linera in particular, 
I do not propose that the current vice president of Bolivia in any way have the final word 
on the status of emergent indigeneity today. Rather, my insistence on studying this 
author as a means to understanding the actuality of emergent indigeneity has to do with 
the fact that the latter comes in some way to represent the official discourse of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia. In other words, and as I will show in what follows, the 
work of this author is inescapable for a proper discussion of the contemporary contours 
of emergent indigeneity insofar as the current expressions of this indigeneity now 
necessarily take part in a dialogue in which the state is a central consideration. This state 
configuration (and, with it, the actuality of emergent indigeneity as articulated through 
the state, though not necessarily as part of it) cannot be properly understood, therefore, 
without a proper analysis of the work of this author.  
 
IV.2 Álvaro García Linera and the Question of What’s Left 
 The current political reconfiguration of Bolivia, called the Process of Change, is 
arguably the most important development of emergent indigeneity in Bolivia since 
Fausto Reinaga and the Indianist-katarista movements of the 1960s and ’70s in terms of 
the extent of its transformative power. As outlined in the previous chapter, we 
understood emergent indigeneity as a fiction, as a ‘set of relations between sense and 
sense,’ in the way that it was defined by Jacques Rancière. It became a ‘way of making 
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sense of the world.’ It is not just any fiction, or way of making sense of the world, 
however, but one that brought the figure of indigeneity as a political force into the public 
sphere on its own terms. It is a political positioning from a certain place of enunciation 
— the historical place of colonized peoples of the continent. If this is the case, however, 
then it must be admitted that a series of changes since the late 1980s had managed to 
displace the largely Aymara-centric vision of indigeneity that had prevailed throughout 
the ’60s, ’70s and ’80s in Bolivia. A combination of the popular resistance to the War on 
Drugs in the Chapare, the neoliberal reforms of the ’90s and the almost simultaneous 
emergence of political demands for autonomy from lowland indigenous peoples and, 
finally, an explosion of social movements whose collaboration crossed easily identifiable 
cultural, racial and socio-economic distinctions, came together in the early years of the 
twenty-first century to articulate a new political vision for the country. What it meant to 
be indigenous in the historical narrative of Bolivia, the place of indigeneity in this new 
order and buzzwords such as decolonization and the ‘good life’ (suma qamaña in 
Aymara) were now mediated through this generalized, national process for change. 
Where their meaning was disputed, which has been a constant characteristic of emergent 
indigeneity, it was always contextualized within those debates.  
 Just as had been the case for emergent indigeneity in the work of Fausto Reinaga, 
but also in the work of anthropologists and social linguists, of other kataristas and 
Indianists, this fiction or ‘set of relations between sense and sense’ takes place within a 
specific struggle over the interpretation of history. The Process of Change as a radical 
turn to the left has required a new reading of history from the standpoint of what it 
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means to reconstruct the state from a position that is left, revolutionary, decolonizing, 
emancipatory — the list of words, all of which imply a political but also an ethical 
problem, could go on. The question of ‘what’s left’ — what it means to carry out a left-
wing transformation of the state and society today, and what the new direction of a leftist 
politics should be — is ultimately what is at stake in any interpretation of the current 
historical processes that have taken hold in Bolivia.243 It is nowhere else clearer that the 
question of historical interpretation is not only about how one accounts for the events of 
history, but also about the reconstruction of a kind of grounds upon which that history 
can be interpreted in the first instance. 
 In the remainder of this chapter I propose provide an in-depth analysis of the 
readings of current vice president of Bolivia Álvaro García Linera. By the term ‘readings 
of Álvaro García Linera’ I refer both to the intellectual writings of the vice president 
(how he reads Bolivia’s history, Marxism and the current Bolivian process), and the 
readings that have been made of his work by other scholars interested in current events 
                                                
243 No where is this more clearly expressed than by John Holloway in his preface to the German edition of 
Raúl Zibechi’s Dispersing Power (republished in the English edition), where this author emphasizes that 
no longer can we take it for granted that the Western European countries should provide a political model 
for the global periphery; in fact, the opposite is now true. He writes: “Time has done a somersault. Bolivia 
used to be seen as a backward, underdeveloped country which could hope, if it was lucky, to attain the 
development of a country like Germany one day in the future. Perhaps even now there are some people 
who still think like that. But, as the disintegration of the capitalist world becomes more and more obvious, 
more and more frightening, the flow of time-hope-space is reversed. For more and more Europeans, Latin 
America has become the land of hope. And now, as we read of the movements in Bolivia, we say not 
‘poor people, have they any hope of catching up with us?’ but rather ‘how wonderful! Can we in Germany 
(or wherever) possibly hope to do something like that? Can we ever aspire to act like the people of 
Cochabamba or El Alto?’ On the answer to this simple question hangs the future of the world” (Holloway 
2010, xv). This view should not be understood merely as a hypothetical or theoretical gesture. One only 
has to take a look at the importance of the Bolivian case for the development of a renewed hegemony 
theory for the left in the intellectual writings of Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón of PODEMOS in Spain, 
for example, to see the real political effects of this reversed state of affairs (refer to Errejón 2011, 2012 
and Iglesias et al., 2014). 
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in Bolivia. I will argue that, by doing so, one can a) better understand the central 
problems that are at stake today in defining positions on the contemporary left (in 
Bolivia, but also elsewhere), and b) analyze how the discourse of emergent indigeneity 
comes to be transformed by the current process in such a way that all discussions over 
the meaning of indigeneity within the general horizon of the Bolivian nationalist 
narrative come to be mediated by the discussions over the general direction of the 
Bolivian Process of Change itself.  
 The importance of these readings for my analysis is in part explained by the 
special place that has been inscribed for Álvaro García Linera in the current Bolivian 
process. As a young scholar and activist, he was involved in the radical katarista-
Indianist groups Ofensiva Roja and the Tupaj Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK), where he 
took very seriously the question of indigenous emancipation and of the communal forms 
of the ayllu. At the turn of the century, he became involved in a collective intellectual 
endeavor with a number of other scholars called the Grupo Comuna (Commune Group), 
which quickly became famous as the principle interpreters of the political upheaval that 
took place during the years 2000-2005. Becoming ever more interested in the question of 
the reformation of the state, however, García Linera was invited by Evo Morales to stand 
as vice president for the 2005 elections and, since 2006, has been the most important 
ideologue of the state, both within Bolivia as well as internationally. Many of the current 
developments in Bolivia are read, from the international left, through García Linera’s 
own speeches and writings. What is more, the former members of the Grupo Comuna in 
which García Linera participated found themselves in increasing disagreement with the 
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new vice president, and in 2011 the group disbanded as a result of intellectual and 
political disagreements over the direction of the country. As we can see, therefore, the 
‘question of what’s left’ in Bolivia, given in this case by the ‘readings of García Linera' 
— both García Linera’s readings of the current conjuncture as well as the readings that 
are made of him as both intellectual and politician — are absolutely fundamental to 
understanding the central nodes of tension over what the current political process means 
in Bolivia, what direction it is taking, and what direction it should be taking, if different. 
My argument is that the new face of emergent indigeneity produced within this process 
can only be understood as a part of these more general debates. This is not, I must insist, 
to say that García Linera here determines the general shape of emergent indigeneity, 
which would be to support the fetishization of the current state transformation as a 
victory for emergent indigeneity, a perspective from which I aim precisely to provide a 
critical distance in my analysis. It is rather than he represents an inescapable author of 
contention insofar as his writings on the relationship between the state and indigeneity 
have formed an important node of current debates, and therefore have to be engaged 
with in a serious manner.  
 The question of ‘what’s left,’ however, is not only the question of how to map 
the left of the current historical and political coordinates of the contemporary 
conjuncture, of what it means to be on the left and what is the horizon for leftist action. 
It is also the question of ‘what remains.’ I present the question of ‘what remains’ in this 
ambiguous form that invokes a series of problems that current interpretations seek, in 
one way or another, to resolve. These questions include: what remains of the social 
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movements that brought about the political upheaval of these years in Bolivia, and from 
whose support the MAS rose to power, once the new state structure has been 
consolidated? What remains of the two horizons of indigenous memory once emergent 
indigeneity becomes entangled in and unravels itself in the folds of a national-popular 
narrative of the new ‘revolutionary’ order? What remains, finally, of the specters of 
history, which was ultimately what had been at stake in the process of emergent 
indigeneity since the writings of Fausto Reinaga? I do not claim to answer these 
questions, or even that these questions are answerable as such. They are rather a guiding 
thread which will direct us through the work of García Linera and his interpreters, those 
who try to account for these remains, sometimes without remainder, on a question which 
remains undecided. Even, perhaps, undecidable.  
 
IV.2.1 Readings of García Linera and of History 
 Contemporary studies of the work of García Linera and his role as ideologue of 
the new Bolivian state can be divided, in a simple manner, into those who would support 
the current government and those that feel, for one reason or another, that the current 
transformation of the state does not remain faithful in some way to the original impulse 
of the new social movements as they appeared at the turn of the century. Within this 
division, thereafter, there are a number of different approaches which structure the 
scholars’ approach to the current transformations and justify their respective positions.  
 First of all, among those that would support the MAS and the current direction of 
Bolivia’s government, or at least supported it during the earlier years (between 2006-
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2010, let us say, before the TIPNIS affair), are those who would argue that the MAS 
represents a historical turn by which we see the subaltern sectors of society become or be 
represented by the state. Therefore, they argue, however uneven that process maybe, it is 
necessary for intellectuals on the left to throw their support behind such changes in order 
to be in solidarity with the real left movements of the continent. In the North American 
academy, John Beverley is the person who most strongly has come out in favor of such a 
position. In his final chapter of Latinamericanism After 9/11 (2011), Beverley critiques 
the binary hegemony/subalternity that had become commonplace in the Latin American 
Subaltern Studies Group in which he had been an active member throughout the 1990s. 
What is essentially at stake here, though Beverley does not make this so clear, is the 
criticism of a certain membership within that group for whom subaltern studies 
represented a radical critique of leftist politics in its current form, whereby a general 
refusal of hegemony theory as understood via both Gramsci and Laclau had become 
necessary.244 However, Beverley asks:  
[What] happens when, as has been the case with some of the governments 
of the marea rosada in Latin America, subaltern or, to use the expression 
more in favor today, subaltern-popular movements originating well 
outside the parameters of the state and formal politics … have ‘become 
the state,’ to borrow Ernesto Laclau’s characterization, or have lent 
themselves to political projects seeking to occupy the state? (110) 
 
 It is clear that, for Beverley, the central question here is that subaltern studies, by 
setting up this absolute distinction between hegemony and subalternity, therefore ‘re-
                                                
244 This position is most clearly elucidated by Alberto Moreiras in The Exhaustion of Difference (2001), 
especially in the final chapter on the ‘double register,’ and by Gareth Williams in The Other Side of the 
Popular (2002).  
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subalternizes’ in each and every case the subaltern, by leaving them as a romanticized 
outside with which one can only be in solidarity but for whom there is no possible access 
to power. Setting aside the fact that Beverley’s understanding of the subaltern is here 
very different from that of those he would presume to critique (the so-called 
‘deconstructionists’), he is not wrong to criticize the absolute separation of social 
movements from the state as if the latter were an apparatus of capitalist domination with 
no room for transformation, and the former were entirely separate entities that could 
remain ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’ from such an apparatus — a point to which we will return 
later. Nevertheless, what one must question in Beverley’s account is the idea that the 
subaltern — however we are to understand this ambivalent term — and the state, could 
together form a hegemonic bloc without any remainder, that is to say, without there in 
turn being a number of groups who are not represented by the new hegemonic formation. 
In other words, in Beverley’s account, it would be as if the election of Morales and the 
MAS was the culmination of a series of processes that had begun in 2000, where the 
state comes simply to ‘represent’ those social movements that had brought it into power. 
He would therefore critique, as pure negative work which re-subalternizes the subaltern, 
any claim that this new hegemonic bloc could never completely represent this 
subalternity. He calls this critique of a deconstructionist approach to politics a post-
subalternist position. We can see this most clearly in Beverley’s analysis of two citations 
that he juxtaposes, in order to critique this hegemony-subalternity binary, in favor of his 
post-subalternist approach. The first citation is from subalternist Gayatri Spivak, and the 
second from no other than Álvaro García Linera. I will cite both in their entirety to 
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contextualize Beverley’s argument. The citation from Spivak is taken from her 1993 
Outside in the Teaching Machine (78, quoted in Beverley 2001, 118): 
Especially in a critique of metropolitan culture, the event of political 
independence can be automatically assumed to stand between colony and 
decolonization as an unexamined good that operates a reversal. But the 
political goals of the new nation are supposedly determined by a 
regulative logic derived from the old colony, with its interests reversed: 
secularism, democracy, socialism, nationalist identity, and capitalist 
development. Whatever the face of this supposition, it must be admitted 
that there is always a space in the new nation that cannot share in the 
energy of this reversal. This space has no established agency of traffic 
with imperialism. Paradoxically, this space is also outside of organized 
labor, below the attempted reversals of capitalist logic. Conventionally, 
this space is described as the habitat of the subproletariat or the subaltern.   
 
 The quote from García Linera is taken from an essay entitled “State Crisis and 
Popular Power,” which was published in translation in 2006 in New Left Review, in other 
words, immediately following the election of Morales and García Linera to government 
(page 75, quoted in Beverley 2001, 119): 
The important thing to note about these popular groupings, hitherto 
excluded from decision making [García Linera is referring to indigenous 
communities, retirees, coca-growing peasants, unemployed miners or 
relocalizados, among other new social movements in Bolivia], is that the 
demands they raise immediately seek to modify economic relations. Thus 
their recognition as a collective political force necessarily implies a 
radical transformation of the dominant state form, built on the 
marginalization and atomization of the urban and rural working classes. 
Moreover — and this is a crucial aspect of the current reconfiguration — 
the leaderships of these new forces are predominantly indigenous, and 
uphold a specific cultural and political project. In contrast to the period 
that opened with the 1930s when the social movements were articulated 
around a labour unionism that held to the ideal of mestizaje — or racial-
cultural mixing — and as the result of an economic modernization carried 
out by business elites, today the social movements with the greatest 
power to interrogate the political order have an indigenous social base, 
and spring from agrarian zones excluded from or marginalized by the 
processes of economic modernization.  
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 Beverley’s assertion is that Spivak and García Linera are here talking about the 
‘same thing:’ namely, the subaltern. If this is the case, he argues, then while Spivak’s 
argument ultimately refuses a place for the subaltern within the new hegemonic order, 
García Linera’s claim is that the official recognition of traditional subaltern groups in 
Bolivia implies a consequential transformation of the state in favor of the subaltern, that 
would somehow come, then, to ‘represent’ them. Yet the ambiguity of the word 
subaltern here comes to the fore. If García Linera is indeed speaking, in the citation 
above, of a number of subaltern groups which have found forms of articulation in the 
public arena and which today the new project of the ‘refoundation of the state’ attempts 
to account for in its political practice, it is difficult to ascertain whether these historically 
excluded groups are the ‘same thing’ as what Spivak means to say when she speaks of 
the subaltern. We know that, for Spivak, the subaltern “is necessarily the absolute limit 
of the place where history is narrativized into logic” (Spivak 1988, 16). In other words 
we can say that, for Spivak, the name ‘subaltern’ betrays itself; the subaltern is somehow 
unnameable, found only within the folds of political subjectivity and capitalist ontology, 
it is a trace, but not strictly a ‘thing.’ Spivak’s claim, alongside and against García 
Linera’s, still stands: whatever the face that is given by national independence, at least 
while there still remains a regulative society based on Western foundations — political 
theology and an onto-theological structuration of history — “there is always a space in 
the new nation that cannot share in the energy of this reversal” (qtd in Beverley, 118, as 
cited above). In other words, Spivak refuses to accept that the subaltern can simply 
‘become’ the state without there being some remainder, without there being a space of 
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exclusion with respect to the new state formation. What is presented as ‘the same thing’ 
here is actually two forms of conceptualizing subalternity. While they are not necessarily 
incompatible, Spivak challenges the position of those that would unequivocally support 
the MAS government such as Beverley on the basis of the State’s ‘representing’ the 
subaltern, by insisting on the fact that such representation can never be given in a whole, 
undivided way.  
 In other areas of the left that would support the MAS government and García 
Linera, and particularly from within the MAS government itself, a slightly different 
argument is presented. While accepting that the MAS government is effectively not 
carrying out a revolutionary change in its relationship to civil society, and particularly 
where capitalist relations are at stake, the acceptance of this fact is justified among these 
thinkers by making reference to a global state of affairs by which the actions of the 
government are restrained by flows of global capital and both national and international 
interests. In other words, the limits of the MAS’s transformations are justified by making 
claims to the limits of the present historical conditions in which the Bolivian state finds 
itself. There is no doubt about the fact that this is partly true, as is the case for any 
political regime in the world. The argument is, in that sense, a strong one. Jeffrey 
Webber has been the person who has most strongly exposed this general sentiment 
within the MAS in his contribution to Jacobin Magazine “Managing Bolivian 
Capitalism” (2014), where he quotes, among others, Manuel Canelas, who had just 
become a new member of the editorial board for the critical leftist magazine El 
desacuerdo. Manuel Canelas tells Webber in an interview that:  
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In spite of certain exaggerations in statement of the economy by the 
government, we are absolutely not living in any kind of postcapitalism, 
because given the realities we’ve inherited it would be impossible to try 
to do so … More than that … what we’re living through are very classical 
processes of modernization and economic development. (My emphasis)  
 
 While supporting Webber’s general claim of the current Bolivian model as a 
reconstituted or compensatory neoliberalist model (we will return to this shortly), what 
Webber’s interview with various figures in Bolivia who support the MAS reveals is that 
there is a certain idea of what is historically ‘possible’ in the present historical moment 
and thereby in which direction one must move. From this perspective, it is not simply 
about equating the rise of the MAS with the equation between subaltern sectors and the 
state. The picture is clearly more complex in Manuel Canela’s view. Nevertheless, when 
speaking of the historical possibilities of development on the left it must nevertheless be 
asked: according to whom, and on whose behalf? The question of hegemony returns to 
the scene through the back door, if you will. As I already claim above, a historical 
interpretation is not merely a question of how to interpret history but of what direction 
action on the left can and should take today. It is worth asking, as Jeffrey Webber does, 
what the possibilities for transforming the future of capitalism are if one maintains from 
the outset that there is no other possibility than working with the capitalist system as it 
currently stands.  
 A third perspective in general support of the MAS and its representatives such as 
García Linera would have it that the real transformations of the state that are currently 
being witnessed in Bolivia should be celebrated, against a ‘melancholic left’ which 
would look to an idealized imaginary past of left resistance which is irretrievable but 
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constantly mourned,245 or a ‘speculative left’ which would prefer to found projects of the 
left on abstract claims without historical substance.246 In this sense, the MAS would 
represent the real left horizon, where actual transformations were taking place and 
renewing the possibilities of leftist action in Bolivia, and elsewhere. This is the position 
advocated by Bruno Bosteels. For Bosteels, Bolivian Vice President García Linera’s 
position as foremost Bolivian Marxist theoretician and political figurehead provides an 
example which can help to respond to the problem of the left’s “melancholic attachment 
to marginality and failure” (225), making the left “a radical critique of the status quo in 
the name of a communist alternative” (ibid.). In other words, through an analysis of 
some of García Linera’s earlier texts in relation to his current position in the MAS 
government, Bosteels shows how García Linera works within the what he calls the 
‘actuality of the present,’ with what is at hand, to renew the possibility of a 
contemporary communist horizon which would be capable of offering a real challenge to 
the right wing and the capitalist order. This would be juxtaposed to a speculative left that 
would merely mourn the impossibility of its potential action in the present and criticize 
the world based on utopic ideas, where the relationship between theory and praxis has 
been irreparably torn. Among his many examples, Bosteels takes up García Linera’s 
notion of the communist horizon, and in particular the way in which this has been 
interpreted by Jodi Dean in her recent contribution to the series of ‘little red books’ 
                                                
245 This expression, taken from Walter Benjamin’s writings, has been employed by Wendy Brown: see 
Brown 2001. 
246 The notion of the speculative left has been adopted particularly by Bruno Bosteels, based on his close 
reading of the work of Alain Badiou. Bosteels appears to identify this concept with a number of theoretical 
positions from within the field of Latin American Studies. Refer to Bosteels 2005.  
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published by Verso, of which Bosteels’s own The Actuality of Communism forms a 
part.247 I will quote the extract taken from an interview with García Linera published in 
Las vías de la emancipación (75, quoted in Bosteels 2011, 226-7):  
The general horizon of the era is communist. And this communism will 
have to be constructed on the basis of society’s self-organizing capacities, 
of processes for the generation and distribution of communitarian, self-
managing wealth. But at this moment it is clear that this is not an 
immediate horizon, which centers on the conquest of equality, the 
redistribution of wealth, the broadening of rights. Equality is fundamental 
because it breaks a chain of five centuries of structural inequality; that is 
the aim at the time, as far as social forces allow us to go — not because 
we prescribe it to be thus but because that is what we see. Rather, we 
enter the movement with our expecting and desiring eyes set upon the 
communist horizon. But we were serious and objective, in the social 
sense of the term, by signaling the limits of the movement. And this is 
where the fight came with various compañeros about what it was possible 
to do.  
 
 Drawing on Jodi Dean, Bosteels argues that this notion of the communist horizon 
should not be understood in the ‘vulgar’ sense of horizon as the movement from 
capitalism to socialism and eventually to communism, but rather as an untranscendable 
horizon of the present: “This and nothing else is what the invocation of the communist 
horizon is meant to produce or render actual once again,” writes Bosteels, “a complete 
shift in perspective, or a radical ideological turnabout, as a result of which capitalism no 
longer appears as the only game in town and we no longer have to be ashamed to set our 
expecting and desiring eyes here and now on a different organization of social 
relationships” (228). In other words, García Linera’s bringing the communist horizon 
into the sphere of the present would in some way change the coordinates of what is 
                                                
247 Refer to Jodi Dean’s The Communist Horizon, 2012.  
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presently possible, and even thinkable. However, as Jaime Rodríguez Matos notes in his 
essay “Nihilism and the Deconstruction of Time” (forthcoming), we are essentially 
dealing here with two different notions of horizon, where in the work of García Linera, 
the word clearly refers to something still yet to be constructed, not something that is 
present. “Horizon,” Rodríguez Matos writes, “entails a movement toward something that 
is to come, which will have to be constructed” (page 23 of manuscript). Furthermore, 
Bosteels does not appear to ask the question here over the meaning of communism in 
García Linera’s work, taking its signification as self-evident in that context. In other 
words, he does not ask how such a horizon of communism is projected by the author. 
These are questions to which we will return in a more serious and detailed fashion in the 
second half of the chapter. For now we shall simply state that these questions are not 
satisfactorily resolved in the analysis of Bosteels. Nevertheless, Bosteels is certainly 
right to argue for an articulation of new possibilities on the left that works within the 
general actuality (the horizon, one might say) of the present, and thereby transform that 
horizon from within. To this extent, his support of García Linera’s work and of the 
project of the MAS more generally remains to this day one of the more powerful and 
convincing intellectual arguments.  
 On the other hand, a number of people who have criticized García Linera as an 
intellectual and politician have done so on the basis of an absolute rejection of the state 
as a platform for revolutionary change in the contemporary conjuncture. In the North 
American academy, José Rabasa provides an example of this argument. In the final 
chapter of his book Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency and the 
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Specters of History (2010) entitled “Exception to the political,” he makes this argument 
by supporting the rejection of state authority by the APPO [Popular Assembly of the 
Peoples of Oaxaca] in Chiapas, and criticizing the position of García Linera in a speech 
he gave to the attendees of the 2007 Latin American Studies Association (LASA) in 
Montreal. His argument lies in a strong rejection of the necessity for choosing between 
either a constituent or a constituted power, which Rabasa identifies with what Walter 
Benjamin called mythical violence. Instead, for him, the social movements and in 
particular the Aymara ayllus, by resisting the state without putting in its place another 
structure of political domination, represent what Walter Benjamin called divine 
violence.248 Rabasa writes at the end of the chapter: “This chapter underscores the need 
to remain within the spirit of Benjamin’s revolutionary pure violence [i.e. divine 
violence for Rabasa — P.B.], which entails an exception to the political — the 
manifestation of rage in the conjunction of means and ends” (279).  
 It should come as no surprise, then, that the state as the law-preserving machine 
par excellence is rejected outright as a platform for mobility on the left for Rabasa. “In 
reflecting on the new political status quo of the Left,” he writes, “we ought to consider 
the state as both a repressive force and a protector of capital. It makes little sense to beg 
the question of a new kind of state (kind, benevolent, democratic) when the state cannot 
                                                
248 The difference that Walter Benjamin makes between mythical and divine violence in his essay “A 
Critique of Violence” is somewhat enigmatic and one should not take for granted its possible meanings 
and interpretations. One could refer to the very subtle criticism that Jacques Derrida makes of this 
distinction in his essay “The Force of Law” (published in Derrida 1992) or that Idelber Avelar makes of 
Jacques Derrida’s own critique in his The Letter of Violence (2004). It is safe to assume in this case that 
Rabasa understands mythical violence as constitutive and constituent law-making violence, whereas divine 
violence would be that violence which breaks with the law without putting anything in its place.  
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be conceived outside its role of protecting and administering capital, whether in the 
mode of safeguarding international finance or in the mode of a socialist administration of 
capital” (ibid., 251). There is no ‘good state,’ then, for Rabasa, given that the state is 
only a handmaiden to capital. The social movements such as APPO that he analyzes for 
the case of Chiapas, for example, work necessarily outside of the state in his view. “My 
observation on the diversity of the APPO calls for one caveat,” writes the author: 
“multitudes that turn, to borrow Hardt and Negri’s terms, from flesh into body, always 
carry in their constitution the force of multiple singularities that cannot be reduced to a 
state” (ibid., 256-57). Rabasa, now referring directly to the case of Bolivia and Ecuador 
and the new constitutional reforms, would pit social movements and the state as an 
absolute non-dialectical struggle for freedom against the state, in the case of social 
movements, or for hegemonic power, in the case of the state. He writes: 
It hardly makes a difference if the state in question is conceived as 
including a plurality of nations [reference to the cases of Bolivia and 
Ecuador are here clear — P.B], if one ends up with a plurality of forms of 
preserving the regime of law and system of property. If the state is an 
inevitable reality one faces today, revolutionary violence [i.e. that 
violence of new social movements in Bolivia from 2000-2005, associated 
by Rabasa with Benjamin’s divine violence — P.B.] would seek to 
dismantle the state — not to reform the state — to construct a new world 
in which the state would disappear. (ibid., 257) 
 
 Rabasa’s critique of García Linera consists of many points that converge around 
themes of the chapter that have been developed. The main foci of this critique lie in the 
idea that García Linera’s call for a “state which is not a state” is not feasible unless the 
state actually undoes the constitutional system of law upon which is it based. As the new 
Constitution of Bolivia was called upon by a constituent assembly — a tradition, he 
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reminds us, that comes from Western Enlightenment — it is necessarily the 
reformulation of a structure with a monopoly on violence in the hands of an elite, where 
there is no room for traditional Aymara forms of decision-making or of managing the 
economy. The other central focus for Rabasa is on the question of capitalism itself, 
where García Linera insists on the need to continue the capitalist operations of the state 
and justifies the need for a number of non-indigenous technocratic elites within the 
government accordingly. This, for Rabasa, is merely a sign that the state is doing what is 
has always done: normalizing power relations in favor of an elite, with which only the 
social movements may be capable of breaking through acts of ‘pure revolutionary 
violence.’ 
 A very similar view is taken by Uruguayan intellectual Raúl Zibechi in his study 
of Aymara social movements in El Alto in 2003 entitled Dispersing Power (2010). Yet 
while Zibechi’s argument adopts the ‘social movements against the state’ structure, it 
clarifies the precise nature of this relationship by drawing on an intellectual tradition 
different from the Negrian analysis of Rabasa. For unlike Rabasa, Zibechi accepts that 
social movements have an inevitable relationship to the state. In fact, for Zibechi, 
placing blame on the state for the contemporary problems of civil society would play to 
the fetishization of the state as ultimate guarantor of the social order. The author writes: 
“For those of us who struggle for emancipation, the central and critical challenges are 
not from above but from below. There is no point in blaming the governments or issuing 
calls of ‘betrayal.’ It is a daily task for all of us committed to creating a new world to 
care for the people’s power as the sacred fire of the movement.” (7) Nor does Zibechi in 
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any way idealize or glorify the social movements that have been so important for 
resisting the power of the neoliberal state in Bolivia. Zibechi dedicates a chapter of his 
analysis, for example, to the question of local community justice, showing how the 
transference of the communal justice system to the city of El Alto from the ayllu has 
produced a situation in which very often vigilantes will choose to execute a supposed 
thief without allowing the accused a fair defense, in fear that otherwise they will escape 
or that government authorities may otherwise intervene (91-100).  
 Using the communal organization of social movements in El Alto in 2003, 
Zibechi argues that the strength of the neighborhood organizations there, when faced 
with government repression, lies in their own lack of vertical power structures. This is 
what Zibechi calls ‘dispersing power.’ He draws here on the work of Pierre Clastres, 
who in his seminal work Society Against the State (2007), showed how a number of 
primitive societies were constantly able to resist the consolidation of vertical power 
structures. This was taken up by Deleuze and Guattari, who speak of dispersion 
machines, which would resist the consolidation of power in the hands of a single locus, 
and a unification machine, which would be, for example, the state, where political 
powers are gathered and centralized.249 It is not, therefore, that it is necessarily possible 
to think of politics outside of the state, but rather that the emancipatory model that the El 
Alto neighborhoods provide shows that, by putting into effect structures that do not 
unify but actually disperse power, the state can never appropriate the energy of those 
movements to its logic. “We must recall,” Zibechi reminds us, “that there are no 
                                                
249 Refer to Deleuze and Guattari: “Nomadology: The War Machine” (1986).  
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societies or social spaces without the state: when we speak of non-state powers we are 
referring to their capacity to disperse or prevent the state from crystallizing” (ibid., 66). 
 His criticism of García Linera, therefore, with whom he otherwise appears to 
have somewhat amicable intellectual relations at the time of writing the book (García 
Linera appears as mentioned in the acknowledgements), resides in the idea that García 
Linera would argue for a cohesive state structure requiring a certain modernization of the 
forms of power delegation within communities so that power can be redistributed 
rationally from a central locus (i.e. the state itself). This is combined, in Zibechi’s 
reading, with a supposedly non-violent economic integration of the modern economy 
with the communal and informal ones, explaining what García Linera calls “Andean-
Amazonian capitalism.” Zibechi, following his analysis of a number of interviews with 
García Linera where he analyzes the position of the vice president as described above, 
concludes: “This quasi-Marxist modernizing vision … seems to ignore the experience of 
the MNR since 1952 and especially the results obtained: the failure of the MNR to 
modernize or discipline the movement” (ibid., 117). This ‘failure’ is in fact, for Zibechi, 
the success of the movement’s own resistance to the state form, namely, its dispersing 
power that must not only be preserved but, preferably, emulated in other sectors of 
society.  
 Another bloc of critics of García Linera that argue against the state form as the 
possible site of a leftist transformation come from within the intellectual group of which 
García Linera himself formed a part and which collapsed in 2011 as a result of internal 
disputes over the direction of the country: the Grupo Comuna. Raúl Prada and Raquel 
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Gutiérrez Aguilar are the two former members who have most strongly argued that the 
social movements should be the emphasis of intellectual work on the left for the possible 
transformation of contemporary capitalist society. For Raúl Prada in his 2008 
publication Subversiones indígenas, the ayllu as a community form is the condition of 
possibility for the social mobilizations seen in Bolivia from 2000. What is important for 
the author is that, in the expression of these social movements, “communism becomes 
flesh” (17): the social movements are a corporal expression of dissidence which makes 
visible a certain being-in-common that in turn produces concepts, making its own 
philosophy. This, in short, would be the author’s reading of the social mobilizations 
from 2000-2005. The radicality of these social movements lies in the fact that they are 
necessarily anti-representational and therefore anti-statist in nature. This is true both for 
his definition of communism and of community, strongly connected for the author with 
the ayllu form and, after, to the new social movements. Of communism, he writes: 
“[Communism] is the construction in the present of the social mesh alternative to the 
state and to the social structures captured by the state and by capital” (16).250 The 
community of the ayllu, meanwhile, is defined as a society against the state, where the 
organizational return of the ayllu in the last instance would be the destruction of the state 
itself (44). Ultimately, what is at stake for this author is the conceptualization of the 
possibility of social movements which represent a ‘return’ to the community, which is 
                                                
250 “el comunismo es la construcción en el presente del entramado social alternativo al Estado y a las 
estructuras sociales capturadas por el Estado y por el capital.” 
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nevertheless not a restoration of the Tawantinsuyu. It is more like a certain co-habitation 
which is non-statal, and therefore resists forms of domination by state and capital.  
 In Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar’s 2010 Rhythms of the Pachakuti,251 the author 
undertakes a detailed analysis retrospectively on the new social movements that took 
Bolivia by storm from 2000-2005. What is clear is that, for Gutiérrez Aguilar, and 
looking back on the emancipatory potential of the social movements from the 
perspective of the present, the current state project of the MAS represents a great 
disappointment when compared to the significance of the social unrest of those years. 
This is based on the notion that the social movements represented a break away from the 
logic of the state’s distribution of powers, indicating the possibility of other ways of 
organizing the social. She writes in her introduction: “My starting point … is to clearly 
affirm that society does not need new and better proposals for synthetic reconfiguration 
to effect deep social transformation” (xxiv). In other words, society is able to effect 
those transformations without a prior synthesis. She identifies the articulation of the 
social from within universalist claims which would pretend to provide such a synthesis 
with the tradition of political philosophy, claiming that her own study is therefore 
something outside of and against that tradition. It would appear as though, for the author, 
her ex-companion García Linera would be placed under this tradition of political 
philosophy which she writes against. She identifies his work as a theory of social 
subordination which would try to identify their actors, placing them into a framework 
that makes the ‘subjects’ of such acts easily identifiable — in other words, of 
                                                
251 All references here will be made to the 2014 English translation, translated by Stacey Alba D. Skar.  
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subordinating such actors to a general framework of knowledge. She also criticizes his 
theory of the state, which we will analyze in more detail later, as being such an attempt 
to synthesize social actors under a cohesive and universal articulation.  
 Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar’s analysis is original in its care not to fetishize the 
distinction between state and society. She does not regard the rise of the MAS as a 
betrayal of the original energies of the movement, for example, but as an unfortunate 
missed opportunity to radicalize elements of social transformation that never found 
lasting forms. Ultimately, what interests the author are expressions of what she calls the 
community-popular, features of social unrest which challenge the state’s vertical 
relationship with society in its ability to organize social life and make decisions over the 
use of natural resources. This has, however, a strong relationship to the national-popular, 
she insists. Ultimately, her problem lies not with the state as an apparatus but rather with 
the fact that the consequences of the social movements’ rethinking of the relationship 
between the state and society, its new emancipatory potentials for social actors, were not 
consistently and thoroughly thought through, and that the state as a result was allowed to 
re-appropriate its traditional decision-making power over aspects of the social that could 
have been directly in the hands of other social forms with other means of distributing 
that power.  
 A third critical body of literature has focused on the disparity between the 
rhetoric of the MAS and of García Linera in particular, analyzing the differences 
between the government’s own appraisal of the current political process as the victory of 
the social movements and as a transition towards communism and/or decolonization, and 
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the empirical data on the ground of the actual political and economic configuration 
within the new plurinational state. Without doubt the most important and notable of 
these scholars has been Jeffrey Webber. This scholar has insisted on the distinction 
between a revolutionary epoch and a social revolution to describe the events in Bolivia 
since 2000. If after 1952 a revolution of the organization of society took place to such an 
extent as to merit the term social revolution, this has not been the case, Webber argues, 
for the current government of the MAS. Thus, while the social movements of 2000-2005 
indeed were an expression of a revolutionary epoch, the MAS government did not result 
in a social revolution. Furthermore, as cited above, Webber has described, in 2011, the 
political economy of the MAS administration as “reconstituted neoliberalism” and later, 
in 2014, as “compensatory neoliberalism.” Both refer, essentially, to the idea that the 
mode of production associated with neoliberalism has not been challenged as such in 
Bolivia. Instead, it is merely the use of the surplus value that is made on its products 
which has been re-oriented to redistribute differently among society, essentially leaving 
the premises it is based upon in place.  
 Webber is not the only scholar to adopt this form of analysis to produce a critical 
discourse on the current direction of the MAS government. James Petras and Henry 
Veltmeyer, in their study What’s Left in Latin America make an attempt to understand a 
number of current leftist regimes in Latin America, claiming that they can be best 
understood by “examining its most salient paradoxes, identifying the basic contrast 
between the proclaimed appearances and the empirical reality” (22). Like Webber, the 
authors identify a special case in Bolivia, where, “[n]otwithstanding the emergence and 
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subsequent development in Venezuela of a new social revolution, only in Bolivia did the 
‘new left’ emerge in the context of a revolutionary epoch and the possibility of a 
revolutionary assault on state power” (95). However, the authors observe a number of 
contradictory claims within the current state ideology when compared with 
developments on the ground, including the protection of private property under the guise 
of an Andean-Amazonian capitalism and an ethno-nationalism which nevertheless does 
not challenge the state’s policy-making power (115-116). Such studies have been 
extremely effective in demonstrating the gap between the government’s ideological 
position and how developments are really taking place in Bolivia. Nevertheless, we have 
seen that the ideology of the MAS is a complex structure composed of many different 
and conflicting interests, which makes any such notion of a simple ‘betrayal of values’ 
very difficult to maintain.  
 Finally, the most significant of these anti-statist positions for our purposes are 
those inherited from a properly Indianist and katarista legacy, positions which we can 
call neo-Indianist-katarista. A number of intellectuals in this group would develop 
proposals for a different kind of state synthesis which would be based on community 
forms, strongly associated with Aymara culture and with the legacy of a strongly 
Aymara-centric tradition of emergent indigeneity as it has been presented in the previous 
chapters. The Aymara intellectual Félix Patzi, for example, has argued for the general 
expansion of community-based forms of governance at the local level throughout society 
which would provide a kind of national structure (refer to Patzi 2004). Pablo Mamani 
Ramírez, a professor of El Alto’s public university Universidad Pública de El Alto 
 332 
(UPEA), has been one of the most vocal critics of the MAS government in recent 
years.252 In an essay published shortly after the election of Evo Morales and the MAS, 
Mamani Ramírez asks about whether in the first years of the new government we are not 
seeing the restoration of the old powers of what he calls the white-mestizo elite return, 
coopting the indigenous-popular impulse behind the change of government. He affirms 
that in the current Morales government, alongside “our indigenous president brother, 
Evo Morales,”253 “the hegemony of the old project has made itself visible, rejuvenated 
from the mestizo revolutionary nationalism (R-N) that now presents itself as a new 
national-popular” (“Evo Morales entre Revolución india o contra revolución india,” 
21).254 For this author, García Linera would be a particular proponent of this view even 
at this early stage of his work from within the Bolivian state, where he quotes the vice 
                                                
252 It is worth mentioning here, briefly, the importance of the UPEA in creating a space where it was 
possible to construct a different idea of university and education built on a deeper understanding of 
Aymara culture and heritage. The university itself was built, as Mamani Ramírez himself confirms (“Hacia 
un estado multicéntrico construido con technología indígena comunal,” 153-54), from the initiative of 
grassroots movements who demanded the right from the state to establish the university, using the grounds 
that had once belonged to a vocational school. Finally founded in 1999, after around a decade of demand 
for it, the facilities had to be entirely provided for by the community of El Alto itself. “I remember that in 
the first months,” recounts Mamani Ramírez in an interview, “the students brought chairs from home, 
adobe seats… little by little we went about reconstructing the area [Recuerdo que los primeros meses los 
estudiantes se traían sillas de casa, asientos de adobe … poco a poco fuimos reconstruyendo el local]” 
(ibid., 154). UPEA was thus an important example of what it meant for Aymaras, supported by their 
specific customs and practices, to appropriate new areas of development for themselves from and against 
the neoliberal state in power at the time. The author affirms in the same interview: “To succeed in 
establishing the university is part of a group of struggles for recuperating the public space, for making 
ourselves visible [Conseguir la universidad es parte de un conjunto de luchas para recuperar el espacio 
público, para visibilizarnos]” (ibid).  
253 “nuestro hermano presidente indígena, Evo Morales” 
254 “se ha hecho visible la hegemonía del viejo proyecto, muy remozado del nacionalismo revolucionario 
(N-R) mestizo que ahora la presentan como un nuevo nacional-popular”  
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president speaking about the integration and incorporation of indigenous peoples to that 
same state (ibid., 22).255  
 Yet the author does not reject completely the notion of a state, but rather suggests 
the possibility of a multi-centered state based on what he calls indigenous communal 
technology. In an interview, Mamani Ramírez elucidates: “The word state is very 
powerful, it directs us to many discussions, but I don’t share certain visions that say that 
the state and the indigenous cosmovision are antithetical” (“Hacia un estado 
multicéntrico construido con technología indígena comunal,” 155).256 Disagreeing with 
Subcomandante Marcos in that there is no need to take power (ibid., 157), and stating 
that the presence of Evo Morales in the current Bolivian state in some way “indianizes” 
the Republican tradition (ibid.), Mamani Rodríguez claims that “the form of social 
relation proper to the indigenous (the indigenous ‘state’) is multi-centered, of diverse 
territoriality” (ibid., 155, emphasis in the original).257 He uses the examples of the ayllu 
and the vertical archipelago by way of demonstration. What is clear is that, in these 
                                                
255 It is curious to note here the absolute distinction on racial grounds that Mamani Ramírez would make 
between the indigenous president brother Evo Morales and García Linera, who would appear to represent 
the national-popular mestizo project.“Undoubtedly [indudablemente],” writes Mamani Ramírez, Evo 
Morales’s presidency “is producing with his sole presence in the government-state a historical space-time 
which is very important and unimaginable for the indigenous/originary/popular/afro world [está 
produciendo con su sola presencia en el gobierno-Estado un espacio-tiempo histórico muy importante e 
inimaginable para el mundo indígena/originario/popular/afro]” (“Evo Morales entre Revolución india o 
contra revolución india,” 39). What are we to make therefore of the role of Evo Morales in government, 
and his relationship to a vice president with whom he collaborates daily and whom he chose, in 
conjunction with his party, to invite to that role? Is Morales allowing himself to be a puppet head of a 
white-mestizo governing elite? Mamani Ramírez’s distinction here can only be explained on a racial basis 
that would supposedly immunize Morales from the possible critique in which his own government is here 
implicated. It stands, therefore, as a privileging of racial categories that nevertheless has no grounds. 
256 “La palabra Estado es muy fuerte, nos lleva a muchas discusiones, pero yo no comparto ciertas visiones 
que dicen que el Estado y la cosmovisión indígena son antitéticas.”  
257 “la forma de relación social propia indígena (el ‘Estado’ indígena) es multicéntrico (sic), de 
territorialidad diversa.”  
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examples, if Patzi and Mamani Ramírez are working within an intellectual tradition 
which we can call specifically Aymara, Indianist and katarista, their discourse is 
nonetheless radically different as a result of the social transformations that have taken 
place since 2000 in Bolivia to those that we have seen in authors such as Luciano Tapia. 
Their notion of the indigenous state is based on a strong notion of the possibility of a 
generalized redistribution of power that can operate on a national level but is nonetheless 
based on a sense of indigenous — largely Aymara — ways of life.  
 In sum, in taking positions for or against the current state transformation of the 
MAS, and with Álvaro García Linera as its principal ideologue, the underlying basis of 
these otherwise very different and incompatible perspectives remains within the purview 
of two axes. The first is the question of what kind of transformation within what we 
might call ‘the organization of the social’ is historically possible given the current 
conditions of Bolivian society, particularly in its relation of subordination and 
dependence on global capitalism. The second, closely connected to the first, is a precise 
understanding of the history of how society has been organized in order to determine the 
platform in which that transformation should take place. Ultimately, both questions aim 
to identify possible ways of theorizing social emancipation. It is worth making two 
otherwise obvious observations here. The first is that none of the perspectives analyzed 
above present us with the possibility of a return to a mythical pre-Columbian 
community. Whether at the level of the state or some other kind of national unification, 
or in local and dispersed struggles for autonomy, these proposals envisage a necessary 
transformation of society which will bring about something unlike what has been seen 
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before. Secondly, it should also be emphasized that all of these authors regard the 
transformations as being something which takes place within a larger articulation of the 
social. In other words, the question is not how to separate and protect communities in a 
space exclusive to or outside of history or general global developments, as a kind of 
fossilization of the indigenous. It is rather a question of how these transformations 
should take place, taking for granted that indigenous communities are always part of, 
and subject to, a larger articulation of social, political and economic relations which they 
cannot escape.  
 There is a closely-knit nexus in all of these studies, not explicitly stated by any of 
the authors here, between history and language, or what we might more specifically call 
theory, rationality or political philosophy, depending on the particular perspective. Is a 
rational articulation of society, whether it be a society with or without a state, able to 
bring about a more just and equal social organization? Gutiérrez Aguilar, by rejecting 
the tradition of political philosophy, would appear to reply in the negative, as would 
Prada, for example. However, it is not that these writers reject outright the possibility of 
productive intellectual work on the left — otherwise their own writing would be a 
contradiction of its aims. They rather emphasize a position which would highlight 
possibilities of future emancipation by theorizing the meaning behind social protest. The 
other question which emerges is whether the state can, in its central position within the 
articulation of society, provide a more equitable distribution of power and resources 
without simultaneously re-appropriating that power and those resources. And whether, 
beyond how one answers this question, there is any space outside of the state from which 
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a real transformation of society becomes possible. Bosteels might suggest, for example, 
that criticizing the actions of the state would only inhibit the real possible transformative 
possibilities of the left in favor of a merely speculative left without real proposals for 
change. Beverley might argue that in not supporting the state we are fossilizing the 
subaltern as those who can never change their own conditions, denying them the 
possibility of truly occupying the state. Rabasa and Zibechi might retort, on the other 
hand, that only the social mobilization of the masses is able to provide a more equitable 
social justice.  
 This question of the connection between history and language is precisely the 
central tension in the work of Álvaro García Linera. Let us now turn directly to his work 
to see how this tension develops, paying particular attention to the way in which a 
certain tradition of emergent indigeneity becomes inscribed into his writing. Once again, 
I must insist that the objective of my argument is not to propose that García Linera 
effectively redefines emergent indigeneity by inscribing its discourse into the state, a 
perspective which would re-inscribe the exceptional place of the author as intellectual 
and politician in national life. Rather, my aim is to show how García Linera is a 
particularly important node or expression by which emergent indigeneity comes to be 
understood in an essential relationship to the current state transformation in Bolivia 
today (whether internal to that transformation, as in the writings of García Linera, or as 
external to it, as we have seen in the case of a number of other writers studied above).  
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IV.2.2 García Linera Reading History 
IV.2.2.1 Between Two Historical Times 
 Álvaro García Linera stands out for being part of a younger generation who had 
not been involved with any of the “old left” political parties such as the POR or the PIR, 
something very rare for an intellectual and an activist in the Bolivian tradition — as we 
have seen, even Fausto Reinaga began his political career affiliated to a number of these 
parties. García Linera found himself, therefore, in a situation where, as a young 
intellectual, he was able to take a critical distance from the tradition of the old Bolivian 
left (his critical perspective here is probably helped, as was also the case for a number of 
the intellectuals that would later form the Grupo Comuna with which García Linera was 
deeply involved, by the time he spent abroad, especially in Mexico where he carried out 
his studies in mathematics and read Marx alongside the working groups run by the 
important Latin American scholar of Marx, Bolívar Echeverría). His earliest texts date 
from his involvement with the Ofensiva Roja del Ayllu, a party which, as we saw in 
Chapter III, was an outgrowth of the collapse of earlier Indianist parties due to problems 
of leadership, in which the already-experienced Aymara activist Felipe Quispe played an 
essential role. As part of his participation in the Ofensiva Roja, García Linera would 
later also take part in its militant wing, the Tupaj Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK), 
alongside his partner Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar. Many of its members, including García 
Linera and his partner, would be imprisoned for their involvement in the movement. 
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 García Linera’s role as a ‘translator’ (which, according to Pablo Stefanoni, is 
how García Linera likes to regard himself in his role as vice president)258 begins already 
at this early stage of his career. Rather than a translator between different sectors of 
Bolivian society, however, at this early moment García Linera instead adopts a role as 
translator of Karl Marx’s writings, or at least of a critical Marxism found in those 
writings.259 What García Linera became able to do during his years in the Ofensiva Roja 
(something which, we should not be unaware of the fact, was no easy task in a party with 
radical Indianist roots), was to offer a Marx and a Marxism which was at once radically 
critical of the old Bolivian left and, at the same time, able to offer practical critical 
interventions for indigenous (but not only indigenous) emancipation. In order to do this, 
García Linera provided in his writings critical reflections on a number of lesser-known 
texts or passages of Marx’s work in which the latter deals with modes of production 
which are non-Western or pre-capitalist in nature. For García Linera, it was necessary to 
celebrate these studies by Marx on at least two accounts. Firstly, Karl Marx showed 
himself to have a genuine interest in understanding how capitalism came to interact with 
modes of production that were completely foreign to the West, a question that came to 
be ignored in the official Communist literature of the twentieth century. Secondly, 
García Linera sought to show how Marx adopted an absolutely undogmatic approach 
when studying such societies (which was nevertheless clearly limited, as García Linera 
himself points out, by a certain lack of available historical sources on these topics). In 
                                                
258 See the prologue to the anthology of texts La potencia plebeya written by Pablo Stefanoni (2008).  
259 This role as translator is indicated, in part, by his Aymara nom de guerre: Qhananchiri (literally, s/he 
who ‘clarifies things,’ the verb qhanaña from which it derives meaning roughly ‘to illuminate’).  
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other words, García Linera would highlight that Marx did not approach the study of 
these modes of production by first of all applying a certain “necessary” structure of 
history (i.e. the necessary stages of the historical dialectic: feudalism, capitalism, 
communism), thereby forcing the mode of production under study into one of these pre-
determined categories. Rather, García Linera claimed, Marx showed himself to be 
extremely sensitive to the historicity of different economic forms entirely heterogeneous 
in both time and space. In an early text from 1989 entitled “Introducción al Cuaderno 
Kovalevsky” (“Introduction to the Kovalesvky Notebook”), for example, García Linera 
writes the following: 
By refusing to accept this conception [i.e. of a mechanical and linear 
perspective of history], laughing at it and rejecting the use of categories 
which were intended for understanding Europe but erroneous for the 
understanding of other societies whose historical course was different, 
Marx is indicating to us that a revolutionary thought which fits reality 
into abstract models is impossible [i.e. it would not longer be 
revolutionary — P.B.]. And he shows us, instead, that any scientific 
knowledge of reality must emerge from the study of its own real 
conditions. (“Cuaderno Kovalevsky” 2008, 26)260 
 
 Instead of understanding the history of foreign modes of production according to 
pre-established models, then, “what [Marx] does is remove himself from that reality, his 
knowledge and his characterization [of the world]. It is from that richness that Marx is 
constantly unravelling the multi-lineality and diversity of the different historical 
                                                
260 “Marx, al no aceptar esta conceptualización, al burlarse de ella y rechazar el uso de categorías propias 
para el conocimiento de Europa, pero erróneas para el entendimiento de otras sociedades cuyo curso 
histórico es distinto, nos está indicando la imposibilidad para el pensamiento revolucionario de encajar o 
rellenar a la fuerza la realidad en esquemas abstractos. Y nos muestra, en cambio, que todo conocimiento 
científico de la realidad debe hacer emerger del estudio de sus propias condiciones reales.”  
 340 
developments of Europe, America, Asia and Africa” (ibid., 29).261 By separating Marx’s 
writings proper from the readings that had been made a posteriori of Marx, of a certain 
fossilization of “Marxist thought” under the tutelage of official Stalinist propaganda and 
education, of Stalinist communist parties, and of the influence of the III International, 
García Linera defends the possibility of a critical Marxism which would not be, perhaps, 
incompatible with projects of Indianist or indigenous liberation – on the contrary. 
Simultaneously, García Linera becomes capable of providing a Marxist critique of old 
Bolivian Marxism, but one which is more than merely the inversion of that critique, or 
the replacement of one kind of idealist Marxism for another. It instead rejects an entire 
leftist tradition which had with few exceptions always regarded the indigenous question 
as an obstacle rather than as a support of revolutionary action in Bolivia — what García 
Linera calls in these early texts pseudo-leftists262 — in favor of a re-reading of the 
Marxist tradition with a view to precisely those ‘forgotten’ sectors of society, and the 
particularity of their histories studied for their own merit.  
 In 1991, García Linera and several other members involved in the EGTK are 
taken to a high security prison for terrorist acts. It was during his time in prison that 
García Linera began work on what would become his seminal work, Forma valor, forma 
comunidad (Value Form, Community Form), published in 1995 while the author was 
still in prison. It is a study that consists of a close analysis of passages of Marx, 
especially of Capital and of his writings on agrarian modes of production. According to 
                                                
261 “lo que hace [Marx] es desentrañar de esa realidad, su conocimiento y su caracterización. Y es de esa 
riqueza desde donde Marx va desentrañando la multilinealidad y diversidad de desarrollos históricos 
diferentes de Europa, América, Asia y África.”  
262 See “Cuaderno Kovalevsky” 2009 (29) 
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the author, it is a work that was carried out clandestinely during his time at the high-
security prison of Chonchocoro, where his training in mathematics no doubt came in 
handy when it became necessary to encrypt his analyses in large numbers of 
notebooks.263 The work takes up a number of concerns that had been central to earlier 
studies by the author, particularly in his work De demonios escondidos y momentos de 
revolución (1991) published under his nom de guerre Qhananchiri, where he had 
already undertaken a study of Marx’s writings on the nation and on non-European modes 
of production. The impact of this study on his future work is thus undeniable. In the 
introduction to the 2009 re-edition of the original work, García Linera writes 
retrospectively about Value Form, Community Form: “In a strict sense, I consider that 
my later writings on the working class condition, social movements, state formation, 
etc., are in part thematic derivations from the conceptual matrix worked on in this book” 
(12).264  
 Value Form, Community Form begins with a very detailed analysis of the way in 
which value is conceptualized in Marx’s writings, and specifically as the production of a 
particular social form. This is elaborated throughout his writings in order to analyze the 
way that Marx describes the development of capitalism based on this social form which 
subordinates itself, through labor, to the abstract notion of value, to eventually describe 
the formation of the nation-state as a specific universalization of this social form. This 
detailed, step-by-step analysis of the development of a civilizationary order, built upon 
                                                
263 Refer to the prologue of the 2009 re-edition of Forma valor, forma comunidad.  
264 “En sentido estricto, considero que mis posteriores investigaciones sobre la condición obrera, los 
movimientos sociales, la formación del Estado, etc., son en parte derivaciones temáticas de la matriz 
conceptual trabajada en esta obra.”  
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the value form as a product of a particular set of social relations, follows closely Marx’s 
own writings on this matter. This is followed, finally, by a study of Marx’s writings on 
communal social forms, what Marx calls two types of archaic societies. García Linera 
identifies these analyses in Marx with the development of the Quechua and Aymara 
community forms in Bolivia, and more specifically of the historical ayllu or Aymara 
indigenous communities. While the main part of his study focuses on Marx’s writings 
themselves, the author provides extensive footnotes referencing contemporary 
anthropological and historical work on the ayllu in order to show the parallels between 
Marx’s theory and what is currently known about the historical ayllu form. Ultimately, 
the objective of García Linera’s work is to ask about the possibility of a universalized 
form of anti-capitalist resistance that takes root in what remains of the old communal 
forms of the ayllu. Such a hypothesis explains the subtitle of the work: Aproximación 
téorica-abstracta a los fundamentos civilizatorios que preceden al Ayllu Universal or 
“Theoretical-Abstract Approximation to the Civilizationary Foundations that precede the 
Universal Ayllu.” In other words, for García Linera at this stage of his writing and in 
conjunction with his work in radical Indianist circles, the indigenous communal forms 
represent the possibility of a universalized mode of social interconnectedness beyond 
capital. We should note here, immediately, that this is an expression of what it means to 
be indigenous that goes beyond any easy ethnic identifications.  
 Even in 2009, some three years into his vice presidency, García Linera is not 
willing to renounce the possibility of a communist future based on a certain reinvention 
of the indigenous community form. He writes in the prologue of the 2009 edition: 
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In the end, it is about a book that seeks to scrutinize the historical force of 
communism as a superior material and territorially universalized 
densification of communitarian civilization from the basis of which what 
we are and have become today, that is, on the basis of a conjunction of 
universal communitarianist potentialities contained in the contradictions 
of capital (the working class struggles, the social-universal intellect), and 
the associative, subjective and historical productive forces of the actually 
existing agrarian and urban communities. (12, emphasis in the original)265  
 
 It would appear then, at first sight, that Álvaro García Linera is following a 
tradition we have outlined with specific reference to Indianists in particular, but also to a 
lesser extent with kataristas and other supporters of indigenous emancipation. That 
tradition would be the conceptualization of indigenous emancipation as the restoration of 
the historic Tawantinsuyu, what Fausto Reinaga calls the ‘Indian Nation;’ in other 
words, a restoration of an indigenous society free of the ills of the West. As we will see, 
however, García Linera’s specific understanding of what he calls “the universalization of 
the ayllu” presents something quite different from the Indianist conception, and 
oftentimes García Linera directly challenges indigenous scholars on this point. I will 
show that, on the one hand, this conceptualization is located in a certain tension that can 
be found in García Linera’s work more largely between what we could call the scientific 
analysis of historical conditions of possibility, on the one hand, and the necessity for 
thinking possibilities for the development of anti-capitalist forms, on the other. I will 
argue that, in García Linera’s later writings and particularly in his role as vice president 
                                                
265 “Al final, se trata de un libro que busca escudriñar la fuerza histórica del comunismo como 
densificación material superior y territorialmente universalizada de la civilización comunitaria a partir de 
lo que hoy somos y hemos llegado a ser, esto es, a partir de la conjunción de las potencias comunitaristas 
universales contenidas en las contradicciones del capital (las luchas obreras y el intelecto social-universal), 
y en las fuerzas productivas asociativas, subjetivas e históricas de las comunidades agrarias y urbanas 
actualmente existentes.”  
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of the State, a particular version of this tension wins out over the other. However, by 
reading García Linera’s work against the grain of later developments in his writings and 
resisting a certain trend towards normativity and hegemony, I will underline a number of 
interesting reflections that García Linera provides that can help us to understand the 
continued importance of emergent indigeneity in Bolivian political life, drawing on a 
number of intellectuals who currently find themselves in disagreement with the general 
direction of the MAS.  
 Beforehand, however, it is necessary to outline a number of premises that belong 
to Value Form, Community Form, as well as many of his earlier writings, in order to 
better understand the wager of this important contribution in the intellectual career of 
García Linera, and in particular with a view to understanding the place of the Bolivian 
indigenous in that writing. The first of these premises is that, for García Linera, all forms 
of social organization are based upon what he calls the ‘acquisition’ of use values 
(adopting the difference between use value and exchange value that is laid out in the first 
part of Marx’s first volume of Capital). He writes in the opening pages of the first 
chapter: “every society is definitively a form of acquisition of use values” (2009, 43, 
emphasis in the original).266 The acquisition of use value is in turn determined by the 
historical socio-material conditions in which each civilization or ‘social form’ finds itself 
at any given time. “The specific social use value of wealth,” he writes, “beginning with 
the ‘natural’ form in which they are given and passing through the very social-natural 
capacities that engender them constitute, then, the authentic material historical ground 
                                                
266 “toda sociedad es en definitiva una forma de adquisición de los valores de uso.” 
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upon which social organization in any of its forms turns” (ibid., 44).267 At first sight, 
then, this approach to the analysis of any given society appears to be radically un-
Eurocentric, insofar as it privileges no single social form, only claiming to be able to 
explain them according to the principle of ‘value’ (which should not only be understood 
in economic terms). What García Linera claims to be able to do, then, is provide a 
general Marxist account of the fundamental principles of value to explain the operation 
of two distinct models of civilization, which are contemporaneous in Bolivia but do not 
find themselves in a relationship of equality.  These two forms are the general form of 
value, on the one hand, and the general communal form, on the other. The author 
elucidates: “The general communal form and the general form of (mercantile) value of 
the organization of social life are two of these modalities in which use value is socialized 
between people as ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’” (ibid., emphasis in the original).268  
 The fundamental difference in these modes of civilization lies in the way in 
which the value associated with labor and its products, and above all surplus labor, is 
produced socially. For García Linera, the community form is the remnant of a pre-
capitalist form which is defined essentially by its resistance to the abstraction of labor as 
a commodity that works for an un-productive other, and the abstraction of the value of 
the products of labor as exchange value (we will analyze precisely how García Linera 
understands this operation in what follows). The value form, on the other hand, is the 
                                                
267 “El específico valor de uso social de las riquezas comenzando por la ‘forma natural’ en la que ellas se 
dan, pasando por las propias capacidades social-naturales que las engendran, constituyen pues el auténtico 
fondo histórico material sobre el que gira la organización social en cualquiera de sus formas.” 
268 “La forma general comunal y la forma general del valor (mercantil) de la organización de la vida 
social son dos de estas modalidades en las que el valor de uso se socializa entre las personas como 
‘productoras’ y ‘consumidoras.’” 
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mercantile economy which develops precisely as Marx attempted to lay out in his 
writings, with the abstraction of all value to exchange value, the creation of the 
commodity and the use of surplus value for an other that does not produce, but rather 
owns the conditions of production themselves or, at least, directs the orientation of that 
surplus labor.  
 The central problem that must be engaged with this first premise of García 
Linera’s work is the distinction upon which the difference between value and 
community forms is grounded: that is, use value and exchange value. What distinguishes 
the general community form for García Linera in this case is that it never accomplishes 
the move from use to exchange value, thereby never creating the abstraction of living 
labor which forms the condition of possibility for the expansion of the capitalist world 
system. The distinction between use value and exchange value, whether they are 
opposed notions or whether one can ever entirely escape the other, remain hotly debated 
topics in contemporary Marxism which it is no easy task to resolve, and with which 
García Linera himself does not directly engage. The complexity of this problem is 
provided in the following citation that García Linera offers when describing the 
characteristics of ancestral communal forms in Marx’s writings:  
The non-existence of exchange relations or its secondary character means 
therefore that the productive social unity is self-sufficient [i.e. it does not 
need something external to it in order to function — P.B.], that it is 
capable of reproducing for itself the totality (or the better part) of the 
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indispensable means of living in order to sustain, reproduce and 
perpetuate the entire community. (ibid., 294)269  
 
 Yet this distinction here in the community form which would make exchange 
value only secondary to use value is undecidable. Indeed, as we will see later in García 
Linera’s theoretical treatment of the notion of ‘reciprocity’ in indigenous communities, 
the author himself often allows for a certain abstraction or calculability of exchange 
which seems to challenge the statement that community forms maintain themselves 
always within the regime of use value. The example García Linera provides of the 
exchangeability of women in ancestral communities as “bounty” should be taken as an 
exemplary case in point.270 Without denying the seriousness of this problem, I propose to 
sideline this question by taking it for granted that the real distinction here in García 
Linera’s writing is between living labor and abstract labor (we shall see this later in 
reference to other texts), where exchange value, and particularly the totalization of it in 
the form of currency, is important only to the extent that it permits the generalization of 
abstract labor in the production process as part of the general expansion of capital. In the 
example above, we can see that the self-sufficiency of the community’s own mode of 
social reproduction does not allow for an abstraction of labor for the gain of another in 
such a way as to produce a general equivalence of all living labor as abstract labor, that 
is, as commodity. If this is the case, we can assume, then, that what really defines the 
distinction between use value and exchange value is the absolute generalization and 
                                                
269 “La no existencia de relaciones de cambio o su carácter secundario significa entonces que la unidad 
productiva social es autosuficiente, que es capaz de reproducir por sí misma la totalidad (o la mayor parte) 
de los medios de vida indispensables para sostener, reproducir y perpetuar la entidad comunitaria.”  
270 García Linera: Forma valor, forma comunidad (2009, 283-289).  
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equivalence of all value in a society subject to the real subsumption of labor by 
capital.271 
 This brings us to the second basic premise of García Linera’s work, which is 
fundamentally important for understanding above all how he presumes to interpret the 
place of Quechua and Aymara communities in contemporary Bolivian life. If 
globalization has led to a situation in which we are witnessing, on a global scale, the real 
subsumption of labor by capital, then, according to García Linera, the fact that there 
remain in Bolivia agrarian forms of economic organization with some level of autonomy 
from the capitalist world-system proves that such real subsumption of labor by capital is 
not total. What distinguishes Bolivia as a peripheral economy in the global capitalist 
system is the fact that there are still indigenous strongholds — community forms — that 
have resisted the real subsumption of labor by capital and are subject therefore only to 
what is called the formal subsumption of labor by capital. In other words, the actual 
modes of production that belong to the communities, and that form the basis of the social 
reproduction of the community itself, have yet to be appropriated by capital (real 
subsumption). Nevertheless, it is not the case that the indigenous communities live an 
entirely autonomous existence separate from the state. In their relationship of 
                                                
271 For a detailed understanding of Marx’s concept of the real subsumption of labor to capital and its 
relevance for understanding contemporary society, refer to Antonio Negri’s study of the Grundrisse: Marx 
beyond Marx (1984, 92). Here I draw here upon the notion, not commented on by García Linera but 
important in order to reconsider the use of his earlier work for thinking about the capitalist periphery, on 
the critique of the general principle of equivalence which is symptomatic of the post-historical society in 
which we live. For an introduction to the idea of the general principle of equivalence, refer to Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s L’équivalence des catastrophes (The Equivalence of Catastrophes, 2012). To understand the 
specific way in which the post-historical is understood here as post-metaphysical, refer to Martin 
Heidegger’s writings, particular The End of Philosophy (1973). 
 349 
dependence upon the world capitalist system, the agrarian communities of the ayllu are 
forced to enter into the logic of the value form in order to exchange their produce and 
purchase items in return (this is what is called formal subsumption of labor), even if the 
conditions of production remain in the hands of the communities themselves.272 The 
author’s claim is that relative autonomy over the conditions of production would 
provide, therefore, a potential space for anti-capitalist resistance to grow.  
 However, and this would be the third basic premise of the work, that such 
communities still find themselves in a relationship of subordination with respect to the 
world-system that is capitalism necessarily means that any anti-capitalist resistance from 
these communities will ultimately be re-absorbed by this system, which is able to 
constantly renew its energies. To this extent, while the community form as social 
organization remains isolated within a distantly interconnected system of enclosed 
islands, no absolute destabilization of the society of the value form can come to fruition. 
It is for this reason that in the introduction to the 1995 edition of Value Form, 
Community Form, that García Linera and his co-writer Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar write: 
Yet, and this is what is both decisive and tragic, each local victory, each 
stretch of autonomy conquered LOCALLY against colonial power, does 
so sheltering and to some extent legitimizing and in the long term 
reinforcing that general colonial power, given that, in that conquest of 
local autonomy, [what is still being] produced and preserved is the 
general relation of forces, fixed as a colonial moment in the continent, 
that is to say, the de-structuring of communal inter-unification. (1995, 
xix) 273  
                                                
272 For Marx’s elaboration of the formal and the real subsumption of labor to capital, refer to Marx on the 
production of relative surplus value (Marx 1977, 429-643) 
273 “Pero, y esto es lo decisivo y lo trágico, cada victoria local, cada trecho de autonomía LOCALMENTE 
conquistada frente al poder colonial se lo hace resguardando, hasta cierto punto legitimando y a la larga 
reforzando ese poder colonial general ya que junto a la conquista de autonomía local se está produciendo y 
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 In other words, the universalization of the community form is a necessary 
development, should that form as a whole hope to survive. If this universalization is not 
given in a certain historical moment in the future, the general structure of capitalist 
relations will never be directly challenged; indeed, it will only be reinforced and 
legitimized by those same local acts of resistance. This is the ultimate wager of the work, 
and explains its subtitle, which was cited above: “Theoretical-Abstract Approximation to 
the Civilizationary Foundations that precede the Universal Ayllu.” What García Linera 
claims to make theoretical ground for is the possibility of a universalized version of the 
community form, one which is thus able to replace the value form of capitalism with a 
different order of social relations.  
 In order for García Linera to make this theoretical move, however, it is first 
necessary for him to explain how, within a Marxist framework, the value form (or the 
abstraction of value in mercantile capitalism) was able to become a universal form of 
social relations which eventually came to crystallize in the body of the nation-states of 
modern Europe, and thereby provide an account which can claim the possibility for 
community form to do the same in Bolivia  (this move, as we shall see, never gives 
conclusive grounds for such a universalization, but will nevertheless be important in the 
development of his thought on the state). This is the general argument: following closely 
Marx’s writings on the matter, the author posits that the nation as a collective ‘spirit’ 
actually precedes the state. The nation is something like the necessary symbolic cohesion 
                                                                                                                                           
preservando la relación de fuerzas general fijada como momento colonial del continente, esto es, la 
desestructuración de la interunificación comunal.”  
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which makes the state form possible in the first place. The state, then, eventually 
becomes the apparatus for the normalization of social relations within the logic of value 
form, but only once a certain social cohesion has made such a development possible. 
This subjective inter-unification that is the ‘nation’ is achieved by none other than the 
eventual subsumption of labor by capital, whereby the application of what García Linera 
calls a “machinal logic” (the establishment of industrial factories, for example) gives 
way to a secularized, calculable and chronometrized private individual, and to a 
generalized “civil-citizen comportment” (Forma valor, forma comunidad 2009, 210).274 
The nation appears, ultimately, as a particular social relation which is able to (re)produce 
the social according to an extension of value form’s internal logic, which is the logic of 
mercantile capitalism. In other words, the nation as a form of social cohesion is, in the 
nation-state form, given by the generalization of capitalist social relations (which 
eventually wear away feudal or other pre-capitalist relations). The author elaborates:  
It is on this elemental predisposition of existing social cohesion, now 
given as a cohesion in-value of the products of labor (including therefore 
even of man himself), that the formal subsumption of the social process 
of labor to value, or what one has come to call the desolating devastation 
of ancient organizational and self-representational forms of social 
destiny, will come to completion. (ibid., emphasis in the original)275 
 
 He adds, now directly including a reference to the state: 
Private property … and the territory of its reproductivity, the interaction 
between free private owners in relations which are minimally satisfactory 
and favorable, exist in this last case, finally, as a project, and [as] 
                                                
274 “comportamiento civil ciudadano” 
275 “Es sobre esta predisposición elemental de la cohesión social existente ahora como cohesión en-el-
valor de los productos del trabajo (incluido entonces también el ser humano), que ha de completarse la 
subsunción formal del proceso de trabajo social a la forma valor o lo que se ha venido a llamar, la 
devastación desoladora de las antiguas formas organizativas y autorrepresentativas del destino social.”  
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nation, as a politicized sociality of private owners or, if you like, as a 
nation of the state. [This] is the ascension of real subsumption of 
society to mercantile value, that is, the creation of intersubjectivation as 
a specific product of social (re)production organized in the state: value as 
a national substance materialized in the state. (ibid., emphasis in the 
original)276 
 
 So much for the birth of the state in the capitalist order. But what of the 
community form? In order to understand what is at stake for García Linera in this study, 
it is necessary to turn to his specific analysis of the community form, and attempt to 
understand how he proposes that the specific conditions that have enabled the 
universalization of the value form will, possibly, give way to the universalization of a 
different social form — in this case, the community form itself. In the sixth and final 
chapter to Value Form, Community Form, García Linera provides a theoretical analytic 
for the ayllu as a communal form, drawing on the distinction made by Marx himself 
between two types of so-called archaic communities. In the first type of these 
communities, we are presented with a self-sufficient community whose products of labor 
are never oriented to the use of another, external to the social re-production of the 
community itself. The community is the body, if you like, which appropriates the living-
labor of its members, meaning that the conditions of work’s realization all happen within 
the framework of the self-reproduction of that community, and of other communities 
connected to it by relations of kinship. García Linera writes that: “The control of living 
                                                
276 “La propiedad privada (de los medios de producción, del producto del trabajo, de la tierra, de la fuerza 
de trabajo) y el territorio de su reproductividad, la interacción de los libres propietarios privados en lazos 
mínimamente satisfactorios y favorables, existen en este último caso, al fin como proyecto, y la nación 
como socialidad politizada de los propietarios privados, o si se quiere, como nación del Estado. Es la 
ascensión de la subsunción real de la sociedad al valor mercantil, esto es, la creación de la 
intersubjetivación como producto específico de la (re)producción social organizada en el Estado: el valor 
como sustancia nacional materializada en el Estado.”  
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labor over the conditions of its material realization can only be given, therefore, as 
control of the communal-worker over the material conditions of production” (2009, 
297, emphasis in the original).277 Yet what is important here is that this mode of 
production resists any attempt at the general equivalence of living labor as abstract labor, 
and of all value as commodities, potentially equivalent in principle, under the regime of 
exchange value. Indeed, García Linera argues that the specific mode of exchange of 
goods as it is given in the community becomes imagined therefore as a process of 
constant reciprocity.278 Consequently, the goods that are produced in this first type of 
society are envisaged “not as things but rather as gifts” (ibid., 304),279 and become 
part of a mode of production which therefore forms a “communitarian technological 
ethic” (ibid., 305, emphasis in the original in both cases).280  
 To understand more clearly the character of this ethic, of what this form of 
exchange — which is envisaged as reciprocity and not as market exchange — means for 
this first type of archaic society, it is useful to analyze how García Linera describes the 
relationship of these communities to nature. Ultimately, it is nature itself which grounds 
the members of the community in their relationship to one another but also to nature 
itself, and discloses its members to one another in their labor. Yet what is important 
about this relationship to nature is that, while nature is itself the source of all labor and 
                                                
277 “El control del trabajo-vivo sobre las condiciones de su realización material sólo puede darse, por ello, 
en tanto control del trabajador-comunal sobre sus condiciones materiales de producción.” 
278 This is a creative way of understanding, from a political economy perspective which lays claim to some 
objectivity, what is meant today by the supposed reciprocity that belongs to Andean economies. This is a 
feature of the Andean economy and of the ayllu specifically that, beginning with J. Murra’s seminal work 
on the Andean economy (1956), has been widely commented.  
279 “no como cosas sino como dones” 
280 “ética tecnológica comunitaria” 
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even of all being for the community, it is not a ‘resource’ to simply be used up, an 
abstract measure of value that is used to calculate all other worth of exchange. García 
Linera explains that:  
As nature is not postulated as a thing-like being which is dissectible, 
violable and, before all else (given that this is first of all its only form of 
expression), as natural forces, beginning with the earth, are not 
presented before the community as a product of labor in its social 
reality of accessibility, then the natural reality that is found beyond what 
is directly sensible [sensible] and verifiable by natural co-habitability 
(which is much more than tradition), presents itself as symbolically 
tractable or impenetrable, as divine-unknowing, perhaps even as the non-
object of knowledge, that in the long term reactualizes that omnipresent 
power of living-nature over the devenir of the community. (ibid., 310, 
emphasis in the original)281 
 
 The passage is complex and in a style which is typical of García Linera’s 
writings, almost overwhelmingly technical yet surprisingly ambiguous, with complex 
and at times even confusing syntactical structures. Yet the following can be inferred 
from this passage in connection with his overall elaboration of the production of ‘nature’ 
as concept in the first type of archaic community: the ‘natural reality,’ which is source of 
all possible production within and for the community, and as source of all things that are 
to be exchanged reciprocally, is not understood as a source of materials which are 
calculable, as a precise finite set of resources to be exchanged. As the divine non-object 
of knowledge, it is a source of knowing which is infinitely incalculable and grounds 
                                                
281 “Al no ser postulada la naturaleza como un ser cósico diseccionable, avasallable y, ante todo (pues esto 
primero es sólo su forma de expresión), como las fuerzas naturales comenzando por la tierra no se 
presentan ante la comunidad como producto del trabajo en su realidad social de accesibilidad, 
entonces la realidad natural que se halla más allá de lo directamente sensible y verificable por la 
convivialidad natural (que es mucho más que la tradición), se presenta como simbólicamente tratable o 
impenetrable, como desconocimiento-divino, quizá incluso como no-objeto de conocimiento, que a la 
larga reactualiza ese omnipresente poder de la naturaleza-viva sobre el devenir de la comunidad.” 
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itself, and therefore the relations between all belonging to the community (who 
understand themselves in a particular relationship to the earth), in this incalculability. 
This conceptualization would, therefore, be in eternal resistance to the determination of 
labor to abstract notions of value. Social wealth is defined in these communities not by 
the continual primitive accumulation of natural materials (including the human as 
material labor, but also as a source of reproduction of the social unit in the case of 
women and children), but by an unbreachable relation with a divine nature which 
grounds the possibility of relations within the community. “Nature,” writes García 
Linera, “with which the community strikes up relations is therefore a doubly limited 
nature” (ibid., 311, emphasis in the original).282 It is limited, firstly, in so far as the 
space of nature itself is limited within the community. Secondly, as a form of 
“produced, thing-like wealth,” (ibid., 312, emphasis in the original),283 it is limited in 
so far as, as the material of social wealth itself, and the form by which that wealth is able 
to develop in the community, “it does not exist as an abstraction of its specific natural 
forms” (ibid., my emphasis).284 In other words, insofar as the community is not able to 
make an abstraction out of the basic materials of its productive labor, and therefore 
neither of its labor nor of the relations of exchange within the community, there is no 
absolute abstraction of value to a generally equivalent value form.285  
                                                
282 “La naturaleza con la que entabla relaciones la comunidad es entonces una naturaleza doblemente 
limitada” 
283 “forma de riqueza cósica producida” 
284 “no existe como abstracción de sus formas naturales específicas.” 
285 It is worth drawing attention here to an aspect of García Linera’s work on the social forms that also 
merits praise, and that is the collapse of a nature-culture dichotomy by which nature would be the 
inaccessible “real” to which culture has no access and from which it is produced entirely separately. Here, 
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 So much for the first type of archaic community. It is generally understood in 
García Linera’s writing that this first type is what we could call an archaic form or proto-
type of the ayllu, something like the development of the community before the arrival of 
the Incas and the centralization of power and re-organization of labor and production 
according to a centralized accumulation of wealth brought about by this arrival. What is 
therefore introduced in the second form is a certain level of abstraction of labor by virtue 
of the centralization of the economic organization of the territorial space under the Incas. 
Indeed, what essentially distinguishes these two types of communal economies that 
García Linera describes is a differentiation between property and possession in regards 
to the conditions of production of the earth. While possession of the earth continues to 
be, in this second type, communal possession shared by the different members of any 
given community, remaining therefore largely unchanged from the first type of 
communal organization, the nominal property of the earth in this case belongs to the 
state or the sovereign. What thus changes is the orientation of the use of surplus labor or 
products, depending on the case concerned.  
 What is important here is that, according to the author, the communal form of 
managing local economies remains largely unchanged in this second type from the first 
type of archaic community. The state or sovereign makes demands for the products or 
the use of labor from within the communities, but the communities themselves continue 
to organize their own conditions of production. For example, García Linera writes that, 
                                                                                                                                           
nature is a specific production of the social form as it is given in each historical moment according to its 
conditions of economic, but also social, reproduction.   
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if the rent that is required from the state or sovereign from the community is demanded 
in the form of labor, then, “[the] social subject of rent is, in this case, the community 
[and not the individual — P.B.]” (ibid., 318, emphasis in the original).286 Equally, if the 
rent required is offered in the form of products, these products “do not alter, in any way, 
economically speaking, the essence of the land rent” (ibid., 319).287 And finally, if the 
rent required is given in a monetary form, which would imply a much larger integration 
of the community into the market economy, it is nevertheless the case that, “we are 
before a communal strategy that preserves the communitarian configuration” (ibid., 
emphasis in the original).288 Only the social value that is accorded to the surplus value of 
labor and its products is transformed in this case, transforming only the orientation of 
that labor and those products, but not the actual modes of production themselves that 
belong to the community. 
 Yet all of this does not mean that the community or the sense of community is 
otherwise entirely unchanged. As García Linera explains, in this second type of archaic 
community, the community is no longer only the community; it is the community plus 
the state, plus the other communities or productive units that are tied to the initial 
community through the state, but only externally so. “The state here carries out a form 
of imposed and strange [extraña] unification between the reality of the different 
communities,” writes García Linera (ibid., 321, emphasis in the original).289 The word 
                                                
286 “El sujeto social de la renta es, en este caso, la comunidad” 
287 “no alteran en absoluto, económicamente hablando, la esencia de la renta de la tierra.”  
288 “estamos ante una estrategia comunal que preserva la configuración comunitaria.” 
289 “El Estado aquí desempeña la forma de unificación impuesta y extraña entre la realidad de las 
distintas comunidades.” 
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extraña stands out here, meaning principally strange or odd, but above all in the sense 
here of that which is not familiar, that which is not quite homely or at home, like the 
strangeness of being estranged. This extraña or strange unification is thus also externa 
(external) and extranjera (foreign), an imposition which is outside or external to the 
community, but here this outside, this limit of the social unit, is given a precise sense. 
García Linera thus provides the reader with a very precise form of understanding the 
specificity of the colonial state: if the European countries of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were supposedly able to provide an organic kind of self-
organization or self-unity according to the techniques of the so-called value form, which 
eventually gave way to the state form, in the Latin American (post)colony, the state is 
not organic but rather one which imposes itself over social forms that have different 
logics of social reproduction, where the operations of the state are carried out over and 
above those logics that belong to each individual community. Yet this imposition, the 
author insists, is not one which changes the modes of production themselves — there is 
some level of formal subsumption, but the real subsumption of labor never takes place. 
“[The] state in these cases does not do more than superimpose itself over an activity 
which we know has existed before it,” the author confirms (ibid., 322-323, emphasis in 
the original).290 
 One of the central innovations of García Linera’s very detailed analysis of the 
economic organization and social form of indigenous communities under Inca rule, 
                                                
290 “el Estado en estos casos no hace más que sobreponerse a una actividad que con seguridad ha existido 
antes que él” 
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therefore, is found in its challenge to the notion of an idealized indigenous past. In a 
certain version of this past, strongly connected to discourses of emergent indigeneity that 
have been studied previously, the Inca ‘state’ would be understood to be a proto-socialist 
type of government to which one had only to return, a kind of indigenous promised land 
— inaugurating the famous idea of the return to the Tawantinsuyu that we have already 
seen in a number of Indianist writings in this dissertation, from Fausto Reinaga through 
to Ramiro Reynaga and Luciano Tapia. García Linera, however, provides a different 
understanding of the specificity of communal social forms under Inca rule. To 
recapitulate, what distinguishes the communal forms of social existence for García 
Linera is the fact that, however complex their economic systems are, or however 
partially integrated their economies into the mercantile merchant economy are, their 
labor circulates within that community as a social use value, and never as exchange 
value. Yet García Linera is not so naive as to believe that use value exists in absolute 
resistance to all chains of equivalence. In what may appear a surprising move, then, the 
author claims that: “The form of circulation that … shows itself to be closest to the 
exchange of equivalents mediated by the time of labor contained in the product of labor, 
is balanced reciprocity” (ibid., 339, emphasis in the original).291 The notion of 
reciprocity in Andean communities, therefore, a notion which since the studies of John 
Murra has become a common way of understanding the mode of exchange in Andean 
economies and today is often celebrated for its non-capitalist character, is here 
                                                
291 “La forma de circulación que, en cambio, se muestra más cercana al intercambio de equivalentes 
mediados por el tiempo de trabajo contenido en los productos es la reciprocidad equilibrada.”  
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denounced by García Linera as the closest pre-capitalist form of exchange to capitalism. 
The author’s argument against the Inca state resides in the notion that, while it is true 
that the conceptualization of a mode of exchange within the community according to the 
logic of reciprocity resists the appropriation of power in the hands of an elite within the 
community, this is not the case when those communities are presided over by a state or 
sovereign. In other words, the Inca state should not be celebrated as an agent of 
communal reciprocal exchange. In fact, reciprocity becomes a technique of social 
reproduction by which state power comes to infiltrate and colonize values belonging to 
the community for its own ends. García Linera elaborates:  
The circulation of material goods that reciprocity implies between 
relatively independent producers and components of the community does 
not do anything, in the long run, other than perpetuate the immediate 
sovereignty of the producers in the immediate process of labor and, of 
course, the active community which shelters them. However, when 
(economic, political, religious) intercommunal hierarchies intervene in 
the cycle of product circulation, which have either developed previously 
as a result of an internal folding … or externally … reciprocity does no 
more than perpetuate these hierarchies and, in the long run, legitimate 
relations of exploitation, in some cases, or submission, in others. 
(ibid., 343 - 344, emphasis in the original) 292 
 
 While the so-called Inca state, therefore, never entirely usurps the community’s 
self-determination of its labor and products as social use value, it nevertheless manages 
to transform the system of balance reciprocity by turning it into a relative field of general 
                                                
292 “El circuito de los bienes materiales que implica la reciprocidad entre productores relativamente 
independientes y componentes de la comunidad no hace a la larga, más que perpetuar la soberanía 
inmediata de los productores en el PTI [proceso de trabajo inmediato — P.B.] y, claro, la comunidad 
activa que los cobija. Mas cuando en el ciclo de la circulación de los productos intervienen jerarquías 
intercomunales (económicas, políticas, religiosas) que se han desarrollado previamente por 
desdoblamiento interno … o externos … la reciprocidad no hace más que perpetuar estas jerarquías y, 
a la larga, legitimar relaciones de explotación en unos casos o de sometimiento en otros.”  
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equivalence by which it is able to legitimize and reproduce its own power (the closest to 
the exchange of equivalents mediated by the time of labor contained in the product of 
labor, says García Linera, as quoted above). It is on this account that the author of Value 
Form, Community Form rejects other contemporary Indianist-katarista interpretations of 
the history of statehood in Bolivia. In footnote 168 of the 2009 edition, for example, he 
directly attacks one such author: Fernando Untoja, a respected katarista and author of 
numerous publications, among them Retorno al ayllu (Return to the Ayllu, 2001), where 
the author makes a claim for the Incan state as a ‘good state.’ “It makes no sense,” writes 
García Linera, “to speak about ‘good’ states linked to the communal economy and ‘bad’ 
and ‘abusive’ states tied to the mercantile economy, as [Fernando] Untoja insinuates” 
(348).293 In other words, it is not a matter, for García Linera, of idealizing one particular 
form of organizing or structuring the economy over another, of the possibility of 
returning to one particular way of organizing the economy. There are not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
civilizations; there is no ‘good’ Andean essence against a ‘bad’ European essence. 
Instead, it is a matter of the way in which one particular social form has historically 
resisted the absolute valorization of all labor as commodity (i.e. the community form), 
and the recognition that, in that potential to resist capital, there resides the possibility of 
a universalizing mode of work that would destabilize the capitalist-world system.  
 This brings us the third and final development of the community form in García 
Linera’s writing, which rather than a description of an actual, historical state of affairs 
                                                
293 “No tiene sentido hablar de Estados ‘buenos’ ligados a la economía comunal y Estados ‘malos’ y 
‘abusivos’ vinculados a la economía mercantil, tal como insinúa F. Untoja.”  
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that the author interprets through Marx’s writings, is rather a theoretical or hypothetical 
development. García Linera’s wager is that, in the contemporary moment, where we are 
witnessing the almost complete totalization of capital’s domain, and private property has 
become the institutional means of its material reality, capitalism shows itself to be “a 
social curse and impediment before the forces that capitalism itself has unconsciously 
awakened” (ibid., 351 - 52).294 These ‘awakened forces’ will be the grounds of 
possibility, resulting from the very development of capitalism itself, by which the 
generalization and universalization of the community form will, according to the author, 
become possible: 
With this, the regime of property and of capitalist labor unveils itself as a 
historical anachronism that should give way to the restoration of the 
archaic community, but now with a planetary content and sustained in the 
achievements of social-universalized labor, awakened in an unconscious 
way throughout these centuries of human history. The universal 
community grounded on directly universal labor, in which the working 
individual recovers (recobra) his or her labor activity as something 
pleasurable, and in his or her originary unity with nature as a living and 
sacred body of human self-determination, [this] is what we can call the 
‘tertiary’ formation of society. (ibid., 352)295 
                                                
294 “un estorbo y maldición social frente a las fuerzas que el (sic) mismo ha despertado 
inconscientemente.”  
295 “Con ello, el régimen de la propiedad y del trabajo capitalista se devela como un anacronismo histórico 
que debe dar lugar a la restauración de la comunidad arcaica, pero ahora con un contenido planetario y 
sostenido en los logros del trabajo social-universalizado, despertados inconscientemente en todos estos 
siglos de historia humana. La comunidad universal fundada en el trabajo directamente universal, en la que 
el individuo trabajador recobra su actividad laboral como algo gozoso, y en su unidad originaria con la 
naturaleza como el cuerpo vivo y sagrado de la autodeterminación humana, es lo que podemos llamar la 
formación ‘terciaria’ de la sociedad.” A number of ambiguities arise here that are in no way resolved 
within the text. First of all, despite the historical specificity of García Linera’s general understanding of 
the community form, there is talk here of a ‘restoration’ of the archaic community, but a type of 
restoration which would actually give way to a tertiary formation, that is, a restoration which is not at all a 
restoration but the production of something new (it should be noticed that the loose translation of recobra 
for ‘recovers’ here does not have the same ambiguity; it is not necessarily implied as a historical 
‘recovery’). A number of abstract nouns slip into García Linera’s usage here, and we have to depend on 
the general economy of his writing in order to be able to draw provisional conclusions. His reference to 
‘nature’ can be understood both as a specific production of nature, that which is found in the communal 
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 For García Linera, what is clear is that, given that a) the community form has 
managed to remain largely unchanged despite its exploitation by the state apparatus 
under the Incas, Spanish colonialism, and later the Bolivian Republic,296 and that b) 
capitalism has provided the material conditions by which a social-universalized form of 
labor has become possible, this community form is regarded in Value Form, Community 
Form as the real possibility of overcoming capitalism in Bolivia (and, one supposes, 
eventually, the world). However, while this form of anti-capitalist resistance remains 
merely local in character (García Linera calls it an “atomized resistance” [ibid., 158]),297 
it will only contribute to the general success of the capitalist onslaught over 
communitarian forms. García Linera writes: “the gains that any community may obtain 
here or there … indirectly favor the continuity of the dispersion and defeat of other 
communities” (ibid.).298 This is so given that, firstly, “all local conquests are made in the 
general sphere of the continuity and legitimacy of the colonial-mercantile economy” 
                                                                                                                                           
form as he describes at length in earlier passages of the book, or otherwise can only be explained by a 
recourse to the idea that the ‘indigenous’ as societies with communal forms are somehow ‘closer to 
nature’. No further indications in the text would indicate which of these two understandings is the correct 
one. Furthermore, the notions of ‘self-determination’ and of ‘work as pleasure’, while no doubt derivations 
from Marx’s philosophy, are nevertheless ambiguous within his general re-reading of Marxism. It is not 
clear, for example, whether these notions should be understood together as the reinscription of living labor 
back within its abstraction, the refusal of the general equivalence of all human production even as social-
universalized labor, as has been indicated in other places in his work.  
296 García Linera writes that: “In some cases, the internal structure of a type of community is so stable and 
cohesive that it has been permitted to survive with very few transformations for hundreds of years, 
eventually being slowly dispersed, utilized, fragmented and exploited by contemporary capitalist 
colonialism, as is taking place with the aymara-qhiswa community until today [En unos casos, la 
estructura interna de un tipo de comunidad es tan estable y cohesionado que le ha permitido sobrevivir con 
ligeras transformaciones por cientos de años, hasta ser lentamente disgregada, utilizada, fragmentada y 
explotada por el colonialismo capitalista contemporáneo, como sucede con la comunidad aymara-qhiswa 
hasta nuestros días].” (García Linera, Forma valor, forma comunidad 2009, 353, my emphasis). 
297 “resistencia atomizada” 
298 “los triunfos que cualquier comunidad puede obtener aquí y allí … favorece (sic) indirectamente la 
continuidad de la dispersión y derrota general del resto de las otras comunidades” 
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(ibid.),299 and, secondly, insofar as this economy is, in the meantime, “achieving 
devastating gains in many other local zones with reduced possibilities of resistance” 
(ibid.).300 It is only by challenging the universality of capitalism that the community 
form may be able to represent a viable alternative to capitalism or, in other words, the 
universal totality that is capitalism “can only be superseded by another totalization 
equally universal — de-alienated, de-reified — that would restitute the concrete-real 
human being” (ibid., 165, emphasis in the original).301  
 García Linera is very careful to stay clear of any structure of thought that may 
appear as a normative historical prescription, an idealist Marxism in which he accuses 
his contemporaries of participating. He insists, for example, that his theoretical 
framework “says nothing at all about the inevitability of the transition from one 
formation to the other nor much less about the superiority of one type of these 
formations to other types and between distinct types of different formations” (ibid., 
352).302 He is also insistent on the idea that if there is any possibility for such social 
forms to overcome the domain of capitalism, this must be given in the present, with 
conditions that are at hand. In other words, certain historical conditions of possibility, 
both material and symbolic, are necessary in order for such a transformation of the 
                                                
299 “toda conquista local se hace en el terreno de la continuidad y la legitimidad de la totalidad mercantil-
colonial” 
300 “[está] logrando triunfos devastadores en muchas otras zonas locales con menores posibilidades de 
resistencia”  
301 “sólo puede ser superada por otra totalización igualmente universal desenajenada, descosificada, que 
restituya al ser humano concreto-real ” 
302 “no dice nada en absoluto acerca de la inevitabilidad del tránsito de una formación a la otra ni mucho 
menos de la superioridad de un tipo de una de las formaciones sobre otros tipos y entre los distintos tipos 
de las distintas formaciones.”  
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conditions of labor to take place. The potential universalization of the community form, 
he reiterates, is possible only “thanks to counter-finalities whose emergence are caused 
by the very same regime that seeks to annihilate the communal forms” (ibid., 366, 
emphasis in the original),303 where, as a result, capitalist forms would inadvertently 
allow communal forms to “appropriate its fruits” (ibid.).304 However, despite all claims 
to objectivity, and to recuperating a Marx and a Marxism that is critical and has no 
normative view of history, it is never clear how precisely such community forms would 
be able to appropriate capitalist conditions for their own ends. The study finds itself at an 
impasse, insofar as the universalization of the community form is only possible through 
a certain inhabitation of a universalized labor which is, nevertheless, an abstract form of 
labor commodified by the value form. The point is, if the modes of production in which 
labor and its products are commodified belong to the domain of capitalism, how is 
community form to take hold, precisely when its vantage point from the perspective of 
history has always been its relative autonomy in the face of capitalist domination (the 
argument of formal subsumption of labor versus real subsumption of labor)?   
 How would such a re-inhabitation of the capitalist space become possible? It is 
clear that if there are conditions of possibility that may make such an inhabitation 
possible, it is not made any clearer by the double bind in which García Linera’s work 
articulates itself. A double bind because, on the one hand, the author claims that 
community form has only survived in Bolivia thanks to the limited expansion of capital, 
                                                
303 “gracias a las contrafinalidades que hace brotar el mismo régimen que busca aniquilar las formas 
comunales” 
304 “apropiarse de sus frutos” 
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where formal subsumption of labor has nevertheless not changed the communal modes 
of production which reproduce the community’s own social form. On the other hand, 
however, he claims that the expansion of capital is the very condition of community 
form’s becoming universal. A clear contradiction becomes apparent, one that there 
appears to be no way of resolving despite the fact that García Linera insists on his point 
so emphatically.  
 To disentangle the bind in which we find ourselves upon a deeper exploration of 
García Linera’s premises, we will take recourse in another text that was produced shortly 
after the author was freed from prison. When García Linera left prison in 1997, he was 
appointed as a professor of sociology in La Paz’s biggest university, the UMSA 
(Universidad Mayor de San Andrés). During his first few years there, he developed 
studies on the conditions of the new working class under neoliberal capitalism, exploring 
specifically the case of the mining sector, publishing the 1999 work Reproletarización: 
Nueva clase obrera y desarrollo del capital industrial en Bolivia (1952-1998) 
(Reproletarization: New Working Class and the Development of Industrial Capital in 
Bolivia (1952-1998)), out of which a series of other studies on the contemporary 
working class emerged.305 The premises of these texts are not important here. It is only 
worth noticing in passing that these detailed studies of the new conditions of the working 
class in Bolivia represent not a rupture but a continuation of his previous work. Where 
the study of the conditions of the new working class may not be directly concerned with 
                                                
305 Refer also to “La muerte de la condición obrera del siglo XX” (2000) and “Los ciclos históricos de la 
condición obrera minera en Bolivia (1825-1999)” (2000), both later re-published in the anthology La 
potencia plebeya (2008) and then later in the English translation Plebeian Power (2014).  
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the place of the indigenous in traditional Marxist thought in Bolivia, the lessons he 
developed from a close analysis of Marx’s writings on the capitalist periphery are 
applied. Above all, one notes a certain attention to the question of the historical 
possibility for social mobilization and general class organization, just as he had, in Value 
Form, Community Form, been concerned with the material conditions that made the 
universalization of the ayllu possible. Such a position is clear in the essay “La muerte de 
la condición obrera del siglo XX” (“The Death of the 20th-Century Working Class 
Condition,” 2000), where he reproaches the March for Dignity carried out by ex-
members of the miners’ union after they had been disbanded following the neoliberal 
reforms of 1985, claiming that their demand for a ‘return’ to the protectionism of the 
state was a conservative demand. They could not see, claims García Linera, that the 
historical conditions of capitalism had radically changed, and with them so too forms of 
anti-capitalist resistance needed to adapt.  
 It is during this time that García Linera, alongside his partner Raquel Gutiérrez 
Aguilar, became very active as part of a group of intellectual activists looking for new 
ways to engage critically with the contemporary political situation. This group was given 
the name Grupo Comuna,306 and it would mark the ascension of García Linera and the 
rest of the group as public intellectuals and primary interpreters of the so-called new 
social movements that came to life at the turn of the twenty-first century. Before this, 
however, in 1999, the group published a lesser-known collection of essays entitled El 
                                                
306 According to private correspondence with Raúl Prada (Personal interview, 14 Jun. 2014), it was Raquel 
Gutiérrez who originally proposed the group`s name. Only himself and Gutiérrez continue to use the name 
as a mark of their intellectual trajectory.  
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fantasma insomne, which can be translated as The Insomniac Phantom, or as the Ghost 
or Specter That Does Not Sleep. The work offers itself as a contemporary exploration of 
Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto, with regard to how this text, following its 150th 
anniversary, can still be relevant for the Bolivian left today. Its title is a clear reference 
to the opening lines of the Manifesto — A specter (phantom, ghost) is haunting Europe 
— the specter (phantom, ghost) of Communism [Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa — das 
Gespenst des Kommunismus]. The question for this group became how to reinvent a 
critical engagement of leftist thought which would be capable of thinking the 
contemporary conjuncture in a moment of general crisis among what they called the “old 
left,” a general crisis marked by a series of symptoms: the triumph of neoliberalism on a 
global scale articulated most famously by Francis Fukuyama’s text The End of History 
and the Last Man (1992); the collapse of leftist experiments in Latin America more 
specifically, with the defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1991; the collapse of the 
Bolivian leftist stronghold in the miners’ unions which, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, were disbanded following the 1985 New Economic Plan; and, finally, the 
general delegitimization of the left for their dogmatic Stalinist ideological leanings, a 
criticism articulated most pronouncedly among activist indigenous circles. What the 
group nevertheless saw, however, was that there was a spirit or a specter of Marx and of 
Marxism, even of a tradition of the Bolivian left, of the working class and of the 
indigenous peoples, that was not dead but had been and still was awake, watching over 
the death of leftist intellectuality as if in a vigil. And that this specter or ghost awaited 
new articulations, new possibilities of resistance. This is ultimately what the Grupo 
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Comuna mean when, in the introduction to the collection, they write: “we are seeking for 
the phantom not to sleep” (9).307 
 García Linera’s contribution to the collection, “El Manifiesto Comunista y 
nuestro tiempo” (“The Communist Manifesto and Our Time”),308 is by far the largest 
essay in the work, and presents four theses on the Manifesto that develop in a 
progressive manner. The first concerns the new condition of social labor in a now-
globalized capitalism, while the second describes the emergence of new forms of the 
proletariat, which ends by announcing the need for identifying new ways of constructing 
class organization. The third thesis therefore deals with the notions of bourgeois and 
proletariat in their strict sense in Marx’s text, finally bringing the argument round full 
circle to analyze the meaning of ‘party’ in Marx and proposing that Marx teaches us a 
                                                
307 “buscamos que el fantasma no duerma.” These specters are not just the specters of capitalism, but the 
specters of Bolivian history itself, where a capitalist ontology would be immanent to the conditions of 
possibility for such a history. We must agree with José Rabasa when he writes: “The question of the 
specter of history assumes two modalities: one pertains to repetition, the other pertains to immanence. 
Whereas the first modality exposes the work of history itself as haunting the present, the second modality 
carries the promise of liberation in the ‘life history’ of individuals and communities that history cannot 
access or delimit” (Without History, 9). Whereas Rabasa associates the first kind of history with a 
repressive structure of history associated with the state’s ‘official history,’ I argue that this does not need 
necessarily to be the case. If this first specter as a repetition of the past and a haunting of the present is in 
someway repressive, it is so in the same way as memories are repressed in psychoanalysis; the structure of 
national ideology is constantly interrupted by the apparition of what it is necessary to repress in order to 
give way to a constant sense of identity. The specters of Bolivian history as repetition of the repressed are 
also, therefore, those individuals and communities that Rabasa also mentions above, but that he associates 
only with the second form of spectrality. The second type of specter of history is equally important, 
however, and particularly so for García Linera’s contribution which is currently under analysis. It should 
be understood that this immanent ‘life history’ of individuals mentioned by Rabasa is ultimately a life 
history which lies below that absolute limit in which “history is narrativized into logic,” to repeat the 
much-quoted statement by Gayatri Spivak on the subaltern (1988, 16). In fact, these two forms of the 
specter are but one and the same thing. This is ultimately what Derrida, in Specters of Marx, which is 
contemporaneous with the Insomniac Phantom of the Grupo Comuna, ultimately means in his reference to 
the specter. Hauntology is the inscription of the other, of the trace, of untimeliness, of the a-venir, which is 
the condition of any historical narrative, whether it be of the nation(-state) or of any other kind.  
308 All citations from the text will here refer to the 2008 re-edition as part of the anthology La potencia 
plebeya.  
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particular understanding of self-determination that is essential for the anti-capitalist 
struggle (the fourth thesis). It is worth pointing immediately to the fact that one can 
identify here a change in direction in García Linera’s concept of the possibilities for 
capitalist resistance in Bolivia. On the one hand, it is true that so-called communal forms 
continue to be important for him as a source of anti-capitalist resistance. He writes: “In 
fact, in countries such as the Latin American ones, at this stage, the possibility of an 
authentic insurgence against the domain of capital turns out to be unthinkable on the 
margins of the communal class and their struggle to universalize the social rationality 
that characterizes it” (2008, 93).309 Nevertheless, the principle agents of a new 
revolutionary class for García Linera do not appear in this essay as the indigenous 
peoples of the communities. “The community is not destined to disappear,” he writes, 
while adding, almost flippantly, “although this is its most probable route” (ibid.).310 It is 
a different kind of possible resistance that here, in this essay, García Linera will take up. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, there are a number of similarities between the two texts 
that will help us to identify a tension in his work that opens onto two possible readings, 
meshed together in the general economy of García Linera’s writing as a double bind.  
 Once again, we find that García Linera’s understanding of Marx, and particularly 
in this case of the Communist Manifesto, has at stake no less than the refounding of a 
critical Marxism which would reject the tradition of the Bolivian left, understood as 
being caught up in an idealist and teleological Marxism inherited from the III 
                                                
309 “De hecho, en países como los latinoamericanos, a estas alturas, la posibilidad de una auténtica 
insurgencia contra el dominio del capital resulta impensable al margen de la clase comunal y de su lucha 
por universalizar la racionalidad social comunal que la caracteriza.”  
310 “La comunidad no está condenada a desaparecer, aunque éste sea su camino más probable” 
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International and Stalinism. The Manifesto is, the author insists, “the radical critique of 
the existent and not the liturgical recounting of all that is written in the past” (ibid., 
53).311 In its primitive form, this liturgical tradition of which García Linera is so critical 
consists in “the little sects of devotees who assume militancy as an apostle and who have 
confused their mystical-religious inclinations with political ascriptions” (ibid.).312  If the 
author’s vocal critique of the Bolivian left is clear enough, however, one question still 
remains. In what does this ‘radical critique of the existent’ consist, the ‘other side,’ if 
you like, of the idealism of the little sects of devotees he criticizes? In other words, on 
what grounds can Marxism be claimed to be a critique of all that is existent, and in the 
name of what? Following the title of the collection of essays, one can provisionally 
provide the response: this radical critique is made possible by the specters that do not 
sleep, as that which lies below or on the other side of all that it existent, that haunts the 
existent from within. Yet this provisional response would only offer us the most abstract 
formulation of what is at stake in García Linera’s text.  
 In order to present my reading of García Linera’s text as caught in a certain 
double bind, it is necessary to analyze in more detail his four theses on the Manifesto, 
and particularly the first thesis, where we find a response to the question of what these 
‘specters that do not sleep’ are for the author. His argument resides in the idea that the 
Manifesto continues to be relevant for us today because we are still living the 
transformation of social conditions by capital that Marx began to describe in the 
                                                
311 “la crítica radical de lo existente y no el recuento litúrgico de lo escrito en el pasado.” 
312 “las sectillas de devotos quienes asumen la militancia como apostolado y quienes en el fondo han 
confundido sus inclinaciones místico-religiosas con adscripciones políticas.” 
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Manifesto, albeit in new forms today that Marx would not have been able to recognize or 
anticipate. Such an observation is important not only for understanding how Marx 
somehow anticipated the general expansion of capitalist relations, and in particular 
through the real subsumption of labor by capital, but also because the author of the 
Manifesto had a very specific understanding of how the capitalist system would 
eventually be superseded. “The current ‘worldization’ (mundialización) of capital, far 
from putting into doubt the critical thought of Marx, is the historical presupposition upon 
which he proposes to investigate the possibilities of overcoming it” (ibid., 57).313 On this 
basis, García Linera criticizes previous projects on the left such as national state 
socialisms, claiming that they profoundly misunderstood Marx on this point. In fact, 
Marx is clear on this: there is no revolution if it is not a global revolution, if it is not the 
total turning upside down of capitalist relations in favor of other types of social relations.  
 What is the condition of this overturning of capitalism in favor of a different kind 
of universalized social structure? In García Linera’s reading of Marx, the question comes 
down in the end to that gap between two forms that divide labor internally, one that is 
the source of the other but that ultimately becomes alienated by the more dominant form, 
that is, the difference between abstract and living labor. García Linera writes: “[The] 
only thing that is strictly not-capital but at the same time is its source of life, is living 
labor in its different bodily forms” (ibid., 58),314 in which he includes “agrarian 
communities but also, and now for the most part, the working potentiality in a state of 
                                                
313 “La ‘mundialización’ actual del capital, lejos de poner en duda el pensamiento crítico de Marx, es el 
presupesto histórico sobre el cual él propone indagar las posibilidades de superarlo.”  
314 “lo único que estrictamente es no-capital pero que a la vez es su fuente de vida, es el trabajo-vivo en 
sus diferentes formas corpóreas” 
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fluidity, still not objectivized, that the social worker unfolds in order to create material 
and symbolic wealth” (ibid.).315 What is important to underline here is that, at this stage 
in García Linera’s writing, and this would be the case both for this text as equally for 
Value Form, Community Form, the conditions for the overturning of capital, here 
identified as living labor, are already at hand in capitalism’s current manifestation. It is 
not that we had to wait for the present moment, therefore, in order to be given the right 
material conditions for the overturning of capitalism. Capitalist relations themselves are 
never, writes García Linera, total, and therefore no amount of ‘waiting’ for that 
totalization is either possible or necessary. He writes that: “[speaking] about capital is 
therefore speaking about the remodeling of the world as a whole for its domain, of the 
always growing tendency, but always unfinished” of subjecting all to its domain (ibid., 
57, my emphasis),316 adding that: “In fact, these misinterpretations are at base those 
attitudes of numerous parties and intellectuals that proclaim themselves to be Marxists 
and have worked as fervent adulators of ‘capitalist progress’ given that, according to 
them, that would prepare the conditions for a transition towards socialism” (ibid., 59).317 
Here, García Linera is openly critical of such positions, making it clear that the 
universalization of work (as abstract labor), while opening the material possibilities for 
collective action, nevertheless “means neither that capital has produced this social 
                                                
315 “las comunidades agrarias pero también, y ahora mayoritariamente, la potencialidad laboral en estado 
de fluidez, aún no objetivada, que despliega el trabajador social para crear riqueza material y simbólica.”  
316 “Hablar del capital es hablar entonces de la remodelación del mundo como un todo para su dominio, de 
la tendencia siempre creciente, pero siempre inacabada” 
317 “De hecho, estas malas interpretaciones están en el fondo de las actitudes de numerosos partidos e 
intelectuales que se proclaman marxistas y que se han desempeñado como fervientes aduladores del 
‘progreso capitalista’ pues, según ellos, eso prepararía las condiciones para el tránsito hacia el socialismo.”  
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interdependence in a deliberate way nor that that universalization would directly create 
the imminence of communism” (ibid.).318  
 It is merely a question, then, of the collective possibilities of social work opened 
by capital in any given historical moment, and above all of the fact that this social work, 
universalized as an abstraction of itself in the market, that is, as commodity, is never 
quite equal to itself. There is abstract labor, then there is the living labor that feeds it. It 
is this, I would argue, although García Linera himself never makes such a connection so 
explicit, that we must understand by the title of this collection of essays, as the specter 
that does not sleep, as what is always there as the spectral shadow cast by abstract labor, 
that happens below or beneath labor as commodity (and this is the distinction that I have 
also identified above, in my analysis of Value Form, Community Form, as the absolute 
distinction between the two different forms of value in García Linera’s writing). In the 
following paragraph which I will cite at length, García Linera mentions neither the word 
specter nor the phrase living labor, and yet the entire economy of this passage turns on 
these notions, and give it its strength of force:  
Marx’s attitude in the Manifesto before this globalization of capital is 
simply to understand it in all of its implications and, above all, to 
investigate its counter-finalities, the emancipatory potentials hidden in 
this globalization, but that until today have been given in a deformed and 
twisted form by the dominant capitalist rationality. The Manifesto juggles 
two dimensions of the argument concerning globalization: on the one 
hand, the concrete dimension, which is that globalization is created by 
and for capital as an expanded mechanism of accumulation. On the other, 
the abstract dimension, awakened but permanently repressed by the first, 
which speaks of this positive interdependence of human beings on a 
                                                
318 “no significa ni que el capital ha producido esta interdependencia social deliberadamente ni que la sola 
presencia de esa universalización vaya directamente a crear la inminencia del comunismo.”  
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global scale and whose transcendence goes much further that that 
miserable and frustrating way in which capitalism has been unraveling up 
until today. (ibid.) 319 
 
 This ‘abstract dimension,’ which is the human potential of transforming the 
conditions of labor beyond those that have been given and made possible by the 
development of capitalism itself, turns upon the distinction between abstract and living 
labor. This difference which is internal to a universalized form of social labor can open 
up, potentially, to the demolition of the category of the ‘concrete’ dimension of 
globalization or, to paraphrase the openings lines of the essay, the ‘existent’ as that 
which is radically critiqued by Marxism, and substitute it for this abstract dimension. 
This possibility, that Álvaro García Linera calls self-emancipation or self-determination, 
only makes sense from the framework of this double dimension of labor. The author 
writes:  
That this radical superseding of the capitalist form of globalization be 
feasible or given at hand [factible], is given by the forceful argument that 
capital is simply the (alienated) fruit of social labor, a form of social labor 
that should give way, through a self-transformation which is nothing 
other than self-emancipation, to another form of universal social-labor in 
which [this labor] becomes capable of recognizing itself and enjoying the 
product of its capacities in common. (ibid., 60) 320 
                                                
319 “La actitud de Marx en el Manifiesto frente a esta globalización del capital es sencillamente entenderla 
en todas sus implicaciones y, por sobre todo, indagar sus contrafinalidades, las potencias emancipativas 
ocultas en esta globalización, pero que hasta hoy se dan deformadas y retorcidas por la racionalidad 
capitalista dominante. El Manifiesto maneja dos dimensiones argumentales sobre la globalización: por una 
parte, la concreta, que es la globalización creada por y para el capital como mecanismo de acumulación 
ampliada. Pero otro, la abstracta, despertada pero permanentemente reprimida por la primera, que habla 
de esta interdependencia positiva de los seres humanos a nivel planetario y cuya trascendencia va 
muchísimo más allá de esa miserable y frustrante manera en que se desenvuelve hasta hoy en el 
capitalismo.’  
320 “El que esta superación radical de la forma capitalista de la globalización sea factible, viene dado por el 
contundente argumento de que el capital es simplemente fruto (enajenado) del trabajo social, una forma de 
ese trabajo social que deberá dar lugar, por auto-transformación que no es otra cosa que auto-
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 These counter-finalities of capitalism produced from within the system itself, that 
are given by and through labor and its own self-division between abstract and living 
labor: these are the potentially emancipating forces which it is, writes García Linera, the 
responsibility of Marxists “to understand and to strengthen by any means within reach” 
(ibid.).321 In other words, the development of capitalism itself is not sufficient to be able 
to eventually give way to a new order beyond capitalism. It should not be taken for 
granted, as more traditional readings of Marxism might have had it, that the natural 
motor of history, driven by the weaknesses that capitalism itself brings to the surface, 
will bring about a revolution of the proletariat inevitably and without need for self-
organization. “This potentiality,” writes García Linera, “for it to come to fruition, will 
never do so as a result of the advance of capital itself” (ibid., 65).322 It is only those who 
are themselves the bearers of living labor that have the potential to bring about this 
emancipatory organization by and for themselves: “it is necessary for those same bodies 
that are bearers of living labor to be able to recognize one another, desire one another, 
appropriate materially and directly what they do in common, that is, on a planetary 
scale” (ibid.).323 It is a question of being able to determine for oneself, over and above 
the determination that it is given within the capitalist structure, the meaning of one’s 
                                                                                                                                           
emancipación, a otra forma del trabajo social-universal en la que sea capaz de reconocerse y disfrutar en 
común del producto de sus capacidades” 
321 “entender y potenciar por todos los medios al alcance.”  
322 “esta potencialidad, para que brote, jamás lo hará por obra del propio avance del capital” 
323 “se necesita que los propios portadores corporales del trabajo vivo sean capaces de reconocerse, de 
desearse, de apropiarse material y directamente de lo que ellos hacen en común, esto es, a escala 
planetaria.” 
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labor, “the self-construction of labor before and over what capital does on a daily basis 
with it” (ibid.).324  
 Over and above — it would perhaps be more accurate to say ‘in the folds of’ and 
‘below’ —  the equivalence of all labor as abstract labor, that is, as commodity, in the 
social relations as they are given under capitalism: this is ultimately what is at stake in 
the notions of self-determination and self-emancipation in García Linera’s text. It should 
be clear, already, that there is a direct connection between the way in which García 
Linera envisages this emancipatory force in this essay and the specific way in which he 
develops the potentially anti-capitalist force of the community form in Value Form, 
Community Form. Ultimately, it is the fact that the community form prevents an absolute 
abstraction of social labor in a system of general equivalence that makes it so 
intellectually appealing to García Linera. The universalization of the ayllu would be no 
different in character perhaps, regardless of the specific historical genealogy that his 
study of the Andean communities involves, from a general appropriation of the 
determination of labor’s meaning by a working class developed within the folds of 
capitalist development itself. Once again, the determinant characteristic in each case is 
the gap contained within the same labor force between living and abstract labor, where 
the abstraction of labor in a system of general equivalence (labor as commodity under 
capitalism) does not mean that the living labor beneath the surface of that abstraction is 
eliminated. It continues to be the source that feeds the machine of capitalism at the same 
time as being the condition of possibility for an overturning of that same machine. It is 
                                                
324 “la autoconstrucción del trabajo frente y por encima de la que el capital hace cotidianamente de ellos.” 
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infinitely irreducible to abstract labor as commodity value. It is important to reiterate 
that this possibility is only potential, but it is a potentiality whose facticity is given in 
capital in every moment. Living labor, as the other side or the underside of abstract 
labor, does not need to ‘wait’ for capitalism to offer its ideal conditions. Its ideal 
conditions must be appropriated by that living labor in and for itself, but only on the 
basis of conditions that are at hand, in the facticity of the present (factible, says García 
Linera in the quote above, meaning both viable but also real, at hand).  
 The rest of the essay develops in what appears to be, however, an altogether 
different direction. In the second thesis, García Linera devotes his energy to presenting 
the way in which the conditions of capitalism have changed in the contemporary world 
as a result of the real subsumption of labor, and draws some conclusions about what this 
means for working conditions. What García Linera outlines, in a form compatible with 
his work more generally on the new working class condition under post-neoliberal-
reform Bolivia that he undertakes in the late 1990s, is how the current conditions of 
capitalism, reconfigured following the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, have radically 
changed the possibilities for mobilizing resistance to the domain of capital. Whereas 
Marx believed that the crisis of capitalism brought about through its own self-destructive 
tendencies would produce the necessary social discontent to bring about its supersession, 
García Linera shows that capitalism is dynamic and has a powerful capacity to be 
reconfigured by the classes in whose interest it operates. Hence, the crisis of capitalism 
in Latin America in the 1970s leads not, he explains, to a general crisis of capitalism, but 
to its renewal in the so-called neoliberal reforms. What we are witnessing today as a 
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result, claims García Linera, is a very different quality of organized resistance to 
capitalism, where much of this resistance is “anchored in a horizon defined by the past,” 
(ibid. 84),325 where the author provides the example of the miners’ unions. The urgent 
task for Marxism today, then, would be to identify the new sites of resistance to 
capitalism that work not in a mythical past but rather in those real opportunities where 
the collective social labor is produced. He writes:  
We are not only in front of a reorganization of proletarian labor 
conditions; there unfolds before our eyes the springing forth of a new 
type of proletariat, of a new link between global working activities, that 
is, a new form of relating to one another among workers on a planetary 
scale which modifies those that have been worked out up until now, and 
with it, we are bearing witness to a distinct way of linking formally 
subsumed global capital with economic (productive, circulatory and 
financial) branches truly subsumed to capital. (ibid., 87)326 
 
 The third thesis thus confronts the question, somehow necessitated by García 
Linera’s own reading of Marx, of class, of how classes are formed within the 
development of capital and how they become able to organize themselves internally as a 
class, that is, with consciousness of themselves as forming part of a class (not only a 
class in itself, writes García Linera in a strongly Hegelian formula, but also for itself). In 
his reading of Marx, the author clarifies that, in the last instance, classes should not be 
understood to be simply expressions of who does and who does not own the conditions 
of production, that is, as a question of private property. Classes are the antagonistic 
                                                
325 “ancladas en un horizonte definido por el pasado.” 
326 “No sólo estamos ante una reorganización de las condiciones de trabajo del proletariado; también se 
despliega ante nuestros ojos el surgimiento de un nuevo tipo de proletariado, de una nueva vinculación 
entre las actividades laborales mundiales, eso es, una nueva forma de relacionamiento entre los 
trabajadores a escala planetaria que modifica las hasta aquí labradas, y con ello, estamos presenciando una 
manera distinta de vinculamiento de las actividades formalmente subsumidas al capital mundial con las 
ramas económicas (productivas, circulatorias y financieras) realmente subsumidas al capital.”  
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relations of force that operate in society and are expressed, in capitalism, between those 
who organize themselves for the eventual expansion of capitalist relations and those that 
are dispossessed of their own self-determination over their conditions of (re)production 
by those forces. “The importance,” García Linera clarifies for the reader, “of this 
categorical way of expressing modern social relations resides in the fact that it allows us 
to overcome the bureaucratic-juridical conceptions that have marked the political 
experience of the last seventy years [of Marxism in particular]” (ibid., 101).327  
 The proletariat is not, therefore, simply a historical given for García Linera. It 
must be constructed in the same way that the bourgeois, as a class, constructs itself on 
the basis of a sense of shared interests and historical destiny, within a specific set of 
relations of force. This is not to say that it is not possible to identify or classify a certain 
group of people according to the notion that they do not own their conditions of 
production, that the product of their surplus labor is for another. Yet, for García Linera, 
just as important is the social construction of class by which a class is able to think itself 
and act as such. This is especially difficult in the contemporary world given that the 
current conditions of capitalism, the author affirms, bear witness to the fragmentation of 
the old social order which makes it difficult for the new proletariat to recognize and 
organize themselves as such. Given that this is the case, then, the task for a Marxist 
philosophy would be to think the possibility of “swerving the field of classes in another 
direction, defining labor in another way as a result of its own labor, [this is] the problem 
                                                
327 “La importancia de esta manera categorial de la expresión de las relaciones sociales modernas radica en 
que permite superar las concepciones burocrático-juridicistas que han marcado la experiencia política de 
los últimos setenta años.”  
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of the construction of the laborer for him or herself … the historical-material problem of 
self-determination” (ibid., 114).328  
 The fourth and final thesis, therefore, is committed to describing the process by 
which such a ‘swerve’ or change of historical direction can be thought. García Linera 
immediately rejects as a viable option the possibility of a political class which would 
claim to be a vanguard of the proletariat, presuming therefore to somehow represent or 
direct the proletariat on their behalf. At this stage of his work, therefore, there is no 
possibility of a ‘revolution from above’ for the future vice president. Regarding this 
outdated mode of thinking about the socialist revolution, he writes: “We are before the 
fetishism of working-class consciousness that presents itself as a subordinated 
consciousness, dependent and tributary of the treacherous consciousness of capital” 
(ibid., 115).329 Instead, then, García Linera adopts the notion of ‘revolutionary party’ in 
the strict sense that it adopts for Marx in his Manifesto, in order to argue that a 
revolution that overturns the capitalist system can only be carried out by the workers 
themselves, by re-appropriating the meaning of their labor for themselves, and thereby 
transforming their very conditions. García Linera claims that, according to Marx, the 
‘class political party’ in a strict sense is the construction of a revolutionary class, as a 
social class which confronts and transforms its own working conditions. He writes: 
“Marx calls this material movement of self-constitution, that is [also] a process of 
                                                
328 “curvear en otra dirección el campo de las clases, definir de otra manera el trabajo por el propio 
trabajo, es un problema de construcción para sí del trabajador … es el problema histórico-material de la 
auto-determinación.”  
329 “Estamos ante el fetichismo de la conciencia obrera que se presenta como conciencia subordinada, 
dependiente y tributaria de la conciencia alevosa del capital.”  
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general self-determination before capital, class political party” (ibid., 121, emphasis in 
the original). For the author, then, against the idea of a revolutionary vanguard, and 
against the idea that the proletariat is forever condemned to being reabsorbed by the 
plasticity of capitalism, there is another option:  
[That] the laborer works at continuously breaking these tiered chains of 
submission; first, individually before the boss, the capitalist individual, 
which supposes the erosion of complacency with internal fears, weariness 
of abuse, [and] the recuperation of a human dignity buried beneath this 
bartered docility. This is the beginning of a step-by-step ascension of 
breakages with his/her former being, therefore of antagonisms with the 
order of capital, that will eventually mark the beginning of the 
constitution of the worker in class by his/her own affirmation. (ibid., 
emphasis in the original)330  
 
 This is no doubt a curious form of expressing the slow steps on the way to the 
self-affirmation of one’s own conditions of production. The collective constitution of a 
class that is able to determine its own conditions, carrying out a certain process of self-
emancipation, is thus given as the act of uniquely individual decisions in each case, ones 
whose responsibility can never be passed onto another, and which is ultimately about 
breaking with being, or with a former being, the being, presumably, of a bartered or 
negotiated docility. In what now appears as an about-face in García Linera’s reasoning, 
however, we nevertheless find that the conception of social class construction is given in 
a somewhat traditional form here, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say a strictly 
metaphysical form inherited by Hegel. Whether this decision is made on a purely 
                                                
330 “que el obrero vaya rompiendo estas cadenas escalonadas de sumisión; primero individualmente frente 
al patrón, al capitalista individual, lo cual supone la erosión de las complacencia con los miedos internos, 
el hastío con el abuso, la recuperación de una dignidad humana enterrada detrás de la docilidad regateada. 
Éste es el inicio de una serie escalonada de rupturas con el antiguo ser, por tanto de antagonismos con las 
disposiciones del capital, que estará dando inicio a la constitución del obrero en clase por afirmación 
propia.” 
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individual basis or not, what is at stake in the turning of tables against capitalism is the 
formation of a class which is not only in itself (an sich) but is also for itself (für sich). 
However, there is no sense of historical inevitability for such a movement from the in 
itself to the for itself, and there is no specific class or feature which would define the 
revolutionary class as such. The conditions for the emergence of a working class as a 
revolutionary class suddenly become an epistemologically murky area, where there is a 
gap between the real and ideal elements of class which there appears to be no way of 
breaching. Furthermore, the question of freedom is taken for granted in García Linera’s 
writings. An important question arises in the text: if the worker is determined by the 
conditions of capital which allow for his/her emergence as a class category in the first 
place, then on what basis can García Linera assume to claim that there is some space of 
autonomy from which such resistance could spring forth? The question can only be 
resolved with reference to that insomniac specter with which García Linera opened his 
essay but to which now he does not return, like the forgotten question of his own 
investigation. It is living labor, as the division internal to labor between its own 
abstraction and the source of its production, which alone is able to explain this space for 
the freedom of decision. It is precisely because such labor cannot be reduced to its 
abstraction as commodity, because it is more than how it is valued in the capitalist 
system, because it is entirely irreducible to all calculation and all equivalence, even, that 
García Linera is able to make claim to a space where the meaning of labor is internally 
contestable. This, however, is never brought up in the second half of the essay and 
remains, therefore, only a hypothetical resolution to a tension between the class in itself 
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and the class for itself that remains otherwise reducible to an extremely orthodox 
Hegelianism.  
 This ‘forgotten question’ of the essence of living labor should not be considered 
separately from what we will call the double bind that García Linera establishes in his 
writing. This double bind is found equally in his writings on Value Form, Community 
Form and in his four theses on the Communist Manifesto, but I have yet to present it in a 
systematic fashion. Following an in-depth analysis of both of these important texts in the 
work of García Linera, however, we are now in a position in which to appreciate the 
general complexity of this double bind. On the one hand, García Linera’s own Marxism 
or, which is to say the same thing, what he most celebrates in Marx’s texts, is a certain 
scientific objectivity in the analysis of social forms, of its political economy, the ‘thing 
itself,’ we might say, of all Marxist analysis. His attack on the old Bolivian left would be 
their introduction of a normative structure of history, of the reduction of history to a 
transcendent metaphysical principle. This is what Marx does not do, according to García 
Linera, and which allows him to partake in an ‘absolutely objective’ study of social 
forms, of their historicity, without making any comment on the possible future of their 
development. It is as if Marx, and García Linera with him, were able to extract 
themselves from their own implication from within the development of social forms to 
give an analysis which would be accurate and objective in all cases. This is, in the end, a 
structure of thought that results in García Linera analyzing quite simply the historical 
material and symbolic conditions of possibility of social forms, and of possible self-
organization within those social forms. 
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 The role of the Marxist intellectual as one who merely analyzes the conditions 
that make certain forms of social expression possible is, however, unsatisfactory of its 
own accord. In tension with itself, the writing develops a number of lines of possibility 
for escaping from the historical inevitability of the totalization of capital. These two 
texts of García Linera not only analyze the material and symbolic conditions that may 
make an exit out of capitalism possible; they actively seek out and hope for, they desire, 
the possibility of those anti-capitalist social forms to become universal. The political 
power of García Linera’s Marxism, in this sense, lies strictly not with scientific 
objectivity but rather with the imagination, the possibility of thinking alternatives to the 
current state of things, as a ‘critique of the existent,’ to use his words. This imaginative 
thinking would constantly seek to close the gap between the real and the ideal elements 
which make the existent unsatisfactory for Marxism, eventually transcending it so that a 
critique of the existent could lay the ground for a new existence, one of the end of the 
value form and of social conflict in the form of communism.  
 Yet there is seemingly no way out of this paradox, where the possibility of new 
working conditions that would permit the workers’ own self-determination, a possibility 
that García Linera identifies with the community form or forms of social labor that have 
been universalized through capital, would always remain in every case an imaginative 
creation, whose reality is nevertheless seemingly cut off by his own objective analysis of 
real social forms. In Value Form, Community Form, we saw that the Andean 
communities, which can only overturn capitalism if they become universalized social 
forms, grounded their difference to capital on the basis of the fact that, historically, no 
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real subsumption of labor by capital within the communities had taken place. 
Nevertheless, for the author, it is only the expansion of the domain of capital itself which 
allows for a collective social labor capable of colonizing or inhabiting the technologies 
of that capital while at the same time transforming them for its own use. How it would 
be possible, however, within technologies historically defined by a particular regime of 
social value and orientation — that of the value form — to overturn the reign of capital, 
is a question that is suspended. The conditions that may make such a re-inhabitation of 
capitalist ‘worldization’ possible are never found in García Linera’s writing. A similar 
problem emerges when we consider the central tension in the author’s study of the 
Manifesto. On the one hand, García Linera proposes that the construction of class must 
be based on the material conditions provided to the workers at hand which make 
possible the reproduction of a certain social form, that of the capitalist mercantile 
economy. At the same time, it is this social form, which is otherwise apparently 
overdetermined in the author’s analysis, that would bring about entirely new conditions 
of social relations.  
 This tension in García Linera’s writings that I have expressed in terms of a 
‘double bind’ must be considered in both its temporal and spatial dimensions. In its 
temporal dimension, García Linera’s writings on the possibility for an expression of 
resistance against capital, and specifically of a place for indigenous forms of expression 
which have been determined by capitalist colonialism for hundreds of years, finds itself 
oscillating between two historical times: a structure of now and not yet. On the one hand, 
the conditions of social unrest, of the overturning of capitalism by alternative social 
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forms, are always at hand for the author, they simply must be identified and require a 
certain self-organization of the appropriate social forces. Yet, at the same time, that self-
organization that is required, that last and all-important condition for the eventual 
overturning of capitalism, is always yet to come, and one is always left waiting for the 
possible future of a communism whose advent is indeterminable. Within this, the role of 
the intellectual who would look to give support to the eventual overturning of the 
capitalist order is itself ambiguous. This determines the ambiguity of the spatial 
dimension in García Linera’s work. On the one hand, García Linera as intellectual is 
merely an element in the complex mesh of social fabric whose participation in the 
advent of anti-capitalist forces is horizontal, forming part of but not determining or 
directing in any sense the self-organization of the eventual revolutionary class. On the 
other hand, however, there is another sense in which the intellectual, García Linera in 
this case, is that person uniquely able to identify the necessary conditions for the 
overturning of capital, reinstating thus a vertical relationship with those whose social 
labor it most concerns, prescribing, in a certain sense, through the power of the 
imagination, the possible modes of anti-capitalist resistance, or in other words, which 
forms of anti-capitalist resistance are possible. Let us now turn to García Linera’s 
writings on the state to analyze how this double bind is developed in the author’s later 
writings.  
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IV.2.2.2 The State of the Question 
 Pablo Stefanoni remarks the extraordinary transition of García Linera from a 
theorist enormously influenced by the writings of Autonomia to his place as ideologue of 
the new Plurinational State of Bolivia.331 The influence of the Italian Autonomia 
movement is already evidenced in his analysis of the Communist Manifesto that we have 
analyzed above. Rejecting the state or the party as the platform for political change, 
instead García Linera sees imminent in the conditions of capitalism the possibility for 
workers to take conditions into their own hands, to resist the subsumption of living labor 
to the technologies of capitalism, oriented always towards the reproduction of capital 
and the commodity. This is intensified when, following the rise of new social 
movements in the year 2000, Álvaro García Linera and other members of the Grupo 
Comuna became the principle interpreters of the particularly complex historical 
conjuncture that followed. In the work of each of these authors, ideas inherited from the 
Autonomia were generally important, and the social movements were interpreted as a 
general challenge to the state’s administration of life and capital. Raúl Prada’s 
“Hermeneútica de la violencia” (“Hermeneutics of Violence,” 2000) is particularly 
exemplary of this general expression, where for the author the violence of social 
movements was symptomatic of the potential of the social movements for autopoiesis.  
                                                
331 Stefanoni writes: “Perhaps the most significant political-ideological evolution of García Linera is his 
passage — with few mediations — from his ‘autonomista’ positions towards an almost Hegelian defense 
of the State, as a synthesis of the ‘general will’ [Quizás la evolución político-ideológica más significativa 
de García Linera es su pasaje — con escasas mediaciones — de sus posiciones ‘autonomistas’ hacia una 
defensa casi hegeliana del Estado, como síntesis de la ‘voluntad general.’]” (“Prefacio” 2008, 20).  
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 Nevertheless, the ambivalence of García Linera’s work in the face of these social 
movements remains. Despite an emphasis on the self-productive powers of the social 
movements, we nevertheless continue to see a model of thought which is structured 
around a certain double bind, where the historical possibility for anti-capitalist 
emancipation and the objective conditions of production at hand never quite appear to 
meet, except for as the result of a certain wishful thinking.   
 In order to understand what César Pérez, in a conference given at LASA in 
Chicago in 2014, called García Linera’s ‘transition into the state’ (Pérez 2014), which is 
also therefore a transition from his supposedly more Autonomista to a more Hegelian 
position regarding the state, it becomes necessary to study in some detail the conceptual 
turn which drove this transition — the notion of state-crisis, and of transitional state, 
where the first term is strongly associated with the Autonomista movement and the 
second has a Gramscian origin. It is the first notion which preoccupies the writing of 
Álvaro García Linera in an earlier moment of his writing on the state, and later the 
second becomes more important. Finally, we see García Linera identify the eventual 
‘resolution’ of this state transition around the year 2010. Here, I will briefly outline these 
developments with a view to understanding how it is that García Linera comes to 
understand the role of the state in the contemporary conjuncture. I will do so with a 
specific view to the way in which he would claim that the state may be able to become a 
platform for a transformation of society which is compatible with the social upheaval of 
earlier years, where indigenous resistance and the discourse of emergent indigeneity in 
general had been so important. This will put us in a position to be able to discuss with 
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precision the distinct interpretations of the state transformation and its relationship to 
emergent indigeneity as understood through the figure of García Linera, or ‘readings of 
García Linera’ — both his readings of Bolivian society and its history, as well of the 
readings that are made of him in this respect.  
 First of all, however, it is worth summarizing García Linera’s earlier writings on 
the state. We saw that, in Value Form, Community Form, the state was a particular 
apparatus which appears in Europe, following the prior development of a national body 
symbolically united by technologies of capitalism, as a specific mode of social 
reproduction — that of the value form. The specificity of this state form in the Bolivian 
case, or otherwise the ‘colonial state,’ is that it did not emerge on the basis of this prior 
national unification. It was, rather, a super-imposing of a particular class, but also culture 
and civilization, foreign to those social units over which it preside. It therefore did not 
look over those units as a particular mode of social, economic and political unification, 
but merely as a relation of exploitation of surplus value which nevertheless did not 
change the modes of production native to those subordinate social units. Indeed, this 
conceptualization of the state within a specifically Latin American history is found in 
García Linera’s work from a very early stage. In the essay “América,” which was 
originally published in the author’s De demonios escondidos y momentos de revolución 
under the nom de guerre Qhananchiri in 1991 with the Ofensiva Roja,332 García Linera 
attacks José Aricó for his criticism of Marx’s judgement of the state form in the 
                                                
332 All citations refer to the 2008 re-edition as part of the edited collection of essays by Pablo Stefanoni, La 
potencia plebeya, later published in English as Plebeian Power (2014).  
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Americas. According to García Linera, Aricó criticizes Marx for identifying in the 
American state form what the latter called an “absence of vital social energies,”333 which 
made the state merely a construction imposed over “an institutional vacuum” 
(“América,” 47).334 Aricó claims that Marx’s perspective of the Latin American state is 
grounded in a strong Eurocentric perspective, which he associates with the Hegelian 
notion of ‘peoples without history,’ where Marx would have denied Latin America a 
proper history prior to the state. However, regarding Aricó’s judgement of Marx, García 
Linera asks: 
Is it not possible that the image of the arbitrary character of state 
constructions and the leaving for the future of the conditions for real 
national construction have nothing to do with the Hegelian concept of 
‘peoples without history,’ and that rather it would be the real 
understanding of the role of civil society in the national-state formation? 
(ibid., 48) 335 
 
 For García Linera, then, Marx understood that, for a state to have an effective 
institutional framework, the conditions for unifying the national arena had to be formed 
from within the fabric of civil society — the state could not make those conditions for 
itself. This explains, in part, how García Linera conceives the continuation of indigenous 
forms of life throughout history in a form almost unchanged despite the transformations 
of the country at the level of the state and of its integration in the global capitalist 
markets. “[The nation-state] is and continues to be,” therefore, “an authoritarian, 
                                                
333 “ausencia de las energías vitales sociales” 
334 “un vacío institucional.” Refer to Aricó, José. Marx en América Latina, 1980. 
335 “¿No será más bien que la imagen del carácter arbitrario de las construcciones estatales y el dejar para 
el futuro el surgimiento de condiciones para la construcción nacional real, nada tiene que ver con el 
concepto hegeliano de ‘pueblos sin historia’ y sea más bien la comprensión real del papel de la sociedad 
civil en la formación nacional estatal?”  
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irrational, formal construction” (ibid., 50), he writes, in reference to the Latin American 
case.336  
 This critical perspective on the state also became, in García Linera’s work, a 
specific form of critiquing the former governmental project of mestizaje under the 1952 
National Revolutionary ideology, and particularly in its attempt to subsume indigenous 
subjects to its realm of appropriation. The supposedly nationalist state, according to the 
author, would be the state which “has caused the most havoc over the material and 
spiritual continuity of the indigenous collective entities” (“Narrativa colonial y narrativa 
comunal” 2008, 194).337 He criticizes the state’s supposed synthesis of the national spirit 
under its apparatus, whereby the technologies of power it employs would actually 
undermine indigenous communities, where the articulation of a national spirit to which 
they would be subject is always mediated through a cultural mestizo lens which only 
recognizes Western capitalist forms of organizing the social. Revolutionary nationalism 
was, therefore, for García Linera, the “theologization of state reason” (ibid., 196).338  
 It is not at all clear at this stage of García Linera’s writing how the state can be 
any more than that which it has always been: an apparatus in the service of a particular 
civilizationary model — that of mercantile capitalism. We can say that in general terms 
the problem that García Linera identifies and seeks to resolve lies, on the one hand, with 
a lack of synthetic articulation among society, so that civil society may be able to 
produce its own unifying technologies of social relations. On the other hand, state reason 
                                                
336 “era y es una construcción autoritaria, irracional, formal.”  
337 “mayores estragos ha provocado en la continuidad material y espiritual de las entidades colectivas 
indígenas.”  
338 “teologización de la razón estatal.”  
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would appear to be an attempt to subordinate all differences to a single principle of 
national unity, always based on a Western and ethnocentric mode of production and 
administration.  
 Already by the year 2002, García Linera began to argue very powerfully that the 
current political crisis that Bolivia is living is a specific crisis of the Republican State 
that can be resolved only by a reformation of that same state apparatus. His 
understanding of that crisis is grounded on what he identifies as the three characteristics 
which define the state in general terms: 1) the state is a correlation of forces; 2) it is a set 
of institutions; 3) it is a mobilized system of beliefs (2002, 154-55).339 If the Bolivian 
State is currently in crisis, therefore, this is because there is a crisis in the capacity of the 
state to administer all three of these features under a hegemonic articulation. First of all, 
there is a new articulation of social forces which are acting against the government 
(ibid., 155-56). This has led to what he describes as an underground institutionalization 
of those forces, outside of areas under the control of the state (156-57). Finally, and most 
importantly of all for García Linera, these changes are part of a general shift in the 
horizon of values among society, where a clear ideological division inserts itself between 
the state and civil society, and the state is no longer able to provide unificatory values in 
terms of shared interests and ends (157). Of this last dimension of the state crisis, he 
writes: 
                                                
339 This mode of conceptualizing the state is constant throughout the years running from 2002 until the 
present. We find the same mode of understanding the state articulated in the essays “La crisis del estado y 
las sublevaciones indígena-plebeyas” (2004), “La lucha por el poder el Bolivia” (2005) and “Estado 
Plurinacional” (2007).  
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In the political institutional field, it is clear that the rebellions of the year 
2000 and the recent General Elections have provoked a decline in the 
symbolic receptivity of subaltern classes to the discursive fluxes emitted 
by the economic and political elites previously unified around political 
parties such as the MNR, MIR and ADN, giving way to the multiplication 
of sources of episodic transmissions of a clientelist character and without 
generating hegemony. (ibid., 163-4) 340   
 
 However, the tripartite character of the Bolivian State crisis is supplemented in 
the work of García Linera, from 2004 onwards, with a historical explanation for the 
crisis of a double nature: a crisis of short durée and a crisis of longue durée.341 The crisis 
of short durée belongs to a specific crisis of the neoliberal state form, resulting from 
nearly two decades of privatization measures, leaving civil society fragmented and 
dispossessed. This crisis of short durée draws from the Autonomia perspectives on crisis-
state that attempted to explain the current reconfiguration of capital under post-
Fordism.342 It is, at the same time, what Linera means to describe when he speaks in 
other texts of the triple dimension of the state crisis: social forces, institutions, beliefs, as 
we have described above. 
 The crisis of longue durée therefore introduces a new element of the crisis which 
was not discussed by García Linera in his 2002 text. This element, he explains, belongs 
to the nature of the colonial state itself, of what we might call a neo-colonial distribution 
                                                
340 “En el campo político institucional, está claro que las rebeliones del año 2000 y las elecciones 
generales recientes, han provocado el declive de la receptividad simbólica de las clases subalternas a los 
flujos discursivos emitidos por las élites económicas y políticas anteriormente unificadas en torno a 
partidos políticos como el MNR, MIR y ADN, dando lugar a la multiplicación de las fuentes de emisión / 
clientelar episódica y sin generación de hegemonía.” 
341 Citations refer to the re-edition of the essay “Crisis del Estado y sublevaciones indígena-plebeyas en 
Bolivia” (2008). 
342 For more on this notion in the context of Autonomia, refer to Antonio Negri’s essay “Capitalist 
domination and working class sabotage” (1979).  
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of times and spaces in the organization of society under the state. If this notion of the 
crisis of the colonial state is introduced in 2004, it is more clearly articulated in the 2005 
Comuna publication Límites y horizontes del Estado (Limits and Horizons of the State), 
in an essay titled “La lucha por el poder en Bolivia” (“The Struggle for Power in 
Bolivia”).343 García Linera explains that the colonial nature of the current Bolivian state 
is what has been called the Bolivian apartheid, the exclusion of indigenous cultures and 
modes of life from the public sphere. This, as we have seen in García Linera’s 
reflections on the state, is intimately connected to the formation of a state apparatus that 
was never any more than an instrument for extraction of surplus labor and products from 
communities that were otherwise self-sufficient.344 This would be a problem that 
continued, although now in a transfigured way, into the legacy of the 1952 state. García 
Linera’s claim would therefore be that the current crisis of the state is not only a crisis of 
neoliberalism but also of the historical (neo-)colonial form that that state has adopted. 
What is important about all of this is that it explains, for García Linera, the particular 
importance of the indigenous presence in contemporary popular struggles. García Linera 
writes: “Today, the most striking social movements are or are being directed by Indians; 
they are indigenous forces” (“The Struggle for Power in Bolivia” 2008, 357),345 adding: 
                                                
343 Citations reference the re-edition of the essay in the 2008 publication La potencia plebeya. 
344 García Linera would also later define this specific problem of the colonial state as a difference, in 
Gramscian terms, between an ‘apparent state’ and an ‘integral state,’ where the Republican state had been 
the former and that the current Process of Change represented the transition to the latter. One can refer to 
his speech published through the Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional entitled “Del Estado aparente al 
Estado integral” (2010). For a more detailed analysis of the concept of integral state, one can refer to 
Mouffe 1981.  
345 “Hoy en día, los movimientos sociales más impactantes son o están dirigidos por indios, son fuerzas 
indígenas.”  
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“There is no room for doubt that [these] are the fundamental subjects of the current 
interpellation to the State” (ibid.).346 In sum, he writes: “we can say that the Republican 
state is a state of a mono-ethnic or mono-cultural type and, in this sense, is exclusive and 
racist” (ibid., 359).347  
 A further, and final, dimension to the crisis of the state is developed in 2005 in 
reaction to the claims for autonomy in the eastern lowlands. García Linera calls this 
dimension of the crisis the “spatial fissure of the state,” (ibid., 362),348 and associates its 
emergence with the shift in the production of national development towards the eastern 
lowlands following the neoliberal reforms after 1985. Like the crisis of short durée 
which belongs to the incapacity of the neoliberal patrimonial state to consolidate its 
legitimacy within civil society, the polarization of the country according to classist- and 
ethnic-regional dimensions would have led to a “situation of mutilated hegemonies” 
(ibid., 364).349 García Linera is here responding, of course, to the demand for autonomy 
during the final years of the ‘crisis’ that ran from 2000-2005 from the elites of the 
eastern bloc who sought to bring an end to the instability of those years and protect their 
own interests from popular-indigenous movements.  
 In sum, by 2005, in García Linera’s perspective, the country is torn among three 
axes of the state crisis: a classist crisis, which would be articulated between proposals for 
a continuation of the neoliberal state or a more equitable redistribution of wealth in a 
                                                
346 “No cabe duda de que son los sujetos fundamentales de la actual interpelación al Estado.” 
347 “se puede decir que el Estado republicano es un Estado de tipo monoétnico o monocultural y, en tal 
sentido, excluyente y racista.”  
348 “fisura espacial del Estado” 
349 “situación de hegemonías mutiladas” 
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productive state model; an ethnic crisis, where the two poles would be between the 
continuation of a mono-cultural state or the construction of communal models of 
governance; and, finally, a regional crisis, where the proposal would be between a 
unificatory state system or autonomy in the name of protecting and conserving economic 
interests in a new, racist and right-wing nation-building project.  
 What is clear in any case is that the disfigurement of the Republican state’s 
capacity to provide a political articulation of society is regarded at this stage in the 
thought of García Linera as being disastrous. Borrowing the term from Antonio 
Gramsci, he claims that the moment of 2005 (that is, just before the collapse of the 
neoliberal state and the subsequent elections in which García Linera would be voted vice 
president) was a “catastrophic equilibrium” (ibid., 372),350 a situation which emerges 
when “there does not exist the capacity for a complete hegemony but rather for 
unresolved confrontations for that hegemony between two protohegemonies” (ibid.).351  
 Two observations are important here for a full understanding of how García 
Linera imagines the state crisis. The first is that, already by the year 2002, García Linera 
perceives the state crisis as a reconfiguration of forces whose only possibility of 
resolution is found in the same state that has gone into crisis. There is no solution outside 
of the state for the author that can resolve the current crisis, which is both a threat and 
opportunity to the social movements that have brought it about. If in 2002 this position is 
                                                
350 “empate catastrófico.” Refer to Gramsci on the notion of catastrophic equilibrium: “Caesarism and 
‘Catastrophic’ Equilibrium of Politico-Social Forces” (2000).  
351 “no existe la capacidad de una hegemonía completa sino de una confrontación irresuelta por esa 
hegemonía entre dos protohegemonías”  
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more ambiguous,352 by 2004 it is stated in the clearest of terms: “In all, it is well 
known,” writes García Linera, “that state crises cannot last long because there is no 
society that supports long periods of uncertainty and vacuity of political articulation” 
(qtd in “Crisis de Estado y sublevaciones” 2008, 343).353 In other words, for García 
Linera there was no platform other than the state that could bring resolution to the 
moment of impasse that had been reached in 2005 in Bolivia. 
 The second observation, equally important, is that by the year 2005, only months 
before the social turmoil that would result in the election of Evo Morales and the MAS 
and with it the ‘refoundation’ of the state based on a constitutional reform, the struggle 
over the eventual resolution of the crisis — which, we should be reminded, for García 
Linera could only be resolved by the eventual reformation of the state — adopted only 
two horizons of possibility. One was a left-wing reformation of the state apparatus based 
on an “indigenous-popular” (349)354 hegemony (this would include the popular classes, 
the indigenous and above all communal forms of life, and a reunification of the state) or 
a modernizing, elitist and racist state project that threatened to divide the country (i.e. 
                                                
352 García Linera writes: “Thinking the state beyond the state, working on a new institutionality of 
government from the basis of an integration within the superior hierarchies of the state, of the 
organizational networks that the very same society has created autonomously: this is, at this stage, an 
unavoidable requirement for overcoming the conservative epistemological obstacles in the political arena 
that have done nothing but increase the unresolvedness of structural conflicts and the uncertainty of 
society [Pensar el estado más allá del estado, trabajar una nueva institucionalidad de gobierno a partir de la 
integración, en las jerarquías superiores del estado, de las redes organizativas que la misma sociedad ha 
creado de manera / autónoma es, a estas alturas, un requerimiento ineludible para saltar los obstáculos 
epistemológicos conservadores en la acción política que no hace más que incrementar la irresolución de 
los conflictos estructurales y la incertidumbre social]” (“El ocaso de un ciclo estatal” 2002, 164-65, my 
emphasis).  
353 “Con todo, es sabido que las crisis estatales no pueden durar mucho porque no hay sociedad que 
soporte largos períodos de incertidumbre y vacío de articulación política.” 
354 “indígena-plebey[a]” 
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that of the so-called Camba nation). This particular vision of the nature of the crisis 
would, as we will see, affect how García Linera would come to celebrate the eventual 
constitutional reforms of the Plurinational State of Bolivia as a victory for left-
indigenous sectors.  
 As early as 2002, then, García Linera would develop a proposal for state reform 
which he would continue to advocate over the following years, and which would come 
to present, in some way or another, an ‘official’ version of the meaning of the new 
Plurinational State of Bolivia.355 The proposal was based on a very precise reading of the 
limits of the current patrimonial neoliberal state which was currently in power, and 
inherited the (neo-)colonial state apparatus before it. As we have already noted, this state 
had ultimately been unable to provide a national synthesis in García Linera’s eyes, it was 
an instrument of power super-imposed over other civilizations and not an expression of 
national sprit. The limit of the Republican state adopted two dimensions. The first was, 
and despite the multicultural or multinational character of Bolivian society, that the 
current state was “monolingual and monocultural in terms of Bolivian Spanish-speaking 
cultural identity” (“Autonomías indígenas y Estado multinacional” 2008, 226).356 That 
is, it excluded a large proportion of the population from participating in the public and 
political sphere as a result of the unique use of Spanish and of the monopoly of Western 
cultural values. The second dimension was that despite there being, according to García 
Linera, four types of economies or what he calls civilizations which lived side by side in 
                                                
355 This proposal is developed in terms almost unchanged between 2002 and 2007 in “El ocaso de un ciclo 
estatal” (2002), “Crisis del estado y sublevaciones indígeno-plebeyas” (2004), “La lucha por el poder en 
Bolivia” (2005) and “Estado plurinacional” (2007).  
356 “monolingüe y monocultural en términos de la identidad cultural boliviana castellanohablante.”  
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Bolivia (modern capitalist, informal/domestic, communal and Amazonian), the 
management of national wealth and political decision-making was made exclusively in 
the realm of techniques and habits belonging to only one of these civilizationary models: 
that of modern, mercantile capitalism. He explains this second dimension thus:  
Due to the qualities of its historical formation, the complex social reality 
of Bolivia has produced various techniques of political democratic 
behavior, and an effective democratic state would be required to 
recognize on a large scale, in the sphere of fundamental decision making 
of public policies, the institutionalized legitimacy of the different ways of 
practicing democratizing political power. (ibid., 265) 357 
 
 A reformation of the state would therefore, he claims, have three possible options 
in the contemporary conjuncture. The first would be a modern-state type that would seek 
to eradicate other non-modern forms of life based on different cultural or civilizational 
models in order to guarantee a unifying state model. The second would be a communal 
model based on Indianist and katarista proposals. Appearing to reject both, García 
Linera instead suggests that there is a third possibility of reforming the state so that it is 
both multicultural/multinational and multicivilizational in character (in the last essay 
where he speaks of this proposal, in 2007, he has already replaced the term 
‘multinational’ for ‘plurinational,’ in consonance with the official state discourse around 
the Constituent Assembly).  
 An important feature of this proposal for a reformation of the state should be 
made immediately apparent: it responds to a very specific element of the state crisis as 
                                                
357 “Debido a las cualidades de su formación histórica, la compleja realidad social boliviana ha producido 
variadas técnicas de comportamiento político democrático, y un Estado efectivamente democrático 
requeriría reconocer a gran escala, en al ámbito de las tomas de decisión fundamentales de las políticas 
públicas, la legitimidad institucionalizada de las distintas maneras de practicar democratización del poder 
político.”  
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García Linera has envisaged it. It is clear that, if the Bolivian state has been 
monocultural and monocivilizational for the entirety of its Republican history, this is not 
the root of the breakdown in social cohesion caused by the crisis of short durée, which is 
essentially the crisis of the economic model of neoliberalism. The proposal for a 
multicultural and multicivilizational state responds, therefore, to the problem of the 
colonial state, that is, that problem of the state which has been placed above all in 
question by the activism of indigenous mobilizations in the recent history of Bolivia — 
what we have here been studying under the name of emergent indigeneity.358 His 
proposal, in other words, is to take hold of the opportunity presented in the 
contemporary conjuncture by the state crisis, which is a moment of impasse, of political 
vacuity, in order to fill that vacuum with a new state structure and therefore a new 
articulation and synthesis of social organization which does more than merely provide a 
stabilization of the correlation of forces within society. It responds not only to the 
neoliberal crisis, but to the problem of the ‘apparent state,’ to use Gramsci’s term, or of 
the state as merely an instrument of power, in favor of one representative of indigenous 
forms of life – one might say, even, an ‘Indianized’ state.   
 If this is the case, then this inclusion of what has been excluded from the state 
since colonial times — civilizationary models based on non-modern forms, and 
                                                
358 García Linera, in his discussion of the crisis of the long durée, himself associates this resistance with 
the earlier Indianist and katarista movements of the 1960s and 70s that we have analyzed in previous 
chapters, writing: “This new cycle of indigenous mobilization has its antecedent in the 70s, with the 
emergence of the Indianist-katarista movement in intellectual arenas and agrarian unions [Este nuevo 
ciclo de movilización indígena tiene su antecedente en los años setenta, con la emergencia del movimiento 
indianista-katarista en los ámbitos intelectuales y sindicatos agrarios]” (“La lucha por el poder en Bolvia” 
2008, 360).  
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especially in this case indigenous ones — then it is included in a very particular way: as 
a synthesis. This is the sense in which García Linera’s conceptualization of the state 
becomes closely linked to the Hegelian one. Indeed, in his eventual adoption of the 
Gramscian terms ‘apparent state’ and ‘integral state,’ this becomes clear, where the 
integral state would be based on the integration of civil society to the state: the condition 
of possibility for the state itself, according to Hegel.359 In a logical sequence, we can say 
that the following is true for García Linera: 1) that the state is necessary in order to give 
a stable structure to the gains made by the social forces at work in society, who alone 
(that is, without the state), find themselves in impasse, 2) that the state must be a 
legitimate state, capable of synthesizing in its body the common interests and ends of 
civil society, and thus, 3) there is hence a need to provide the ideological synthesis of the 
social in order for such a construction to be possible, based on a more democratic order, 
which ‘decolonizes’ elements of the current state structure.  
 When García Linera speaks of the construction of “indigenous-popular 
hegemony” (“Crisis del Estado y sublevaciones,” 349), therefore, it becomes clear that 
he is speaking of the metamorphosis of the tradition of emergent indigeneity as an 
element of a new national synthesis, overseen by a state apparatus which is also itself 
transformed in the process. Emergent indigeneity is not sidelined or ignored by García 
Linera in his transition into the state: it is rather that emergent indigeneity itself 
transitions with him. The meaning of the place of the indigenous in Bolivian history can 
now no longer, in the readings of García Linera, be separated from the project of a new 
                                                
359 See Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1991).  
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state structure that would claim to be able to synthetically unify these motley elements 
within the same single articulation. That those who find themselves currently in 
opposition to the MAS and to García Linera in particular, whether they be indigenous 
activists or otherwise, speak in terms of a ‘betrayal’ of the original impulse behind the 
popular struggles of 2000-2005, does nothing but confirm that the current debates over 
emergent indigeneity cannot be understood outside of political transformations that pass 
through the new state project.  
 In the years that followed the 2005 General Elections, then, and throughout the 
conflict over the constituent assembly that brought the country to the verge of civil war 
due to tensions coming from the elites of the eastern lowlands, García Linera came to 
present the new state configuration, now as vice president, as a ‘transitional state,’ 
moving towards a new state form. In a draft version of an essay entitled “State 
Transition. Power Bloc and Point of Bifurcation” which was published in 2008 as part of 
the anthology of texts La potencia plebeya, García Linera reflects on the current 
situation of the country amidst the tensions over the current constituent process. He 
writes at this time that the new state formation is looking for its point of bifurcation, a 
“point of conversion from the disorder of the system into the order and stabilization of 
that same system” (410).360 If the state crisis presented Bolivia with an impasse of social 
forces that was an open-ended process and whose final outcome was unknown, then the 
points of bifurcation would be the closure of this open-ended process, and the 
                                                
360 “punto de conversión del desorden del sistema en orden y estabilización del mismo.” 
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consolidation of a new state order — a new hegemony. In a manner that now appears 
premonitory, García Linera makes the following statement:  
Initially we had believed that the construction of the state was possible 
through mechanisms of dialogue and pacts and, actually, we still believe 
in and support this option, the idea of reaching a point of bifurcation of a 
democratic character, by successive approximations. But the logics of 
reason and history make us think, rather, that increasingly we will 
eventually reach something more like a moment of a tensioning of forces, 
the point of bifurcation, and we will have to see what happens. I think 
that in the case of Bolivia, this moment is closer than it seems. But in any 
case, the point of bifurcation and its qualities are going to define the 
personality and the qualities of the new state in the future. (ibid., 412)361 
 
 The essay is published in its definitive form in 2010 in the last of Comuna’s 
publications, El Estado. Campo de lucha (The State. A Battlefield). García Linera comes 
to supplement the text with what he calls a ‘working hypothesis.’ This working 
hypothesis would be, in sum, that the complex events that led to eventual approval of the 
new Constitution by public vote — and we should not forget that the process of these 
constituent reforms had involved a number of concessions with the powerful bloc of the 
eastern lowland elites — was a closure of the state transition. The new form of the state 
as the Plurinational State of Bolivia would be, then, the final victory of the left as the 
consolidation of an ‘indigenous-popular hegemony.’ This would be confirmed by García 
Linera’s reading of the historical moment in a text published by the Vicepresidencia del 
Estado Plurinacional, which was given the title Las tensiones creativas de la revolución: 
                                                
361 “Inicialmente habíamos creído que era posible la construcción del Estado mediante mecanismos 
dialógicos y pactados y, de hecho, seguimos apostando a ello en la idea de un punto de bifurcación de 
carácter democrático y por aproximaciones sucesivas. Pero las lógicas de la razón y de la historia nos 
hacen pensar que cada vez, más bien, se habrá de llegar más a un momento de tensionamiento de fuerzas, 
al punto de bifurcación, y habrá que ver qué sucede. Creo que en el caso de Bolivia, este momento está 
más cerca de lo que parece. Pero en todo caso, el punto de bifurcación y su cualidad van a definir la 
personalidad y la cualidad del nuevo Estado hacia el porvenir.”  
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La quinta fase del Proceso de Cambio (The Creative Tensions of the Revolution: The 
Fifth Phase of the Process of Change). Describing the different phases of the current 
historical moment, beginning with the crisis of the state as he developed it in previous 
years, he ends by claiming that Bolivia is in the fifth phase of its Process of Change, 
where creative tensions continue to produce changes within the state, but the forms and 
direction of that state itself, as a synthetic articulation of social organization, has already 
been decided.362  
 What happens, however, when from within the Process of Change, one wishes to 
debate the meanings of that consolidation, question the division of the political space, of 
its parts, of whom it supposedly includes and whom it does not include? This 
distribution of the sensible, as has been analyzed in previous chapters, is the primary 
field over which emergent indigeneity has acted, producing a new relation between sense 
and sense which questioned the very foundations of the Bolivian political tradition from 
a certain historical place of enunciation (that of the indigenous peoples). This, 
ultimately, was its power upon irrupting into the Bolivian public, political and cultural 
sphere, by re-reading the place of the indigenous in history. However, now absorbed 
within a general articulation of the synthesis of society which supposedly ‘represents’ 
the indigenous-popular masses, this questioning of the distribution of powers can be 
                                                
362 We have to disagree, on this account, with Jeffrey Webber (2015) when he argues that the period from 
2010 onwards (and he cites in particular the publication Las tensiones creativas de la revolución) would 
represent a break from García Linera’s earlier positions. As we have seen, from the year 2002 onwards, 
García Linera’s position regarding the need for a transformation of the Bolivian state has remained 
constant. What is more, the theoretical reasoning upon which this position is based — a state crisis, the 
articulation of a motley Bolivia — is entirely compatible with his earlier work on the community form and 
the re-proletarianization of Bolivia.  
 406 
interpreted by the current plurinational state ideology in only one of two ways.  At best, 
this questioning would represent the insubordinacy of sectors of civil society who do not 
understand the aims of the movement. At worst — and given that national unification 
was forged in the horizon of a conflict between leftist-popular-indigenous hegemony 
versus rightist-autonomist-capitalist hegemony — those who question the direction of 
the Process of Change become enemies of the revolution.  
 In fact, these two possibilities become indistinguishable in García Linera’s 
official response to the TIPNIS conflict, which was published through the 
Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional in 2013, and is entitled Geopolítica de la 
Amazonía (Geopolitics of the Amazon). It can be considered as the official government 
justification for the TIPNIS highway and condemnation of those who protested against 
the announcement of its being constructed — without, we should remember, the prior 
consultation of those occupying the land, as is guaranteed by the Constitution. It is worth 
following its argument in detail. In a historical analysis of the geopolitics of the 
Amazon, García Linera shows that, unlike the communal forms of the Andean high 
plains that he analyzes in detail in Value Form, Community Form, the numerous 
indigenous societies of the lowland Amazon were never able to mobilize and find strong 
modes of self-representation that could compete with the foreign structures of 
domination which slowly infiltrated the areas they inhabited and appropriated the 
indigenous as labor. Moreover, these structures of foreign domination were themselves 
never ones which belonged to the state, but rather had a relatively autonomous 
relationship to it. These were first the Jesuits, followed by owners of large haciendas. 
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The only organization that in recent years had come to compete with the power of the 
‘hacendal’ elite would be the NGOs which, García Linera reminds the reader, are foreign 
entities, supported and given direction by foreign governments, in spite of their name.  
 However, García Linera claims that this disproportionate balance of power which 
has subjected the indigenous peoples of these areas to abuses and exploitation 
throughout the entire of colonial and postcolonial Bolivian history was challenged when 
the new state order in 2006 attempted to produce new local systems of representation 
that were governmental, that is, autonomous from the strongholds of conservative 
‘hacendal’ power. The author writes that: 
[The] revolutionary government [i.e. the Plurinational State], as well as 
modifying the structure of land holding, which dissociates the routine of 
the hacienda from the action of the state, has driven forward regional 
governmental state mechanisms which act autonomously with respect to 
the dominant territorial bloc. (2013, 51, emphasis in the original)363 
 
 Yet, as the vice president explains, drawing from the writings of Lenin, every 
revolutionary moment necessarily comes with a period of counterrevolution which is 
armed against those changes, especially in the case where a certain class or historical 
bloc’s interests are challenged. This is, effectively, what has taken place today in 
Bolivia, writes García Linera, an “inevitable reaction to revolutionary measures” (ibid., 
12, emphasis in the original).364 This counterrevolution can adopt two dimensions. In the 
first, the forces of counterrevolution act as an organized class. The second is a more 
indirect, diffuse expression of the counterrevolution that takes place in the “heart of the 
                                                
363 “el gobierno revolucionario, a la par de la modificación de la estructura de tenencia de la tierra, que 
disocia la rutina de la hacienda de la acción del Estado, ha impulsado mecanismos estatales de gobierno 
regional que actúan autónomamente respecto del bloque dominante territorial” 
364 “inevitable reacción a las medidas revolucionarias”  
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people,” (ibid., 13),365 writes the author, citing Mao Tse-tung. The reaction against the 
announcement of plans to build a highway through the TIPNIS would be, therefore, an 
example of the second kind of protest for the author. He writes: 
The tragic route of history is unravelling in such a way that the 
counterrevolution can come side by side with a faction of [the 
revolution’s] own constructors who, without necessarily proposing it as 
such, [but rather] as a consequence of the exacerbation of its corporative, 
regional or sectorial particularism, and upon not taking into account the 
general unfolding of the total correlations of social forces at the national 
and international level, end up defending the interests of the conservative 
forces of the right and finish by undermining their very own revolutionary 
process. This is exactly what has just happened in the so-called “TIPNIS 
march.” (ibid., 14) 366 
 
 Are the participants of the TIPNIS March innocent victims of the 
counterrevolution that did not know better, or are they active enemies of the revolution? 
There is, in this account, a certain undecidability between these two options, though it 
would appear that the author tends to veer towards the first interpretation. What is 
important here is not whether García Linera’s historical analysis is correct. Faced with a 
situation where a number of indigenous peoples have been historically subjected to 
abuses by powerful economic elites, new systems of representation, albeit subordinated 
to the centralization of a state which would presume to be a ‘synthesis’ of the 
indigenous-popular hegemony, would certainly provide a counter-force to the capitalist 
                                                
365 “seno del pueblo” 
366 “La ruta trágica de la historia se desenvuelve de tal manera que la contrarrevolución puede venir de la 
mano de una facción de sus propios constructores que, sin necesariamente proponérselo, como 
consecuencia de la exacerbación de su particularismo corporativo, regional o sectorial, y al no tomar en 
cuenta el despliegue general de las correlaciones de fuerzas sociales totales a nivel nacional e 
internacional, acaban defendiendo los intereses de las fuerzas conservadoras de la derecha y terminan 
socavando su propio proceso revolucionario. Esto es justamente lo que viene sucediendo con la 
denominada ‘marcha del TIPNIS.’” 
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elite’s own hegemony in the lowland Amazon. And, no doubt, it would be a more 
equitable system of representation. This is ultimately, if we are to believe García Linera 
— and the debate goes on as to the real intentions of the government — the reason for 
the necessity for a highway which connects the Department of Beni to the rest of the 
country: for the local government representation to be more strongly articulated within 
the general national framework.367 In this sense, the reasoning of the government and of 
García Linera in particular is logically sound.  
 It seems that we have no other choice, given the unresolved nature of the debates 
surrounding the TIPNIS, than to take García Linera at his word in good faith. Yet what 
is preoccupying in this case is that the voice of indigenous subjects as such becomes 
erased in the unfolding of the vice president’s general argumentation. The framework of 
history that the author provides systematizes the possible interpretation of the actions of 
social actors according to a number of responses which must ultimately conform to that 
same framework: you are either with us or you are against us, it seems to say. One can 
argue that what leftist intellectuals such as Slavoj Žižek have tried to demonstrate, 
however, is that even what is often perceived as right-wing fundamentalism in the 
contemporary world is at its base a manifestation of discontent among those whose 
interests the left would supposedly most represent, and therefore a failure of the left to 
                                                
367 Regarding the construction of the TIPNIS highway, García Linera writes: “if one has the intellectual 
honesty and courage to look carefully at a map of Bolivia, one would realize that if in truth there exists 
some way of dismantling the current geopolitics of the foreign occupation of the Amazon, it is precisely 
through the construction of this highway [si uno tiene la valentía y honestidad intelectual de mirar 
detenidamente un mapa de Bolivia, podrá darse cuenta de que si en verdad existe alguna medida que 
desmantale la actual geopolítica de ocupación extranjera de la Amazonía, es precisamente la construcción 
de este camino]” (2013, 59).  
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understand the particular responses of that population.368 The point is that whether or not 
the consequences of the actions of indigenous groups in protesting against the TIPNIS 
highway actually runs counter to their own interests is negligible: at the limit — Kant 
knew this all too well369 — the consequences of one’s actions can never be entirely 
anticipated prior to the act. What is important is that the sense of injustice — one that is 
irreducible to the state juridical system or the official ethicality of state history — that 
became visible in the collective decision to march against the government announcement 
to build a highway through the TIPNIS becomes absorbed and processed in a centralized 
state logic that silences the possibility of response on behalf of those actors that are 
neither of the revolution nor of the counterrevolution — and are thus purged silently by 
default.  
 What happened, in all this process, to the universalization of the ayllu, of the 
worker re-appropriating the conditions of labor for his or her own ends? García Linera 
does not deny that the current conjuncture is unsatisfactory from the perspective of 
communism. He continues to insist that if there is to be a communist order in the future, 
since the “general horizon of the era is communist” (qtd in Bosteels 2011, 226-7), then 
this communism can only come (and this would be consistent, whatever criticism we 
may have of it, with the general positions that the author expresses even from his earliest 
work) through a universalized replacement of the mercantile social form by other social 
forms, on a global scale. In Geopolitics of the Amazon, García Linera reiterates this 
                                                
368 See in particular his take on the Charlie Hebdo affair in Paris, published in the New Statesman (“Slavoj 
Žižek on the Charlie Hebdo massacre: Are the worst really full of passionate intensity?” 2015).  
369 This epistemological limit is a fundamental basis for Kant’s categorical imperative. Refer, for example, 
to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1998).  
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point, in a clear response to those that would accuse him and the government of the 
MAS of staging a false revolution:  
The only mode of production that will overcome capitalism is 
communism, the communitarization of the production of the material life 
of society. And that mode of production does not exist in pieces, it can 
only exist on a planetary level. But while that is not given, the only thing 
that is left is to fight. (ibid., 105, emphasis in the original) 370 
 
 One should perhaps not disregard too flippantly the significance of an ideologue 
of the state who, in a world which continues to be largely ruled by neoliberal hegemony, 
would call upon the people of the nation to fight for the eventual overcoming of 
capitalism and regularly explain Marxist principles to the citizens of that state, citing 
Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung. Nevertheless, it would appear that, in the double bind 
that we detected from the earliest moments of García Linera’s work, a small but 
important transformation has taken place. Between the two historical times that defined 
the possible horizon of communist action — one of the immediate irreducibility of living 
labor to all forms of extraction and equivalence, the other of the not yet which needed to 
await the right historical conditions, understood through a precise historical analysis of 
what those conditions were, performed by none other than the intellectual him- or herself 
— it would appear here that the second of these historical times has won out in the work 
of García Linera. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there has taken place 
a certain overlap or synthesis of the two times. The now of living labor is no longer 
infinitely irreducible to the state, which would be able to prepare the ground for the 
                                                
370 “El único modo de producción que supera el capitalismo es el comunismo, la comunitarización de la 
producción de la vida material de la sociedad. Y ese modo de producción no existe por pedazos, sólo 
puede existir a nivel planetario. Pero mientras eso no se dé, lo único que queda es la lucha.”  
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communism to come. The Plurinational State in García Linera’s writing embodies, in a 
sense, a certain suture of that double bind between two historical times, and becomes 
master of both of its times. What is clear is that, in the necessity to defend the revolution, 
the immediate communist struggle of the people is postponed for a synthetic operation of 
society carried out from above.  
 
IV.3 Conclusion: New Readings of García Linera and of History 
 Overall, and in spite of all criticism that we can and should make of the current 
Bolivian process, there is no doubt about the fact that the transformations that have taken 
place over the last decade in Bolivia should be celebrated, in general terms, and for the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia in particular. Faced with widespread civil unrest that put 
the Bolivian state into crisis but found no cohesive alternatives in the moment, the threat 
of a right-wing military coup, and the difficulty of confronting a political tradition which 
had been built upon an elite which excluded the large majority of the population, an 
electoral compromise was found for a left-wing reformation with relatively little conflict 
ensuing as a consequence. Gutiérrez Aguilar, who nevertheless finds the overall 
direction of the MAS government since 2005 disappointing, agrees that: 
Without proposing the classic dichotomy that characterizes any electoral 
effort as reformist, comparing it to a hypothetical revolutionary purism 
that emerges solely from social struggle, I think that the electoral 
agreements, the parliamentary cycles and procedures, and the plethora of 
alliances that MAS created captured part of the disruptive and 
deconstructing force that vibrantly sprouted out of the Chapare, at least in 
2002. At the same time, they undoubtedly contributed to consolidating a 
political structure that was capable of dealing with the even more acute 
instability to come in 2003 and 2005. And they did so without throwing 
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the country and its entire mobilized population into a disastrous civil war. 
(2014, 96) 
 
 Furthermore, it should be emphasized that, in agreement with Bruno Bosteels, 
the current transformation of the state in its relation to civil society, the narrative that is 
being produced around the meaning of the so-called Process of Change and its ensuing 
adjustments to the coordinates of ideological discourses in the country, provides an 
opening to the possibility of left-wing discourse in the public sphere that makes the 
country an important site of political experimentation, and which has consequences for 
the Latin American and global left as a whole. In a recent text published in the Bolivian 
daily La razón concerning the recent election of the Morales-García Linera partnership 
to their third term in government with a massive majority vote, García Linera reflects on 
these possibilities and the way that they have forced right-wing sectors to adapt their 
own discourse:  
Contrary to the 2009 General Elections, where the right-wing bloc 
attempted to re-establish the privatist logic of primary materials and the 
racialized order of political power, in the 2014 elections, this polarization 
disappeared. Of course! If they took back up the jurassic proposal of 
privatization, they ran the risk of disappearing from the political map. So, 
what they did was adopted it, ambiguously, in a new discourse. “We’ll 
respect nationalization,” “we’ll make it better,” “we’ll negotiate with the 
social organizations,” etc., were the sentences that day by day they 
repeated before an electorate whose categories of perception and of the 
construction of the world had already been secured around the question of 
the nationalization of public resources and the power of social 
organizations. (“El nuevo campo político en Bolivia,” La Razón 
02/11/2014)371  
                                                
371 “A diferencia de las elecciones generales de 2009, donde el bloque de la derecha intentó reflotar la 
lógica privatista de las materias primas y el orden racializado del poder político, en las elecciones de 2014, 
esta polarización desapareció. ¡Claro!, si retomaban la jurásica propuesta de la privatización, corrían el 
riesgo de desaparecer del mapa político. Entonces, lo que hicieron fue adoptar, ambiguamente, en un 
nuevo discurso. “Respetaremos la nacionalización”, “vamos a mejorarla”, “dialogaremos con las 
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 Finally, we can say that it is difficult to provide a critical account of García 
Linera, who seems to have already anticipated his critics ahead of time. The notion that 
he is merely sitting in the co-pilot’s seat of a machine (i.e. the state) composed of a 
correlations of forces which can be directed but cannot be produced or entirely 
controlled is no doubt true. So is it true that the economic model which provides the 
basis of the nation’s wealth cannot be changed overnight, and that there is some 
necessity to build upon that model in accordance with the pressures of global markets. 
On this last point, García Linera says himself in Geopolitics of the Amazon:  
But you all will say, “Obviously the structure of property of the means of 
production and public wealth has changed, and so too has the distributive 
structure of economic surplus, but the mode of production hasn’t 
changed.” Well of course fundamentally it has not changed. How can one 
expect that a small country defend itself daily from the counterrevolution, 
organize the unification of a profoundly fragmented and corporatized 
society, carry forward the most important political revolution of its 
history, change the structure of economic property and structure and 
above all this in 6 years — yes, only 6 years — change in isolation a 
mode of production that has taken 500 years to establish itself and that 
continues to expand? (2013, 11, emphasis in the original) 372 
 
                                                                                                                                           
organizaciones sociales”, etc., fueron las frases que día a día se repitieron ante un electorado cuyas 
categorías de percepción y construcción del mundo ya se habían afianzado en torno a la nacionalización de 
los recursos públicos y al poder de las organizaciones sociales.” 
372 “Pero ustedes dirán,‘evidentemente ha cambiado la estructura de propiedad de los medios de 
producción y de la riqueza pública, y también se ha transformado la estructura distributiva del excedente 
económico, pero no se ha modificado el modo de producción.’ Pues claro que en lo fundamental no se ha 
modificado. ¿Cómo esperar que un país pequeño se defienda cotidianamente de la contrarrevolución, 
organice la unificación de una sociedad profundamente fragmentada y corporatizada, lleve adelante la 
revolución política más importante de su historia, cambie la estructura de propiedad y distribución 
económica, y encima en 6 años — sí, sólo 6 años — cambie de forma aislada un modo de producción que 
tardó más de 500 años en instaurarse y que hoy todavía sigue expandiéndose?”  
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 Overall, I think we can make the claim that, de facto, the situation in Bolivia is of 
a strongly post-hegemonic character.373 This is clear from the fact that, however we are 
to read the conflict between social movements and the MAS that took place between 
2010-2011, the social movements themselves showed a great deal of dynamism and 
energy in bringing into question government plans and forcing negotiations from the 
same government, as well as in questioning the general direction of the political process 
itself. Moreover, the democratic energies of the media and of intellectual life in Bolivia 
remain uniquely lively, where public contestation over the meaning of the current 
Process of Change is not only possible but common, leading to a situation where the 
reading of history itself is by no means closed, and discussions over the meaning of the 
2000-2005 unrest and of the current state transformation remain open. That this is the 
case is confirmed by the numerous accounts that have been analyzed in this chapter 
alone.  
 Despite this, however, the intensity of this post-hegemonic character is a great 
deal reduced in comparison to the more open moment of 2000-2005. If this is the case, it 
                                                
373 The question of post-hegemony has been widely discussed in the field of Latin American Cultural 
Studies, beginning with proposals in Alberto Moreiras (2001) and Gareth Williams (2002) and probably 
most famously theorized by Jon Beasley-Murray in his book of the same name (2010), although each of 
these authors, among others who have used the term, have given it a different meaning. Here, I reject the 
notion that post-hegemony can be understood as a state of affairs beyond the politics of hegemony. 
Precisely, what is post-hegemonic would resist any notion of ‘state.’ It would rather be a certain fluidity of 
the social that resists the capture by a hegemonic apparatus, by what Ernesto Laclau calls “the construction 
of a people” (see Laclau 2006). Post-hegemony, in this sense, would operate according to intensities and 
rhythms rather than simply being a state of what is or what is not present, and would always work within 
the folds of the hegemonic, never entirely independently of it.  
It should also be emphasized, on a separate note, that the statement I am making is therefore a provocative 
one: I am claiming, despite all discussions to the contrary, that what we are witnessing taking place in 
Bolivia is not populism (at least in the sense which it is given by Ernesto Laclau, for whom populism 
would be a hegemonic articulation), though there are no doubt important populist elements to the current 
political process.  
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is partly because the technologies of governmental power, and of the production of its 
ideological coordinates whose official representative is none other than Álvaro García 
Linera himself, have produced an official and officialized synthesis of the Process of 
Change under a very specific rubric of history. This rubric of history determines the 
moment of social unrest from 2000-2005 as a battle for a new state hegemony, divided 
between left-popular-indigenous movements (that would now be represented by the 
MAS) and right-autonomist-capitalist movements (that had been successfully defeated). 
In and through these readings of history, the place of the indigenous in Bolivian public 
life, their specific contribution and their right to a voice over the division of public 
resources and decision-making capacities, also becomes absorbed in this synthetic and 
appropriative apparatus. This has become the new terrain in which both tendencies that 
we have identified with the operation of emergent indigeneity (ethnogenesis and savage 
nomadism) act, producing various effects and affects.  
 One should neither fetishize the state nor the role of García Linera here: as we 
saw in Gutiérrez Aguilar’s accounts of the social movements (2014), it was these same 
social movements who looked to the government to resolve the crisis that took place at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, in other words, who invested themselves and their 
energy into the possibility of a state transformation. If the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
has been constituted, in part, as a synthesis of the people (at least this would be the 
claim), it is also because this ‘people’ has invested itself in the state. What is clear is that 
all further transformations of the meaning of the place of indigeneity in the public sphere 
will henceforth have to take place, for the time being, from within this new framework, 
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which is that of the Bolivian state but also of history, and an apparently new onto-
theological structuration of history which is, nonetheless, internally dynamic.374  
 It is possible to say that the grand majority of what we have called ‘readings of 
García Linera’ — in other words, not only García Linera’s readings but also of the 
readings made of the author’s own writings — revolve around a reading of history that 
questions not the problem of hegemony itself, but simply the meaning of that hegemony. 
Jeffrey Webber, for example, criticizes García Linera’s hegemonic bloc on the account 
that it does not meet up to the claims of the vice president: it is not a social revolution. 
Indianist authors would claim, meanwhile, that the economic destructuration that was 
supposed to take place in favor of the spreading of communal forms of economy did not 
happen. It is not a case, in these accounts, of bringing a claim to hegemony into 
question, but of some hegemonies being good hegemonies, and others being bad ones. 
Even Prada, Gutiérrez Aguilar and Rabasa, where they reject the state, are left at a 
certain impasse where it is not clear if any kind of alternative synthesis becomes 
necessary in order for there to be a more equitable social organization, beyond the state. 
Certainly, this would be the proposal made by Luis Tapia based around the notion of a 
‘common nucleus.’375  
                                                
374 It is for this reason that I must disagree with Beasley-Murray when he writes: “There is no hegemony 
and never has been” (2010, ix). Here, I would argue that it is only possible to understand the 
recomposition of the relationship between state and society through a specific understanding of hegemony, 
whereby hegemony would come to be a certain articulation of the social grounded upon a center of gravity 
found in the notion of the ‘people,’ which in turn is distributed materially and symbolically among 
institutions and discourses which are systematized and ordered according to this center of gravity. I draw 
here, not only on Laclau and Mouffe’s well-known elaboration of hegemony (see Laclau and Mouffe 
1985), but also on what Deleuze and Guattari in their essay “Treatise on Nomadology” called a ‘state’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987) and on Étienne Balibar’s notion of fictive ethnicity (Balibar 1991).  
375 Refer to Tapia (2006). 
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 Is there another option, beyond hegemony? What happened to that ‘other time’ in 
the writings of García Linera, the absolutely irreducible time of living labor that was the 
condition of a relative autonomy in the contemporary Bolivian working class? How to 
move beyond the reduction of history to a vertical relationship between state and society 
which can do nothing but capture and appropriate living expressions of that history to its 
systemization, ordering and hierarchization? How to find a new meaning for the double 
bind within García Linera’s writings, where the aim would not be to reduce the gap of 
this double bind to a synthetic articulation of society, bringing to rest the specters that do 
not sleep, but rather to reinscribe that difference, that différance, back into contemporary 
reflections on the political as its central problem?  
 I insist that, as I presented in the introduction to this dissertation, emergent 
indigeneity should be strictly understood not only as a tendency towards ethnogenesis 
but also and perhaps above all as a savage nomadism: it is not about the crystallization 
of new ideas of indigenous history inscribed onto bodies, which become a metaphor for 
the mythical past and messianic future of the return of the Tawantinsuyu, or now of the 
new project of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Emergent indigeneity redistributes and 
reterritorializes spaces from a particular place of enunciation — that of the indigenous, 
that is, colonized peoples of the country. And in each case where the spaces of the 
distribution of power and of the social, where what it means to be indigenous and the 
place of the indigenous in Bolivian history, where every canonization of official history, 
is challenged from that place of enunciation, emergent indigeneity as savage nomadism 
is at work. This is what Raúl Zibechi identifies as the dispersing power of Aymara 
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communities in El Alto in his analysis. But it is also the processes of subjectivation in 
the intellectual and political work of Indianists and kataristas since the 1960s that I have 
analyzed in this dissertation. It is the more powerful and innovative feature of studies on 
Aymara and Quechua in linguistics and anthropology from the same era, and it is the 
current disputes over the place of the indigenous that are taking place within the nation 
— whether its principal actors are or are not indigenous. It is true that emergent 
indigeneity can only effect and affect this challenge to the Bolivian political tradition 
from within a framework that later must systematize that knowledge, those flows and 
those irruptions, forming the genetic code of a new ethnogenesis. Yet its explosive 
energy is never entirely tamed or captured in this new code, and this ethnogenesis 
continues to feed off the power (potestas) of a savage nomadism.  
 García Linera’s notion, therefore, in his reflections on the state, that every demos 
is reducible to an ethnos must be criticized.376 If an ethnos is the production of a people 
and a nation, what Étienne Balibar calls a fictive ethnicity,377 which is the task of a 
                                                
376 In “Autonomía indígena y Estado multinacional” (2008), García Linera writes the following: “It is 
therefore incoherent to separate ethnos from demos, for in a strict sense all demos is also an ethnos, given 
that at the end of the day the exercise of ‘universal citizenship’ supposes a language of public education, 
of access to the superior state functions and public services, it supposes a history, heroes and festivities 
and commemorations appropriate to the historical narrative of a particular culture, which inevitably 
promotes a particular cultural identity over other identities [Es por tanto incoherente separar el etnos del 
demos, pues en sentido estricto todo demos es también un etnos, ya que al fin y al cabo el ejercicio de la 
‘ciudadanía universal’ supone una lengua de educación pública, de acceso a las funciones estatales 
superiores y a los servicios públicos, supone una historia, unos héroes, unas festividades y 
conmemoraciones adecuadas a la narrativa histórica de una particular cultura, lo que promueve de manera 
inevitable una particular identidad cultural por encima de otras identidades]” (247).  
377 Refer to Balibar (1991). The reference is not merely supplementary. Rather, García Linera himself 
adopts Balibar’s notion of fictive ethnicity in his study of ‘nation,’ precisely on the topic of proposing a 
new state form (“Autonomía indígena y Estado multicultural,” 223). It is perhaps important here to 
emphasize that Balibar himself by no means appears to equate what he understands by fictive ethnicity to 
the real possibility of a democratic synthesis of the nation which would include all of the people within it 
— quite the opposite. His study can be read merely as the analysis of the historical conditions by which 
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(hegemonic) politics for Laclau,378 then the construction of an ethnos cannot be removed 
from the question of political theology, of an onto-theological structuration of history. A 
demos, however, following the writing of Rancière, but also giving it a deconstructive 
inflection, is entirely irreducible to an ethnos, and even perhaps to itself. The demotic 
irruption would be the reminder that a system can never represent the creative energies 
of the vital forces upon which it feeds. It would be the emergent indigeneity that 
interrupts both a fictive ethnicity and an ethnogenesis which also simultaneously 
reabsorbs and re-metabolizes it, but not without failing to capture a certain excess. 
Emergent indigeneity is irreducible to ethnicity, in spite of its name.  
 Finally, we must reinscribe, in the double bind that we have identified with the 
earlier work of Álvaro García Linera and which appears to resolve itself over time 
through a transition into the state, the historical time of living labor into the current 
Process of Change. This time of living labor would be like the Derridean avenir, a time 
completely irreducible to logic, that is, to logos, to its systematization and mechanization 
                                                                                                                                           
the nation-state became the political form of modernity and had such strong hegemonic power throughout 
the modern period. In this sense, he is acutely aware of the necessary exclusions and violences that took 
place in the name of such a nation-building project. Indeed, it can be said that his study of what he calls 
the ‘production of a people’ as the foundation for the modern nation-state is a deconstructive approach to 
the analysis of European bourgeois ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is safe to say that 
this forms part of a larger trajectory in Balibar’s work by which he attempts to analyze the conditions 
which have historically made separations of the common political sphere according to senses of 
anthropocentrism, where those who have been considered less ‘human’ have been excluded from the 
political sphere, whether that exclusion be in terms of race, gender, mental or physical health, or other 
factors (for reflections on this topic in the writings of this author, refer to Balibar 2004). It is also worth 
reiterating, as was stated in the introduction to this dissertation, that emergent indigeneity, even as 
ethnogenesis, must necessarily be considered as different from what Balibar calls fictive ethnicity, insofar 
as the latter is specifically the form of producing a people found in the modern nation-state. Therefore, 
García Linera’s synthesis can only be read as an attempt to convert the ethnogenesis of emergent 
indigeneity into a fictive ethnicity for the new Plurinational State of Bolivia. It is precisely where this logic 
overflows and comes into contradiction with itself that we see the power of an emergent indigeneity that 
has not been entirely captured by the state.   
378 Refer to Laclau 2006.  
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in the apparatus of the state and of the factory, and of the state as factory. The time of 
living labor is only given to us as time remains.379 Such a conception would radically 
challenge the notion, on the one hand, of García Linera’s current claims regarding the 
‘communism to come,’ where the consolidation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
purports to be the groundwork for the eventual resolution of all societal conflict. It 
would also challenge the notion that it were possible, within the state, to provide an 
ideological and structural synthesis of its demographic composition (an ethnogensis, 
which, we must remember, is also a history of a people; it is therefore the 
systematization and mechanization of its internally diverse and irreducible times).  
 The future of the Bolivian Process of Change, what we will have made of that 
future, will surely depend on the new state’s own plastic ability to deconstruct itself, to 
reinscribe the irreducibility of the time of living labor and of emergent indigeneity back 
into its own machinery. It will also depend on the continued ability of emergent 
indigeneity to irrupt into the time of the state and challenge its central, molar logic from 
within. Ultimately, what is at stake is the reinscription into the political space of a time 
                                                
379 I have Jaime Rodríguez Matos to thank for his enlightening understanding of Derridean time as l’avenir 
in what the latter calls, in his study of Hegel, Glas (1986), ‘time remains’ (refer to Rodríguez Matos, 
forthcoming). About this absolutely irreducible time that cannot be counted or measured, that is always in 
a relationship of difference to itself — différance — Rodríguez Matos writes: “The remain(s) of time, or 
that time that is not without being nothing, point to a ‘time,’ or time, that is no longer the time of 
metaphysics, but as such is only ‘time’ if we understand this word catachrestically, as the only word that 
we have available even though it is not up to the task. For this ‘time’ is a formless time, the absence of 
time as a formalized structure of any sort, a time that lies beyond the columns (for instance the two 
columns of Glas). This is an uncertain time” (page 29 of the manuscript). Towards the end of Glas, 
Derrida ultimately tries to question how we are to understand the time of Sa’s (Absolute Knowledge’s) 
own self-presencing, bringing into question whether such a time would ever be available or given as such, 
that is, as pure presence. The consequences of this are important for any thinking of the eventual 
conciliation of the social, whether in the form of Kant’s eternal peace or Marx’s end of class struggle. 
Ultimately, Derrida would emphasize the impossibility, whatever we are to make of Hegel’s enigmatic 
absolute knowledge and his bringing an end to history, of such an end being an end to all conflict, to all 
possibility for change, even to all time itself. Time remains.  
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absolutely irreducible to distribution of the collective common space, in any of its forms 
— the time of the democracy to come.380  
                                                
380 What is at stake — what has been at stake — in this analysis is a necessary deconstruction of Marxism, 
for Marxism. This was ultimately what was at stake for Jacques Derrida in his excellent study of the work 
of Marx, Specters of Marx (1994), a study which has silently but noticeably, I think, guided my approach 
to the current Process of Change, of how to think of its history and its readings, guided as if it were its 
guardian angel. What is at stake in Specters of Marx, for Derrida, is to find a problem at the heart of 
Marxism from which it could not escape, and which — whether or not we choose to reject Marxism, and 
Derrida makes it clear that deconstruction is not Marxism (“[that] is why deconstruction has never been 
Marxist,” he writes [95]) — is a memory in which deconstruction as a project necessarily dwells, over 
which it watches in vigil and works on as a work of mourning. “Deconstruction has never had any sense or 
interest, in my view at least,” writes Derrida, “except as a radicalization, which is to say also in the 
tradition of a certain Marxism, in a certain spirit of Marxism” (115, emphasis in the original).  
In what does such a radicalization consist? Derrida immediately indicates a certain problem, in Marx and 
for Marx, a problem in which Marx dwells and which dwells in him as a haunting — the problem of a 
specter. The specter of communism, but also the specter of failed revolutions, of missed opportunities, of 
the losers of history. Even a certain specter that haunts the present and discloses it as a non-present 
present, inhabited by those who do not belong to its time. “The time is out of joint” (61), writes Derrida, 
drawing from Shakespeare’s Hamlet — the question is clearly connected to that of ‘time remains’ that 
appears in the author’s study of Hegel and which was discussed in the footnote above. What is at stake for 
Derrida is a certain deconstruction of Marxism where the latter remains, for the author, still too attached to 
a certain metaphysics of presence and phallogocentrism, whose desire is still that of resolving the 
historical dialectic, and which would claim to be able to bring an end to history as conflict, bringing peace 
not only for the living, but perhaps also for the dead and for those ghosts of the future. Yet the question of 
justice, for Derrida, would be one that remains open to the impossibility of such a historical closure, a 
politics of memory whose past would come from the future to live in the present, out of joint. This would 
be irreducible to the restitution of a fictive ethnicity, of course, but also to any kind of ethnogenesis. One 
can claim the dead for one’s own, but the specters of the dead refuse to respect the frontiers of the polis. 
They walk through the walls of the fortress, they do not work, they form no community. They do not 
follow the routine of the community, they are sleepless and always haunting but they are never there, they 
are pure non-presence, they make visitations in the most unexpected of times. They are never welcome, 
but always find a place there wherever crisis and a certain sense of uncertainty of meaning prevails. This is 
why sites of trauma are a breeding ground for specters, regardless of whether or not their own trauma took 
place there. This question of the specter is, for Derrida, inseparable from a certain question of justice. 
Derrida writes: “If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, 
generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either 
to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice” (xvii). 
If there is a spirit of Marx, the spirit of his specters, it is to be found in its own internal haunting. What 
must be confronted today in contemporary reflections of Marxism is a haunting that is Marx’s brilliance 
and his absolute limit. The impossibility of reducing an economy to a system of equivalences is ultimately 
applied to everything, in Marx, except to his own economy of writing. The apparition of a specter which 
does not belong to the time of the theater of the present “resembles an axiom, more precisely an axiom 
concerning some supposedly undemonstrable obvious fact with regard to whatever has worth, value, 
quality (axia). And even and especially dignity (for example man as example of a finite and reasonable 
being), that unconditional dignity (Würdigkeit) that Kant placed higher, precisely [justement], than any 
economy, any compared or comparable value, any market price [Marketpreis]” (xx). My analysis 
therefore, works, as mourning, in a certain memory of Marx and his specters, and of Derrida and his 
specters, to both of whom we have yet, thankfully, to say the final adieu.  
 423 
CHAPTER V                                                                                            
CONCLUSIONS: EMERGENT INDIGENEITY, READING AND THE 
INFRAPOLITICAL 
 
  A new reading is currently taking place in Bolivia today. This new reading is a 
re-reading of Bolivia, of its history and of the place of indigeneity in that history. This 
re-reading, which is also its re-writing, and which I have called in this study emergent 
indigeneity, is a re-reading of the place of the indigenous in Bolivian history and, 
therefore, a bringing into question of the very grounds upon which the Bolivian 
historical canon is based, and also therefore of the symbolic production of Bolivia as an 
imagined community, as nation-state, that is, as a fictive ethnicity. Indeed, as I have 
shown, emergent indigeneity cannot be reduced to the national arena. It partakes in a 
global network of emerging discourses which are themselves a consequence of a new 
global order, a transformation in the nature of political conflict that is taking place before 
our very eyes. This new reading is not only a re-reading of Bolivia, therefore, as a fictive 
ethnicity and as a home to the people who inhabit its geopolitical realm. It is also a re-
reading of the West, or at least of a certain tradition of the West. If this is the case, then, 
as I have attempted to show here, this new reading of the West takes place from within 
technologies of communication that are already Western. This new reading, then, does 
not leave the West, or our conception of the West, of what it means to speak of the 
Western world, unscathed. It is, perhaps, the very transformation of the West as history.  
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 What I have attempted to demonstrate in my study of what I have called 
emergent indigeneity is that these new political processes taking place in Bolivia today, 
which question the traditional (non-)place attributed to the indigenous in public civil life, 
are actually part of a more general global trend which has seen the reduction in power of 
traditional nation-state sovereignties and of their suturing power over an increasingly 
fragmented civil society. This all takes place under a new configuration of the political 
that is occurring, albeit in an unequal way, across the globe. Rather than carrying out a 
comparative study, however, I have rather offered a detailed analysis of the particular 
conditions by which emergent indigeneity became able to effect a certain redistribution 
of the sensible in Bolivia, specifically, by reconfiguring the political field of 
intelligibility and sensibility, of the visibility and invisibility of the different parts of the 
community in the civil public sphere. Consequently, it has been possible to show 
precisely how emergent indigeneity partakes in a new conditioning of the political 
sphere that is mediated by a series of (mis)encounters between the global and the local.  
 In so doing, we have seen that emergent indigeneity arises from out of two 
interconnected processes. First of all, it is a critical engagement with, and response to, 
the failures and general collapse in the suturing power of National Revolutionary 
discourse, which had been a national-popular discourse based around the ideology of 
mestizaje, and which had as its literary and artistic counterpart the practice of 
indigenismo. Its mode of constructing the people as a political subject was, therefore, the 
production of what Étienne Balibar has called a fictive ethnicity. Through a close 
analysis of the work of Fausto Reinaga, I argued that the new ideology of Indianism 
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cannot be understood except as a response to the particular way in which a new set of 
ideas about what it meant to be indigenous in Bolivian society was able to infiltrate and 
adapt the official national discourse by colonizing the technologies of national-popular 
ideology in a moment of the latter’s decline. Chapter III has shown how this response 
became a generalized phenomenon which, supported by an intensification and 
acceleration of the interconnectedness of Bolivian civil society with other developments 
around the globe, came to radically bring into question not only the National 
Revolutionary heritage of the country, but the possibility of a national-popular subject 
tout court. 
 Second of all, I have demonstrated that emergent indigeneity is both a cause and 
effect in a transformation taking place today at a global level in the way in which 
political conflict is managed (or perhaps it would be more accurate to say not managed). 
The national-popular subject of fictive ethnicity following the 1952 National Revolution 
had been conditioned to regard the subjects of their same geopolitical space as 
compatriots, and internal conflict was effectively managed by the state apparatus by 
framing it in terms of conflicts of interests (but not of values). This form of containing 
and controlling the terms of political conflict in a vertical structure of government, 
which was applied across a specific geographical territory, began to be replaced in the 
late twentieth century as a consequence of the increasing fragmentation of global 
society. Global or ‘glocal’ networks effectively weakened the suturing power of 
nationalist ideologies, and conflicts of interest began to make way for conflicts of values, 
as competing identities whose primary identifications were no longer strictly mediated 
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by the nation-state’s production of ethnicity. Conflict is therefore no longer mediated by 
the state, but rather takes place in the short-circuit of the glocal sphere, as a consequence 
of which the state loses its capacity to neutralize conflicts within the cultural field by 
framing that conflict in terms of conflicts of interest.  
 However, my study of the current MAS administration under the direction of Evo 
Morales and Álvaro García Linera may suggest that this state of affairs is changing. 
What I demonstrated in Chapter IV of this dissertation is that recent readings of history 
in Bolivia, and the connected question of the new direction of a leftist politics for the 
twenty-first century, and particularly those readings of and from the official state 
ideologue and current Vice President Álvaro García Linera, have reoriented this 
emergent indigeneity that threatened the national-popular subject of 1952. In the current 
attempt to produce a new fictive ethnicity in Bolivia under a reconfiguration of state, 
there has been a certain appropriation of emergent indigeneity by which the new 
processes of this phenomenon can no longer be separated or understood in isolation from 
the current transformations of the state. Emergent indigeneity remains, nevertheless, 
strongly connected to a different type of political conflict, whereby the state finds it 
impossible to entirely tame or capture the energy of its field of effectivity — at least so 
far. 
 It would appear as though a kind of reversal occurs at some point between these 
two transformative moments of emergent indigeneity, that is, between Fausto Reinaga’s 
writing as a kind of rupture with the national-popular state logic, and Álvaro García 
Linera’s as a partial reabsorption of this new discourse on indigeneity into the state. We 
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can identify this first moment associated with Fausto Reinaga as a period of strong 
disagreement in the sense that this term is given by Jacques Rancière, that is, that truly 
political moment in which a disagreement over one’s part in the space and time of the 
division of the common is brought into question.381 By tracing a new history of the 
indigenous peoples with a strongly critical vision of a certain history of colonialism at its 
base, it became able to create a sense of identification on behalf of political actors who 
suddenly felt called to the Indian cause, as Indians, perhaps for the first time. While the 
earlier Indianist, katarista and academic writers who were involved in this process, to 
many of whom we have dedicated a good many pages in this study, demonstrated a 
strong tendency towards ethnogenesis during these early years (the production of new 
racial identities on the basis of this re-reading of colonial history), its effects were 
nevertheless much more strongly those of a savage nomadism. What it appeared to make 
visible in a striking way, that suddenly became a new ‘common sense’ for a series of 
people who identified with this indigenous register, was a (post-)colonial and 
specifically modern political ordering of spaces and times, of the management of conflict 
and of the administration of life, all of which was suddenly and radically brought into 
question.    
 This is no doubt a difficult movement to map out. On the one hand, there appears 
to be a shift during this process from a perspective which privileges class as an analytical 
tool, to one that privileges race, and back again. Whereas the National Revolutionary 
ideology had based its understanding of the place of the indigenous according to Marxist 
                                                
381 Refer to Disagreement, 1999. 
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writings on the peasantry (though not those of Marx himself), for example, emergent 
indigeneity appeared to provide a break with that model in favor of a more racialized 
discourse. However, the rise of the MAS has seen a more mixed approach in recent 
years, which appeared to reconcile understandings of class with ethnic divisions. Yet to 
understand the development of emergent indigeneity in this way would be to confirm the 
absolute fissure between class and race which has been the ideological basis of both the 
model of fictive ethnicity as the single race which manages conflicts of interests (a 
political universe), as well as the model of emergent indigeneity as the multiplicity of 
races which compete as conflicts of values (a political pluriverse).  
 Instead, what a careful reading of emergent indigeneity has shown, in its more 
savage and nomadic dimensions, is a breakdown of the logic of class-ethnic divisions. 
We have seen, for example, that while the MNR government of Revolutionary 
Nationalism sought to speak about the indigenous peoples in terms of peasants, 
apparently applying a common Marxist interpretation of class, this political party 
actually consolidated its power by managing to establish a strong cross-class alliance 
among a variety of societal sectors, where the suturing power of a united mestizo 
heritage was always much stronger than a classist perspective. Meanwhile, Fausto 
Reinaga, and the many that followed in his legacy, failed to purge Marxism from their 
understanding of race, by actually accommodating these new theories of indigeneity 
within a framework strongly informed by such Marxism. Meanwhile, in the conflict 
produced in the highlands by the new social movements of 2000-2005, we saw that 
Aymara peasants actually re-appropriated their own conditions of production through a 
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discourse which nevertheless rejected Marxism and privileged a long memory of 
colonial violence, understood in racial terms. Finally, the relative reabsorption of the 
indigenous question to the moderate socialism of the MAS government is also difficult 
to measure in strict terms, as is made apparent by the important place the indigenous 
peoples had in Marxist writings and the theorization of the state in the work of Álvaro 
García Linera.  
 On the other hand, there also appears to be a simultaneous movement during 
these years from fictive ethnicity to emergent indigeneity and back again. Once again, 
however, this appears to be a difficult position to maintain in absolute terms. The 
sovereignty that was consolidated by the national-popular state following the 1952 
revolution was, like all sovereignty, based on an ideological suturing, that is, on a certain 
administration of the political space. Yet the state in Bolivia was always weak and 
lacking the ability to provide a strong social cohesion among society. This is not to 
challenge the essential gesture of what Étienne Balibar has called fictive ethnicity, and 
which has been an important term for this study. It is rather to say that fictive ethnicity 
must be understood, rather than in its ideal aspect, as this negotiation by which the state 
attempted to neutralize and administer political conflict in terms of interests and not 
values. As we have seen, the production of new identities in the public sphere that 
articulated a sense of indigeneity did not come from nowhere; there already existed in 
Bolivia, in part because of the nature of the (post-)colonial state that it had inherited, a 
strong separation between indigenous-peasant groups and the center of what we might 
call the ‘lettered city.’ In other words, we should not understand by the term fictive 
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ethnicity a smooth process by which all questions of values incompatible with the logic 
of state reproduction were successfully neutralized without remainder. What is 
important, rather, is simply the articulation of the political as such, where the relative 
success of the nation-state (which was short-lived and only partial in the Bolivian case) 
was mediated by a specific form of managing political conflict.  
 Meanwhile, we should not assume that the irruption of emergent indigeneity onto 
the political scene implied, for all that it questioned a state logic that sought to neutralize 
all conflict in its territory in terms of individual interests, that the state no longer served 
as a manager of conflict and administrator of life, nor that the national-popular ideology 
as a ghost of a previous fictive ethnicity did not retain some symbolic power. It should 
be considered no accident, from my perspective, that until the 1990s in Bolivia the 
political struggles of indigenous activists remained fixed on the state as a space of 
possible transformation. Emergent indigeneity became, for a number of authors I have 
studied here, the possibility, not of challenging the very basis of fictive ethnicity and 
what it represented for the political history of Western modernity, but of replacing a 
‘bad’ fictive ethnicity (the bastard, hybrid cholo race) for a ‘good’ fictive ethnicity (the 
return to the Tawantinsuyu) that would thereby allow for an Indian Nation in place of a 
cholo one. Nevertheless, what remains important is that the production of ethnicity in 
this case did not consolidate a new center of political gravity which became able to order 
and control social conflict through its agglutinating and suturing power in the state form. 
Rather, it brought into question the possibility that any entity might have the right to do 
so, where emergent indigeneity became the production of an ethnicity that sought to 
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make war, not with foreign nations (as in the leviathan model), but with other ways of 
life, other civilizational models, regardless of whether or not these were internal to the 
state. 
 Finally, we cannot simply dismiss the current state transformations in Bolivia as 
a ‘normalization’ of the process of emergent indigeneity, converting its energy, as if the 
state were a kind of transformer, into a new fictive ethnicity. This would be to ignore the 
fact that, throughout my study, I have identified the specificity of emergent indigeneity 
with a new global public sphere, part of an intensification of the process of globalization 
which has led to an entirely different quality of modernity; a world modernity, whose 
political conflicts are thereby also different (what I have also called a new stage of 
history). Emergent indigeneity then continues to have a certain power that resists 
complete absorption into the new national-popular state of the MAS. This is because it 
produces conflicting identities (as ethnicities) from within a global articulation, where 
the principal expression of conflicts is that of values and not of interests. It is therefore 
necessary to conclude, that if the state has indeed managed to absorb some of the 
energies of this very problematic political positioning that is emergent indigeneity, it is 
by virtue of a certain metamorphosis that makes it different from the classical model of 
the state. There is an attempt — only partially successful, as we have seen, and still 
being negotiated as class dynamics within the country shift — to account for this new 
Bolivian people of the Revolution, not only as a people which have conflicting interests, 
but also as citizens who have the right to conflicting values. This would qualify a 
specific understanding of the ‘plurinational’ dimension of the state. If the new 
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plurinational state construction is, therefore, the production of a fictive ethnicity, then we 
must admit that this production itself has also changed, it has been transformed, just as 
our traditional understandings of indigeneity were transformed in a similar way by 
emergent indigeneity itself. The question would become, in that case, a question of the 
quality of such a transformation. As I have attempted to show in Chapter IV, this 
transformation still veers towards a certain reconstruction of an onto-theological basis of 
national history, which serves to overdetermine those voices that seek to question the 
possible directions of the current conjuncture.  
 In the introduction to this dissertation, I presented emergent indigeneity as a split 
between a tendency towards ethnogenesis and towards savage nomadism, two absolutely 
incompatible registers of indigeneity, which nevertheless formed the conditions of each 
other’s possibility. In my analysis of the various different authors that appear in this 
study, this Janus-faced characteristic of emergent indigeneity guided the directions of 
my interpretations. In the case of Fausto Reinaga, I argued that his writing performed a 
re-reading of Bolivian history which, although veering towards an ethnogenesis that 
became almost totalitarian in character, actually produced real effects of rupture with old 
political imaginaries beyond a simply ‘intellectual’ level, producing processes of 
subjectivation based on identifications with this new history. These affective processes 
and deterritorializing openings were sometimes reabsorbed and became the condition of 
possibility for new ethnogeneses, while at other times their disruptive energy never 
found a home, or a lasting form. Whatever the case was, what is true is that this savage 
nomadism that took place beneath the production of ethnicity was the condition by 
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which emergent indigeneity became able to effect a redistribution of the sensible. In the 
formation of an official state discourse, a similar process took place. While ethnogenetic 
processes produced senses of ethnic identity and histories that were either, on the one 
hand, a specific production of the state, with a view to providing a symbolic synthesis 
for the country under its apparatus (fictive ethnicity), or, on the other hand, were 
productions against the state, based on a conflict of values that was no longer mediated 
by the leviathan model (emergent indigeneity), an analysis of the 2000-2005 movements 
shows that there was a certain savage nomadism at the base of the movements which 
never found a lasting articulation. This is ultimately Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar’s great 
frustration: the new social movements did not ask themselves, she claims, what was the 
meaning of their protesting which appeared to break with all types of political logic.  
 It is important not to fall into a reduction of history into Manichean figures 
grounded in ideological positions. We saw that the current political process is normally 
understood either as the culmination of a long history of indigenous coming-to-power 
whose root is found in a pre-Columbian genesis, as the promise of returning to the 
originary land, a pachakuti, or instead it is interpreted as the betrayal of a revolutionary 
spirit which was truly indigenous in nature, where the current MAS administration is 
regarded as being a mere continuation of previous colonial forms. My reading refuses to 
accept that we are caught in a struggle between two different kinds of history (even if, as 
we have already seen, this is often how the proponents of indigeneity understand this 
history themselves). It refuses to accept that the choice is between either the eventual 
modernization of the indigenous peoples or a necessary return to communitarian forms 
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of life upon which indigenous life in the Andes has been based (for example, the ayllu). 
That is, it is neither about reconstructing political modernity and the metaphysical 
tradition upon which it is based — the work of Martin Heidegger and the so-called post-
structuralists have shown this to be neither possible nor desirable. Nor is it about 
returning to what preceded it, which would assume the possibility of an impossible 
historical reversal, and would mask the fact that, whatever we are to make of it, the 
Western tradition of political modernity continues to ground any future possibilities of 
political life: that despite the decline of the nation-state model, the terms we have 
inherited such as sovereignty, equality and democracy continue to be as operative as 
ever. There is no possible horizon of political action today without the ruins of this 
political tradition, which is not to say that other, indigenous traditions cannot play their 
own part in this new stage of history. What is at stake is no less than the reconfiguration 
of what we understand by history, politics and culture. Ultimately, emergent indigeneity 
is part of a metamorphosis of a specific historical system, produced from an element of 
the system which cannot simply be metabolized without transforming the entire genetic 
composition of the system itself.  
 That recent indigenous activism or new ways of understanding what it means to 
be indigenous in Bolivia are the strongest manifestations of new post-national political 
distributions in the country does not mean that they represent the only challenge to this 
tradition of political modernity today, or that there are not other possible challenges 
being articulated otherwise, elsewhere, or even still to come. In other words, in my 
study, it was never a question of essentializing what it means to be indigenous, or what 
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indigenous ways of life ‘are.’ Rather, it was the question over this meaning, as the 
making visible of this political positioning and place of enunciation that is emergent 
indigeneity itself, that transformed the relationship of indigenous peoples to modern 
politics by virtue of the place that those peoples had and have historically held within it, 
which thereby transformed, necessarily, the contours of modern political life.   
 Neither returning, nor modernization: I do not claim that the answer to the 
problems or limits which entail the decline of Western political modernity that we are 
witnessing today, in Bolivia as elsewhere, are ‘indigenous.’ In other words, I do not 
propose that indigenous modes of life or indigenous forms of organizing politics, the 
economy, or society hold the ‘secret’ to the problems of the West, and to the 
contemporary problem of nihilism, a secret that would simply need to be discovered or 
reactivated, like the discovery of a new world. This is not to deny, of course, that 
experimentation with political forms based on indigenous modes of organization may be 
possible, productive or desirable. However, the real field of effectivity and affectivity that 
belongs to emergent indigeneity is to be found in its challenge to the traditional 
dichotomy West-indigenous, which thereby breaks open our tradition of political thought 
at its margins and opens to new possibilities of thought and practice. 
 As I have already argued, emergent indigeneity is a certain reading. Now that we 
have reached a historical moment, if we are to believe some of the great philosophers of 
our times, in which the tradition of metaphysics as a single world-history-in-thought has 
come to its completion, and we are witnesses to a new stage of history where the former 
centers of this modernity are losing hegemonic power and the political conflict of today 
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happens over the meaning of that world-history, then emergent indigeneity intervenes 
with its own particular reading. It is post-metaphysical, but not in the sense that it can be 
regarded as its own deconstruction, as something which resists the problematic of onto-
theological metaphysical structures. As we have seen, it does replicate such structures. 
Yet its intervention already takes place within a world where the nihilism of the 
metaphysical pretension is realized, there is no further ‘progress’ to be made, just change 
that is immanent to this new stage, as a plastic world history.  
 There is no doubt that emergent indigeneity, as a reading, must be celebrated. Its 
multiple interventions have implied a series of processes of self-organization, 
subjectivation, and emancipatory struggles for a group of peoples who, as a result of 
historical structures which they suffered merely through the ‘misfortune’ of birthright, 
continued to live under conditions of extreme levels of poverty, oppression, exploitation 
and humiliation. For all its complexity, these historic achievements must be given the 
attention they deserve. At the same time, we must be attentive to the fact that the current 
historical conjuncture does not represent a widespread indigenous emancipation that 
would erase the problems of racial hierarchies and exploitation in the country. We must 
continue to identify and deconstruct those symbolic and material bases where we see the 
reproduction of racialized, class, gendered and heteronormative dispositifs that have 
accumulated a certain structure of power over hundreds of years.  
 The reading of emergent indigeneity, or emergent indigeneity as reading, must be 
celebrated, then, but it is not sufficient by itself. If my study has been informed here by a 
certain practice of reading, it is not the same reading as that which is provided by 
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emergent indigeneity itself, although it does attempt to give emphasis to and radicalize 
the more democratic and democratizing elements of its multiple manifestations. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this study, my reading of emergent indigeneity is an 
infrapolitical reading. We are now in a position to better appreciate the possible 
implications of this practice of reading. It is ultimately a reading that, in the cultural and 
political field, refuses to believe that the form in which a certain distribution of spaces 
and times is given to us at a certain moment exhausts all the possibilities of thought. In 
other words, that subjectivity, identity, or, more importantly here, ethnicity, as 
metaphors or placeholders for an onto-theological structure of thought, by which we 
become able to order, hierarchize, categorize, discipline, control, but ultimately also 
understand, perceive, respond to our reality, are nevertheless not all that reality is. There 
are processes that take place beneath, below or in the folds of the political and the 
cultural, that subcede them. And this would ultimately indicate to us an absolute alterity 
that, we might suggest, following Jacques Derrida, could represent the possibility of a 
democratic practice that does not attempt to suture the totality of the social, but is rather 
open to an absolute alterity, which is not simply an-other (my enemy, a stranger), but 
that alterity which is never expected or recognizable in advance.  
 Ultimately, my reading as an infrapolitical reading takes a certain distance; it is a 
retreating of and from382 any production of ethnicity as a new metaphorization of the 
                                                
382 The French word that is appropriate here is retrait, which means both to retreat, to distance oneself or 
move away from, and also to retrace, or to treat something anew. We find this reference in Derrida’s 
complex essay on possible directions for a deconstruction of metaphysics, closely following the work of 
Heidegger, in the essay “The Retrait of Metaphor” (1998). It was also taken up by Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe in specific reference to the political sphere, in an essay entitled “Le ‘retrait’ du 
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political community, as the possible grounding of a new onto-theological structuration of 
history, competing in the global market for the best-selling Weltgeschichte or World 
History. As a retreating of and from the metaphorization involved, for example, in a 
process of ethnogenesis — in other words, as a retreating of those metaphors from a 
place of critical distance, by first of all retreating from the myths that every ethnogenesis 
carries within itself — an infrapolitical reading would reinscribe into the processes of 
ethnogenesis those conditions that make it possible for such a construction to take place 
in the first instance, revealing its own specters or remainders, its own internal différance. 
This reading therefore thinks the question of ethnicity from what Alberto Moreiras has 
called the marrano register. As Moreiras explains: “The marrano register is the 
abandonment of what was previously one’s own and the embrace of the dominant state 
of the situation, and at the same time the abandonment of the state of the situation 
without the recovery of what was previously mine. Whatever was mine, if anything ever 
was, is blocked forever.” (“Common Political Democracy” 2012, 78). What is important 
in Moreiras’s reading, for our purposes, is the absolute impossibility here of recovering 
what is lost. There is no community of the excluded in which to invest oneself in the 
Marrano’s exclusion. It is, therefore, a double exclusion: 
[There] is no exclusion without at least a double exclusion: the first 
gesture of exclusion is always inclusive—you are excluded, and the very 
fact of your exclusion creates the illusion of a “we”—we, the excluded—
which is the potential ground of immunitary excess. It is only the second 
                                                                                                                                           
politique” (Le retrait du politique ed. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, 1983). In this essay, what is at stake 
for these authors is taking a certain critical distance from the political which allows them to perform a 
deconstruction of its forms without, for all that, abandoning political principles of the Western tradition. It 
should be clear these specific forms of thinking about the question of the metaphor have been extremely 
influential for my study.  
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gesture that opens to exposure. You are excluded a second time, and the 
exclusion becomes infinite. (ibid.) 
 
 An infrapolitical reading of emergent indigeneity would consider this 
phenomenon from the perspective of a kind of reverse Marrano register: rather than the 
abandonment of an identity through violence in which one neither assimilates to the new 
dominant state of affairs, nor recovers what was lost, in this case it is rather that one 
abandons a dominant state of affairs, as an anti-colonial and emancipatory gesture, only 
to find that there is nothing to recover on the other side of coloniality. An infrapolitical 
reading would therefore read into the limit where the self-constitution of indigeneity, 
whose result would always be an ethnogenesis, is always open to exposure, because its 
very condition requires it. The important gesture of an infrapolitical reading would be in 
its maintaining that irreducible exposure to alterity which is part of its very constitution.  
 Yet this retreating of and from the production of ethnicity nevertheless recognizes 
that the new ‘concept of the political’ today cannot be simply abandoned. It is not about 
finding a safe place, auto-immunizing oneself, not only from one particular political 
community, but indeed from all political community, as if it were possible — wild 
fantasies of an early Romantic legacy — to return to a savage but noble paradise prior to 
the Original Sin, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s forest in his “Second Discourse.” A 
retreat is not an abandonment or a desertion. Indeed, retreating is often used in military 
tactics as a specific strategy of war, without any intention of withdrawing from the 
battle. Ultimately, we cannot escape the home that has been made for us on this new 
stage of historical conflict. But there is still some determination, some freedom, over the 
way that we live in such a home. A retreating of and from the production of ethnicity 
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ultimately allows us not only, in our freedom, to refuse to be captured by the logics of 
ethnogenetic coding, but also to be open to those without genesis, those orphans or 
nomads never identifiable in advance. Ultimately, it is an openness to the other — and 
even to that other that lives within us. 
  We are already acting on a new stage of history. However, if the possibility of an 
infrapolitical reading of emergent indigeneity is to mean anything at all, it is precisely 
the possibility of a retreat from the spectacular theatricality of ethnic and identitarian 
performances that define the new conditions of political conflict today, and not only in 
Bolivia. This spectacularity belongs to that of the spectacle, which always carries the 
effect of a mirror or speculum, a subjectivating effect of identification which is always 
an interpellation, is always identitarian. We should not forget, we readers, in this 
intimate, interior non-space of reading that is an infrapolitical reading, that we are not on 
show or on stage, in a trial or tribunal. We should not forget, we readers, that reading is 
not the writing of a confession, it is not about giving testimony, it is not strictly part of 
the circulation or propagation of publishing, even if writing is no doubt a condition for 
reading. The condition of infrapolitical reading cannot be understood if not in relation to 
a certain alterity which is irreducible to this specular logic of the political (which is 
always, perhaps, the production of an ethnicity). It would rather be a spectral specularity, 
like the ghost of Hamlet’s father in Shakespeare’s play. Enter the Ghost, exit the Ghost, 
re-enter the Ghost. An infrapolitical reading must be able to take place in this liminal 
space that is neither on nor off stage, precisely as a retreat from the spectacle. Indeed, I 
would argue that this alone is the very possibility of critical thinking today.  
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